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Author SHA1 Message Date
rock ac73035c9e fix(iam): stop rotating client secrets on every apply, repair Grafana OIDC
Grafana sign-in failed with "Failed to get token from provider". The deployed
client secret no longer matched, because _ensure_oidc_apps called
_generate_client_secret for every app on every run, and ZITADEL stores exactly one
client secret per app: each call replaced the previous value and invalidated every
deployed copy.

Two changes:
1. Generate a secret only when the app is created. For an app that already exists,
   reuse the value from state.json, because the API cannot read a secret back.
2. Re-encrypt grafana-oidc-secrets.enc.yaml with the live secret, so Grafana's
   token exchange succeeds again.

Verified with the introspection endpoint:
  old deployed secret -> {"error":"unauthorized_client"}
  new secret          -> {"active":false}   (credentials accepted)
2026-10-27 12:45:13 -07:00
rock 12c66fb612 feat(grafana): provision a Gotify contact point
Grafana gains one contact point, `gotify`, of type webhook. It posts to the
bridge in the notifications namespace because Gotify rejects a Grafana payload
with 400 "Field 'message' is required".

maxAlerts 0 keeps every alert in one request, and the bridge names the extra
count in the message body instead of dropping alerts.
2026-10-27 12:38:29 -07:00
rock 50a751de44 feat(gotify): bridge Grafana alerts into Gotify
Gotify rejects a Grafana payload with 400 "Field 'message' is required", so a
translation step is mandatory. This adds a small standard-library Python
service: it accepts Grafana's JSON, builds a Gotify message, and posts it with an
app token.

Mapping:
  firing   -> priority 8, title "[FIRING] <alertname>"
  resolved -> priority 3, title "[RESOLVED] <alertname>"
  body     -> the summary annotation plus severity, namespace, pod, instance, job
A multi-alert notification names the alert count instead of dropping the rest.

The script ships as a ConfigMap so no image build is needed. The app token comes
from a SOPS secret and belongs to Gotify application `grafana`.
2026-10-27 12:35:44 -07:00
rock 863c11d75f feat(igotify): wire the assist bridge with a Gotify client token
The bridge runs server-side, so it cannot run a browser flow and ZITADEL has no
part in it. Give it a Gotify client token instead: GOTIFY_URLS points at the
public host, GOTIFY_CLIENT_TOKENS comes from a SOPS secret.

The token belongs to user `rock`, is named igotify-assist, and has
expiresAfterInactivitySeconds 0 so it never idles out. Delete the client row in
Gotify to revoke it.

Verified with the token: GET /client returns 200 and GET /message returns the
latest message.
2026-10-27 12:14:28 -07:00
rock a525a52580 Revert "feat(gotify): put the Gotify UI behind ZITADEL single sign-on"
This reverts commit 03cebb0aeb.
2026-10-27 12:12:22 -07:00
rock 3e92f34153 Revert "fix(gotify): use a 32-byte cookie secret for oauth2-proxy"
This reverts commit 549e0be502.
2026-10-27 12:12:22 -07:00
rock 549e0be502 fix(gotify): use a 32-byte cookie secret for oauth2-proxy
The first value was a base32 string, so oauth2-proxy rejected it at startup:
cookie_secret must be 16, 24, or 32 bytes to create an AES cipher, but is 56
bytes.
2026-10-27 12:08:13 -07:00
rock 03cebb0aeb feat(gotify): put the Gotify UI behind ZITADEL single sign-on
Gotify has no OIDC support, so it cannot validate a ZITADEL token itself. Put
oauth2-proxy in front of it and let nginx ask the proxy for every request.

The Gotify REST API keeps its own client-token check. /message, /application,
/client, /user, /version, /stream and /health are skipped by the proxy, so
Forgejo webhooks, the harness, poimen-sender and the Android client keep working
without a browser session. Only the web UI requires SSO.

The /oauth2 path needs its own ingress: the auth_request annotation would
otherwise also guard /oauth2/start, and the login entry point would demand a
login first.

The client id and secret come from project role provisioning:
`zitadel-provision.py apply` now creates the `gotify` OIDC app, and the secret is
SOPS-encrypted under k8s/argocd/secrets.

Gotify's own login remains behind the proxy. ZITADEL decides who reaches the
service, Gotify decides what that person may do inside it.
2026-10-27 12:06:00 -07:00
rock cc7c30ee20 fix(iam): actually enforce MFA
forceMFA never took effect because of the JSON key. ZITADEL's v1 endpoint speaks
protojson, which accepts "forceMfa" (lowerCamel of force_mfa). The spelling
"forceMFA" is treated as an unknown field and silently dropped, so every earlier
run returned 200 with a new sequence while force_mfa stayed false in
projections.login_policies5.

Send forceMfa and forceMfaLocalOnly. Verified in the database:

  force_mfa = t | force_mfa_local_only = t | mfa_init_skip_lifetime = 0

and in the login flow: after the password step the browser lands on
/ui/login/mfa/prompt with the "2-Factor Setup" page, so a second factor is now
required instead of optional.
2026-10-27 00:14:42 -07:00
rock 6768d1c762 feat(iam): require password + 2FA at login
Add a login-policy phase: password plus a second factor, with
mfaInitSkipLifetime 0s so enrolment is demanded at login rather than skipped for
30 days. Second factors stay OTP and U2F (authenticator app or hardware key).
Multi-factor is already configured for U2F-with-verification, so moving 2FA to
2MFA later needs no further policy change.

forceMFA does not persist through the v1 policy endpoint: it reads back absent
even after a successful PUT, which is why the skip lifetime is the lever used.

A repeat run returns 400 "Default Login Policy has not been changed"; treat that
as success so provisioning stays idempotent.

Full apply now completes end to end:
  login page   : built-in
  smtp         : already active
  login policy : password + 2FA, enrolment required
  roles        : 21 ensured
  oidc apps    : 11 ensured
2026-10-27 00:12:32 -07:00
rock 80af9b1fd0 feat(iam): provision and activate the SMTP provider
ZITADEL sends verification codes and password resets by SMTP only, and nothing
delivered until the instance had an *active* SMTP config. Two traps, both now
handled here instead of by hand:

- POST /admin/v1/smtp creates the config INACTIVE (state 3). An inactive config
  makes GET /admin/v1/smtp answer 404 "SMTP configuration not found", so the API
  reports success while every send is dropped. The _activate call is mandatory.
- The target is the in-cluster smtp-gotify relay, which forwards to Gotify.

The phase is idempotent: an active config short-circuits and only logs.

Also fix the role-exists check: ZITADEL returns `key`, not `roleKey`, so the set
was always empty and every re-run died on the first 409 "Role already exists".

Verified: `zitadel-provision.py apply` now completes, reporting
`smtp : already active`, `roles : 21 ensured`, `oidc apps : 11 ensured`.
A resend then produced Gotify message 1185 ("Verify email, Code ZVYLQG") and
submitting that code set verified_email for user riotpiao.
2026-10-27 00:11:50 -07:00
rock 7f29d640fd feat(iam): own the ZITADEL core objects in GitOps
The chart declares its ServiceAccount, ConfigMap, Role and RoleBinding as
pre-install/pre-upgrade Helm hooks with hook-delete-policy before-hook-creation.
ArgoCD maps those to PreSync and prunes them when a sync ends, so every sync
deleted the ServiceAccount and ConfigMap the ZITADEL Deployment mounts. New pods
failed with `serviceaccount "zitadel" not found`, leaving the IdP one restart
from an outage.

Add a zatadel-core Application owning hook-free copies, keeping them as ordinary
desired state that survives every sync. Prune is off for this path: deleting a
ServiceAccount here would recreate the outage.

The ConfigMap also carries the notification settings, pointing
DefaultInstance.SMTPConfiguration at the smtp-gotify relay, with
SMTPSenderAddressMatchesInstanceDomain false because the sender
[email protected] differs from the instance domain zatadel.riotpiao.com.

Drop the envVarsSecret approach: ZITADEL created no SMTP provider from those env
vars (no instance.smtp.config.added event).
2026-10-26 23:54:57 -07:00
rock 9c3b2bfbbe feat(iam): wire ZITADEL SMTP through envVarsSecret
ZITADEL must send verification codes, and it only speaks SMTP. Route that at
the smtp-gotify relay so codes reach Gotify and the phone.

The settings go in as a ZITADEL_DEFAULTINSTANCE_SMTPCONFIGURATION_* envFrom
secret, not as configmapConfig. Editing configmapConfig makes ArgoCD stop
managing the rendered zitadel-config-yaml ConfigMap, which the Deployment still
mounts; that twice left the IdP one restart away from failing. Env vars override
the same keys and leave that ConfigMap alone.

Validated with helm template 10.4.0: envFrom appears on both ZITADEL containers
and zitadel-config-yaml still renders.
2026-10-26 23:45:59 -07:00
rock 81e6e9bc03 Revert "feat(iam): send ZITADEL notifications to the Gotify relay"
This reverts commit aa1f224349.
2026-10-26 23:41:01 -07:00
rock aa1f224349 feat(iam): send ZITADEL notifications to the Gotify relay
Point DefaultInstance.SMTPConfiguration at the in-cluster smtp-gotify relay, so
verification codes and password resets arrive on the phone instead of being
dropped for lack of a mail path.

Validated with `helm template zitadel/zitadel 10.4.0` before syncing: the block
renders, and the zatadel-config-yaml ConfigMap is still produced. An earlier
attempt looked like it removed that ConfigMap, which is why this went in only
after a local render check.
2026-10-26 23:39:53 -07:00
rock 37933de756 fix(iam): give the SMTP->Gotify relay a writable /tmp
The relay stages each message in /tmp before pushing. readOnlyRootFilesystem
left it with a read-only /tmp, so it answered '250 queued' and then dropped the
message: no Gotify push, no error line. Mount an emptyDir at /tmp.
2026-10-26 23:38:29 -07:00
rock 468ed16737 revert(iam): back out the SMTP values block that dropped the config ConfigMap
The sync removed zitadel-config-yaml while the Deployment still mounts it, so
the next pod restart would have failed. Restore the previous render first; the
relay stays deployed and can be wired once the chart accepts the block.
2026-10-26 23:32:50 -07:00
rock ab9c2b444b fix(iam): make the SMTP->Gotify relay actually push
Two defects in the first cut, both silent from the sender's side because the
relay answers 250 either way:

- GOTIFY_URL needs a trailing slash; without it the push has no path.
- GOTIFY_TITLE_TEMPLATE referenced .Subject, which the relay does not expose,
  so template execution failed.

The relay's default title already carries the subject, so drop the template.

Also register the SOPS file in secret-generator.yaml: the sops-secrets app only
renders files listed there, so the Secret was never created and the relay sat in
CreateContainerConfigError.
2026-10-26 23:28:44 -07:00
rock b6e1e0c591 fix(iam): give the IAM support manifests an ArgoCD app again
Retiring Authentik deleted the iam-jobs Application, so k8s/infra/iam stopped
being synced. The new smtp-gotify relay would have sat in git and never been
created.

Add an iam-support Application for that path, and drop the stale
rbac-dashboard-rolebinding reference from its kustomization: the file went away
with Authentik, and a missing resource fails the whole app.
2026-10-26 23:24:55 -07:00
rock 701d79deac feat(iam): deliver ZITADEL notifications through Gotify
ZITADEL sends verification codes and password resets by SMTP only, and this
cluster has no mail path. Every human user therefore sits at
verified_email = empty and can never finish a first login, at ZITADEL or at
Forgejo.

Add an smtp-gotify relay in the iam namespace: it accepts plain SMTP on :2525
and forwards each message to the existing Gotify instance, so codes arrive on
the phone through gotify/igotify instead of email.

Point DefaultInstance.SMTPConfiguration at that Service with TLS off, because
the relay speaks plain SMTP inside the cluster. The relay holds the Gotify app
token in a SOPS-encrypted Secret; values never carry the token.
2026-10-26 23:24:33 -07:00
rock fbc1b6a33d feat(iam): manage the Forgejo OAuth login source from a script
Forgejo keeps login sources in its database and exposes no REST endpoint for
them, so neither GitOps nor `tea` (whose admin command only manages users) can
set them. The in-pod CLI is the only supported writer.

This script wraps `gitea admin auth update-oauth` so the rename from the
Authentik-era label to `zitadel` is repeatable instead of a one-off command in
a shell history. Note in the header: the source name is both the button label
and the callback path, so ZITADEL must have both redirect URIs registered
before a rename.
2026-10-26 23:17:03 -07:00
rock 3f93ddc002 feat(iam): provision the built-in login page
loginV2.required lives in the instance database, not in chart values, so
disabling the hosted Login UI in values is only half the change: the server
kept redirecting /oauth/v2/authorize to /ui/v2/login, which no longer had a
backend and returned 503.

Set loginV2.required=false in the provisioning run so the server serves its
own login page. Verified: authorize now redirects to /ui/login/login and the
page renders the "Welcome Back!" login form.
2026-10-26 23:12:53 -07:00
rock eaf9804374 fix(iam): use the built-in ZITADEL login page
Sign-in failed with "Could not create session for user". The ZITADEL API
logged, on every session call:

  authz: verify access token -> invalid token
  token verifier repo: issuer does not match: Expected
    https://zitadel.riotpiao.com, got: login-client
  zitadel-login: [Password] Could not update session

The hosted Login UI authenticates as the machine user `login-client`. That
user did not exist in this instance, because the chart's setup job creates it
and setupJob is disabled after the first sync. Without the user the UI cannot
write a session, so no one can sign in, at ZITADEL or at Forgejo.

Disable the hosted Login UI so ZITADEL serves its built-in login, which needs
no machine user. Re-enable only after creating `login-client` and registering
the public key that matches zitadel-login-service-key.

Also register both callback spellings for the forgejo and paperless apps: the
callback path follows the login-source name, so a rename between authentik and
zitadel must not break sign-in.
2026-10-26 23:08:20 -07:00
rock 903a72a6fd feat(iam): provision the LLM inference roles and assert project roles
The api-gw gates /v1/* on a capability named in the access token. ZITADEL
had no such role, so every inference call was 403 once the token came from
ZITADEL instead of Authentik.

- add llm:inference (Authentik spelling, keeps consumer manifests unchanged)
  and llm-inference (dash alias) to the project roles
- enable projectRoleAssertion on the project, which is what puts
  urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles into the access token; without it the
  role list never reaches the resource server
2026-10-26 10:26:54 -07:00
rock 81883a8ea1 chore(iam): retire Authentik
Zitadel is running and has provisioned OIDC clients for all 12 consumers
(state.json: kubernetes, paperless, forgejo, argocd, grafana, immich, minio,
vault, poimen, api-gw, queue-sqs, homarr). Authentik's remaining job was to
serve until the last consumer moved.

Remove every Authentik artifact from GitOps:
- ArgoCD Application `authentik` and its Helm values
- ArgoCD Application `iam-jobs` (provisioner RBAC + migration job)
- ArgoCD Application `oidc-bootstrap` (one-shot apiserver restart)
- authentik-db CNPG cluster definition
- authentik-secrets SOPS file and secret-generator entry
- Ingress rule, cloudflared tunnel hostname, CoreDNS rewrite
- Prometheus alerts and ServiceMonitor
- admin OIDC ClusterRoleBinding provisioning binding
- scripts/iam/provision-rbac.py (the Authentik provisioner)

The chart repo https://charts.goauthentik.io is removed from the AppProject.

Kube-apiserver OIDC and consumer configs are switched to Zitadel in the
local cluster-config (gitignored) and applied separately via talosctl.
2026-10-26 03:32:18 -07:00
rock 7f96da880f fix(ingress): restore the authentik.riotpiao.com route
Commit a02bee5 had both the Ingress rule and the cloudflared tunnel
hostname for authentik.riotpiao.com. Both were lost, so the tunnel
answered 404 for the hostname and the ingress had no matching rule.

The CoreDNS rewrite and the authentik-server Service were still intact;
only the two routing entries were missing. Re-add the Ingress (namespace
iam, service authentik-server port 80, TLS terminated by the wildcard
default-ssl-certificate) and the tunnel hostname.
2026-10-26 03:12:26 -07:00
rock f37e5f32cb fix(paperless): use Recreate strategy for paperless-ai RWO PVC deadlock 2026-10-26 00:35:59 -07:00
rock 8c4a900b40 feat(vault): wire Zitadel OIDC login via postStart auth/oidc config 2026-10-26 00:28:19 -07:00
rock e6ba83cd38 feat(iam): wire all 9 consumer manifests to Zitadel OIDC 2026-10-26 00:14:51 -07:00
rock a02bee50e2 feat(iam): wire all 9 consumer manifests to Zitadel OIDC
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-10-26 04:34:51 +00:00
rock f9af686c36 Merge pull request 'integration: merge minio-client fix, local-path backend, and local cloudflared ingress' (#70) from integration/merge-56-58-69 into main
integration: merge minio-client fix, local-path backend, and local cloudflared ingress (#70)
2026-10-26 03:24:32 +00:00
rock 3ec46d26f0 merge: harness/zitadel-iam-wiring 2026-10-25 20:20:54 -07:00
rock 52bca6b1b6 merge: feat/local-path-backend 2026-10-25 20:20:40 -07:00
rock 3e079b1cf7 merge: fix/minio-mc-image (keep digest pin + comment) 2026-10-25 20:20:22 -07:00
rock 227a67a8c1 feat(cloudflared): manage tunnel ingress locally via ConfigMap
The tunnel was remotely managed from the Zero Trust dashboard: the
Deployment ran 'run --token' and ignored the ConfigMap that already
existed in the tree. Switch to a locally-managed tunnel so the ingress
routing table lives in git.

- deployment: mount cloudflared-config (config.yml) and the
  cloudflared-credentials Secret; drop TUNNEL_TOKEN env
- configmap.yaml: per-hostname ingress rules to ingress-nginx via the
  CoreDNS rewrite, plus a 404 catch-all
- secret-generator: register the SOPS-encrypted credentials file
- homelab-ca: add the cloudflared namespace copy so the connector trusts
  the ingress certificate (force-ssl-redirect makes plaintext impossible)

Credentials were extracted from the live cloudflared-token Secret and
re-encrypted with SOPS; no plaintext secret is committed.
2026-10-25 19:57:37 -07:00
pi d4e9dbf350 refactor(iam): retire terraform/zitadel, provision through the API
The Terraform root module duplicated a writer that the provisioning script could
be, and its state carried generated client secrets. Declare the objects in the
script instead: project, 19 roles, 12 OIDC apps, applied through the management
API with the iam-admin PAT. State is a 0600 JSON file under ~/.config/zitadel.

Also add zitadel to the Cloudflare tunnel hostname list, with the import command
and the note that the tunnel's Public Hostname entry is a separate dashboard
step: DNS alone yields a 404 from the tunnel.
2026-10-25 19:35:01 -07:00
pi be44a576d4 fix(iam): own the Zitadel login keypair through ksops
The chart generated the login RSA keypair on every render, so
checksum/secret-login-service-key changed each time and both Zitadel
Deployments stayed permanently OutOfSync.

Adopt the live keypair into k8s/argocd/secrets/zitadel-login-service-key.enc.yaml
(SOPS, age recipient from .sops.yaml), list it in the ksops generator, and point
login.loginServiceKeySecretName at it. The chart then stops generating the
keypair and the Deployment checksums become deterministic.
2026-10-25 19:16:18 -07:00
pi 39081222a3 fix(iam): stop the setup hook running after first boot
A PreSync setup run is not harmless once the instance exists: it replays every
repeatable migration on every sync, and interrupting one leaves a
system.migration.started event with no matching done. ZITADEL then waits
forever on 'migration already started'. That deadlocked this instance twice
(projections.projects4, then repeatable_delete_stale_org_fields).

Move the setup job's hook from pre-install,pre-upgrade to post-delete so ArgoCD
sync never runs it. Re-enable deliberately for a schema upgrade.
2026-10-25 19:10:32 -07:00
pi 7e5b793670 fix(iam,edge): freeze first-boot and wire the WireGuard CIDR variable
Zitadel first boot completed on 2026-10-26, so set FirstInstance.Skip: true and
initJob.enabled: false. Without Skip, every sync re-runs machinekeyWriter and
silently rotates the iam-admin key that terraform/zitadel authenticates with.

Also wire wireguard_allowed_cidr into the WireGuard security-group rule; the
variable was declared but the rule still used relay_admin_cidr, which blocks
the homelab peer unless its egress address happens to match the operator CIDR.
2026-10-25 18:48:15 -07:00
pi 354814a531 security: stop tracking Talos secret backup; rotate edge WireGuard key
- remove terraform/terraform.tfvars.local.bak from the index (it carries the
  live cluster PKI: CA keys, service-account key, secretbox secret)
- ignore terraform/*.bak and terraform/edge/.secrets/
- generate a fresh WireGuard relay keypair into the git-ignored local tfvars;
  the committed example now documents rotation instead of holding key material
2026-10-25 18:15:48 -07:00
pi 54fac02783 fix(cloudflared): pin tunnel protocol to http2
QUIC loses long-lived SSE streams when Chinese ISP gateways throttle UDP.
http2 over TCP is the deliberate fallback already in use.
2026-10-25 18:04:53 -07:00
pi eb83aa6290 refactor(edge,iam): apply best practices to relay and Zitadel config
- edge: extract VPC/subnet/bandwidth/disk/DNS/Caddy settings into variables
- edge: add Caddyfile template with SSE-safe flush_interval -1 and security headers
- edge: add WireGuard NAT masquerade so homelab peer accepts forwarded client IPs
- edge: mark user_data sensitive and add prevent_destroy to the relay instance
- edge: validate relay_admin_cidr and Cloudflare hostnames
- edge: parameterise Cloudflare TTL/proxied and enforce proxied tunnel CNAMEs
- iam: fix PDB key to chart-supported pdb and remove unsupported extraVolumes
- iam: keep login hardened; drop unsupported login PDB
2026-10-25 18:03:55 -07:00
pi 6ebecec1c4 fix(zitadel): raise setup job deadline to 20m
The chart default killed zitadel-setup at ~5.5 minutes while it was still
replaying projections.projects4, which failed the whole PreSync and left the
Application OutOfSync/Missing. 1200s leaves room for a cold database without
masking a genuine hang.
2026-10-25 09:47:33 -07:00
rock 091ecdd7bb feat(edge): Terraform for the China-facing relay and Cloudflare DNS
Adds terraform/edge, a root module with two providers:

- Cloudflare 5.28.1: CNAMEs to the existing tunnel, plus an opt-in resource that
  can take the tunnel ingress list over when manage_tunnel_config is true. It is
  off by default because that resource REPLACES the whole list, and the tunnel is
  remotely managed from the dashboard today.
- Tencent Cloud 1.83.38: VPC, subnet, security group with three rules, key pair,
  one CVM relay with cloud-init (WireGuard listener, forwarding sysctls, Caddy),
  and DNSPod A records for the .cn hostnames.

The design keeps the homelab inbound-free: the relay terminates TLS in China and
forwards over a WireGuard tunnel the cluster dials outbound. Cloudflare keeps
serving every existing hostname untouched.

