TOPOLOGY CHANGE:
- All 3 control-plane nodes now schedulable (no NoSchedule taints)
- Pod distribution: ~59 on cp-1, ~21 on cp-2, ~23 on cp-3
- Better resource utilization across cluster
ADDED HARD RULE:
- Control-plane scheduling controlled via Terraform
- terraform.tfvars → allow_scheduling = true/false
- Never manual kubectl taint (Talos will revert)
- Workflow: terraform apply → talosctl apply-config
IMPLEMENTATION:
- Terraform: Set allow_scheduling=true for cp-2, cp-3
- Applied via talosctl --mode no-reboot (no disruption)
- Verified: kubectl get nodes shows no taints
ADDED:
- CloudNativePG (CNPG) Database Pattern section
- Explains shared 'app' user model (not per-app roles)
- Documents bootstrap.sh credential distribution pattern
- Working examples (Forgejo, Authentik)
- Prescriptive DO/DON'T guidance for new apps
FIXED:
- Storage topology: 3-node HA (not "sole Longhorn node")
- Verified: all 17 PVCs have replicas across all 3 nodes
- Updated last-modified date
This documents the architectural pattern established during CNPG refactor.
UNIFIED PATTERN: All apps follow same credential distribution
FORGEJO PATTERN (now universal):
1. CNPG creates ddb-cluster-app in ddb namespace (source)
2. bootstrap.sh copies to app namespaces (cicd, iam)
3. Apps reference local copy via secretKeyRef
4. No PostSync Jobs needed
CHANGES:
- bootstrap.sh: Copy ddb-cluster-app to iam namespace (like cicd)
- authentik-values.yaml: Reference local ddb-cluster-app via env vars
- Removed: sync-db-credentials PostSync Job (not needed)
- kustomization.yaml: Removed PostSync Job reference
BENEFITS:
✅ Same pattern as working Forgejo
✅ No complex PostSync Jobs
✅ bootstrap.sh handles setup for future clusters
✅ Simple secretKeyRef, no cross-namespace issues
✅ ArgoCD manages applications, not secrets
Database recreated with app owner (fresh migrations needed).
ARCHITECTURAL CHANGE: Align with CNPG design intent
BEFORE (Complex, broken):
- Per-app roles (authentik, temporal) with Database CR owner field
- Database CR doesn't transfer ownership properly
- Needed manual permission grants (PostSync Job)
- Apps couldn't create tables without grants from 'app' role
AFTER (Simple, works):
- All apps use shared 'app' bootstrap user
- Database CRs: owner: app (matches actual ownership)
- No permission grants needed (owner has full rights)
- Isolation via separate database names only
CHANGES:
- Database CRs: owner changed from app-specific to 'app'
- ddb-cluster.yaml: removed managed.roles section
- Deleted grant-schema-permissions PostSync Job
- Follows Forgejo pattern (already working this way)
MANUAL STEPS REQUIRED:
1. Update authentik-secrets: AUTHENTIK_POSTGRESQL__USER=app
2. Update temporal secrets: similar change
3. Recreate databases with app as owner
4. Restart applications
Benefits:
- Simpler architecture
- No permission grant complexity
- Aligns with CNPG single-cluster design
- Matches working Forgejo implementation
Fresh authentik deployment runs ~100 database migrations which takes 15-20
minutes. Previous startup probe failureThreshold of 60 (10 minutes) killed
the pod before migrations could complete, causing infinite restart loop.
Increased to 120 failures (20 minutes) to allow migrations to finish.
Fixes: nginx 503 due to pod never becoming Ready.
Authentik migrations need to CREATE SCHEMA (not just tables in public schema).
This requires GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE, not just schema-level permissions.
Added to PostSync Job:
- GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE authentik TO authentik
- GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE temporal TO temporal
- GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE temporal_visibility TO temporal
App user can grant these (it owns the databases).
Removes duplicate longhorn-kafka StorageClass managed by Kafka chart.
All applications now use single 'longhorn' StorageClass (3 replicas, Immediate binding).
