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rock f81ff0e2fc feat(iam): declare Zitadel identity objects in Terraform
Adds terraform/zitadel: the provisioning half the ArgoCD wiring left open.
It declares 1 project, 19 project roles, 12 OIDC applications, 5 machine users
plus keys, one API application for the gateway, project grants, per-agent claim
metadata, and a disabled groups-claim action.

Facts established while writing it:

- Client IDs cannot be preserved. ZITADEL v4.19.2 CreateOIDCApplicationRequest
  has no client_id field, and provider 3.8.7 rejects a settable application id
  (terraform validate reports "Invalid or unknown key"). Plan §3.2 assumed a
  client_id-preserving re-point; every consumer now also changes client ID.
- Role keys equal the existing group names, so the groups claim can be
  byte-identical and no RBAC file changes. v4.19.2 allows role keys of 1-200
  characters with no character-set restriction.
- Machine users get JWT profile keys, not passwords. Per-agent claims move to
  user metadata and reach tokens only through the groups-claim action.
- The action stays gated: enable_groups_claim_action defaults to false because
  the action runtime API is unverified. Two validations stop a null script from
  reaching file().

Checks: terraform fmt -check -recursive clean, terraform validate 0 errors,
plan reaches only the expected missing-credentials error, structural gate
0 error / 0 warning, and one reviewer round: BLOCK on a plan-time
fileexists(null) and on the missing api-gw machine path, both fixed, re-reviewed
to SIGN-OFF.

State is local and git-ignored; it carries generated client secrets and machine
keys. Move it to MinIO before a second operator applies.

Not applied: no Zitadel instance is running yet.
2026-10-24 03:38:21 -07:00

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# Environment files — real values must never be committed
.env
.env.terraform.sh
# Private CA key and generated TLS certs — ca.key must never enter the cluster or git.
# Only ca.crt is safe to share, but we exclude the whole dir to avoid accidents.
forge/pki/
# Talos machine configs — contain WireGuard private keys, bootstrap tokens, PKI
cluster-config/controlplane.yaml
cluster-config/worker*.yaml
cluster-config/talos-worker*.yaml
cluster-config/cp-*.yaml
cluster-config/talos-cp-*.yaml
cluster-config/secrets.yaml
cluster-config/talosconfig
talos-forge-trust.yaml
# Kubeconfig — contains admin client certificate + private key
cluster-config/kubeconfig
*.html
LOG.md
project_context.md
.claude/*
ca.crt
ca.key
ca.srl
forgejo.crt
forgejo.key
forgejo.csr
# Compiled test binary — Go produces a native binary named after the directory.
# Source is k8s/storage/test/main.go; the binary has no place in version control.
k8s/storage/test/test
*.key
*.conf
# CLAUDE.md is now version-controlled (was previously excluded as a
# private-notes file; contains no secrets - just architecture, IPs
# [private RFC1918 space], and operational lessons, same bar as README.md).
# Terraform state and cache (local files, remote state in MinIO)
.terraform/
terraform/.terraform/
terraform/*.tfstate
terraform/*.tfstate.*
# The Zitadel root module keeps its own state (see terraform/zitadel/providers.tf).
# That state carries generated client secrets and machine keys.
terraform/zitadel/*.tfstate
terraform/zitadel/*.tfstate.*
terraform/zitadel/*.tfvars
terraform.tfvars.local
skills-lock.json
secrets-plaintext.yaml
# Saved plan files — binary, environment-specific, may embed resource attributes
terraform/tfplan
terraform/tfplan-*
.DS_Store
CLAUDE.md
docs/
bootstrap-argocd.log
# Any plaintext (non-SOPS) secret manifest. Encrypted ones are *.enc.yaml and
# ARE committed — see .sops.yaml. A missing newline once merged two patterns on
# one line here, which is how a plaintext deploy key reached a public remote.
k8s/**/*-secret.yaml
!k8s/**/*.enc.yaml
# IAM provisioning scripts contain credential references — never commit
scripts/iam/*.py