Verified: terraform init succeeds for both providers, fmt clean, validate
reports 0 errors, and plan resolves to 10 creates with placeholder variables.
Provider-side name validation caught a real bug during that run: key pair and
security group names allow only letters, digits and underscore, so the derived
names use underscores.

Not applied. Credentials come from CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN,
TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_ID and TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_KEY; the WireGuard private key is
TF_VAR only. State is local and git-ignored like terraform/zitadel.

Blocked on facts this module cannot invent: the real .cn domain, whether it has
an ICP filing, the CVM image ID, the operator CIDR, and the homelab WireGuard
public key.
2026-10-24 22:59:54 -07:00
rock 7251032081 Merge pull request 'fix(monitoring): cap Prometheus retention below the PVC size' (#68) from fix/prometheus-retention-size into main 2026-10-25 04:43:21 +00:00
rock ebb1b9b02d feat(storage): add local-path-provisioner as the fleet's persistent-storage backend 2026-10-06 12:46:58 +08:00
rock 71b3cef2eb fix(minio): replace the dead minio/mc image in the provision hook and backup job 2026-10-06 10:10:56 +08:00
80 changed files with 2164 additions and 2583 deletions
+8
View File
@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ terraform/*.tfstate.*
terraform/zitadel/*.tfstate
terraform/zitadel/*.tfstate.*
terraform/zitadel/*.tfvars
terraform/edge/*.tfstate
terraform/edge/*.tfstate.*
terraform/edge/*.tfvars
terraform/edge/terraform.tfvars.local
terraform.tfvars.local
skills-lock.json
secrets-plaintext.yaml
@@ -81,3 +85,7 @@ scripts/iam/*.py
# Runtime credential export from the old Authentik provisioning run. Holds live
# M2M tokens; never commit it.
/authentik-m2m-tokens.env
# Never commit backup copies of plaintext tfvars (they carry cluster PKI)
terraform/*.bak
terraform/edge/.secrets/
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
{
"nextId": 2,
"loops": [
{
"id": "1",
"prompt": "Check Longhorn and CNPG recovery progress in the homelab cluster and report terse. Run: kubectl -n longhorn-system get volumes.longhorn.io -o json (count by state/robustness), kubectl -n longhorn-system get replicas.longhorn.io -o json (count running/stopped/failed), kubectl get clusters.postgresql.cnpg.io -A (ready instances per cluster), kubectl -n cicd get pods,pvc | grep forgejo-db. Report: volumes healthy vs degraded, replicas running vs stopped, and each CNPG cluster ready count. If every volume is attached/healthy and every CNPG cluster shows 3/3 ready, say RECOVERED, list any leftover anomalies, and stop this loop with LoopDelete. Otherwise name what is still rebuilding and keep going.",
"trigger": {
"type": "cron",
"schedule": "*/5 * * * *"
},
"status": "expired",
"recurring": true,
"createdAt": 1792898370946,
"updatedAt": 1792901371403,
"expiresAt": 1793503170946,
"source": "tool",
"readOnly": true,
"maxFires": 6,
"fireCount": 6
}
]
}
+56
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
# cloudflared ingress configuration.
#
# This list is the tunnel's routing table: for each incoming hostname the
# connector dials the matching origin. The final rule is a catch-all, so a
# hostname absent from this list gets 404 from the connector — DNS alone does
# not route a request into a service.
#
# Management model: this file makes the tunnel LOCALLY managed. cloudflared is
# given a credentials file instead of a token, so Cloudflare stops pushing the
# remotely-managed ingess list and this ConfigMap wins. Revert the Deployment to
# `run --token` to return to the dashboard-managed list.
#
# Origin services self-reference the public hostname. That resolves because
# CoreDNS rewrites each of these names to ingress-nginx
# (terraform/files/coredns/Corefile), so the connector reaches the in-cluster
# ingress instead of looping back out through Cloudflare.
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: cloudflared-config
namespace: cloudflared
data:
config.yml: |
tunnel: 32d0bf93-e1bd-45b8-93a9-71ff9f83de80
credentials-file: /etc/cloudflared/creds/credentials.json
# WARP-to-Tunnel routing. The remotely-managed config had this enabled;
# dropping the key would break WARP access to private addresses. cloudflared
# 2026.x has no `enabled` field — the key's presence is what enables it, and
# `enabled: true` here makes the binary warn about an unused key.
warp-routing: {}
ingress:
- hostname: paperless.riotpiao.com
service: https://paperless.riotpiao.com
- hostname: img.riotpiao.com
service: https://img.riotpiao.com
- hostname: riotpiao.com
service: https://riotpiao.com
- hostname: grafana.riotpiao.com
service: https://grafana.riotpiao.com
- hostname: gotify.riotpiao.com
service: https://gotify.riotpiao.com
- hostname: igotify.riotpiao.com
service: https://igotify.riotpiao.com
- hostname: poimen.riotpiao.com
service: https://poimen.riotpiao.com
- hostname: comfyui.riotpiao.com
service: https://comfyui.riotpiao.com
- hostname: forgejo.riotpiao.com
service: https://forgejo.riotpiao.com
# ZITADEL. Without this rule the connector answers 404 for the hostname
# even though the DNS CNAME points at the tunnel.
- hostname: zitadel.riotpiao.com
service: https://zitadel.riotpiao.com
- service: http_status:404
+49 -7
View File
@@ -13,21 +13,63 @@ spec:
labels:
app: cloudflared
spec:
# Ingress-nginx forces HTTPS (force-ssl-redirect), so cloudflared must
# dial https://<hostname> and trust homelab-ca or the TLS handshake fails
# with "certificate signed by unknown authority". Same pattern as
# iam values: merge the system bundle with homelab-ca.crt.
initContainers:
- name: merge-ca-certs
image: debian:bookworm
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
securityContext:
runAsUser: 0
command:
- sh
- -c
- (cat /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt 2>/dev/null; cat /homelab-ca/ca.crt) > /merged/ca-bundle.crt
volumeMounts:
- name: homelab-ca
mountPath: /homelab-ca
readOnly: true
- name: merged-ca
mountPath: /merged
volumes:
- name: config
configMap:
name: cloudflared-config
- name: credentials
secret:
secretName: cloudflared-credentials
- name: homelab-ca
configMap:
name: homelab-ca
- name: merged-ca
emptyDir: {}
containers:
- name: cloudflared
image: cloudflare/cloudflared:latest
args:
- tunnel
- --no-autoupdate
- --protocol
- http2
- --config
- /etc/cloudflared/config.yml
- run
- --token
- $(TUNNEL_TOKEN)
env:
- name: TUNNEL_TOKEN
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: cloudflared-token
key: token
- name: SSL_CERT_FILE
value: /merged/ca-bundle.crt
volumeMounts:
- name: config
mountPath: /etc/cloudflared/config.yml
subPath: config.yml
readOnly: true
- name: credentials
mountPath: /etc/cloudflared/creds
readOnly: true
- name: merged-ca
mountPath: /merged
readOnly: true
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
+1
View File
@@ -3,3 +3,4 @@ kind: Kustomization
namespace: cloudflared
resources:
- deployment.yaml
- configmap.yaml
+110
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
# The bridge script is mounted as a ConfigMap so no image build is needed.
# Regenerate this block from grafana_gotify_bridge.py when the script changes.
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: grafana-gotify-bridge
namespace: notifications
data:
grafana_gotify_bridge.py: |
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Translate a Grafana alert webhook into a Gotify message.
Grafana sends its own payload shape:
{"receiver": "...", "status": "firing", "alerts": [{"labels": {...}, "annotations": {...}}]}
Gotify requires:
{"title": "...", "message": "...", "priority": 0..10}
Gotify answers 400 "Field 'message' is required" to a Grafana payload, so a
conversion step is mandatory. This service is that step and nothing else.
Standard library only, so it needs no image build and no dependencies.
"""
import json
import os
import urllib.request
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
GOTIFY_BASE = os.environ.get("GOTIFY_URL", "http://gotify.notifications.svc.cluster.local")
GOTIFY_TOKEN = os.environ["GOTIFY_TOKEN"]
LISTEN_PORT = int(os.environ.get("PORT", "8080"))
# Firing is louder than resolved. Gotify priority runs 0 to 10.
PRIORITY = {"firing": 8, "resolved": 3}
def to_gotify(payload):
alerts = payload.get("alerts") or []
status = (payload.get("status") or "firing").lower()
priority = PRIORITY.get(status, 5)
if not alerts:
title = payload.get("title") or "Grafana notification"
return title, json.dumps(payload)[:2000], priority
first = alerts[0]
labels = first.get("labels") or {}
annotations = first.get("annotations") or {}
name = labels.get("alertname", "Grafana alert")
title = "[%s] %s" % (status.upper(), name)
lines = []
summary = annotations.get("summary") or annotations.get("description")
if summary:
lines.append(summary)
for key in ("severity", "namespace", "pod", "instance", "job"):
if labels.get(key):
lines.append("%s: %s" % (key, labels[key]))
if len(alerts) > 1:
lines.append("+%d more alert(s) in this notification" % (len(alerts) - 1))
return title, "\n".join(lines) or name, priority
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def _reply(self, code, body=b"ok"):
self.send_response(code)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
def do_GET(self):
self._reply(200)
def do_POST(self):
length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length") or 0)
raw = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b"{}"
try:
payload = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8", "replace") or "{}")
except ValueError:
payload = {}
title, message, priority = to_gotify(payload)
body = json.dumps({
"title": title[:200],
"message": message[:4000],
"priority": priority,
}).encode()
request = urllib.request.Request(
GOTIFY_BASE.rstrip("/") + "/message",
data=body,
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Gotify-Key": GOTIFY_TOKEN},
)
try:
urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=10).read()
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - log and report to Grafana
print("forward to gotify failed: %s" % exc, flush=True)
self._reply(502, b"gotify rejected the message")
return
print("forwarded: %s" % title, flush=True)
self._reply(200)
def log_message(self, fmt, *args): # keep the log to one line per delivery
print("%s - %s" % (self.address_string(), fmt % args), flush=True)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("grafana-gotify bridge listening on %d" % LISTEN_PORT, flush=True)
HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", LISTEN_PORT), Handler).serve_forever()
+80
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
# Grafana sends its own JSON and Gotify rejects it, so this Deployment is the
# translation step between them. Grafana posts to the Service, the bridge posts
# to /message with the app token from a SOPS secret.
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: grafana-gotify-bridge
namespace: notifications
labels:
app: grafana-gotify-bridge
spec:
replicas: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
app: grafana-gotify-bridge
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: grafana-gotify-bridge
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 65534
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: bridge
image: python:3.12-alpine
command: ["python3", "/app/grafana_gotify_bridge.py"]
env:
- name: GOTIFY_URL
value: "http://gotify.notifications.svc.cluster.local"
- name: PORT
value: "8080"
- name: GOTIFY_TOKEN
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef: {name: grafana-gotify-bridge, key: app-token}
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 8080
readinessProbe:
httpGet: {path: /, port: http}
initialDelaySeconds: 3
periodSeconds: 10
livenessProbe:
httpGet: {path: /, port: http}
initialDelaySeconds: 10
periodSeconds: 20
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
volumeMounts:
- name: script
mountPath: /app
readOnly: true
resources:
requests: {cpu: 10m, memory: 32Mi}
limits: {cpu: 200m, memory: 96Mi}
volumes:
- name: script
configMap:
name: grafana-gotify-bridge
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: grafana-gotify-bridge
namespace: notifications
labels:
app: grafana-gotify-bridge
spec:
type: ClusterIP
selector:
app: grafana-gotify-bridge
ports:
- name: http
port: 8080
targetPort: http
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Translate a Grafana alert webhook into a Gotify message.
Grafana sends its own payload shape:
{"receiver": "...", "status": "firing", "alerts": [{"labels": {...}, "annotations": {...}}]}
Gotify requires:
{"title": "...", "message": "...", "priority": 0..10}
Gotify answers 400 "Field 'message' is required" to a Grafana payload, so a
conversion step is mandatory. This service is that step and nothing else.
Standard library only, so it needs no image build and no dependencies.
"""
import json
import os
import urllib.request
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
GOTIFY_BASE = os.environ.get("GOTIFY_URL", "http://gotify.notifications.svc.cluster.local")
GOTIFY_TOKEN = os.environ["GOTIFY_TOKEN"]
LISTEN_PORT = int(os.environ.get("PORT", "8080"))
# Firing is louder than resolved. Gotify priority runs 0 to 10.
PRIORITY = {"firing": 8, "resolved": 3}
def to_gotify(payload):
alerts = payload.get("alerts") or []
status = (payload.get("status") or "firing").lower()
priority = PRIORITY.get(status, 5)
if not alerts:
title = payload.get("title") or "Grafana notification"
return title, json.dumps(payload)[:2000], priority
first = alerts[0]
labels = first.get("labels") or {}
annotations = first.get("annotations") or {}
name = labels.get("alertname", "Grafana alert")
title = "[%s] %s" % (status.upper(), name)
lines = []
summary = annotations.get("summary") or annotations.get("description")
if summary:
lines.append(summary)
for key in ("severity", "namespace", "pod", "instance", "job"):
if labels.get(key):
lines.append("%s: %s" % (key, labels[key]))
if len(alerts) > 1:
lines.append("+%d more alert(s) in this notification" % (len(alerts) - 1))
return title, "\n".join(lines) or name, priority
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def _reply(self, code, body=b"ok"):
self.send_response(code)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
def do_GET(self):
self._reply(200)
def do_POST(self):
length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length") or 0)
raw = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b"{}"
try:
payload = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8", "replace") or "{}")
except ValueError:
payload = {}
title, message, priority = to_gotify(payload)
body = json.dumps({
"title": title[:200],
"message": message[:4000],
"priority": priority,
}).encode()
request = urllib.request.Request(
GOTIFY_BASE.rstrip("/") + "/message",
data=body,
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Gotify-Key": GOTIFY_TOKEN},
)
try:
urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=10).read()
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - log and report to Grafana
print("forward to gotify failed: %s" % exc, flush=True)
self._reply(502, b"gotify rejected the message")
return
print("forwarded: %s" % title, flush=True)
self._reply(200)
def log_message(self, fmt, *args): # keep the log to one line per delivery
print("%s - %s" % (self.address_string(), fmt % args), flush=True)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("grafana-gotify bridge listening on %d" % LISTEN_PORT, flush=True)
HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", LISTEN_PORT), Handler).serve_forever()
+11 -3
View File
@@ -28,9 +28,17 @@ spec:
value: "true"
- name: ENABLE_SCALAR_UI
value: "true"
# GOTIFY_URLS / GOTIFY_CLIENT_TOKENS / SECNTFY_TOKENS intentionally
# left unset — not required when Gotify is reachable via public domain
# (gotify.riotpiao.com). iGotify iOS app registers itself at runtime.
# The bridge authenticates with a Gotify client token, not with
# ZITADEL. Gotify has no way to accept a forwarded identity, so the
# token is the only credential that works server-side. The token
# belongs to user `rock`, never expires, and is revoked by deleting
# the client row in Gotify.
- name: GOTIFY_URLS
value: "https://gotify.riotpiao.com"
- name: GOTIFY_CLIENT_TOKENS
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef: {name: igotify-client-token, key: client-token}
# SECNTFY_TOKENS intentionally left unset: secntfy is not deployed.
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /app/data
+2
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ resources:
- deployment.yaml
- service.yaml
- ingress.yaml
- bridge/configmap.yaml
- bridge/deployment.yaml
- igotify-pvc.yaml
- igotify-deployment.yaml
- igotify-service.yaml
-78
View File
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
# Homarr landing page with Authentik SSO
# Probe tuning (chart DOES expose these — the old PostSync patch-job was
# unnecessary and fragile: it only patched one Deployment revision, so any later
# rollout reverted to the chart's aggressive defaults). Homarr's first-boot icon
# updater blocks the event loop for ~50s ("icons updater took 49553ms"), during
# which /api/health/live can't answer within the default 10s×3 window → kubelet
# SIGTERMs the pod → CrashLoopBackOff (247 restarts, 503 at the ingress). Give
# liveness a wide window so the icon import can finish without a kill.
livenessProbe:
initialDelaySeconds: 60
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 10
readinessProbe:
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 15
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 6
image:
repository: ghcr.io/homarr-labs/homarr
tag: "latest"
pullPolicy: Always
replicaCount: 1
# Configure SSO via environment variables
# Chart supports these via top-level env dict (not array)
env:
AUTH_PROVIDERS: "oidc,credentials"
AUTH_OIDC_ISSUER: "https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/homarr/"
# AUTH_OIDC_URI (authorize endpoint) is REQUIRED in addition to ISSUER — homarr
# hides the "Sign in with Authentik" button entirely when it's absent (per the
# authentik Homarr integration + homarr SSO docs). This was the missing var.
AUTH_OIDC_URI: "https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/authorize/"
AUTH_OIDC_CLIENT_NAME: "Authentik"
AUTH_OIDC_GROUPS_ATTRIBUTE: "groups"
AUTH_OIDC_SCOPE_OVERWRITE: "openid email profile groups"
AUTH_OIDC_AUTO_LOGIN: "false"
# Link the OIDC identity to an existing homarr account with the same email.
OAUTH_ALLOW_DANGEROUS_EMAIL_ACCOUNT_LINKING: "true"
# The analytics cron blocked the (single-threaded) Next.js event loop for ~16s
# per run ("callback took longer than expected"), compounding CPU pressure.
DISABLE_ANALYTICS: "true"
BASE_URL: "https://homarr.riotpiao.com"
NEXTAUTH_URL: "https://homarr.riotpiao.com"
# Client credentials from homarr-oidc secret
# Chart doesn't support envFrom, so we add via extraEnv
extraEnv:
- name: AUTH_OIDC_CLIENT_ID
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: homarr-oidc
key: client-id
- name: AUTH_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: homarr-oidc
key: client-secret
tolerations:
- key: node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane
operator: Exists
effect: NoSchedule
resources:
requests:
cpu: 250m
memory: 384Mi
limits:
# Next.js 16 + bundled redis + the icon-updater (28k icons) saturated the old
# 500m limit; CPU throttling made Next.js abort with exit 134 (SIGABRT) and
# self-restart in a loop, so nginx saw no upstream and returned 502. Give it
# real CPU headroom.
cpu: "2"
memory: 1Gi
-7
View File
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
namespace: dashboard
# Probes are now tuned via homarr-values.yaml (chart-native); the old
# fix-probes-job PostSync hook is removed. homarr-secrets/auth-oidc/db-encryption
# Secrets are delivered by the sops-secrets (ksops) Application.
resources: []
-107
View File
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: serving.kserve.io/v1beta1
kind: InferenceService
metadata:
annotations:
serving.kserve.io/deploymentMode: RawDeployment
# The konghq.com/{connect,read,write}-timeout annotations that used to live
# here went with Kong (retired 2026-08-19). They existed because Kong read
# its upstream timeouts off the Kubernetes Service, and its 60s default cut
# off the first request after any pod restart — a restart flushes VRAM and
# reloading ornith:35b takes longer than that. OLLAMA_KEEP_ALIVE=-1 hid the
# problem in steady state.
#
# The equivalent budget now belongs to the Go gateway's per-route timeout
# config in rock/homelab-frontend, not to an annotation on this object.
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: llm-ornith
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: llm-serving
name: ornith
namespace: llm-serving
spec:
predictor:
containers:
- command:
- /bin/sh
- -c
- 'set -e
ollama serve &
SERVE_PID=$!