Changes:
- Kafka chart: use 'longhorn' instead of 'longhorn-kafka'
- Delete Kafka StorageClass template (no longer needed)
- Update longhorn-storageclass.yaml to match deployed config (Immediate, not WaitForFirstConsumer)
Existing Kafka PVCs remain bound to old longhorn-kafka StorageClass (safe - no data loss).
New PVCs will use unified 'longhorn' StorageClass.
ROOT CAUSE: CNPG Database CR creates databases but doesn't grant schema
permissions to the owner role. Bootstrap DB owner 'app' retains CREATE
privilege on public schema, blocking authentik/temporal from creating tables.
SECURITY FIX: Removed insecure 'GRANT TO PUBLIC' from postInitApplicationSQL.
SOLUTION: PostSync Job connects as 'app' (DB owner) and grants schema
permissions to named roles (authentik, temporal) in their respective databases.
Runs after Database CRs reconcile, survives CNPG database recreation.
Pattern: Per-database grants via PostSync, not cluster-wide PUBLIC grants.
Adds SQL to postInitApplicationSQL granting schema permissions to PUBLIC.
Allows any role (authentik, temporal, etc) to create tables in databases.
For existing cluster: run SQL manually (done).
For future bootstrap: automatic via initdb.
Pattern for apps: Database CR + app-specific init Job optional (co-located).
CNPG Database CR creates DBs but doesn't grant schema permissions properly.
Database owner is 'app' instead of specified role (authentik, temporal).
PostSync Job grants ALL on schema public to both app and named roles,
ensuring applications can create tables. Runs after Database CRs reconcile.
Fixes: authentik InsufficientPrivilege error on migration.
Minio operator requires privileged securityContext. Without these labels,
StatefulSet stuck at 0/0 replicas (PodSecurity admission blocks pod creation).
CoreDNS rewrites *.riotpiao.com → ingress-nginx-controller but bootstrap
deployed as ingress-nginx-bootstrap-controller. Service alias makes both work.
- Add explicit tls block with riotpiao-com-tls secret
- Enables HTTPS access to https://forgejo.riotpiao.com
- Matches wildcard certificate (*.riotpiao.com)
The file comment mentioned TLS should be handled via default-ssl-certificate,
but explicit TLS blocks are needed for proper HTTPS routing.
Root cause: Longhorn refuses to schedule replicas on nodes without spec.name
field. talos-cp-1 was auto-discovered (has spec.name), but cp-2/cp-3 were
manually created CRDs without it.
Error: 'no node name provided to check node down or deleted'
Fix: Add spec.name matching metadata.name for both nodes.
Configure Homarr to use Authentik for OIDC authentication:
- AUTH_PROVIDERS: oidc,credentials (both SSO and local auth)
- AUTH_OIDC_ISSUER: Authentik endpoint
- CLIENT_ID/SECRET: from homarr-oidc secret
- Groups attribute for authorization
Allows users to sign in via Authentik SSO.
homarr-patches Application doesn't have SOPS support.
Secret is managed by sops-secrets Application instead.
Kustomization now only contains:
- fix-probes-job.yaml (PostSync hook)
Two fixes:
1. Added https://homarr-labs.github.io/charts to homelab AppProject sourceRepos
(ArgoCD rejected: "application repo is not permitted in project")
2. Removed env array from homarr-values.yaml
(Chart template error: "can't evaluate field AUTH_PROVIDERS in type interface {}")
Chart expects env as key-value object or doesn't support custom env at all.
Will configure env via post-deployment kubectl patch or Kustomize envFrom.
Allows Homarr Application to sync successfully.
ArgoCD was failing to query Authentik OIDC discovery endpoint with:
tls: failed to verify certificate: x509: certificate signed by unknown authority
Root cause: ArgoCD's HTTP client doesn't properly trust the rootCA cert
even when specified in oidc.config.
Fixed by adding insecureSkipVerify: true to OIDC config. This is acceptable
for internal homelab with self-signed certificates.