until ollama list >/dev/null 2>&1; do sleep 2; done
ollama pull ornith:35b
ollama run ornith:35b "ok" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
wait $SERVE_PID
'
env:
- name: OLLAMA_HOST
value: 0.0.0.0:8080
- name: OLLAMA_MODELS
value: /mnt/models/ollama
- name: OLLAMA_CONTEXT_LENGTH
value: '65536'
- name: OLLAMA_KEEP_ALIVE
value: '-1'
- name: OLLAMA_NUM_PARALLEL
value: '1'
- name: OLLAMA_MAX_LOADED_MODELS
value: '1'
image: ollama/ollama:0.32.9@sha256:1685741456770df6e3cceb2a945a5f75e020f658d1701509668d6f4688f1dd3f
name: kserve-container
ports:
- containerPort: 8080
protocol: TCP
readinessProbe:
exec:
command:
- /bin/sh
- -c
- ollama ps 2>/dev/null | grep -q ornith
periodSeconds: 10
resources:
limits:
cpu: '16'
memory: 16Gi
nvidia.com/gpu: '1'
requests:
cpu: '8'
memory: 8Gi
nvidia.com/gpu: '1'
startupProbe:
exec:
command:
- /bin/sh
- -c
- ollama ps 2>/dev/null | grep -q ornith
failureThreshold: 120
periodSeconds: 15
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /mnt/models
name: models
podMetadata:
annotations:
prometheus.io/scrape: "true"
prometheus.io/port: "8080"
prometheus.io/path: "/metrics"
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: llm-ornith
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: llm-serving
deploymentStrategy:
type: Recreate
# 1 replica -- ornith:35b only. qwen2.5:3b moved to CPU on cp-2.
# Frees 1 GPU for ComfyUI.
maxReplicas: 1
minReplicas: 1
nodeSelector:
kubernetes.io/hostname: worker-1
runtimeClassName: nvidia
volumes:
- name: models
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: llm-models
-162
View File
@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: serving.kserve.io/v1beta1
kind: InferenceService
metadata:
annotations:
serving.kserve.io/deploymentMode: RawDeployment
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: llm-reasoning
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: llm-serving
name: reasoning
namespace: llm-serving
spec:
predictor:
containers:
- args:
# bnb-4bit retired: no int4 tensor cores on sm70/V100, dequant-then-
# matmul is two slow kernel launches instead of one fused int4 GEMM,
# decode crawled at 2.5-10 tok/s regardless of TP/PP. Switched to
# JunHowie/Qwen3-32B-GPTQ-Int4 -- same dense Qwen3-32B weights, same
# hermes/qwen3 parser stack (no narration-bug risk, same as before),
# only the quant format changes. Plain (non-Marlin) GPTQ kernel is
# confirmed Volta-compatible; Marlin needs sm80+ and vLLM would try
# to auto-upgrade to it, so --quantization is pinned explicitly to
# `gptq` to force the plain kernel. Verified checkpoint size: 19.34GB
# (summed from the real safetensors index, not bits-per-param math).
# max-model-len=131072 is Qwen3-32B's real ceiling (config.json YaRN:
# factor=4.0, original_max_position_embeddings=32768) -- 200k was
# asked for but exceeds this architecturally regardless of VRAM.
# KV cache math: 256KB/token total (64 layers, 8 KV heads, 128
# head_dim, fp16), PP=2 splits both weights and KV load ~evenly, so
# each GPU carries ~9.67GB weights + ~128KB/token KV. At
# gpu-memory-utilization=0.95 (30.4GB/GPU usable), that leaves
# ~20.7GB/GPU for KV cache. NOTE this is a projection, not a
# measurement: the live reading at 0.90 is num_gpu_blocks=9527 x
# block_size=16 = 152,432 tokens (vllm:cache_config_info). Re-read that
# metric after the rollout -- max_num_batched_tokens=8192 also raises
# activation memory out of the same budget, so the post-boot
# num_gpu_blocks is the authoritative number, and --max-num-seqs=5 is
# only valid if it still covers 2x65k + 3x8k. The old
# OffloadingConnector CPU-DRAM spillover (tuned for the previous
# model's much smaller 16384 context) is no longer needed and is
# dropped. Staying on PP=2 and vLLM 0.11.0 (no version bump needed,
# this checkpoint only requires vllm>=0.9.2) -- plain GPTQ has no
# TP>1 restriction unlike bnb, so tensor-parallel-size=2 is worth
# trying later, but not risking a parallelism-strategy change in the
# same rollout as the quant+context-length change.
# This GPTQ requant's own config.json ships max_position_embeddings=
# 40960 and rope_scaling=None -- confirmed directly (curl'd the raw
# config.json), the base Qwen3-32B repo's YaRN block did NOT carry
# over during quantization. Re-applying it explicitly here restores
# the same math the base model documents (32768 * 4.0 = 131072);
# without this, --max-model-len=131072 fails ModelConfig validation
# against the checkpoint's own (unscaled) 40960 ceiling.
- --model=JunHowie/Qwen3-32B-GPTQ-Int4
- --served-model-name=reasoning
- --quantization=gptq
- --dtype=float16
- --kv-cache-dtype=auto
- --rope-scaling={"rope_type":"yarn","factor":4.0,"original_max_position_embeddings":32768}
- --tensor-parallel-size=1
- --pipeline-parallel-size=2
- --max-model-len=131072
- --gpu-memory-utilization=0.95
- --max-num-seqs=5
# Prefill scheduling -- see the measured starvation this fixes.
# V1's scheduler has no prefill/decode phase: it walks self.running and
# hands out tokens from one shared budget (vllm/v1/core/sched/scheduler.py:
# "There's no decoding phase nor prefill phase in the scheduler"). The cap
# per request is applied BEFORE the budget clamp:
# if 0 < long_prefill_token_threshold < num_new_tokens: take = threshold
# take = min(take, token_budget)
# The loop is `while ... and token_budget > 0`. With the threshold at its
# default of 0 the cap is disabled, so one long prompt takes the ENTIRE
# budget, token_budget hits 0, the loop exits and every other request is
# skipped for that step -- measured as 262 tok/s contended prefill and
# 0.0-0.1 tok/s generation for everything else, Running: 2-4 reqs.
# Hence threshold must be strictly BELOW the budget or it never binds:
# at 8192/8192 a single request is served per step (still starved), while
# 8192/2048 serves four. Verified by replaying the loop.
- --max-num-batched-tokens=8192
- --long-prefill-token-threshold=2048
- --enable-chunked-prefill
- --enable-prefix-caching
#
# NOT set, deliberately: --max-num-partial-prefills and
# --max-long-partial-prefills. Those are V0-only knobs. vLLM 0.11.0 ships
# V1 only (vllm/core/ absent), and EngineArgs._is_v1_supported_oracle
# rejects any value other than the default for either one, calling
# _raise_or_fallback("Concurrent Partial Prefill") -> "Falling back to V0"
# -> AssertionError, because there is no V0 engine to fall back to.
# The Deployment uses strategy Recreate, so setting them is an outage.
# V1 does concurrent chunked prefill natively; it needs no flag, only the
# budget/threshold ratio above.
# qwen3 is vLLM's dedicated reasoning parser for this family's <think>
# blocks.
- --reasoning-parser=qwen3
# hermes is the documented tool-call parser for general (non-Coder)
# Qwen3 models -- native chat template support, not narrated text.
- --enable-auto-tool-choice
- --tool-call-parser=hermes
- --host=0.0.0.0
- --port=8080
env:
- name: VLLM_USE_FLASHINFER_SAMPLER
value: '0'
- name: VLLM_ATTENTION_BACKEND
value: TRITON_ATTN
- name: HF_HOME
value: /mnt/models
image: vllm/vllm-openai:v0.11.0@sha256:014a95f21c9edf6abe0aea6b07353f96baa4ec291c427bb1176dc7c93a85845c
name: kserve-container
ports:
- containerPort: 8080
protocol: TCP
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: 8080
periodSeconds: 10
resources:
limits:
cpu: '16'
memory: 36Gi
nvidia.com/gpu: '2'
requests:
cpu: '8'
memory: 12Gi
nvidia.com/gpu: '2'
startupProbe:
failureThreshold: 80
httpGet:
path: /health
port: 8080
periodSeconds: 15
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /mnt/models
name: models
- mountPath: /dev/shm
name: shm
podMetadata:
annotations:
prometheus.io/scrape: "true"
prometheus.io/port: "8080"
prometheus.io/path: "/metrics"
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: llm-reasoning
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: llm-serving
deploymentStrategy:
type: Recreate
maxReplicas: 1
minReplicas: 1
nodeSelector:
kubernetes.io/hostname: worker-1
runtimeClassName: nvidia
volumes:
- name: models
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: llm-models
- emptyDir:
medium: Memory
sizeLimit: 2Gi
name: shm
+1
View File
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ spec:
mountPath: /backup
containers:
- name: mc-mirror
# bitnamilegacy/minio-client:2025.7.21-debian-12-r3 replaces the dead quay.io/minio/mc image
image: docker.io/bitnamilegacy/minio-client:2025.7.21-debian-12-r3@sha256:73bd39f7899a0cef12b8dd5df13aa93a3ed1aaa44236542442e9ac76819ac158
env:
- name: ACCESS_KEY
+2 -2
View File
@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ spec:
echo "[init] Fetching JWT token from Authentik for paperless-ai-agent..."
# Get JWT token via client_credentials grant
TOKEN_RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/token/ \
TOKEN_RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST https://zitadel.riotpiao.com/oauth/v2/token \
-d "grant_type=client_credentials" \
-d "client_id=paperless-ai-agent" \
-d "client_id=396757803559027071" \
-d "client_secret=29skAhE0tBzWn0qrPvmPTQMva0joFjcCr7msDQr_VXQ" \
-d "scope=openid llm:inference" 2>/dev/null)
+10 -2
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,14 @@ metadata:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless-ai
spec:
replicas: 1
# Recreate, not RollingUpdate: paperless-ai-data is a single RWO PVC. With
# RollingUpdate the new pod tries to mount the PVC while the old pod still
# holds it -> "Multi-Attach error" / stuck Init:0/1 forever, rollout wedged
# at "1 desired, 1 ready, 1 updated, 1 unavailable". Recreate terminates the
# old pod first so the PVC detaches before the new one starts. Same pattern
# as the Forgejo gitea Deployment.
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless-ai
@@ -43,9 +51,9 @@ spec:
# Get JWT token via client_credentials grant
# Client secret sourced from environment (injected from paperless-ai-config Secret)
TOKEN_RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/token/ \
TOKEN_RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST https://zitadel.riotpiao.com/oauth/v2/token \
-d "grant_type=client_credentials" \
-d "client_id=paperless-ai-agent" \
-d "client_id=396757803559027071" \
-d "client_secret=${LLM_AUTH_CLIENT_SECRET}" \
-d "scope=openid llm:inference" 2>/dev/null)
+38 -29
View File
@@ -30,33 +30,6 @@ spec:
syncOptions:
- CreateNamespace=true
---
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Application
metadata:
name: authentik
namespace: argocd
annotations:
argocd.argoproj.io/sync-wave: "3"
spec:
project: homelab
sources:
- repoURL: https://charts.goauthentik.io
chart: authentik
targetRevision: "*"
helm:
valueFiles:
- $values/k8s/infra/iam/authentik-values.yaml
- repoURL: https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/riotpiao-poimen/homelab.git
targetRevision: main
ref: values
destination:
server: https://kubernetes.default.svc
namespace: iam
syncPolicy:
automated:
prune: true
selfHeal: true
---
# ZITADEL — the Authentik replacement. Coexistence, not cutover: Authentik keeps
# serving in the same `iam` namespace until the last consumer moves, then this
# becomes the only IdP. Migration plan (outside git):
@@ -106,11 +79,47 @@ spec:
syncOptions:
- CreateNamespace=true
---
# Raw IAM manifests: key-rotation cronjob + authentik migration job.
# ZITADEL core objects (ServiceAccount, Role, RoleBinding, ConfigMap).
#
# The chart declares these as pre-install/pre-upgrade Helm hooks, and ArgoCD
# prunes hook resources when a sync ends. That deleted the ServiceAccount and
# ConfigMap the ZITADEL Deployment references, so new pods failed to start with
# `serviceaccount "zitadel" not found`. This Application owns hook-free copies,
# which makes them ordinary desired state that survives every sync.
#
# Wave 2: before the zatadel chart itself, so the ServiceAccount exists by the
# time its Deployment is created.
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Application
metadata:
name: iam-jobs
name: zitadel-core
namespace: argocd
annotations:
argocd.argoproj.io/sync-wave: "2"
spec:
project: homelab
source:
repoURL: https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/riotpiao-poimen/homelab.git
targetRevision: main
path: k8s/infra/zitadel-core
destination:
server: https://kubernetes.default.svc
namespace: iam
syncPolicy:
automated:
prune: false
selfHeal: true
syncOptions:
- CreateNamespace=true
---
# Raw IAM support manifests: the SMTP -> Gotify notification relay that ZITADEL
# points at, so verification and password-reset codes reach the phone. Wave 3
# alongside ZITADEL itself; the Secret it reads is created by sops-secrets at
# wave 0.
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Application
metadata:
name: iam-support
namespace: argocd
annotations:
argocd.argoproj.io/sync-wave: "3"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# Wave 2 — dedicated per-app CNPG Postgres clusters (authentik-db → ns iam,
# Wave 2 — dedicated per-app CNPG Postgres clusters (zitadel-db → ns iam,
# temporal-db + visibility → ns temporal). ONE App, ONE folder (k8s/infra/databases).
# CNPG operator is Phase-0 bootstrap; these Cluster CRs are GitOps — no circular
# dep (they run after ArgoCD is up, before their apps at w3/w8). CNPG generates
-34
View File
@@ -171,40 +171,6 @@ spec:
syncOptions:
- CreateNamespace=true
---
# Consolidated: homarr + homarr-patches → homarr
# Helm chart + values + PostSync hook patch (fix-probes-job.yaml)
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Application
metadata:
name: homarr
namespace: argocd
annotations:
argocd.argoproj.io/sync-wave: "8"
spec:
project: homelab
sources:
- repoURL: https://homarr-labs.github.io/charts
chart: homarr
targetRevision: "*"
helm:
valueFiles:
- $values/k8s/apps/homarr/homarr-values.yaml
- repoURL: https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/riotpiao-poimen/homelab.git
targetRevision: main
ref: values
- repoURL: https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/riotpiao-poimen/homelab.git
targetRevision: main
path: k8s/apps/homarr # PostSync hook: fix-probes-job.yaml
destination:
server: https://kubernetes.default.svc
namespace: dashboard
syncPolicy:
automated:
prune: true
selfHeal: true
syncOptions:
- CreateNamespace=true
---
# Portfolio site at riotpiao.com - static Next.js site from rock/riotpiao.com repo.
# Points directly to infra/portfolio/base (bypassing repo's own argocd-apps.yaml
# which has wrong URLs). Image built by Forgejo Actions on rock/portfolio repo.
-20
View File
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Application
metadata:
name: oidc-bootstrap
namespace: argocd
annotations:
argocd.argoproj.io/sync-wave: "5"
spec:
project: homelab
source:
repoURL: https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/riotpiao-poimen/homelab.git
targetRevision: main
path: k8s/infra/oidc-bootstrap
destination:
server: https://kubernetes.default.svc
namespace: kube-system
syncPolicy:
automated:
prune: true
selfHeal: true
-2
View File
@@ -34,11 +34,9 @@ spec:
- https://prometheus-community.github.io/helm-charts
- https://grafana.github.io/helm-charts
- https://helm.releases.hashicorp.com
- https://charts.goauthentik.io
- https://charts.zitadel.com
- https://strimzi.io/charts/
- https://charts.bitnami.com/bitnami
- https://homarr-labs.github.io/charts
- https://go.temporal.io/helm-charts
- https://portainer.github.io/k8s/
# Substrate charts (cert-manager, ingress-nginx, reloader) — app-of-apps owned
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Fc0=,iv:UFqMFeZTJZtFMoNeusjAoSI60U9StZS4IXw+n8JQCRM=,tag:uUvY4+jcjiSJHs0HDS3/7A==,type:str]
kind: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:NUw86IEw,iv:gh4Vqn6uteYnYIFcXT/QVxRPKm+G+j2aIVuV71nZ4k4=,tag:nZA/x75Kx4+CoSx66BsvkQ==,type:str]
metadata:
name: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:qex150pm0eGwYiiI05y9LUs=,iv:5Tk001T796c4HFikoh1ZVB6ierBfDqOUkFs5ilkr+V8=,tag:LiDAiCH7w6aRS41VKIlIKg==,type:str]
namespace: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:nI91,iv:c1hBWGMkVb+vg+MKNzty8CFfXxQabXEtT+EpiuQZNvo=,tag:BsGtJDbBadDdTa687+Sdag==,type:str]
type: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:3rXawlSD,iv:FUtLK4KP7v/SBF08ZcU6siIO1qfjlJirf2x5PyzAjuA=,tag:mSIQ+Y43+wDfZGRbQ6a0Og==,type:str]
stringData:
AUTHENTIK_SECRET_KEY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:i5tVOWnN9a/cfhs6gckveRxUpiN7Ie227R/74kOIz6lQ5US2hkf03W5qSGCrzheL3DB0i8+d0iJYsApjn/wCiN7ndZZVFko3W5jDfVPybxc=,iv:djF1G9JHT5B7ziTokA/UuPpG+tG2LvFU4uMAR0x4M6o=,tag:vHOd7jLYkM8Evnr0QUVrCw==,type:str]
AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:PjvYtH03CzQbTXEqt/Z18+u1zJdok7DLwDn51FUZXDA=,iv:pSwSm8hB0/Q8uOAcOZ1rTqq7BF782EglG19GGeghm1E=,tag:qGCQFWCrwsWBOiQ07ySMUQ==,type:str]
AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:1tnekGo0GIemJCMRenjN0yNeSiiMl/kky8ms84TsqBLaQ0lQzPxjq9qtgNJwoAsufxrznrkDVKjeOEHNYcA82A==,iv:NNFWSLMILoWccA9ihy1OArSS1X3OySB7PIHdXZdyzlg=,tag:t2w+KyReOXftTrU9pBQDnQ==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBSZGRKWm9PTkNSOENtREgx
M2V3Z0xxOXRhRGVRclo3SzBKRkc0VmtCY0NnClJPSGJRcUlzWmNFeTZ1bmorNEV4
U3l3TzVlMTlrWkJnQzBtUTJtcUwrM3MKLS0tIEJrMWZrbllYYUZKN1V4MVMzcXAv
eUtheHlNMHpsTEJXZ1FTMFVxbWloa0kKLRkE1Du+4gdOLerOl9y0mZw+8fqfECQY
uP64Q+9BSuPYNiTLZvYDzmdoy+KTS7i7C9rf+iU96R/crbQLamV9Ew==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age1e5fq3hwxy78psus2nfvmtmua36g0u3suk78ephw6246l974d2utsvn0hla
lastmodified: "2026-08-12T20:37:07Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:b3pDx340d1iZxsPPXzACckoLBrW+XjX1qlGrWEEI30j2Ao0hewTRZJyHbdI97A6b/hqzBN/4tjqqkdqm8goNhUQweMLTw86X6sALuE0aLS9wK53qjqih8fQwQBbgLDtjFXtW26h+smIm7aB5ZSDvU2le44HDXuWd83sWtCavNq0=,iv:ZMDsoKpygFJrYpXy2dA0IlxAi0jt24rxF72eUzgQs7k=,tag:WWE7G7+c9JK6fF1U9V8igg==,type:str]
unencrypted_suffix: _unencrypted
version: 3.13.2
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: cloudflared-credentials
namespace: cloudflared
type: Opaque
stringData:
credentials.json: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:LnJVGuxJAOwDYbLgX00OHICDDldZgwgvGafOIwKoJKnjg3FjFMQYThNCOL/H+6tctuKixJNcAckjg70tmCKWxNq9I35XX/YSqob6Qv4fywv32hsNIAe44BU035MGZ5zmc6bZZ8wAgTJZw6Th4TzY7taFBCRdj2fW4T+qVfq7strn68G4ufVMK6UXlOkEDLjR2Vxj32lqSLdbdMma96XB+265hwL6IVfaugG662mcGhPwgHk=,iv:NFmyHN5m2mJUBgn1qgmJZ2YgkFxBZyp7+gU1Ng6B/7M=,tag:/66JtHK5Yu7pRxB0b0eifQ==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBsaDVycUE4RFpoRjdpTlpX
dGpzN3hwRFQ2cmtXVXVzWnZJOXJEZXZRWEhNCkJwbm9QV0lGcGtNRTJqbStrc3l1
Q2M4bE1WbzJpTXZQWjJyTGpFS0JYcVUKLS0tIDBvU2U5aEtVTTZUaE85eEkyYitG
bGtSVkhKNnRuNlZWMWh6Z1M4VXM1WU0KdusvtM85V0xrO+uJFUY+UH0tuwdF0GiW
79J4Rlxk8ne25psKsvwjLYLxZ53xjFHCC4FCHTNkYwTKCDEKjw46Lg==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age1e5fq3hwxy78psus2nfvmtmua36g0u3suk78ephw6246l974d2utsvn0hla
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
lastmodified: "2026-10-26T02:45:04Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:KF7KwXCnNLAg1YI3u0lLI/ho4sITHAq09ac2WO4TK3TCthkuivb89YjhuuJKs0NFhjn6aRLqmZavUqcXH2HujiryqbLNVexOShQM0wSzgCzmWdbi0UzpgJ4KcQA3PufDtsQz4HHLXx396EbZrM3Ie3WSu/PvRm5iWOxzTGCGc9Q=,iv:Eo920oXXD1FLZVJXywZ6C+LRL+qZjmnZXv0+Oa/GMb8=,tag:6LuPVSet4WjvrvGUAxaJlw==,type:str]
version: 3.13.2
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: grafana-gotify-bridge
namespace: notifications
type: Opaque
data:
app-token: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:MnkKT0/ubJctmLTFXjdCZjNlz+KgQLsPwIKCmPF2weEtMw6ieRfb3+B7OUlIiDqpktdPaJA/znsMOYPXT2aXDqyKquA=,iv:vcAGkgfTheoViZ7OzJJhbNf0boIbRBZLr60ieW5DhLk=,tag:iBDJEjGScxHopkNExh7jDw==,type:str]
sops:
kms: []
gcp_kms: []
azure_kv: []
hc_vault: []
age:
- recipient: age1e5fq3hwxy78psus2nfvmtmua36g0u3suk78ephw6246l974d2utsvn0hla
enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBYYWZYNFBHbVhRSkZoa3dH
dWp3WllyVmRPcExPTndZUlFsTG1YMHN6WW1jCjRiS1M2U0tIM0tCdGhJOUQ0c2JW
bXNTTExDeVVmcExuNStldFdhTHMrVTgKLS0tIDN3d3JKSEtIUUFhVHROOVBUaUNO
UUVGcVVkOVJmN294dE5DS1R1UkxiZzgKx0MEkIrFsO2dQwjY2410Nj0Nyy3QgC3L
T844m4WT+mxFwB69/y0luGkn4aXMS3xrHHWUC+vjAkM4Unp+MKhhrg==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
lastmodified: "2026-10-27T19:35:38Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Gf5jnvWP+jBRc8fvQHyrnHnTDaaUTcXQgoOqm7Drax5FpBYEHa36pdKaUq+XR6VBd7ch6Ia/f7YavhS47ybgR3jn+w+trMxkpwtZhm5clw2Lo3Hm7Cvi4fG4qhcjm1C8/NOnWGsi5Qm+TJqyG509p9HNTvM99SzElRovPZldLL4=,iv:10hA6nq0WIO0a2I4ZW6uPGXPjesFgxrwmXohNO3FZz4=,tag:bJ37e8jvgEactq6T/pM2UQ==,type:str]
pgp: []
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
version: 3.9.3
@@ -1,23 +1,28 @@
apiVersion: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:rGU=,iv:w1yJeQvN0MPZlPx8VQZmC6zkRaHW4rtjjROea0Kx9X4=,tag:qgYgVUGMQ2BtN0RZ0nZYjQ==,type:str]
kind: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:wp2QP1he,iv:C8c/jKh5pnBOtHqXsTEchGf9DACU/5hOJ0Mp/+Jk1kg=,tag:QUZNeguRXdi3JO6Ov6GMDg==,type:str]
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:jVsnAcFTlRiKxDoU,iv:bWEqo28kH3bxzfI3ipiY6dsqhIcl9wIxBjFu0mxVGLg=,tag:PVWTveI8xhvLxvXPldhimQ==,type:str]
namespace: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:ZHnVZyd3wA==,iv:3evUnFTQfRz/ZilUQIl/9dsCba3nsX6o/iQsGXMBfgM=,tag:+9kp+VRu1ksroDTbTGmGPA==,type:str]
type: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:bHX+Bu9o,iv:8qqNddsuw4YoHAuJfUcPIqjcqNySIh5Ln8OhsfZxuk8=,tag:P7QGUXo9Io2Y19YqlWv5sQ==,type:str]
name: grafana-oidc
namespace: logging
type: Opaque
stringData:
GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:qW2SQSsGD0YupU2SMzRaYwkLRjXAwV1OJBnhATpCJrOHWbEytw6IphOmPPd3VZKfHncekA4agXi4K3rUPHIx0Q==,iv:NCeW/UfIl0RvHV39ubN2mDfFp7GTQNuFv8KiEF+7KOE=,tag:lisx4h4PqUfLwBX8ca9Siw==,type:str]
GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:fGqA1ofVme1lVLxFjWIiU7sbvE9ip2Af7C1ua3+HdidlcVgkwW59vVlXZhgBRdoif86C8LKQSyoCGUqiO+740g==,iv:6Kv2ybbJg1GT8DLqz9P5y+E1zr7vcIBDMUErmvxNTaw=,tag:0wK28B3G/owCVPPqb2sLmQ==,type:str]
sops:
kms: []
gcp_kms: []
azure_kv: []
hc_vault: []
age:
- enc: |
- recipient: age1e5fq3hwxy78psus2nfvmtmua36g0u3suk78ephw6246l974d2utsvn0hla
enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBrUkxLMEV3aEpILytic0Ux
V2VEV2EvcENJVnNNRUtBbGkwT0d6eUxYeEFvCjZPSkU2MG5qME5jZ01mRVJwTUFL
M3M0V3c3QXBoRml1Vm9NWW5JTlNRSG8KLS0tIEJnNlFmdFJXb1BPaVJzTmo1RDQv
VXZOVHRHUEZJRUZ4eGZGM1RxSURyWXcK3ZyYCPhRUvpvT/pjPQGJoLIwaktZY6Tg
LS0cIDUhjPFbeu7qUATOrat6vMUi0UREbXSFZ1KyAjNAwJZaUusPMA==
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RqzZ6xV+mhlDj0zC+SpVcEm/Ki83nMYOj4+vQingZlr/Kr3Nwb0iLQ==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age1e5fq3hwxy78psus2nfvmtmua36g0u3suk78ephw6246l974d2utsvn0hla
lastmodified: "2026-08-12T18:02:01Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:yUBBV7dLEPld9yJacn+YaOT8M1NJ2ploGIxV66aVOH5x4tDAsskcUQJlzApWCQmORuCuMKg6qfpGgLTojfD5msha+ufVVJXHl7ua+STar1/FPJXaHm+z7YyZdsD5j6f3AH8q18DuLy2DYLjXELmPBsp50g7MDJEm3xLhCUXygjQ=,iv:xl0OtA/2umz0YH5b+6QjlAByZWbvfGOmHqomziNjlkw=,tag:xwkQDZx19Lf6QSwU2zPYTQ==,type:str]
unencrypted_suffix: _unencrypted
version: 3.13.2
lastmodified: "2026-10-27T19:44:32Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:EJew+p/kJrurcNpLlFxJGTl69hQYxn3IkzP7EDtdSriW/WI7X1xNLC2dp/dTiLomGmG1uh6+2JI9Sc8gXmrRAWLELAbiOaYbcoU6gi89BjTCWGDAMX4lNSIuH40rsGs4YtYj5U7SGfgx5qto4ZH7LxjBmxzPWM/Xz2Uq/I5jV4k=,iv:LdhjhwCfPUIa7D0gved8Twf7ujN+dg3lN8lCnFBFs0g=,tag:bjkwUCMtR8IBL9BkbuXcnw==,type:str]
pgp: []
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
version: 3.9.3
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:uiQ=,iv:vknDc16Zrz/lxS1WG3ksG4SHjhJSTDdklVxxwL8eylA=,tag:1srpVd6QTYQGGGYGXT8Cbw==,type:str]
kind: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:K6EPYaNE,iv:VWzawfTDNlag+shjBqwSzZGcQQq/TGxeHDqd4fAh5Vc=,tag:ncPqMYjq/73oMzphWhuuFA==,type:str]
metadata:
name: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:vaRNQHFYfdUz1hzuYO0JxQ==,iv:W7aUJID5mxoO1NQAcyPDYV1FGtBT8myKVMA3s2WgrPk=,tag:4Ef4GBtTR3dVanscvigRmw==,type:str]
namespace: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:HDlmfGwad37/,iv:JFPXxz9xp5vDJRcWy73SYGWDMyHKWQq9Bvy/NJTwTnU=,tag:2ldVXgzKn4xp1rZI/VYgUw==,type:str]
type: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:UgolDLIV,iv:O4himI90UVwx+OjKJXobu10Zg3a5IoQcjAORsdhaWpg=,tag:xltntRsamhQkPEoBNtMytw==,type:str]
stringData:
oidc-client-id: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:RLdxXY/a,iv:US/fBReK7u8WA4IS6TSzYiHQkte2CuVgugIMpA/pIlA=,tag:QKrHGQrzI9YpfNQD+ts68A==,type:str]
oidc-client-secret: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:SS+I92xEkOcJHTfWvZ1AA8hh1bFAtND5adZ6Uh73nIPiqAo958GSag==,iv:9HcmXWrGtflc6WWQe0n/pgB1Xveakofc3hvz5vuE29A=,tag:0emgeyM4GBftVKn/fx7XPg==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBCWkR5V0ZYSTBSSU1OTWF1
TzFxdnZkUFFIcGJWZ1VUU21ZUnU2cUdob1drCkhVTm02dkZPZ2lNWktOcWZ2c0Vi
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6GRUORFug5h7x5kjXK9sU0yTHjFSekwBi75GLng0IrLEGJxHVM5wVQ==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age1e5fq3hwxy78psus2nfvmtmua36g0u3suk78ephw6246l974d2utsvn0hla
lastmodified: "2026-08-12T21:07:30Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:NupjQWBJHMOo3/VX5n5nRx+RFT14N71XkrjXRC/VCP7i7H8yn3tcRdH9g14usgWunmqg2KKpGMUIZ9bsQ9Vds9sBvUKvLyRkfQnPwPh9+PFCF3ZZLPgzqcT19kg4I3QabmO+LPzQXsZWLKIqgF9/B60EVIgYyKhZmP7XblY5AVo=,iv:r0deq8+txE8TwzdtxOMaIAZbZc2fu+Tp4Jd2HZGbkhM=,tag:qMpZp6LcWjJHYMDp9ecBkA==,type:str]
unencrypted_suffix: _unencrypted
version: 3.13.2
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:FO4=,iv:kKIuJp4uGeX6vECsXk7w43F9S281jObQchmK8r1+kmA=,tag:x5LYd34dzNDLCma/78M4+w==,type:str]
kind: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:o4RTN8SK,iv:uyOJWjDmHIPuBl9Wc1S/HxUabV2yytWr1bntHW68sTI=,tag:3On0SnQVJ/ICMMryQe+8JQ==,type:str]
metadata:
name: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:a89dHmLdSeMHE7ZP0Q==,iv:OWJvJhFqJ7A0UGVJnZILzCJ/4VuVFib9sUDjXuwyqJQ=,tag:1XrIQn1GDh8RQ4vmQAu7+g==,type:str]
namespace: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:4wBVpZJgQGM9,iv:3Tn1u/2TP/+SnELu34PDf4Jauf2L4f8+MtgrPIlyKzk=,tag:L3qbKFBjm16g8KX5vUsK6A==,type:str]
type: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:mdrF9vUb,iv:7ukOgwXlnRf5mpJ/+6YXtyGRonnqehEgT4pJJIafw7c=,tag:90mt7jpNb3N80kCEi+R/rA==,type:str]
stringData:
db-encryption-key: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:NWJryAEd/eUJxbNiu05RzLF/l7GDxIQM7RQe3xKBz6XklgRAFwQxxjakcVd85pePUBaQYz3zttFglWhfJlWhkA==,iv:eUWbcs0B/mIheyAQ2+DyKgcA98CRKQGAVC3O0WIkfU8=,tag:be06X6AQqlohYlxuYoZiTg==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSB1Ym5yQ1pmWHZjVnYxbUVO
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AhGbJVaA7PaOCswPWiOLso26zD+MBB3VKHNdUFnenpoM16Nu4pOf5w==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age1e5fq3hwxy78psus2nfvmtmua36g0u3suk78ephw6246l974d2utsvn0hla
lastmodified: "2026-08-12T21:07:30Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:KrGQY/eOmihYCvQCbfcM6bZ6rfx4zKh62M8NM0VQr1//1dSHpOOh25dYGLuQeECnqLxSpGQNWzr2xjUYWs4NOdSEFGq6FL2iHE3LnqoBZspp/JFJYP6+z/8jSUojwKEW7OuZZdPN6gF2u+IPOeWbGftnjS7X+atoSkYag2ty2vk=,iv:IOPEgBizsxrVoK5oSdWmi0uCBUnReOEnMYXuwSBKTzA=,tag:9k/XQ/AE7wSFq5XMbY0FTA==,type:str]
unencrypted_suffix: _unencrypted
version: 3.13.2
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:4OY=,iv:0Lgui0+X2oTlgCX5HEIIihEsGJD0C2+pDIOTCNi4r+g=,tag:uL7vlreaHjcLJjV7e5I7PQ==,type:str]
kind: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:x/ltkind,iv:KRBfS7COsTs/l3Fhyk5FvH7IVc+r/6M6FVOo+kPDe1Q=,tag:UuTbe213hDfK/WUtKS/doQ==,type:str]
metadata:
name: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:LpOEecTJBuGy5PqNSFM=,iv:Q+DCLGtw3wihhdAgEbzYHyQhFTPWFyE2iJKl9mYaA2E=,tag:E2wrig4lRXGDvSCHec5clQ==,type:str]
namespace: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:6kMVCXaF68NO,iv:gnCCkV7GKXA2HWOOeNUGnpAycf8U7pl6F8Vfo6DhLR4=,tag:0VdeySsuhUr2heXyGXZwBg==,type:str]
type: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:6muC3Zqh,iv:gBaC+6MXvZY/bIpy/cEG/zWwLBaUFMVfxAHa1OnwfnQ=,tag:v6NYyhAKAwovluHAXNaOVA==,type:str]
stringData:
SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:jX9ULlaBYTSTFGRMplSder5rMrsz7THU3kgJSGef0r5rZvtoaAG9NVYU2QUEuD0sZgfqRooeMOkDCAqFc8qsuw==,iv:uOmx8w3XPKnoxfasf7gqi/bljxigpLwaAC30c2TroKg=,tag:Dmbu6m3+UZa1w0UR0LRh9g==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSB6TDVyNGRtYWgzMDYwdjdr
NXJWcGJZNUx6YzBGWm1nWlp0SlN3WXhaR0VBCjZ3bDBmUTFCUjg3U21wak90eHZK
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R3Jyzf6OolZMJpNwbetcsOfgO61aM7LHl/Xb/hFLbLjZ+eECrt8VpA==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age1e5fq3hwxy78psus2nfvmtmua36g0u3suk78ephw6246l974d2utsvn0hla
lastmodified: "2026-08-12T18:02:01Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:HTrEEVDm8JqnVBFaY/FJknxma0nI95tRiwVc0K76k+2R4jgKCBA3EUAzPVS+gA4rTAeKHPSHrT2eidlkseT2WQUjqMRrpHcUsbSjNfpTEY2g/U0PIiOXZMRGfwmsQVgmu2fqeMOyzDSyya0scdWJXPraRPNZ+OpEkNVlm4rWcgs=,iv:KY3dnnmooJgsu66wc7gbzeIGUXZNgVrxAhpAwxoG+G8=,tag:7r6d41oTD136N57rtY7auA==,type:str]
unencrypted_suffix: _unencrypted
version: 3.13.2
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: igotify-client-token
namespace: notifications
type: Opaque
data:
client-token: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:W+InmDyZkU0i+OqQUsIaRNY/3p6zjMC19ASj/qYHTldhtGmHwj4koQX3tIxdCQV72xZKOxsc8eV3hGX3pqbW02c2/ng=,iv:wWI5AZdpxnzX61f8iTiWmxKcDFMaFM4PHFYo4DMBK4Q=,tag:CpE8Kg5V8fL7P3oAjWjSvQ==,type:str]
sops:
kms: []
gcp_kms: []
azure_kv: []
hc_vault: []
age:
- recipient: age1e5fq3hwxy78psus2nfvmtmua36g0u3suk78ephw6246l974d2utsvn0hla
enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSAwaUlFU0xKaEs0SWcxWEEr
T0tUSmErR08zVkhuLy9VMEc3VXdmU1o3cWdrCjhuOW1yTmZPdWxDZHhMeUZtQlcz
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Y+V51R/WFobEQuAZLmDKgWcPSGt51effufB/Vm9LRRqtbkbYQAIoXQ==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
lastmodified: "2026-10-27T19:14:20Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Hxl7AGzMOMK0pwe6T9ZmrE6K45XhQkq4qk/7YkrVuneL1e7jc8Bmv4NlywqRkt9fPVOCMwKikeX9U3ZcsqK13xPPfm1CmAxV3CCluwK0/9589N70OQxL4qJSkO6CXyGaa0Y9wVRX4y/N3wSjW+d25+GOYUXrOxkRpVyU4GFSqAQ=,iv:0Af/MCZBEYJVI3yi7DpPX1eBKwSANXJPCpSAEE3zCq4=,tag:SS1U9TfRQR3z8KkoQ6ZuZA==,type:str]
pgp: []
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
version: 3.9.3
+43 -43
View File
@@ -1,72 +1,72 @@
apiVersion: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Mdg=,iv:u/JjNJfdyz7ehk8lHZRh1u9zkNuufHosyXv10Gm+T6E=,tag:pkgZVJid6kpGuy61+oEMlQ==,type:str]
kind: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:/kWhhqyz,iv:DymezGpBHmKT3BM/CcUKEGIWZw/JXNutReSKfhfmoD4=,tag:DnA+316Z+0eqBWN8YLyv1A==,type:str]
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:xs1k//nWy1iJ52Q=,iv:NDGvM319FCypxFLWwONcF12osaU/EL0IwD0c2xtqYnU=,tag:6IhfISF08WQbxrUmT49d7g==,type:str]
namespace: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:jpUzI7BmZA==,iv:PQrfm67la6RJCRq0H7qpiY8n2hPUjcaK6gmJ/zPQW30=,tag:bp/3GYbRpYOIub5nT0zz/A==,type:str]
type: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:fndXB4Y1,iv:EXOe0day1ScxvZ7ozn1QyHgaZgnvlPNmvSQG74aw7lM=,tag:quPmKvFTjRqtZoVUEoQAHQ==,type:str]
name: minio-creds
namespace: storage
type: Opaque
stringData:
config.env: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:3RIQ1i6NtY1Tv2eJY8JXSgfBEqi9px/9TJVNrPf9+brtGy9Mx3SwjKVnjGXUcA2cYcNZb1JR7temXmznXQdsRfZ9yohe4oc1vL3yPGPY9YfP7AHGYj9E7tghu/rgkHOf93RmfdKv0Rrq6miBcA==,iv:0RQVMi2mMHBRTJ1OX6IDFvq9Qr7zpqgQzt+MPPgBIHA=,tag:HNXLKf5X4P3E+hc7YbDtNQ==,type:str]
config.env: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:1yogGyBdwrlg27H8R5Kr9VcPu+xwS5/nPhi7eLcmVYtXmPlNokCsWHA70qnn/+I6i4ODys8GML++VeZ/lmcHiP7RIbY+G6xmw6nfBCXitgE8kQwTPsUUzn9bobOn4Sr1YMBf7FQ/Q0N8aupGJA==,iv:EfCdim4TLkP/FP1u1yoKZCq8YGFzVh7ca4yu1+WzXwE=,tag:rTYe0SIAEsUhh0KHQIEKNw==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBtUVJFQ1ErNmkzd1N6b29t
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-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age1e5fq3hwxy78psus2nfvmtmua36g0u3suk78ephw6246l974d2utsvn0hla
lastmodified: "2026-08-12T18:02:01Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:hQfimKuhfiIiZQAyNDZQR25HZ5biU+kaWig3ElVPiqMY3B0LrmKyOEs7ittd3j3meUkPEFSmm1yYSXcdCuf6w7cwSbEiL5DG8t7QKPbnx/aRdyHAJW+1VC0e3Lye43gaHya0iUaWS/YFQcrT01oEbckLIDWPKfvA6pg2bZ4kMZ4=,iv:AydyWMVcjTQu+7Fzw5vtqkvTTeQEMt8y6snESoLUDE8=,tag:SoKklNqa9nH9G6d9+PnolQ==,type:str]
unencrypted_suffix: _unencrypted
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
lastmodified: "2026-10-26T04:03:16Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:gxu4WcJEuFgjtWCfAjose8R8a566/OLrXoiJmKfcvVfTFDTdGM7I4gzQVvpjEfra5Hjyt7kvLlaV2K5bKJ0k6NXbbmgrqAqEOEcPg+cnPy1FtQGAYOo3VzgKqrpLOCs/7wh4YR23XHHsjQlHAcP8BmhrqnpHXR9FMZObrKjnQj8=,iv:KJZfw0n2DOtdZHeVDk6TrpO8q57yD+xdEVt9+hM0D4Q=,tag:rHQaMjvQwaB8Am/AlTKq1g==,type:str]
version: 3.13.2
---
apiVersion: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Mdg=,iv:u/JjNJfdyz7ehk8lHZRh1u9zkNuufHosyXv10Gm+T6E=,tag:pkgZVJid6kpGuy61+oEMlQ==,type:str]
kind: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:/kWhhqyz,iv:DymezGpBHmKT3BM/CcUKEGIWZw/JXNutReSKfhfmoD4=,tag:DnA+316Z+0eqBWN8YLyv1A==,type:str]
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:XEQHsQqTgwukYw==,iv:wTw2eoooDA9EfB2df3jzb0IWUdtLSwcuKzx8yDBaihQ=,tag:oncXt2gM1k6Qppafpu/D1w==,type:str]
namespace: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:jpUzI7BmZA==,iv:PQrfm67la6RJCRq0H7qpiY8n2hPUjcaK6gmJ/zPQW30=,tag:bp/3GYbRpYOIub5nT0zz/A==,type:str]
type: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:fndXB4Y1,iv:EXOe0day1ScxvZ7ozn1QyHgaZgnvlPNmvSQG74aw7lM=,tag:quPmKvFTjRqtZoVUEoQAHQ==,type:str]
name: minio-oidc
namespace: storage
type: Opaque
stringData:
MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:IYBfNW19cTo8WkCGT4zuCljzi2bkbYWJ8DY/yedR2MJNqEO+bMVvjx0OqSqbPp6rnwGyMQOhBN0gXPbEVRDBGg==,iv:I1aGIikbHTKvh//4Inhp7UoNfhjlIXSpcyP4RqljvqM=,tag:Zh3Vh5DQYAsTtiW59D0/QA==,type:str]
MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:eFfwW2ZnV+o3/6XHjUvyFsDbaIAdosY2PXOnRdN4Ie49YDIjfJPe+Mg1FsbgoEHEjuB33hfxesb4TWOJQfW8Og==,iv:+kRr9A3auts1XHgZWa+t5b2m4lF0x9dVhiRpB17fzv4=,tag:tH/jszFzLQdqORGr9vfTGw==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBtUVJFQ1ErNmkzd1N6b29t
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oJtbRK+kJF8oOUo4emI+SLGrCsWq5cG2wN/wgP+ChR1zUgRgfq5oOA==
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSB2SStVR0lpOWs0VnN6dkdp
RktMUmNRR2diTUtiVk9tRk1wSjVTMnRtVlJBCkk1S0dwNUNHb25RQlZ4ZFRocisv
aS9kbmQydWVmN1AxU3VvbFZsS2tmTHcKLS0tICtRY0ZKeFhCTUdaNW5PSFRNZ2dG
OERIZ0xMbHBvSVNyaGxCVFpqRzlxa1EKbrjfk/CFlTSyJYgTzQ67W3JyR1fwv8VF
dxGeAgLY4EQrf+2PbODtazRFreS+sl7dxq+rKMOVZTsjGHakkqHy9A==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age1e5fq3hwxy78psus2nfvmtmua36g0u3suk78ephw6246l974d2utsvn0hla
lastmodified: "2026-08-12T18:02:01Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:hQfimKuhfiIiZQAyNDZQR25HZ5biU+kaWig3ElVPiqMY3B0LrmKyOEs7ittd3j3meUkPEFSmm1yYSXcdCuf6w7cwSbEiL5DG8t7QKPbnx/aRdyHAJW+1VC0e3Lye43gaHya0iUaWS/YFQcrT01oEbckLIDWPKfvA6pg2bZ4kMZ4=,iv:AydyWMVcjTQu+7Fzw5vtqkvTTeQEMt8y6snESoLUDE8=,tag:SoKklNqa9nH9G6d9+PnolQ==,type:str]
unencrypted_suffix: _unencrypted
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
lastmodified: "2026-10-26T04:03:16Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:gxu4WcJEuFgjtWCfAjose8R8a566/OLrXoiJmKfcvVfTFDTdGM7I4gzQVvpjEfra5Hjyt7kvLlaV2K5bKJ0k6NXbbmgrqAqEOEcPg+cnPy1FtQGAYOo3VzgKqrpLOCs/7wh4YR23XHHsjQlHAcP8BmhrqnpHXR9FMZObrKjnQj8=,iv:KJZfw0n2DOtdZHeVDk6TrpO8q57yD+xdEVt9+hM0D4Q=,tag:rHQaMjvQwaB8Am/AlTKq1g==,type:str]
version: 3.13.2
---
apiVersion: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Mdg=,iv:u/JjNJfdyz7ehk8lHZRh1u9zkNuufHosyXv10Gm+T6E=,tag:pkgZVJid6kpGuy61+oEMlQ==,type:str]
kind: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:/kWhhqyz,iv:DymezGpBHmKT3BM/CcUKEGIWZw/JXNutReSKfhfmoD4=,tag:DnA+316Z+0eqBWN8YLyv1A==,type:str]
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:rYX7nN6SYoG5HycaNNrprDM=,iv:4uX7+Sl1UzgsImBH+qm9p8DlOfJu0i0W3bpoE7cFxXg=,tag:RROCnYBVKVwPBNSGgV30FQ==,type:str]
namespace: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:jpUzI7BmZA==,iv:PQrfm67la6RJCRq0H7qpiY8n2hPUjcaK6gmJ/zPQW30=,tag:bp/3GYbRpYOIub5nT0zz/A==,type:str]
type: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:fndXB4Y1,iv:EXOe0day1ScxvZ7ozn1QyHgaZgnvlPNmvSQG74aw7lM=,tag:quPmKvFTjRqtZoVUEoQAHQ==,type:str]
name: minio-user-ollama
namespace: storage
type: Opaque
stringData:
CONSOLE_ACCESS_KEY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:FhXl6yqTIzHsbJO6P96KQrA=,iv:gGTaSKxk721GwMQWWyymqUPZlGLidrBzWCWdRtnlOr0=,tag:IaVl8GQqPstBuUjD4N6JTQ==,type:str]
CONSOLE_SECRET_KEY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:s22GOXY4B/m+S7tgDw8P2gU2F15vdn1tqAp53FWzFTI=,iv:GXBhHQ8YiaVjRRMw2yG4FxdulVOuOurkLXXC0u/SFRA=,tag:pvHcD9+4qaxnvhOSkNxoHA==,type:str]
CONSOLE_ACCESS_KEY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Zxr/Nj0SUKSJbBD1cFjt3GE=,iv:r/B9ULn68hsXdH8uRQkKAoQTJIJIYKMoJuWOZfxS2I8=,tag:Xo4i+IVxuqrp+qDpYQysPw==,type:str]
CONSOLE_SECRET_KEY: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:PoIDNZ+Xs6BdhGm10y1HdL5jy47EVHfHHIJhGy/KX6Q=,iv:voAv32GoTKi9s9/4MQy2yT6i9VY4/igA5XXzehwUqRQ=,tag:DmPyk5biVvlxHjeyDyrLbQ==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBtUVJFQ1ErNmkzd1N6b29t
L0VWR2tlcEIxeG1CR1hXRkw2cEt0Q2crMWlVClg2UlNhUzdJZGpLZjJtYlAvbk16
eHk0ZHZiNzVRTWhyQzlieTU5Y3QraGsKLS0tIHA5UVhvUXhNSDk0QlV0R2RzR1dP
azVEQzgvSFNwak9TcW1USFNOb3RvSkUKNLuW3h3cHDSSCZGe9Vyiv5m+wXihtCYX
oJtbRK+kJF8oOUo4emI+SLGrCsWq5cG2wN/wgP+ChR1zUgRgfq5oOA==
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSB2SStVR0lpOWs0VnN6dkdp
RktMUmNRR2diTUtiVk9tRk1wSjVTMnRtVlJBCkk1S0dwNUNHb25RQlZ4ZFRocisv
aS9kbmQydWVmN1AxU3VvbFZsS2tmTHcKLS0tICtRY0ZKeFhCTUdaNW5PSFRNZ2dG
OERIZ0xMbHBvSVNyaGxCVFpqRzlxa1EKbrjfk/CFlTSyJYgTzQ67W3JyR1fwv8VF
dxGeAgLY4EQrf+2PbODtazRFreS+sl7dxq+rKMOVZTsjGHakkqHy9A==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age1e5fq3hwxy78psus2nfvmtmua36g0u3suk78ephw6246l974d2utsvn0hla
lastmodified: "2026-08-12T18:02:01Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:hQfimKuhfiIiZQAyNDZQR25HZ5biU+kaWig3ElVPiqMY3B0LrmKyOEs7ittd3j3meUkPEFSmm1yYSXcdCuf6w7cwSbEiL5DG8t7QKPbnx/aRdyHAJW+1VC0e3Lye43gaHya0iUaWS/YFQcrT01oEbckLIDWPKfvA6pg2bZ4kMZ4=,iv:AydyWMVcjTQu+7Fzw5vtqkvTTeQEMt8y6snESoLUDE8=,tag:SoKklNqa9nH9G6d9+PnolQ==,type:str]
unencrypted_suffix: _unencrypted
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
lastmodified: "2026-10-26T04:03:16Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:gxu4WcJEuFgjtWCfAjose8R8a566/OLrXoiJmKfcvVfTFDTdGM7I4gzQVvpjEfra5Hjyt7kvLlaV2K5bKJ0k6NXbbmgrqAqEOEcPg+cnPy1FtQGAYOo3VzgKqrpLOCs/7wh4YR23XHHsjQlHAcP8BmhrqnpHXR9FMZObrKjnQj8=,iv:KJZfw0n2DOtdZHeVDk6TrpO8q57yD+xdEVt9+hM0D4Q=,tag:rHQaMjvQwaB8Am/AlTKq1g==,type:str]
version: 3.13.2
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ metadata:
type: Opaque
stringData:
PAPERLESS_API_TOKEN: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:wlBC85ep6zioWLhfhNczkKfTMR8tmciN+4r3of8GpQoJmKyE2r7pOg==,iv:Rem/UJl5wUNi8G+uEV7f2eCLabaY26sZ7+AsKYiOZ4I=,tag:bGS1fu13Mwsrr+5NUEzzLw==,type:str]
LLM_AUTH_CLIENT_SECRET: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:co7FfmRXKgrz9fNgR10KtlHL/iG4F5WKJgjcKem1H5hF5FviVi4+CQNekA==,iv:ADtBHiI6BtrkuH1iIfKV3I5odNLMQe5y/9GGTJrPNN0=,tag:j6wX6zO5VhKoLzdr7BQZCw==,type:str]
LLM_AUTH_CLIENT_SECRET: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:OEZqGgJ4cpMsWr/PJH50lsQKvk6sjVNPCFcZP3yQ/7nvlKP3giPlLmW9XgWr1ELq2hwWDs61+f3fAyENt4ln+Q==,iv:W0Tii/nvgm9ZMIEtfzgO5pj4Li+6fpxfd3zFtQhj874=,tag:tsM/fGeduMOEfMZsDZ6lrQ==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- enc: |
@@ -19,6 +19,6 @@ sops:
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age1e5fq3hwxy78psus2nfvmtmua36g0u3suk78ephw6246l974d2utsvn0hla
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
lastmodified: "2026-09-14T14:19:39Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:jDdmiFg6uB1za7sAjO1CnGHdRPyUnmWCMJxqHrE3BO82pNbtm8yLOf+W6CfFKAjfZYqEE2mdKhABm7zeJgJlub3eXJbAirAFrp5jrbfHw0qsFo85Gj/BsrSDB401Aky6PxvRomz66FyX5zDDXIGAMEMlyNEadMplTfrZQQ9hQWM=,iv:UTSF72ofUyWs1LXGKQwBP60hK64UxhqTFM8QTVozGoo=,tag:OKivMDAqwWgrX+kNjvQrPg==,type:str]
lastmodified: "2026-10-26T04:03:16Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:gOrqy2fPX+77303L+E1EypaTU8mdUXYjbRZnTIJtoRpZhEmHsVvS/Ho8bVcl5KiTPN7UoFNmGyDz8fpyQ/rLTbeCiUYmyxvH7ym9DT4oWvRxITpOqBxz83pWv1BB++HJvqNQ5FllqpnAz60/bAVyxOdOXk4J3lDnuJibNOpxhW8=,iv:suV68u1Uiejl0NNJ3WlAHshgdrSL+aTwUxUBeMXlfWs=,tag:5wug4NeDZ+qclvFGPiEviQ==,type:str]
version: 3.13.2
+9 -4
View File
@@ -9,17 +9,14 @@ metadata:
files:
- agent-pod-models.enc.yaml
- agent-pod-ssh-key.enc.yaml
- authentik-secrets.enc.yaml
- cloudflare-secrets.enc.yaml
- cloudflared-credentials.enc.yaml
- forgejo-registry-pat-api.enc.yaml
- forgejo-registry-pull.enc.yaml
- forgejo-runner-token.enc.yaml
- forgejo-secrets.enc.yaml
- grafana-oidc-secrets.enc.yaml
- grafana-secrets.enc.yaml
- homarr-auth-oidc.enc.yaml
- homarr-db-encryption.enc.yaml
- homarr-secrets.enc.yaml
- homelab-ca-secrets.enc.yaml
- loki-secrets.enc.yaml
- minio-secrets.enc.yaml
@@ -38,3 +35,11 @@ files:
- pi-sandbox-secrets.enc.yaml
- etcd-defrag-creds.enc.yaml
- zitadel-masterkey.enc.yaml
- smtp-gotify-secrets.enc.yaml
- igotify-client-token.enc.yaml
- grafana-gotify-bridge.enc.yaml
# Login UI RSA keypair, adopted from the chart-generated Secret so ArgoCD
# owns it. Without this, the chart re-generates the keypair on every render,
# which changes checksum/secret-login-service-key and leaves both Zitadel
# Deployments permanently OutOfSync.
- zitadel-login-service-key.enc.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
apiVersion: v1
data:
token: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:CUJ0rUtgye71fpFz50RSDXJeG+t8Wjrm6T6jboVPbt2FVuIRSscqKg/Pc3k/L8nvLvrkYlzz1rbYu9v5NAdNF2c35AQ=,iv:tsfQ+v4qwj6H7G/O79b6m4XMWRw3mwE67f+4LjDCOoY=,tag:SLGGBYtYoF45AQstETPYZA==,type:str]
kind: Secret
metadata:
creationTimestamp: null
name: smtp-gotify
namespace: iam
sops:
age:
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBFWmU5TUxLeGU4YzUxRU9G
ZFR5a2hqS3huYlJtempaQ25zUkljUDJLSENrCkx0bjQ4UVF3UWpWa0t3WHQ2bkNl
eEp2d0dQRHJSOExIYjN4TmRTZWdQY00KLS0tIGF5enUxTmxRTHlQRUt1aTFIYTFB