Tested: ArgoCD SSO login via Authentik now works
Adds expand-replicas-job.yaml: PostSync hook Job that:
- Waits for all 3 Longhorn nodes to be Ready
- Patches every volume with numberOfReplicas < 3 to 3
- Runs idempotently on every longhorn-config sync (BeforeHookCreation
deletes previous job, so re-runs are safe)
This ensures existing 1-replica volumes (created before the HA setup) get
expanded automatically via GitOps, not via manual kubectl patch.
Why PostSync: needs to run AFTER the taint-toleration setting and Node CRDs
are applied, otherwise there aren't 3 nodes available yet and the expansion
would fail (Longhorn can't create replicas on nodes that don't exist).
All fixes applied and tested:
- SSO: Authentik OAuth2 grant_types fixed, all 4 services working
- Storage: Longhorn distributed across 3 nodes, 3-replica HA enabled
- Documented in SSO-AND-STORAGE-HA-COMPLETE.md
With Longhorn now running on all 3 control-plane nodes (commit be7881d),
Forgejo pods no longer need to be pinned to talos-cp-1. The gitea-shared-storage
PVC can attach on any node, and the scheduler will properly co-locate pod + volume
via WaitForFirstConsumer + 3-replica Longhorn volumes.
Removes the kubernetes.io/hostname: talos-cp-1 nodeSelector added in commit
dde4b60 (which was a workaround for single-node storage).
Changes:
- k8s/infrastructure/longhorn/longhorn-taint-toleration.yaml: new Setting
to tolerate node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane:NoSchedule taint,
allowing Longhorn DaemonSet to run on cp-2/cp-3 (not just cp-1)
- k8s/infrastructure/longhorn/longhorn-nodes.yaml: explicit Node CRDs for
talos-cp-2 and talos-cp-3 (auto-discovery doesn't work when nodes have
taints; these define /var/lib/longhorn as the storage path)
- k8s/infrastructure/longhorn/longhorn-wffc-storageclass.yaml: bump
numberOfReplicas from 1→3 (true HA: each volume gets 3 copies across
3 nodes; if one node fails, 2 others still have the data)
- k8s/infrastructure/longhorn/kustomization.yaml: add new resources
Root cause: Longhorn was only running on talos-cp-1 (.213) because cp-2/cp-3
have the control-plane taint and Longhorn DaemonSet had no matching toleration.
Every workload with a PVC was forced to schedule on cp-1 (via nodeSelector or
implicit co-location with the storage), defeating the entire purpose of a 3-node
HA cluster.
With this fix:
- Longhorn manager runs on all 3 nodes
- Storage is replicated 3x (erasure-coded across nodes)
- Pods can schedule on any node without PVC attachment failures
- True HA: lose 1 node, cluster still serves all volumes
Adds missing CLIENT_SECRET env injection + nodeSelector constraint:
- k8s/argocd/bootstrap/forgejo.yaml: inject GITEA__oauth2__CLIENT_SECRET
from forgejo-oidc Secret (created by authentik-provision Job), and pin
pods to talos-cp-1 via nodeSelector (only node with Longhorn storage —
gitea-shared-storage PVC can't attach on cp-2/cp-3)
Root cause chain for 'Forgejo SSO not working':
1. Authentik 2026.5.5 requires explicit grant_types on OAuth2 providers
2. Old provision script never set it → all providers had grant_types=[]
3. /authorize returned 'Invalid grant_type for provider' → all SSO broken
4. Fixed in k8s/security/iam/scripts/authentik-provision.py (commit be2a56c)
+ successfully re-ran via iam-jobs Application sync
5. But Forgejo deployment still missing CLIENT_SECRET env var → no creds
6. Forgejo bootstrap App used inline valuesObject (chicken-egg with git
repo self-hosting), but missing the extraEnv block that was only in
k8s/security/ci-cd/forgejo-values.yaml → CLIENT_SECRET never injected
All 4 OAuth2 providers now have correct grant_types=['authorization_code',
'refresh_token'], Forgejo pods now have CLIENT_SECRET env, and pods are
constrained to the storage node. SSO login flow should now work end-to-end.
Story Crater Bot