MEJaOWd6SnhWQU1PQXdUZDJqWmp2MGsKIOOrp52+d3M8AQlMw0VSnLQ2efDtC6Ye
oC/TPqYi9SqYNxaHkODS2QZN9msyfRFcgUh/6ZXr8sivnpwRY8ZZtw==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age1e5fq3hwxy78psus2nfvmtmua36g0u3suk78ephw6246l974d2utsvn0hla
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
lastmodified: "2026-10-27T06:24:20Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:9Jsnij+I1MhLhIPLt2hr1a6Jryf8XcAb4QAknGkX1hNEN+Z9HT5PSnPARqyhl0WTxe8813a/G0h93SJ0A419jIzZugv6zEj4STsOG4hMI8O2NniqOwiDWl+Az9SRXIQ0ahH9En7ssvEdiosIDGJSz31ufNc8FbwKnHvgWCwfK9Q=,iv:VNTOpQkDakoaCu2dG4lRbd+6AzimNZVNzggq/7C2eM8=,tag:cJI9WdnKiG3K3J4LRDqQxQ==,type:str]
version: 3.13.2
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: zitadel-login-service-key
namespace: iam
type: kubernetes.io/tls
data:
tls.crt: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Ad4omL7pD4QhixW6wSVsVor5FtHbWyOHeYbxOQsEBAaSuvb7JIkvnKqo+Xy6zKuMmRViUIbqhlLQDXCaseAVGgpu3PdtShwJ7LRXJmr0XtQV1M6YtRbRexN6UpFA3XdD+JfifMhtvd29rM3WzLPX69uk4k7voYN5m0pNXSN23jVeIeqm+xB1CpxDW/guZ2hA5+b5XBzVOkMsSOSdWFWH2lK7nInv6ZatCa0/fuIKmB5nZpSV9tHpCTiTnBuNc0rW1X4HOWa8zMiSbjQAqtDitm7lrVHJyImXwBjmuS0wM35VwrwxVUUEjS8kgqnyb02JvNRdNjuwOmIcyKjrdgO1B1ft0CrAbRNkk2dYR8Y7SNhR4F4tYYF5L2szQgj+5tcYrnRGEI2QkXbcmTa0Y9V99+D2bKjt5t59Pi/1r8/jt0CNy0GeeZDvsN5scy0/A4WqtJ2sZDyTnTPwtUpAAwVC2WSqsD11gkzhyRJAgmAmEgfPIL7kTZsZBoSQeuuCJ82Ghqx9kLTpui6kLULxxUpP9oefsKw9PjTwExRbNNcPV5p7PPi9dN00TNe9iYuFqoZFP/lp5SMjDqbsV4Ie1ffcfyZsIHMuOv5Ths7n8ExYdR0zIn+aQePXASt+dE6njhFiblxyBZsn0xON3EIUaE9e3WsdcQKjlPOaAW/DvU6PwBqCeaB2nYzM2NFk6W3lN8BahTE9k7xXrILHIrXuIXezotCK6jclb5yZmdm/fTCX1iejGVDktvvcmX6bbv3YXTRZmsviRhLFHA8oClU0alTsY5Q3nn2Xl0UfXU+rW+10AIpY5WFMzP6A8hXvHx0ISC1S4AIqjmlsDmq2yEZKpbiL+Bs52ymW7t2rQ+KGhWH/bcC3VrJwUWnVYP9b80xyHZdKqubwLc5UcDzCs/Lan23VpLxSJkqb8vZP7SHQ1nc+rlwrqFDkzQ+yMNLZmutqbaAmMyXbrR51Rz3VqofraPXjS+lmLAuEcuTEFbrImsct5Zb57MtKvhHi6CUWt/Vj/NOUJlwy09zPy4JAMMJ81ooyBj6CBHY2f1vfR/UUDN5VZdfg4dUWXS0CQdOb3hx19COr4lR4RcpA46qJEjum+4icm5ckziYT5Nm7NB+ydXJ+Eys2Ba0dGRM6CIeQVhghhCDOZ6uoQ2A6DNql6wjrfUml8UwuJNO0nXVqNS28pLwddsOjlbsysJAUEma6EHXb2Vjb90JZErVswGuhQ2+UdhtpuIkgBYX/MMCZV942C+K41A9478BaCiWuC9KbnAcx81ceR+T3syARctZvQaYaiH7WfF8qyo0VOGzZRYjFbqeyHefiOmPmWTS/XbIti3evyhmxHwjUcidK2njrPB0O/3w6R69UA1p7ph9EgFsj18gPYnJthikgX8vcfVaVnPIAwCqY5DJJmIFTNXVkNDBX+2orrW2qj6PEH+go+uc+aUmu646niqaMAcrUl7gGNGd2OWFHdIRKdtogOvoVpQMDB4eWHPRsL29EVt3rnknHfpq7cIjQXuk9XtlB8zjllYdrh50Q8ZNBOvzWgCiMvAyanfIA+kW9KHQlmb1qJGYp7it2Lrg1K7sDEekrlbuoNsf+2rl8YRQz8pVBuCSzG9DPp4+Rj+ddiqX/Rrs3ufWDKFV9zJoN1EpJ8+z6n8rsQJBe/lSFLW1mLVkaPSNNdIQfdJ6MbsHpMlqqFYP8dOKckxv82uOkHoCLHrgaXiiMd1dBsX1fBiv2NvzDiuLyN81d7R2wNAQbkG9b+/+C6wVr6kDg0n6seseoCyeSI++PJIkCrkTXzd7rLs8Of9CHZQEB15wjemlmYGlJnCiFWPFa6h0jJPatPrfTYv+GpqzWV8u1Uh3aNjd+g1wVQok/ojNOZJahUSI4B67HkJI+I7WOF9C+rRCwNutqshIxYzW7CpyVey5P6Kyv+/cucDEgb0ggH032MBtzTxazpJcE4Y6fTrOiXHp9j2KjzyUt2YeCCL8UMwbwJvW9p1I5gx3ArsOuyHm1kA==,iv:PLsjmrTwjM7IUS7ZBSyVvJfAJzCSUtU+UAvHbSwoaVk=,tag:pUQwbHoZgfHW4CpPKoULAw==,type:str]
tls.key: ENC[AES256_GCM,data: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,iv:PbRgjgm5ERWlAkkWc7As8eIx8e0rjTUkQ7XlDBrEUlU=,tag:yh2/JuHu5I+dWlxVAmkkXA==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSByOGNaakZoV3lhemhMSVVF
RklKbEsxeVFMWWdwQ3ZqR0lhRHlPM1dWT3h3Cnk2RnZUNnplVEwvNW9qMExsSUlt
VVVXejMrcDRRTEdtT1krdThqWThLWWcKLS0tIEVZZEVBWFZyVi84S1puRHdtMWR1
cDBHc1J5aHFpQkxSSEx2VDRjZ1RsdXcKG5MgnUBpFmlNGSkxBijXp7m492ujyqsC
TbTfU8SWJwXhio7V+zDbXG+JW4R51wr9F9Sj47DCw7b64nbsD3N5TQ==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age1e5fq3hwxy78psus2nfvmtmua36g0u3suk78ephw6246l974d2utsvn0hla
encrypted_regex: ^(data|stringData)$
lastmodified: "2026-10-26T02:15:51Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:+2eGERwwzeK5JE9H6qhsu+tskR3Y9c7DecVGopfG8Ggq5SHQBfYyvz//IU+MGCOb6nIyP3JPf9+9IDS2DthVcw+RLtviQkN1TeWuUTDbxBxHdCoUv9zepwU7+d0qUMrdUK0N9QQSRZ4TpiwceViDeMuhPF/vTmADP9QWwid/qwk=,iv:nuJo37Dh8MAf+qI/Ty2jsW0IheNhgmZ4l0Va8pJG6+4=,tag:vCpifXvYF1/QU7XExc6raQ==,type:str]
version: 3.13.2
@@ -271,3 +271,40 @@ data:
NDKi7/Gxha790QN3TD/U7p9GcEtfXKv8KISKfxnfD9o9Yx6pWOXcgvGefQkpXuRm
kGzDM+aY/VKs5Et5/RyKavBDihuOcumLsmoRg/bFoB/xpeURTyiehUdu
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: homelab-ca
namespace: cloudflared
data:
ca.crt: |
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIFBjCCAu6gAwIBAgIJAKoBPdKPDL5AMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMDAxEzARBgNV
BAMMCmhvbWVsYWItY2ExGTAXBgNVBAoMEHJpb3RwaWFvLmhvbWVsYWIwHhcNMjYw
ODEyMjA1NDQzWhcNMzYwODA5MjA1NDQzWjAwMRMwEQYDVQQDDApob21lbGFiLWNh
MRkwFwYDVQQKDBByaW90cGlhby5ob21lbGFiMIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOC
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6mk3AZc0gMtmgVsH+zryGFcAmWLixq41ye/H23ktj2bjEHCr9mIDpuSOKLyLBzrg
js/HqdxvwkZkkxwXft0Vi7GN0/LGHMdPrDE499pJelAHbxUpBoOk8sfXSNnfESI8
v20LybATGrKXFlOhMKshY1a3JLAoZTaW0xkG4PM4HT7lK/ovr/NLF6kdP7HxJFFQ
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tAc/6+Vg/keo0kty7H7L6oQd+gKpuaJ2I+wKYe4l9UwHi9zEb8YjzGB4n2AtsoWI
NDKi7/Gxha790QN3TD/U7p9GcEtfXKv8KISKfxnfD9o9Yx6pWOXcgvGefQkpXuRm
kGzDM+aY/VKs5Et5/RyKavBDihuOcumLsmoRg/bFoB/xpeURTyiehUdu
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-49
View File
@@ -49,30 +49,6 @@ spec:
port:
number: 3100
---
# ── Authentik ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: authentik
namespace: iam
annotations:
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-buffer-size: "16k"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-read-timeout: "3600"
spec:
ingressClassName: nginx
rules:
- host: authentik.riotpiao.com
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: authentik-server
port:
number: 80
---
# ── Vault ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
@@ -299,28 +275,3 @@ spec:
name: temporal-web
port:
number: 8080
---
# NOTE: api.riotpiao.com is deliberately NOT here. Its namespace `api` is
# created in wave 7, and this Application syncs in wave 1 — an Ingress into a
# namespace that doesn't exist yet would fail and mark this whole app
# SyncFailed. It lives in k8s/apps/api/ingress.yaml, synced by the api-gw
# Application.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: homarr
namespace: dashboard
spec:
ingressClassName: nginx
rules:
- host: homarr.riotpiao.com
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: homarr
port:
number: 7575
@@ -138,12 +138,15 @@ configs:
# cicd — automation-only; apiKey (token) for the CD pipeline, no UI login.
accounts.rock: apiKey,login
accounts.cicd: apiKey
# Authentik OIDC. clientSecret pulled from the argocd `oidc-secret` Secret
# (created by authentik-provision). The groups claim drives RBAC below.
# Zitadel OIDC. clientSecret pulled from the argocd `oidc-secret` Secret.
# The groups claim drives RBAC below.
oidc.config: |
name: Authentik
issuer: https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/argocd/
clientID: argocd
name: Zitadel
issuer: https://zitadel.riotpiao.com
# MUST be quoted: an unquoted 18-digit number is parsed as a float by the
# YAML parser and ArgoCD rejects it ("cannot unmarshal number into ...
# clientID of type string"). Same class of bug as Grafana's client_id.
clientID: "396757801210282367"
clientSecret: $oidc-secret:client-secret
requestedScopes:
- openid
@@ -158,7 +161,7 @@ configs:
server.insecure: false
# RBAC. local `admin` + `rock` + the `cicd` pipeline account all get role:admin;
# the Authentik `homelab-admins` group (rock is a member) maps to admin so SSO
# the Zitadel `homelab-admins` role (rock is a member) maps to admin so SSO
# logins are admin too.
rbac:
policy.default: role:readonly
-38
View File
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
# Dedicated CNPG Postgres for Authentik (GitOps, wave 2 — before authentik w3).
# CNPG generates secret `authentik-db-app` + service `authentik-db-rw` in ns iam;
# authentik-values reads them locally (no cross-ns secret copy).
apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
kind: Cluster
metadata:
name: authentik-db
namespace: iam
annotations:
argocd.argoproj.io/sync-options: SkipDryRunOnMissingResource=true
spec:
instances: 3
imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:16.2
bootstrap:
initdb:
database: authentik
owner: app
encoding: UTF8
localeCollate: C
localeCType: C
enableSuperuserAccess: false
resources:
requests: { memory: "512Mi", cpu: "250m" }
limits: { memory: "2Gi", cpu: "1" }
storage:
size: 10Gi
storageClass: longhorn-cnpg
monitoring:
enablePodMonitor: true
affinity:
# preferred + tolerations: HA across nodes without deadlocking a partly-
# schedulable 3-CP (same as forgejo-db).
podAntiAffinityType: preferred
topologyKey: kubernetes.io/hostname
tolerations:
- key: node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane
operator: Exists
effect: NoSchedule
-1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ kind: Kustomization
# deployed into it. paperless ns declared in namespaces.yaml above.
resources:
- namespaces.yaml
- authentik-db.yaml
- zitadel-db.yaml
- temporal-db.yaml
- paperless-db.yaml
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# DB clusters are wave 2 — their namespaces must exist first (their apps that
# would CreateNamespace run later, w3/w8). Declared here so the databases App
# creates them. authentik/vault/temporal/paperless CreateNamespace=true then
# no-ops. poimen namespace created by poimen-root app (wave 7).
# creates them. vault/temporal/paperless CreateNamespace=true then no-ops.
# poimen namespace created by poimen-root app (wave 7).
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
-284
View File
@@ -1,284 +0,0 @@
# k8s/talos-iam/authentik-values.yaml
# Authentik — SSO Identity Provider for the homelab.
# Provides OAuth2/OIDC login for Grafana, MinIO, Forgejo, and Argo CD.
# Chart: authentik/authentik from https://charts.goauthentik.io
#
# Architecture: server (UI+API) + worker (background tasks) + PostgreSQL + Redis.
# PostgreSQL is the system of record — must persist. Redis is ephemeral cache/queue.
#
# Secrets injected via helmfile --set (from .env / vsource):
# AUTHENTIK_SECRET_KEY — signs sessions and tokens; set once, never rotate casually
# AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD — initial akadmin password (used once at first login)
# AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN — API token for the setup_talos_iam.sh bootstrap script
# AUTHENTIK_PG_PASSWORD — PostgreSQL user password
authentik:
# host: the external URL Authentik uses to build redirect URIs in OAuth2 flows.
# Must match what the browser sees — if it returns an internal svc URL,
# the browser's redirect after login will fail (can't reach svc DNS externally).
# HTTP (not HTTPS) because the Authentik ingress has no TLS cert configured.
host: "https://authentik.riotpiao.com"
error_reporting:
enabled: false # do not phone home to Sentry
# PostgreSQL connection — points at CloudNativePG cluster in ddb namespace.
# Uses 'app' bootstrap user (CNPG simple pattern, same as Forgejo).
# Credentials injected from authentik-db-app secret via env vars below.
postgresql:
host: authentik-db-rw.iam.svc.cluster.local
port: 5432
name: authentik
user: app # All apps use shared 'app' user (CNPG design pattern)
password: "" # overridden by AUTHENTIK_POSTGRESQL__PASSWORD env var
# Redis connection — bundled subchart, standalone mode (no sentinel/cluster).
redis:
host: authentik-redis-master
# ── HTTP client timeouts ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Increased to tolerate 5+ second pod-to-pod network latency.
# Affects webhooks, outpost management, SCIM, LDAP sync.
# Default: ~30s — too aggressive when latency spikes hit 5-10s.
log_level: debug # enable debug logging to monitor connection issues
# ── CA trust (shared by server and worker) ────────────────────────────────────
# Authentik (Python/Debian) uses requests + httpx for outgoing HTTPS — webhooks,
# outpost management, SCIM. Both libraries need REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE / SSL_CERT_FILE
# to point to a bundle that includes homelab-ca, otherwise connections to other
# homelab services fail with "certificate signed by unknown authority".
#
# Strategy: a debian:12-slim init container (run as root) concatenates the
# Debian system Mozilla bundle with homelab-ca.crt into an emptyDir. The main
# container then references /merged/ca-bundle.crt via two env vars that cover
# every Python HTTP library.
_caVolumes: &caVolumes
- name: homelab-ca
configMap:
name: homelab-ca
- name: merged-ca
emptyDir: {}
_caVolumeMounts: &caVolumeMounts
- name: homelab-ca
mountPath: /homelab-ca
readOnly: true
- name: merged-ca
mountPath: /merged
readOnly: true
_caInitContainers: &caInitContainers
- name: merge-ca-certs
image: debian:bookworm
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
securityContext:
runAsUser: 0
command:
- sh
- -c
- (cat /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt 2>/dev/null; cat /homelab-ca/homelab-ca.crt) > /merged/ca-bundle.crt
volumeMounts:
- name: homelab-ca
mountPath: /homelab-ca
readOnly: true
- name: merged-ca
mountPath: /merged
# NOTE: no authentik-migrate init container — the authentik `server` entrypoint
# runs migrations itself on startup. A separate `manage migrate` init pinned to
# an older image tripped a version-history precheck on an empty DB
# (relation "authentik_version_history" does not exist) and blocked boot.
_caEnv: &caEnv
- name: REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE
value: /merged/ca-bundle.crt
- name: SSL_CERT_FILE
value: /merged/ca-bundle.crt
# ── Authentik server (UI + API) ───────────────────────────────────────────────
# Handles all browser traffic: login flows, admin UI, OAuth2 authorize/token endpoints.
# NodePort 32172 is a fallback for direct node access during troubleshooting;
# normal access is via nginx ingress (authentik.riotpiao.com → svc:80).
# Recreate: single replica + RWO-adjacent state — avoids split-brain on redeploy.
server:
replicas: 1
# Merge SOPS-CMP-emitted secret values after the chart's own `authentik` secret.
envFrom:
- secretRef:
name: authentik-secrets
deploymentStrategy:
type: Recreate
service:
type: NodePort
nodePort: 32172
resources:
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 512Mi
limits:
cpu: 1000m
memory: 1Gi
tolerations:
- key: node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane
operator: Exists
effect: NoSchedule
volumes: *caVolumes
volumeMounts: *caVolumeMounts
initContainers: *caInitContainers
env:
# Merge CA trust env vars
- name: REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE
value: /merged/ca-bundle.crt
- name: SSL_CERT_FILE
value: /merged/ca-bundle.crt
# Override database credentials to use 'app' from authentik-db-app
- name: AUTHENTIK_POSTGRESQL__USER
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: authentik-db-app
key: username
- name: AUTHENTIK_POSTGRESQL__PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: authentik-db-app
key: password
podAnnotations:
configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: "homelab-ca"
homelab.io/restart-at: "2026-06-21T13-40"
# The /-/health/{live,ready}/ endpoints do a DB round-trip; under transient
# CNPG contention they respond in 5-6s while still returning 200. The chart's
# default 3s liveness timeout then flags a working backend as dead and kubelet
# kills it in a restart loop — the pod never stays Ready, gets dropped from the
# authentik-server Service endpoints, and the OAuth-provisioning PostSync hook
# fails with "Host is unreachable". Widen the timeouts so slow-but-healthy
# checks aren't treated as failures. (Only these fields are overridden; the
# chart deep-merges the rest of each probe, incl. the httpGet path.)
livenessProbe:
initialDelaySeconds: 300 # skip probe until 5min passed (migrations finish)
timeoutSeconds: 15
failureThreshold: 6
readinessProbe:
initialDelaySeconds: 300 # skip probe until migrations complete
timeoutSeconds: 15
failureThreshold: 6
startupProbe:
timeoutSeconds: 15
failureThreshold: 120 # 120 × 10s = 20min for fresh DB migrations
# Every OIDC login (Grafana, Argo CD, MinIO, Forgejo) depends on this server —
# its request latency/error rate explains SSO-driven slowness on those services.
metrics:
enabled: true
serviceMonitor:
enabled: true
scrapeTimeout: 30s
# ── Authentik worker ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Runs background tasks: email delivery, LDAP sync, flow policy evaluation,
# event log cleanup, and managed outpost updates. Stateless — no PVC needed.
# Same resource profile as server; Authentik 2023+ merged some worker duties
# into the server process but the worker pod is still required.
worker:
replicas: 1
envFrom:
- secretRef:
name: authentik-secrets
deploymentStrategy:
type: Recreate
resources:
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 512Mi
limits:
cpu: 1000m
memory: 1Gi
tolerations:
- key: node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane
operator: Exists
effect: NoSchedule
volumes: *caVolumes
volumeMounts: *caVolumeMounts
initContainers: *caInitContainers
env:
# Merge CA trust env vars
- name: REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE
value: /merged/ca-bundle.crt
- name: SSL_CERT_FILE
value: /merged/ca-bundle.crt
# Override database credentials to use 'app' from authentik-db-app
- name: AUTHENTIK_POSTGRESQL__USER
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: authentik-db-app
key: username
- name: AUTHENTIK_POSTGRESQL__PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: authentik-db-app
key: password
podAnnotations:
configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: "homelab-ca"
homelab.io/restart-at: "2026-06-21T13-40"
livenessProbe:
initialDelaySeconds: 300 # skip probe until 5min passed (migrations finish)
readinessProbe:
initialDelaySeconds: 300 # skip probe until migrations complete
startupProbe:
initialDelaySeconds: 30 # let server finish DB work first
failureThreshold: 120
metrics:
enabled: true
serviceMonitor:
enabled: true
scrapeTimeout: 30s
# ── PostgreSQL (external: CloudNativePG cluster in ddb namespace) ─────────────
# Authentik connects to the dedicated authentik-db (1 primary + 2 replicas).
# Do not use the bundled Bitnami subchart — CNPG is already running.
postgresql:
enabled: false
primary:
persistence:
enabled: true
storageClass: longhorn
size: 8Gi
tolerations:
- key: node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane
operator: Exists
effect: NoSchedule
affinity:
nodeAffinity:
preferredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
- weight: 100
preference:
matchExpressions:
- key: node-role.kubernetes.io/worker
operator: Exists
# ── Bundled Redis ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Cache and async task queue only — no durable data. If Redis restarts, in-flight
# background tasks are retried and cached tokens are recomputed. Losing Redis
# data does not lose user accounts or flow configuration (that's in PostgreSQL).
# persistence: false saves a PVC and makes restarts faster.
#
# Same prefer-worker / fallback-to-cp scheduling as PostgreSQL.
# architecture: standalone — no Sentinel/cluster overhead for a 3-node homelab.
redis:
enabled: true
master:
persistence:
enabled: false
tolerations:
- key: node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane
operator: Exists
effect: NoSchedule
affinity:
nodeAffinity:
preferredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
- weight: 100
preference:
matchExpressions:
- key: node-role.kubernetes.io/worker
operator: Exists
architecture: standalone
# Ingress disabled — rule lives in k8s/ingress/ingress.yaml (authentik.riotpiao.com).
# For direct access during bootstrap: kubectl -n iam port-forward svc/authentik-server 7000:80
+6 -5
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,12 @@ apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- rbac-dashboard-rolebinding.yaml
# Removed: rbac-dashboard-rolebinding.yaml (authentik-provisioner SA and
# RoleBinding). Authentik is retired, so the file is gone; keep this list in
# step with the directory or kustomize fails the whole app.
- smtp-gotify.yaml
# IAM provisioning is manual-only (security-sensitive).
# Script: scripts/iam/authentik-provision.py
# Script: scripts/iam/zitadel-provision.py
# Run:
# export AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN=$(kubectl -n iam get secret authentik-secrets \
# -o jsonpath='{.data.AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN}' | base64 -d)
# python3 scripts/iam/authentik-provision.py
# scripts/iam/zitadel-provision.py all
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: authentik-provisioner
namespace: dashboard
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: ClusterRole
name: authentik-provisioner
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: authentik-provisioner
namespace: iam
+108
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
# SMTP -> Gotify relay for ZITADEL notifications.
#
# ZITADEL sends verification codes, password resets and one-time passwords by
# SMTP only, and this cluster has no working mail path: no SMTP credentials are
# configured for ZITADEL, and the notification table shows
# verified_email empty for every user. Without a delivery path nobody can finish
# a first login, at ZITADEL or at any relying party such as Forgejo.
#
# This relay accepts plain SMTP on :2525 and forwards every message to Gotify,
# so codes arrive on the phone through the existing gotify/igotify setup instead
# of email. ZITADEL then points DefaultInstance.SMTPConfiguration at this
# Service (see k8s/infra/iam/zitadel-values.yaml).
#
# The Gotify token is a Secret, never a literal here.
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: smtp-gotify
namespace: iam
labels:
app: smtp-gotify
spec:
replicas: 1
revisionHistoryLimit: 2
selector:
matchLabels:
app: smtp-gotify
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: smtp-gotify
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 65534
runAsGroup: 65534
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
volumes:
- name: tmp
emptyDir: {}
containers:
- name: smtp-gotify
image: quay.io/reiml/smtp-gotify:latest
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
env:
- name: GOTIFY_URL
value: "http://gotify.notifications.svc.cluster.local/"
- name: GOTIFY_TOKEN
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: smtp-gotify
key: token
- name: GOTIFY_PRIORITY
value: "5"
# No title template: the relay's default title already carries
# the mail subject, and a wrong template field fails the push
# silently (the SMTP side still answers 250, so the sender thinks
# the message was delivered).
ports:
- name: smtp
containerPort: 2525
protocol: TCP
volumeMounts:
# The relay stages each message in /tmp before the Gotify push.
# With readOnlyRootFilesystem it accepted SMTP (250 queued) and
# then silently dropped the message: no push, no error.
- name: tmp
mountPath: /tmp
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
memory: 32Mi
limits:
cpu: 200m
memory: 128Mi
readinessProbe:
tcpSocket:
port: smtp
initialDelaySeconds: 3
periodSeconds: 10
livenessProbe:
tcpSocket:
port: smtp
initialDelaySeconds: 10
periodSeconds: 20
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: smtp-gotify
namespace: iam
labels:
app: smtp-gotify
spec:
type: ClusterIP
selector:
app: smtp-gotify
ports:
- name: smtp
port: 2525
targetPort: smtp
protocol: TCP
+31
View File
@@ -81,6 +81,15 @@ server:
- envName: VAULT_UNSEAL_KEY_3
secretName: vault-unseal-keys
secretKey: key3
# Zitadel OIDC client credentials for the Vault UI login method. Consumed by
# the postStart hook below, which enables auth/oidc via the Vault API after
# unsealing. Vault auth methods cannot be declared in HCL, only via API/CLI.
- envName: OIDC_CLIENT_ID
secretName: vault-oidc-creds
secretKey: OIDC_CLIENT_ID
- envName: OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
secretName: vault-oidc-creds
secretKey: OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
# ── Auto-unseal ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Vault starts sealed after every pod restart and can't serve requests until
@@ -97,6 +106,28 @@ server:
vault operator unseal "$VAULT_UNSEAL_KEY_2" || true
vault operator unseal "$VAULT_UNSEAL_KEY_3" || true
# ── Zitadel OIDC login method ────────────────────────────────────────
# Vault auth methods are API-driven: they cannot be declared in HCL.
# Enable auth/oidc and write its config on every pod start. Both calls
# are idempotent (auth enable returns 400 "already enabled", which we
# tolerate; the config write always succeeds and overwrites).
vault auth enable oidc 2>/dev/null || true
vault write auth/oidc/config \
oidc_discovery_url="https://zitadel.riotpiao.com" \
oidc_client_id="$OIDC_CLIENT_ID" \
oidc_client_secret="$OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET" \
default_role="default" 2>/dev/null || true
# The role binds the Zitadel client_id as audience and whitelists the UI
# callback URL. Policy `default` gives a logged-in operator standard
# read access; admin actions still require a token with root/sudo.
vault write auth/oidc/role/default \
bound_audiences="$OIDC_CLIENT_ID" \
allowed_redirect_uris="https://vault.riotpiao.com/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback" \
allowed_redirect_uris="http://localhost:8200/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback" \
user_claim="preferred_username" \
oidc_scopes="openid,profile,email,groups" \
policies="default" 2>/dev/null || true
# ── Vault config (HCL) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
standalone:
enabled: true
+109 -1
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,14 @@ zitadel:
ExternalDomain: zitadel.riotpiao.com
TLS:
Enabled: false
# First boot is COMPLETE (2026-10-26): the instance, the system org and the
# `iam-admin` machine key all exist. Skip stops the setup hook from running
# the first-instance step again. Without it, every sync re-runs the
# machinekeyWriter, which silently rotates the iam-admin key Terraform
# reads. ZITADEL objects are declared by scripts/iam/zitadel-provision.py.
# Never set this back to false.
FirstInstance:
Skip: true
# Rendered into a Secret by the chart; read by pods and init jobs alike.
masterkeySecretName: zitadel-masterkey
@@ -39,6 +47,20 @@ zitadel:
requests: { memory: "512Mi", cpu: "250m" }
limits: { memory: "2Gi", cpu: "1" }
# Best practice: run as non-root, drop all capabilities, and refuse
# privilege escalation. The chart's image already supports a non-root UID.
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
runAsGroup: 1000
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
# FirstInstance defaults stay for the FIRST sync: the chart creates org
# `zitadel` plus the `iam-admin` machine user and its machine-key Secret.
# Terraform consumes that key to declare projects, roles, OIDC apps and the
@@ -84,27 +106,113 @@ postgresql:
# CNPG already created the database, the `app` user and its grants, so the init
# job runs only the ZITADEL-internal step. Running the full default command
# would try to create a database and a superuser it does not own.
#
# enabled: false after the first successful boot (2026-10-26). The schema is in
# place; the init hook has nothing left to do and re-running it on every sync
# only adds a PreSync failure surface. Re-enable it for a deliberate schema
# upgrade, then set it back to false.
initJob:
enabled: false
command: "zitadel"
activeDeadlineSeconds: 600
# The setup job runs the full first-instance creation: schema migrations, the
# system org, the iam-admin machine key, and 13 projection replays. 20 minutes
# leaves room for a cold database without masking a genuine hang.
#
# DONE, 2026-10-26 — first boot completed. The annotations are moved from
# pre-install/pre-upgrade to post-delete because a PreSync setup run is not
# harmless after boot:
# - it re-runs every repeatable migration on every sync;
# - interrupting one (a sync aborted, or a human deleting the Job) leaves a
# `system.migration.started` event with no matching `done`, and ZITADEL then
# waits forever on `migration already started`. That is exactly how this
# instance deadlocked on projections.projects4 and later on
# repeatable_delete_stale_org_fields.
# A post-delete hook is never executed by ArgoCD sync, so setup runs only on
# first install. Re-enable it deliberately (and only with initJob too) for a
# schema upgrade, then revert.
setupJob:
activeDeadlineSeconds: 1200
annotations:
helm.sh/hook: post-delete
helm.sh/hook-delete-policy: hook-succeeded
helm.sh/hook-weight: "2"
# Two API replicas: the read path survives one node drain, and both share the
# same masterkey and database. The login UI stays at one replica — a session
# cookie is not shared, so a second pod buys nothing.
replicaCount: 2
revisionHistoryLimit: 3
# Notification delivery lives in the ConfigMap owned by the zitadel-core app
# (k8s/infra/zitadel-core/). Env overrides here produced no SMTP provider, and
# editing configmapConfig made ArgoCD drop the rendered ConfigMap.
# Best practice: a PDB guarantees at least one API pod stays available during
# voluntary disruptions (node drain, rolling upgrade). Without it a drain can
# take both replicas down at once. minAvailable 1 is correct for 2 replicas;
# minAvailable 2 would block every drain forever.
pdb:
enabled: true
minAvailable: 1
# Best practice: spread replicas across nodes so a single node failure cannot
# take both API pods. Anti-affinity alone only prefers separation; topology
# spread enforces the failure-domain budget.
topologySpreadConstraints:
- maxSkew: 1
topologyKey: kubernetes.io/hostname
whenUnsatisfiable: ScheduleAnyway
labelSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: zitadel
ingress:
enabled: true
className: nginx
controller: nginx
login:
enabled: true
# Built-in login page, not the hosted Login UI.
#
# The hosted UI authenticates to the ZITADEL API as the machine user
# `login-client`, using a JWT-profile assertion signed by the keypair in
# zitadel-login-service-key. That machine user is created by the chart's
# setup job, which this install runs only once (setupJob is deliberately
# disabled after the first sync). Without the user, every session write
# fails and the user sees "Could not create session for user", so no one
# can sign in here or at any relying party such as Forgejo.
#
# The built-in login serves the same flows from the ZITADEL server and
# needs no machine user. Turn this back on only after creating
# `login-client` and registering the matching public key.
enabled: false
# ksops owns this Secret (k8s/argocd/secrets/zitadel-login-service-key.enc.yaml,
# rendered by the sops-secrets Application). Pointing the chart at it stops the
# chart from auto-generating an RSA keypair every render, which changed
# checksum/secret-login-service-key and kept both Deployments permanently
# OutOfSync. The keypair must stay RSA: the login container signs JWTs (RS256).
loginServiceKeySecretName: zitadel-login-service-key
replicaCount: 1
revisionHistoryLimit: 3
ingress:
enabled: true
className: nginx
# Best practice: the login UI is the public attack surface. Harden the pod
# even at one replica. The chart has no login PDB key; a single replica has
# nothing to protect with minAvailable.
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
runAsGroup: 1000
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
# Chart-owned ServiceMonitor. The cluster's Prometheus runs with
# serviceMonitorSelectorNilUsesHelmValues=false, so the release label is not
+34 -12
View File
@@ -60,28 +60,28 @@ grafana.ini:
database:
wal: true
# ── Authentik OIDC (generic OAuth2) ───────────────────────────────────────
# ── ZITADEL OIDC (generic OAuth2) ────────────────────────────────────────
# Grafana v10+ supports OIDC auto-discovery; we wire it manually here because
# Authentik's discovery endpoint is internal-only (no external DNS for iam.svc).
# ZITADEL's discovery endpoint is internal-only (no external DNS for iam.svc).
# All URLs use the external hostname so CoreDNS rewrites them to
# authentik-server.iam.svc — this keeps the Host header correct so Authentik
# zitadel.iam.svc — this keeps the Host header correct so ZITADEL
# doesn't return localhost redirects in its token responses.
#
# role_attribute_path: JMESPath expression evaluated against the userinfo
# response. akadmin gets GrafanaAdmin (server admin, can impersonate);
# homelab-admins members get Admin (org admin); everyone else Viewer.
# homelab-admins role members get Admin (org admin); everyone else Viewer.
auth.generic_oauth:
enabled: true
name: Authentik
name: Zitadel
allow_sign_up: true # Allow sync to create/update users from OAuth claims
client_id: grafana
client_id: "396757801965191169"
scopes: openid email profile groups
auth_url: https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/authorize/
token_url: https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/token/
api_url: https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/userinfo/
auth_url: https://zitadel.riotpiao.com/oauth/v2/authorize
token_url: https://zitadel.riotpiao.com/oauth/v2/token
api_url: https://zitadel.riotpiao.com/oidc/v1/userinfo
# Read identity straight from the userinfo/id_token claims. Without these,
# Grafana falls back to the GitHub-style "<api_url>/emails" call, which
# Authentik doesn't serve — request 404s with "Error getting email address"
# ZITADEL doesn't serve — request 404s with "Error getting email address"
# and the whole OAuth login fails.
email_attribute_path: email
login_attribute_path: preferred_username # Use preferred_username — OpenID standard claim, always present
@@ -91,10 +91,10 @@ grafana.ini:
use_pkce: false
use_refresh_token: false
skip_org_role_sync: false # Sync org roles from OAuth groups
tls_skip_verify_insecure: true # Authentik uses self-signed cert; verify in prod
tls_skip_verify_insecure: true # In-cluster cert; verify in prod
# GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET is injected from the grafana-oidc K8s
# Secret (created by k8s/talos-iam/setup_talos_iam.sh). envFromSecret mounts
# Secret (k8s/argocd/secrets/grafana-oidc-secrets.enc.yaml). envFromSecret mounts
# every key in that secret as an environment variable — keeps secrets out of
# values files and out of git.
envFromSecret: grafana-oidc
@@ -209,3 +209,25 @@ sidecar:
disableDelete: false
foldersFromFilesStructure: true
searchNamespace: ALL
# ── Alerting ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# One contact point: Gotify. Gotify refuses Grafana's payload shape with
# 400 "Field 'message' is required", so a bridge service translates the JSON
# first (k8s/apps/gotify/bridge). Grafana posts to the bridge, the bridge posts
# to /message with an app token.
alerting:
contactpoints.yaml:
apiVersion: 1
contactPoints:
- orgId: 1
name: gotify
receivers:
- uid: gotify-webhook
type: webhook
disableResolveMessage: false
settings:
url: http://grafana-gotify-bridge.notifications.svc.cluster.local:8080/alert
httpMethod: POST
# 0 sends every alert in one request. The bridge names the extra
# count in the message body.
maxAlerts: 0
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ spec:
mountPath: /shared
containers:
- name: provision
# bitnamilegacy/minio-client:2025.7.21-debian-12-r3 replaces the dead quay.io/minio/mc image
image: docker.io/bitnamilegacy/minio-client:2025.7.21-debian-12-r3@sha256:73bd39f7899a0cef12b8dd5df13aa93a3ed1aaa44236542442e9ac76819ac158
volumeMounts:
- name: shared
+6 -6
View File
@@ -103,17 +103,17 @@ spec:
- https://minio-api.riotpiao.com
console: https://minio.riotpiao.com
# ── OIDC via Authentik (server-side env, valid in v2 schema) ────────────────
# Use in-cluster URL for config fetch (pod→authentik); browser redirects use
# public URLs embedded in the OIDC metadata response (issuer stays public).
# ── OIDC via ZITADEL (server-side env, valid in v2 schema) ──────────────────
# Use external URL for config fetch (hairpins through ingress-nginx); browser
# redirects use public URLs embedded in the OIDC metadata response.
env:
- name: MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_CONFIG_URL
# Must use external URL — well-known response contains external issuer/jwks_uri.
# MinIO validates issuer in JWT matches well-known issuer. Internal URL = mismatch.
# Hairpins through ingress-nginx but stays in-cluster.
value: "https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/minio/.well-known/openid-configuration"
value: "https://zitadel.riotpiao.com/.well-known/openid-configuration"
- name: MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_CLIENT_ID
value: "minio"
value: "396757803257036801"
- name: MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ spec:
- name: MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_REDIRECT_URI
value: "https://minio.riotpiao.com/oauth_callback"
- name: MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_DISPLAY_NAME
value: "Authentik"
value: "Zitadel"
- name: MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_SCOPES
value: "openid,profile,email,groups"
- name: MINIO_BROWSER_LOGIN_ANIMATION
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PrometheusRule
metadata:
name: authentik-rules
namespace: iam
spec:
groups:
- name: authentik.rules
interval: 15s
rules:
- alert: AuthentikHighErrorRate
expr: |
(
sum(rate(authentik_http_requests_total{status=~"5.."}[5m]))
/
sum(rate(authentik_http_requests_total[5m]))
) > 0.05
for: 10m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "High error rate on Authentik"
description: "5xx error rate exceeded 5% of total requests for 10 minutes. Value: {{ $value | humanizePercentage }}"
- alert: AuthentikOutpostDown
expr: |
authentik_outpost_total_up == 0
for: 5m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "Authentik outpost is down"
description: "Outpost {{ $labels.outpost_name }} (type: {{ $labels.outpost_type }}) has been offline for 5 minutes"
@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ serviceMonitor:
url: https://grafana.riotpiao.com/
- name: loki
url: https://loki.riotpiao.com/ready
- name: authentik
url: https://authentik.riotpiao.com/-/health/ready/
- name: zitadel
url: https://zitadel.riotpiao.com/debug/ready
- name: vault
url: https://vault.riotpiao.com/v1/sys/health
- name: minio-console
-2
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ kind: Kustomization
resources:
- alerts/ingress-alerts.yaml
- alerts/svc-argocd-rules.yaml
- alerts/svc-authentik-rules.yaml
- alerts/svc-zitadel-rules.yaml
- alerts/svc-forgejo-rules.yaml
- alerts/svc-grafana-rules.yaml
@@ -17,7 +16,6 @@ resources:
- alerts/api-gateway-alerts.yaml
- alerts/cag-kv-cache-rules.yaml
- servicemonitors/argocd.yaml
- servicemonitors/authentik.yaml
- servicemonitors/forgejo.yaml
- servicemonitors/minio.yaml
- servicemonitors/ingress-nginx.yaml
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: ServiceMonitor
metadata:
name: authentik
namespace: monitoring
labels:
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
namespaceSelector:
matchNames:
- iam
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: authentik
endpoints:
- port: metrics
interval: 30s
scrapeTimeout: 10s
-33
View File
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
# One-shot bootstrap: restart the control-plane apiservers ONCE so they pick up the
# OIDC authenticator (they last started before the Authentik provider existed, so OIDC
# tokens were never accepted -> every login got 401). Delete this whole directory after.
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: oidc-bootstrap
namespace: kube-system
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: oidc-bootstrap
namespace: kube-system
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: ["pods"]
verbs: ["get", "list", "delete"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: oidc-bootstrap
namespace: kube-system
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: oidc-bootstrap
namespace: kube-system
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Role
name: oidc-bootstrap
-32
View File
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
# Scoped operator access for homarr-admins: the homarr Deployment + app
# secrets only. homarr-oidc, auth-oidc-secret, db-encryption stay excluded
# (security-managed, not app config). Inert until kube-apiserver's OIDC
# wiring lands.
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: homarr-operator
namespace: dashboard
rules:
- apiGroups: ["apps"]
resources: ["deployments"]
resourceNames: ["homarr"]
verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "update", "patch"]
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: ["secrets"]
resourceNames: ["homarr-secrets"]
verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "update", "patch"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: homarr-admins-binding
namespace: dashboard
subjects:
- kind: Group
name: "oidc:homarr-admins"
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
roleRef:
kind: Role
name: homarr-operator
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
-1
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ resources:
- grafana-operator-role.yaml
- minio-operator-role.yaml
- forgejo-operator-role.yaml
- homarr-operator-role.yaml
- portainer-operator-role.yaml
- kmsvc-operator-role.yaml
- temporal-operator-role.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- zitadel-core.yaml
+133
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
# ZITADEL core objects, owned by this repository instead of the Helm chart.
#
# The zitadel chart marks four objects as Helm hooks:
#
# kind: ServiceAccount (also ConfigMap/zitadel-config-yaml, Role, RoleBinding)
# annotations:
# helm.sh/hook: pre-install,pre-upgrade
# helm.sh/hook-delete-policy: before-hook-creation
#
# ArgoCD maps pre-install/pre-upgrade to PreSync and prunes hook resources when
# the sync ends. Every sync therefore deleted the ServiceAccount and the ConfigMap
# that the ZITADEL Deployment references, which produced:
#
# error creating: pods "zitadel-..." is forbidden:
# serviceaccount "zitadel" not found
#
# and left the IdP one restart away from failing.
#
# These copies carry no hook annotations, so they are ordinary desired state and
# ArgoCD keeps them. The chart still renders its own hook versions during a sync;
# these win because the sync no longer removes them.
#
# ConfigMap content mirrors what the chart renders from
# k8s/infra/iam/zitadel-values.yaml, plus the notification settings the chart
# cannot deliver through values (see the SMTP note below). When the chart values
# change, update this file too; it is the authoritative copy at runtime.
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: zitadel
namespace: iam
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: zitadel
app.kubernetes.io/instance: zitadel
app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: gitops
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: zitadel
namespace: iam
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: zitadel
app.kubernetes.io/instance: zitadel
app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: gitops
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: ["secrets"]
verbs: ["get", "create", "patch", "list", "delete"]
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: ["pods"]
verbs: ["get"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: zitadel
namespace: iam
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: zitadel
app.kubernetes.io/instance: zitadel
app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: gitops
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: zitadel
roleRef:
kind: Role
name: zitadel
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: zitadel-config-yaml
namespace: iam
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: zitadel
app.kubernetes.io/instance: zitadel
app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: gitops
data:
zitadel-config-yaml: |
ExternalDomain: zitadel.riotpiao.com
ExternalSecure: true
TLS:
Enabled: false
FirstInstance:
# First boot is COMPLETE. Skip stops the setup step from running again and
# silently rotating the iam-admin key that provisioning reads.
Skip: true
Org:
Skip: true
Machine:
Machine:
Name: Automatically Initialized IAM Admin
Username: iam-admin
MachineKey:
ExpirationDate: "2029-01-01T00:00:00Z"
Type: 1
Pat:
ExpirationDate: "2029-01-01T00:00:00Z"
Machine:
Identification:
Hostname:
Enabled: true
Webhook:
Enabled: false
# Notification delivery.
#
# ZITADEL sends verification codes and password resets by SMTP only. This
# cluster has no mail path, so without a provider every user stays at
# verified_email = empty and cannot finish a first login.
#
# The target is the in-cluster smtp-gotify relay, which forwards each message
# to Gotify so codes reach the phone.
#
# Why here and not in chart values: injecting the same keys as
# ZITADEL_DEFAULTINSTANCE_SMTPCONFIGURATION_* env vars produced no
# instance.smtp.config.added event, so ZITADEL never created the provider.
# Setting configmapConfig in chart values made ArgoCD stop managing this
# ConfigMap. Owning the file here avoids both problems.
DefaultInstance:
DomainPolicy:
# The sender is [email protected] while the instance domain is
# zitadel.riotpiao.com. Leave this true so the sender address is not
# rejected for not matching the domain.
SMTPSenderAddressMatchesInstanceDomain: false
SMTPConfiguration:
SMTP:
Host: smtp-gotify.iam.svc.cluster.local:2525
TLS: false
From: [email protected]
FromName: ZITADEL
+38
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# forgejo-oauth-source.sh — keep the Forgejo OAuth login source aligned with
# ZITADEL.
#
# Forgejo stores login sources in its database, not in GitOps, and its REST API
# does not expose them. `tea` has no auth-source command either (tea admin only
# manages users), so the supported writer is the in-pod CLI:
# gitea admin auth update-oauth
#
# The source name is the label on the "Sign in with ..." button AND the callback
# path (/user/oauth2/<name>/callback), so a rename changes the registered
# redirect URI. Register both spellings in ZITADEL (zitadel-provision.py does)
# before renaming.
#
# Usage:
# scripts/iam/forgejo-oauth-source.sh status
# scripts/iam/forgejo-oauth-source.sh rename zitadel
set -euo pipefail
NS="${FORGEJO_NAMESPACE:-cicd}"
SEL="${FORGEJO_SELECTOR:-app.kubernetes.io/name=forgejo}"
pod() {
kubectl -n "$NS" get pods -l "$SEL" -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.name}' 2>/dev/null \
|| kubectl -n "$NS" get pods -o name | grep -m1 forgejo-gitea | cut -d/ -f2
}
run() { kubectl -n "$NS" exec "$(pod)" -c gitea -- gitea admin auth "$@"; }
case "${1:-status}" in
status) run list ;;
rename)
name="${2:?usage: $0 rename <name>}"
run update-oauth --id 1 --name "$name"
run list
;;
*) echo "usage: $0 [status|rename <name>]" >&2; exit 2 ;;
esac
-669
View File
@@ -1,669 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Provision RBAC groups, service account roles, fine-grained claims, and auth flows.
Idempotent — safe to re-run. Provisions:
1. Global admin groups (homelab-admins)
2. Fine-grained service/bucket/project groups (minio-*, poimen-*, paperless-*, grafana-*, sqs-*)
3. Service account roles with custom claims (paperless-ai-agent, portfolio-agent, etc.)
4. JWT scope mappings for fine-grained claims (minio_buckets, paperless_doctypes, etc.)
5. OAuth2 providers with scopes (api-gw, minio, poimen, paperless, grafana)
6. Auth flows (password grant on api-gw provider)
Usage:
source ~/.env
export AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN=$(kubectl -n iam get secret authentik-secrets \
-o jsonpath='{.data.AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN}' | base64 -d)
python3 scripts/iam/provision-rbac.py
DO NOT commit this file to git — .gitignore covers scripts/iam/*.py.
"""
import json
import os
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
from typing import Dict, List, Any
from pathlib import Path
# Load ~/.env for OAuth2 provider secrets
env_file = Path.home() / ".env"
if env_file.exists():
with open(env_file) as f:
for line in f:
line = line.strip()
if line.startswith("export ") and "=" in line:
key, _, value = line[7:].partition("=")
key = key.strip()
value = value.strip().strip('"').strip("'")
os.environ[key] = value
AUTHENTIK_URL = "https://authentik.riotpiao.com"
TOKEN = os.environ.get("AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN")
if not TOKEN:
print("Error: AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN not set")
print(" source ~/.env")
print(" export AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN=$(kubectl -n iam get secret authentik-secrets \\")
print(" -o jsonpath='{.data.AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN}' | base64 -d)")
sys.exit(1)
def api(method, path, data=None):
url = f"{AUTHENTIK_URL}{path}"
body = json.dumps(data).encode() if data is not None else None
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=body, method=method, headers={
"Authorization": f"Bearer {TOKEN}",
"Content-Type": "application/json",
})
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp:
raw = resp.read()
return resp.status, json.loads(raw) if raw else {}
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
raw = e.read()
try:
parsed = json.loads(raw) if raw else {}
except json.JSONDecodeError:
parsed = {"raw": raw.decode(errors="replace")}
return e.code, parsed
def die(msg):
print(f"FATAL: {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
# ===========================================================================
# Group Definitions (DRY: single source of truth)
# ===========================================================================
GROUPS: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {
"homelab-admins": {
"description": "Cluster administrators with full access",
"is_superuser": True,
},
"minio-admins": {"description": "MinIO administrators", "is_superuser": False, "minio_buckets": ["*"]},
"minio-photos": {"description": "Photos bucket (Immich) access", "is_superuser": False, "minio_buckets": ["immich"]},
"minio-documents": {"description": "Documents bucket (Paperless) access", "is_superuser": False, "minio_buckets": ["paperless"]},
"minio-backups": {"description": "Backups bucket read-only access", "is_superuser": False, "minio_buckets": ["backups"]},
"poimen-admins": {"description": "Poimen memory administrators", "is_superuser": False, "memory_projects": ["*"], "memory_visibility": "private"},
"poimen-devs": {"description": "Dev and staging projects access", "is_superuser": False, "memory_projects": ["dev", "staging"], "memory_visibility": "internal"},
"poimen-prod-readonly": {"description": "Production projects read-only access", "is_superuser": False, "memory_projects": ["prod"], "memory_visibility": "public"},
"paperless-admins": {"description": "Paperless administrators", "is_superuser": False, "paperless_doctypes": ["*"]},
"paperless-finance": {"description": "Finance documents", "is_superuser": False, "paperless_doctypes": ["invoices", "receipts", "expenses"]},
"paperless-legal": {"description": "Legal documents", "is_superuser": False, "paperless_doctypes": ["contracts", "licenses", "agreements"]},
"paperless-hr": {"description": "HR documents", "is_superuser": False, "paperless_doctypes": ["employment", "benefits", "payroll"]},
"grafana-admins": {"description": "Grafana administrators", "is_superuser": False, "grafana_org_role": "Admin"},
"grafana-editors": {"description": "Grafana dashboard editors", "is_superuser": False, "grafana_org_role": "Editor"},
"grafana-viewers": {"description": "Grafana dashboard viewers", "is_superuser": False, "grafana_org_role": "Viewer"},
"sqs-users": {"description": "SQS/Temporal queue read access", "is_superuser": False, "sqs_queues": ["default"]},
"sqs-writers": {"description": "SQS/Temporal queue read/write access", "is_superuser": False, "sqs_queues": ["*"]},
"s3-users": {"description": "S3 read access", "is_superuser": False},
"s3-writers": {"description": "S3 read/write access", "is_superuser": False},
}
SERVICE_ACCOUNTS: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {
"paperless-ai-agent": {
"description": "Paperless AI plugin (auto-tagging, entity extraction)",
"roles": ["llm:inference", "memory:write", "paperless:admin"],
"claims": {
"minio_buckets": ["paperless"],
"paperless_doctypes": ["*"],
"memory_projects": ["*"],
"authorized_models": ["reasoning", "qwen2.5:3b"],
},
},
"portfolio-agent": {
"description": "Portfolio service agent",
"roles": ["llm:inference", "memory:read"],
"claims": {
"memory_projects": ["homelab", "portfolio"],
"memory_visibility": "public",
"authorized_models": ["ornith:35b"],
"minio_buckets": ["backups"],
},
},
"memory-agent": {
"description": "Memory service agent",
"roles": ["llm:inference", "memory:read", "memory:write"],
"claims": {
"memory_projects": ["*"],
"memory_visibility": "private",
"authorized_models": ["reasoning", "ornith:35b", "qwen2.5:3b"],
},
},
"temporal-worker-agent": {
"description": "Temporal workflow worker",
"roles": ["llm:inference", "workflow:execute", "memory:read", "memory:write", "queue:send"],
"claims": {
"memory_projects": ["*"],
"sqs_queues": ["*"],
"authorized_models": ["reasoning", "ornith:35b", "qwen2.5:3b"],
},
},
}
SCOPE_MAPPINGS: Dict[str, Dict[str, str]] = {
"roles": {"expression": 'return user.attributes.get("roles", [])'},
"permissions": {"expression": 'return ["*"] if any(user.groups.filter(is_superuser=True)) else list(user.groups.values_list("name", flat=True))'},
"groups": {"expression": 'return {"groups": list(user.groups.values_list("name", flat=True))}'},
"minio_buckets": {"expression": 'return user.attributes.get("minio_buckets", [])'},
"paperless_doctypes": {"expression": 'return user.attributes.get("paperless_doctypes", [])'},
"memory_projects": {"expression": 'return user.attributes.get("memory_projects", [])'},
"memory_visibility": {"expression": 'return user.attributes.get("memory_visibility", "public")'},
"authorized_models": {"expression": 'return user.attributes.get("authorized_models", [])'},
"sqs_queues": {"expression": 'return user.attributes.get("sqs_queues", [])'},
"grafana_org_role": {"expression": 'return user.attributes.get("grafana_org_role", "Viewer")'},
}
# ===========================================================================
# Phase 1: Create/sync all groups
# ===========================================================================
print("[1/6] Ensuring groups exist...")
status, res = api("GET", "/api/v3/core/groups/?page_size=100")
if status != 200:
die(f"GET groups -> {status} {res}")
existing_groups = {g["name"]: g for g in res["results"]}
created_count = 0
for group_name, group_spec in GROUPS.items():
if group_name in existing_groups:
print(f" {group_name}: already exists")
else:
status, res = api("POST", "/api/v3/core/groups/", {
"name": group_name,
"is_superuser": group_spec.get("is_superuser", False),
})
if status in (200, 201):
print(f" {group_name}: created")
created_count += 1
else:
print(f" {group_name}: FAILED {status} {res}")
print(f" Total: {len(GROUPS)} groups, {created_count} new")
# ===========================================================================
# Phase 2: Create/sync service account users with custom claims
# ===========================================================================
print("\n[2/6] Creating/updating service account users...")
status, res = api("GET", "/api/v3/core/users/?page_size=100")
if status != 200:
die(f"GET users -> {status} {res}")
existing_users = {u["username"]: u for u in res["results"]}
service_pwd = os.environ.get("AUTHENTIK_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_PASSWORD", "DefaultPassword123!")
for agent_name, agent_spec in SERVICE_ACCOUNTS.items():
if agent_name in existing_users:
user = existing_users[agent_name]
attrs = user.get("attributes", {})
attrs.update(agent_spec.get("claims", {}))
attrs["roles"] = agent_spec.get("roles", [])
status, res = api("PATCH", f"/api/v3/core/users/{user['pk']}/", {"attributes": attrs})
if status in (200, 201):
print(f" {agent_name}: claims updated")
else:
print(f" {agent_name}: FAILED {status} {res}")
else:
status, res = api("POST", "/api/v3/core/users/", {
"username": agent_name,
"name": agent_spec.get("description", agent_name),
"email": f"{agent_name}@homelab.local",
"is_active": True,
"is_superuser": False,
"password": service_pwd,
"attributes": {
**agent_spec.get("claims", {}),
"roles": agent_spec.get("roles", []),
},
})
if status in (200, 201):
print(f" {agent_name}: created")
else:
print(f" {agent_name}: FAILED {status} {res}")
# ===========================================================================
# Phase 3: Create scope mappings for fine-grained claims
# ===========================================================================
print("\n[3/6] Creating scope mappings for fine-grained claims...")
status, res = api("GET", "/api/v3/propertymappings/provider/scope/?page_size=100")
if status != 200:
die(f"GET scope mappings -> {status} {res}")
existing_scopes = {m["scope_name"]: m for m in res["results"]}
for scope_name, scope_spec in SCOPE_MAPPINGS.items():
if scope_name in existing_scopes:
print(f" {scope_name}: already exists")
else:
status, res = api("POST", "/api/v3/propertymappings/provider/scope/", {
"name": scope_name,
"scope_name": scope_name,
"expression": scope_spec["expression"],
})
if status in (200, 201):
print(f" {scope_name}: created")
else:
print(f" {scope_name}: FAILED {status} {res}")
# Fix built-in 'openid' scope to include preferred_username (needed by Grafana, Forgejo, etc.)
# Note: sub MUST be a string, not int, for JSON compatibility with Go struct unmarshaling
if "openid" in existing_scopes:
openid_scope = existing_scopes["openid"]
openid_pk = openid_scope["pk"]
openid_expression = 'return {"sub": str(user.pk), "preferred_username": user.username}'
if openid_expression not in openid_scope.get("expression", ""):
status, res = api("PUT", f"/api/v3/propertymappings/provider/scope/{openid_pk}/", {
"name": openid_scope["name"],
"scope_name": "openid",
"expression": openid_expression,
})
if status in (200, 201):
print(f" openid: updated (sub as string + preferred_username)")
else:
print(f" openid: UPDATE FAILED {status} {res}")
else:
print(f" openid: already correct (sub as string)")
# ===========================================================================
# Phase 4: Get flow UUIDs (needed for providers)
# ===========================================================================
print("\n[4/6] Fetching flow UUIDs...")
status, res = api("GET", "/api/v3/flows/instances/?page_size=100")
if status != 200:
die(f"GET flows -> {status} {res}")
flows = {f["slug"]: f["pk"] for f in res.get("results", [])}
auth_flow = flows.get("default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent")
inval_flow = flows.get("default-provider-invalidation-flow")
if not auth_flow or not inval_flow:
die(f"Required flows not found. auth_flow={auth_flow}, inval_flow={inval_flow}")
print(f" authorization_flow: {auth_flow}")
print(f" invalidation_flow: {inval_flow}")
# ===========================================================================
# Phase 5: Create OAuth2 providers with scopes
# ===========================================================================
print("\n[5/6] Creating OAuth2 providers...")
status, res = api("GET", "/api/v3/providers/oauth2/?page_size=100")
if status != 200:
die(f"GET providers -> {status} {res}")
existing_providers = {p["name"]: p for p in res.get("results", [])}
# Fetch scope mapping PKs
status, scopes_res = api("GET", "/api/v3/propertymappings/provider/scope/?page_size=100")
if status != 200:
print(" WARNING: could not fetch scope mappings")
scope_pks = {}
else:
scope_pks = {m["scope_name"]: m["pk"] for m in scopes_res.get("results", [])}
# Include standard OpenID scopes (openid, email, profile) + custom claim scopes
STANDARD_SCOPES = ["openid", "email", "profile"]
scope_pks_list = [scope_pks[s] for s in STANDARD_SCOPES if s in scope_pks]
scope_pks_list += [scope_pks[s] for s in SCOPE_MAPPINGS.keys() if s in scope_pks]
# OAuth2 providers — client_secret sourced from SOPS-encrypted k8s secrets.
# These are the real secrets the services use. Authentik must match.
OAuth2_PROVIDERS = {
"api-gw": {
"client_id": "api-gw",
"client_secret_env": "AUTHENTIK_PROVIDER_API_GW_SECRET",
"redirect_uris": ["http://localhost:3000/callback", "https://api.riotpiao.com/callback"],
},
"minio": {
"client_id": "minio",
"client_secret": "9d2867fe08c3bf7fedd7e32bbaf4456fce3b0aaf788966d7559e1955947b0219",
"redirect_uris": ["http://localhost:9000/auth/sso/oauth2/code", "https://minio.riotpiao.com/auth/sso/oauth2/code"],
},
"poimen": {
"client_id": "poimen",
"client_secret_env": "AUTHENTIK_PROVIDER_POIMEN_SECRET",
"redirect_uris": ["http://localhost:3000/callback", "https://poimen.riotpiao.com/callback"],
},
"paperless": {
"client_id": "paperless",
"client_secret": "6hcxaaVgZlKgafl7BxeSEtPAcbNUJxi2PAZePxSFk4o=",
"redirect_uris": ["http://localhost:8000/accounts/oidc/authentik/login/callback/", "https://paperless.riotpiao.com/accounts/oidc/authentik/login/callback/"],
},
"grafana": {
"client_id": "grafana",
"client_secret": "966bad4fa43812100e7775b3c73fed2ce1d07217fa5a23fbb0f190e46d2f0fa4",
"redirect_uris": ["http://localhost:3000/login/generic_oauth", "https://grafana.riotpiao.com/login/generic_oauth"],
},
"queue": {
"client_id": "queue-sqs",
"client_secret_env": "AUTHENTIK_PROVIDER_QUEUE_SECRET",
"redirect_uris": ["http://localhost:8080/callback", "https://queue.riotpiao.com/callback"],
},
"forgejo": {
"client_id": "forgejo",
"client_secret": "G4klhs3JRfs5A7YnGs90WuOndBAvamWlZgaZRY8x",
"redirect_uris": ["http://localhost:3000/user/oauth2/authentik/callback", "https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/user/oauth2/authentik/callback"],
},
"immich": {
"client_id": "immich",
"client_secret": "QxyWfESXqTD55aUyh6miYnny1QTCEuEwyC4escw9",
"redirect_uris": ["app.immich:///oauth-callback", "https://img.riotpiao.com/auth/login", "https://img.riotpiao.com/user/oauth2/callback"],
},
"homarr": {
"client_id": "homarr",
"client_secret": "RMlDQAWdjT5YPPH0U7ztDoUFP7R7w95b2xqQ1pyS",
"redirect_uris": ["http://localhost:7575/auth/callback", "https://homarr.riotpiao.com/auth/callback"],
},
"argocd": {
"client_id": "argocd",
"client_secret_env": "AUTHENTIK_PROVIDER_ARGOCD_SECRET",
"redirect_uris": ["http://localhost:8080/auth/callback", "https://argocd.riotpiao.com/auth/callback"],
},
"vault": {
"client_id": "vault",
"client_secret_env": "AUTHENTIK_PROVIDER_VAULT_SECRET",
"redirect_uris": ["http://localhost:8200/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback", "https://vault.riotpiao.com/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback"],
},
}
import secrets as _secrets
for provider_name, provider_spec in OAuth2_PROVIDERS.items():
# Resolve client_secret: explicit > env var > generate random
if "client_secret" in provider_spec:
client_secret = provider_spec["client_secret"]
elif "client_secret_env" in provider_spec:
client_secret = os.environ.get(provider_spec["client_secret_env"], _secrets.token_urlsafe(32))
else:
client_secret = _secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
redirect_uris_list = [{"url": uri, "matching_mode": "strict"} for uri in provider_spec["redirect_uris"]]
provider_payload = {
"name": provider_name,
"authorization_flow": auth_flow,
"invalidation_flow": inval_flow,
"grant_types": ["authorization_code", "implicit", "password"],
"client_id": provider_spec["client_id"],
"client_secret": client_secret,
"redirect_uris": redirect_uris_list,
"property_mappings": scope_pks_list,
}
if provider_name in existing_providers:
# UPDATE existing provider — sync secret + redirect_uris
provider_pk = existing_providers[provider_name]["pk"]
status, res = api("PATCH", f"/api/v3/providers/oauth2/{provider_pk}/", {
"client_id": provider_spec["client_id"],
"client_secret": client_secret,
"redirect_uris": redirect_uris_list,
"property_mappings": scope_pks_list,
})
if status in (200, 201):
print(f" {provider_name}: updated (secret + redirect_uris synced)")
else:
print(f" {provider_name}: UPDATE FAILED {status} {res}")
else:
# CREATE new provider
status, res = api("POST", "/api/v3/providers/oauth2/", provider_payload)
if status in (200, 201):
print(f" {provider_name}: created")
else:
print(f" {provider_name}: FAILED {status} {res}")
# ===========================================================================
# Phase 6: Create OAuth2 Applications (bind providers to public token endpoints)
# ===========================================================================
print("\n[6/7] Creating OAuth2 Applications...")
print(" (binds providers to /application/o/token/ endpoints)")
status, res = api("GET", "/api/v3/core/applications/?page_size=100")
if status != 200:
die(f"GET applications -> {status} {res}")
existing_apps = {a["slug"]: a for a in res.get("results", [])}
for provider_name in OAuth2_PROVIDERS.keys():
# Get the provider PK
status, provider_res = api("GET", f"/api/v3/providers/oauth2/?name={provider_name}")
if status != 200 or not provider_res.get("results"):
print(f" {provider_name}: provider not found, skip")
continue
provider_pk = provider_res["results"][0]["pk"]
if provider_name in existing_apps:
# Ensure app is linked to provider (fix orphaned apps)
app_data = existing_apps[provider_name]
if app_data.get("provider") != provider_pk:
app_uuid = app_data["pk"]
status, res = api("PATCH", f"/api/v3/core/applications/{app_uuid}/", {
"provider": provider_pk,
})
if status in (200, 201):
print(f" {provider_name}: re-linked to provider")
else:
print(f" {provider_name}: RE-LINK FAILED {status} {res}")
else:
print(f" {provider_name}: ok")
else:
status, res = api("POST", "/api/v3/core/applications/", {
"name": provider_name,
"slug": provider_name,
"provider": provider_pk,
})
if status in (200, 201):
print(f" {provider_name}: created")
else:
print(f" {provider_name}: FAILED {status} {res}")
# ===========================================================================
# Phase 7: Create/update rock user → homelab-admins, matching Forgejo identity
# ===========================================================================
print("\n[7/10] Creating/updating rock user ([email protected])...")
ROCK_EMAIL = "[email protected]"
ROCK_PASSWORD = os.environ.get("ROCK_PASSWORD", "")
status, res = api("GET", "/api/v3/core/users/?username=rock")
if status == 200 and res.get("results"):
rock_user = res["results"][0]
# Ensure email matches Forgejo's rock user for OIDC linking
patch_data = {"email": ROCK_EMAIL, "name": "Rock"}
status, res = api("PATCH", f"/api/v3/core/users/{rock_user['pk']}/", patch_data)
if status in (200, 201):
print(f" rock: updated email to {ROCK_EMAIL}")
else:
print(f" rock: update FAILED {status} {res}")
else:
if not ROCK_PASSWORD:
print(" rock: NOT FOUND and ROCK_PASSWORD not set, skipping creation")
print(" export ROCK_PASSWORD=<password> and re-run")
rock_user = None
else:
status, res = api("POST", "/api/v3/core/users/", {
"username": "rock",
"name": "Rock",
"email": ROCK_EMAIL,
"is_active": True,
"is_superuser": False,
"password": ROCK_PASSWORD,
})
if status in (200, 201):
rock_user = res
print(f" rock: created with email {ROCK_EMAIL}")
else:
print(f" rock: create FAILED {status} {res}")
rock_user = None
if rock_user:
status, res = api("GET", "/api/v3/core/groups/?name=homelab-admins")
if status == 200 and res.get("results"):
admins_group = res["results"][0]
status, res = api("POST", f"/api/v3/core/groups/{admins_group['pk']}/users/add/", {"pk": rock_user["pk"]})
if status in (200, 201, 204):
print(f" rock: added to homelab-admins")
else:
print(f" rock: group add {status} {res}")
# ===========================================================================
# Phase 8: Email recovery flow (password reset via email)
# ===========================================================================
print("\n[8/10] Creating email recovery flow...")
# Read SMTP config from gotify-smtp secret (same Gmail creds)
SMTP_HOST = "smtp.gmail.com"
SMTP_PORT = 587
SMTP_USER = "[email protected]"
SMTP_FROM = "[email protected]"
# Password read from env at runtime: AUTHENTIK_EMAIL__PASSWORD
# 8a. Create email stage for recovery
status, res = api("GET", "/api/v3/stages/email/?name=email-recovery")
if status == 200 and res.get("results"):
email_stage_pk = res["results"][0]["pk"]
print(" email-recovery stage: already exists")
else:
status, res = api("POST", "/api/v3/stages/email/", {
"name": "email-recovery",
"use_global_settings": False,
"host": SMTP_HOST,
"port": SMTP_PORT,
"username": SMTP_USER,
"password": os.environ.get("AUTHENTIK_EMAIL_PASSWORD", ""),
"use_tls": True,
"use_ssl": False,
"timeout": 10,
"from_address": SMTP_FROM,
"template": "email/password_reset.html",
"activate_user_on_success": True,
})
if status in (200, 201):
email_stage_pk = res["pk"]
print(" email-recovery stage: created")
else:
email_stage_pk = None
print(f" email-recovery stage: FAILED {status} {res}")
# 8b. Create identification stage for recovery (email lookup)
status, res = api("GET", "/api/v3/stages/identification/?name=recovery-identification")
if status == 200 and res.get("results"):
ident_stage_pk = res["results"][0]["pk"]
print(" recovery-identification stage: already exists")
else:
status, res = api("POST", "/api/v3/stages/identification/", {
"name": "recovery-identification",
"user_fields": ["email", "username"],
})
if status in (200, 201):
ident_stage_pk = res["pk"]
print(" recovery-identification stage: created")
else:
ident_stage_pk = None
print(f" recovery-identification stage: FAILED {status} {res}")
# 8c. Create password stage for new password entry
status, res = api("GET", "/api/v3/stages/password/?name=recovery-password-change")
if status == 200 and res.get("results"):
pw_stage_pk = res["results"][0]["pk"]
print(" recovery-password-change stage: already exists")
else:
# Use prompt stage for password change instead
status, res = api("GET", "/api/v3/stages/user_write/?name=recovery-user-write")
if status == 200 and res.get("results"):
pw_stage_pk = res["results"][0]["pk"]
print(" recovery-user-write stage: already exists")
else:
status, res = api("POST", "/api/v3/stages/user_write/", {
"name": "recovery-user-write",
})
if status in (200, 201):
pw_stage_pk = res["pk"]
print(" recovery-user-write stage: created")
else:
pw_stage_pk = None
print(f" recovery-user-write stage: FAILED {status} {res}")
# 8d. Create recovery flow
status, res = api("GET", "/api/v3/flows/instances/?slug=password-recovery")
if status == 200 and res.get("results"):
recovery_flow_pk = res["results"][0]["pk"]
print(" password-recovery flow: already exists")
else:
status, res = api("POST", "/api/v3/flows/instances/", {
"name": "Password Recovery",
"slug": "password-recovery",
"title": "Reset your password",
"designation": "recovery",
})
if status in (200, 201):
recovery_flow_pk = res["pk"]
print(" password-recovery flow: created")
else:
recovery_flow_pk = None
print(f" password-recovery flow: FAILED {status} {res}")
# 8e. Bind stages to flow in order
if recovery_flow_pk and ident_stage_pk and email_stage_pk:
for order, stage_pk, label in [
(10, ident_stage_pk, "identification"),
(20, email_stage_pk, "email"),
]:
status, res = api("POST", "/api/v3/flows/bindings/", {
"target": recovery_flow_pk,
"stage": stage_pk,
"order": order,
})
if status in (200, 201):
print(f" bound {label} stage at order {order}")
elif status == 400 and "already exists" in str(res).lower():
print(f" {label} stage: already bound")
else:
print(f" bind {label}: {status} {res}")
# ===========================================================================
# Phase 9: Set recovery flow on brand
# ===========================================================================
print("\n[9/10] Setting recovery flow on brand...")
if recovery_flow_pk:
status, res = api("GET", "/api/v3/brands/instances/")
if status == 200 and res.get("results"):
brand = res["results"][0]
status, res = api("PATCH", f"/api/v3/brands/instances/{brand['brand_uuid']}/", {
"flow_recovery": recovery_flow_pk,
})
if status in (200, 201):
print(" recovery flow set on brand")
else:
print(f" FAILED {status} {res}")
else:
print(" no brand found")
# ===========================================================================
# Phase 10: Ensure Forgejo OAuth2 source uses matching email claim
# ===========================================================================
print("\n[10/10] Verifying Forgejo OIDC linkage...")
print(f" rock@Authentik email: {ROCK_EMAIL}")
print(" Forgejo OIDC will match on email — ensure Forgejo's rock user")
print(f" has email {ROCK_EMAIL} in Forgejo settings → Profile")
# ===========================================================================
# Summary
# ===========================================================================
print("\n" + "="*70)
print("AUTHENTIK PROVISIONING COMPLETE")
print("="*70)
print(f"\n [1] Groups: {len(GROUPS)}")
print(f" [2] Service accounts: {len(SERVICE_ACCOUNTS)}")
print(f" [3] Scope mappings: {len(SCOPE_MAPPINGS)}")
print(f" [4] Flows resolved")
print(f" [5] OAuth2 providers: {len(OAuth2_PROVIDERS)}")
print(f" [6] OAuth2 applications bound")
print(f" [7] rock user ([email protected]) -> homelab-admins")
print(f" [8] Email recovery flow (smtp.gmail.com)")
print(f" [9] Recovery flow set on brand")
print(f" [10] Forgejo OIDC linkage verified")
print("\nNEXT: Set Forgejo rock user email to [email protected] in Forgejo profile")
print("TEST: https://authentik.riotpiao.com/if/flow/password-recovery/")
print("="*70)
+2 -3
View File
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ generate_secret() {
declare -A NEW_SECRETS
for svc in api-gw minio poimen paperless grafana argocd forgejo homarr immich vault portfolio-agent memory-agent local-llm; do
for svc in api-gw minio poimen paperless grafana argocd forgejo immich vault portfolio-agent memory-agent local-llm; do
NEW_SECRETS[$svc]=$(generate_secret)
log " $svc: ${NEW_SECRETS[$svc]:0:15}..."
done
@@ -70,7 +70,6 @@ declare -A PROVIDER_PKS=(
[grafana]=6
[argocd]=7
[forgejo]=8
[homarr]=9
[immich]=10
[vault]=11
)
@@ -203,7 +202,7 @@ fi
log ""
log "=== Summary ==="
log "Rotated 13 credentials:"
log " OAuth2 Providers: api-gw, minio, poimen, paperless, grafana, argocd, forgejo, homarr, immich, vault"
log " OAuth2 Providers: api-gw, minio, poimen, paperless, grafana, argocd, forgejo, immich, vault"
log " Service Accounts: portfolio-agent, memory-agent, local-llm"
log ""
+346 -44
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ One command replaces the manual sequence the Authentik script
fixed order and every phase is safe to re-run:
keys extract the iam-admin machine key and PAT from namespace iam
apply terraform apply terraform/zitadel (project, roles, apps, machines)
apply create project, roles and OIDC apps through the ZITADEL API
secrets write generated client ids/secrets back into the SOPS files
users import one human user, converting the Django password hash
verify check discovery, client count and the groups-claim gate
@@ -43,12 +43,110 @@ from pathlib import Path
import yaml
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
TF_DIR = REPO / "terraform" / "zitadel"
SOPS_DIR = REPO / "k8s" / "argocd" / "secrets"
SOPS_CONFIG = REPO / ".sops.yaml"
CONF_DIR = Path(os.environ.get("ZITADEL_CONF_DIR", Path.home() / ".config" / "zitadel"))
STATE_FILE = CONF_DIR / "state.json"
NAMESPACE = os.environ.get("ZITADEL_NAMESPACE", "iam")
BASE_URL = os.environ.get("ZITADEL_BASE_URL", "https://zitadel.riotpiao.com")
# Notification delivery target: the in-cluster SMTP -> Gotify relay.
SMTP_HOST = os.environ.get("ZITADEL_SMTP_HOST", "smtp-gotify.iam.svc.cluster.local:2525")
SMTP_FROM = os.environ.get("ZITADEL_SMTP_FROM", "[email protected]")
SMTP_FROM_NAME = os.environ.get("ZITADEL_SMTP_FROM_NAME", "ZITADEL")
# ── desired ZITADEL state ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Declared here, applied through the API by the `apply` phase. This replaces the
# retired terraform/zitadel root module: same objects, no state file to drift and
# no second writer.
PROJECT_NAME = os.environ.get("ZITADEL_PROJECT_NAME", "homelab")
PROJECT_GROUP = "homelab"
# Role keys EQUAL the Authentik group names, so the `groups` claim keeps working
# for every consumer that maps on it (kube-apiserver RBAC, MinIO policies,
# Grafana roles).
ROLES = {
"homelab-admins": "Cluster administrators with full access",
"minio-admins": "MinIO administrators",
"minio-photos": "Photos bucket (Immich) access",
"minio-documents": "Documents bucket (Paperless) access",
"minio-backups": "Backups bucket read-only access",
"poimen-admins": "Poimen memory administrators",
"poimen-devs": "Dev and staging projects access",
"poimen-prod-readonly": "Production projects read-only access",
"paperless-admins": "Paperless administrators",
"paperless-finance": "Finance documents",
"paperless-legal": "Legal documents",
"paperless-hr": "HR documents",
"grafana-admins": "Grafana administrators",
"grafana-editors": "Grafana dashboard editors",
"grafana-viewers": "Grafana dashboard viewers",
"sqs-users": "SQS/Temporal queue read access",
"sqs-writers": "SQS/Temporal queue read/write access",
"s3-users": "S3 read access",
"s3-writers": "S3 read/write access",
# LLM gate for the api-gw. The colon form matches the Authentik-era
# permission string, so consumer manifests did not change.
"llm:inference": "LLM inference access (api-gw)",
"llm-inference": "LLM inference access (dash alias)",
# Per-service capabilities. The gateway derives the required capability from
# the verb: GET/HEAD/OPTIONS -> "<service>:read", anything else ->
# "<service>:write" (internal/serviceadapter/router.go:142). The role key
# must match that string exactly, colon included.
"memory:read": "Poimen memory read (api-gw)",
"memory:write": "Poimen memory write (api-gw)",
"workflow:read": "Temporal workflow read (api-gw)",
"workflow:execute": "Temporal workflow execute (api-gw)",
"s3:read": "Object store read (api-gw)",
"s3:write": "Object store write (api-gw)",
"iam:read": "Identity read (api-gw)",
"iam:write": "Identity write (api-gw)",
"sqs:read": "Queue read (api-gw)",
"sqs:write": "Queue write (api-gw)",
}
_WEB = {"app_type_id": "OIDC_APP_TYPE_WEB", "auth_method_id": "OIDC_AUTH_METHOD_TYPE_BASIC"}
_NATIVE = {"app_type_id": "OIDC_APP_TYPE_NATIVE", "auth_method_id": "OIDC_AUTH_METHOD_TYPE_NONE"}
_PKCE = {"app_type_id": "OIDC_APP_TYPE_USER_AGENT", "auth_method_id": "OIDC_AUTH_METHOD_TYPE_NONE"}
OIDC_APPS = {
"api-gw": {**_WEB, "redirect_uris": [
"http://localhost:3000/callback", "https://api.riotpiao.com/callback"]},
"argocd": {**_WEB, "redirect_uris": [
"http://localhost:8080/auth/callback",
"https://argocd.riotpiao.com/auth/callback"]},
# Forgejo derives the callback path from the login-source NAME
# (/user/oauth2/<name>/callback). Both spellings are registered so a
# rename between authentik and zitadel never breaks sign-in.
"forgejo": {**_WEB, "redirect_uris": [
"http://localhost:3000/user/oauth2/zitadel/callback",
"https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/user/oauth2/zitadel/callback",
"http://localhost:3000/user/oauth2/authentik/callback",
"https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/user/oauth2/authentik/callback"]},
"grafana": {**_WEB, "redirect_uris": [
"http://localhost:3000/login/generic_oauth",
"https://grafana.riotpiao.com/login/generic_oauth"]},
"immich": {**_WEB, "app_type_id": "OIDC_APP_TYPE_NATIVE", "redirect_uris": [
"app.immich:///oauth-callback", "https://img.riotpiao.com/auth/login",
"https://img.riotpiao.com/user/oauth2/callback"]},
"kubernetes": {**_PKCE, "dev_mode": True, "redirect_uris": [
"http://localhost:8000", "http://localhost:18000"]},
"minio": {**_WEB, "redirect_uris": [
"http://localhost:9000/auth/sso/oauth2/code",
"https://minio.riotpiao.com/auth/sso/oauth2/code"]},
"paperless": {**_WEB, "redirect_uris": [
"http://localhost:8000/accounts/oidc/zitadel/login/callback/",
"https://paperless.riotpiao.com/accounts/oidc/zitadel/login/callback/",
"http://localhost:8000/accounts/oidc/authentik/login/callback/",
"https://paperless.riotpiao.com/accounts/oidc/authentik/login/callback/"]},
"poimen": {**_WEB, "redirect_uris": [
"http://localhost:3000/callback", "https://poimen.riotpiao.com/callback"]},
"queue-sqs": {**_WEB, "redirect_uris": [
"http://localhost:8080/callback", "https://queue.riotpiao.com/callback"]},
"vault": {**_WEB, "redirect_uris": [
"http://localhost:8200/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback",
"https://vault.riotpiao.com/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback"]},
}
_TEMP_FILES: set[str] = set()
@@ -155,6 +253,13 @@ def curl_json(method: str, url: str, token: str | None = None, body: dict | None
cfg = [f'url = "{esc(url)}"', f'request = "{method}"', "silent", "show-error",
f"max-time = {timeout}", 'write-out = "\\n%{http_code}"',
'header = "Content-Type: application/json"']
# Reaching the instance by name needs either public DNS through the tunnel
# or a pinned address. ZITADEL picks the instance from the Host header, so a
# plain port-forward fails with "Instance not found". Set this to bypass DNS:
# ZITADEL_CURL_RESOLVE=zitadel.riotpiao.com:443:192.168.1.160
pinned = os.environ.get("ZITADEL_CURL_RESOLVE", "").strip()
if pinned:
cfg.append(f'resolve = "{esc(pinned)}"')
if token:
cfg.append(f'header = "Authorization: Bearer {esc(token)}"')
if body is not None:
@@ -179,27 +284,233 @@ def phase_keys(_args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
# ── phase: apply ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def phase_apply(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
need("terraform")
if not args.org_id:
die("apply requires --org-id (ZITADEL console -> Organization settings -> Resource ID)")
key = CONF_DIR / "iam-admin.json"
if not key.exists():
die(f"{key} missing — run the keys phase first")
env = dict(os.environ, ZITADEL_JWT_PROFILE_FILE=str(key))
def _api(method: str, path: str, token: str, body: dict | None = None,
timeout: int = 30) -> tuple[int, dict]:
code, payload = curl_json(method, f"{BASE_URL}{path}", token=token, body=body, timeout=timeout)
try:
return code, (json.loads(payload) if payload.strip() else {})
except json.JSONDecodeError:
return code, {"_raw": payload}
for cmd in (["init", "-input=false"], ["fmt", "-check", "-recursive"]):
cp = run(["terraform", f"-chdir={TF_DIR}", *cmd], env=env)
if cp.returncode != 0:
die(f"terraform {' '.join(cmd)} failed: {cp.stderr.strip() or cp.stdout.strip()}")
cp = run(["terraform", f"-chdir={TF_DIR}", "apply", "-input=false", "-auto-approve",
f"-var=org_id={args.org_id}"], env=env)
sys.stdout.write(cp.stdout)
sys.stderr.write(cp.stderr)
if cp.returncode != 0:
die("terraform apply failed — no SOPS value was written. Objects created before the "
"failure stay in ZITADEL; re-run apply once the cause is fixed")
def _ensure_project(token: str, name: str) -> str:
code, d = _api("POST", "/management/v1/projects/_search", token, {})
project_id = ""
for row in d.get("result") or []:
if row.get("name") == name:
project_id = row["id"]
break
if not project_id:
code, d = _api("POST", "/management/v1/projects", token, {"name": name})
if code not in (200, 201) or not d.get("id"):
die(f"create project {name} failed: {code} {d}")
project_id = d["id"]
# projectRoleAssertion puts the project roles into the ACCESS token as
# `urn:zitadel:iam:org:project:roles`. Without it the api-gw sees no
# llm:inference role and answers 403 for every inference call, even when
# the caller is correctly authorised in ZITADEL.
code, d = _api("PUT", f"/management/v1/projects/{project_id}",
token, {"name": name, "projectRoleAssertion": True})
if code not in (200, 201):
die(f"enable projectRoleAssertion on {name} failed: {code} {d}")
return project_id
def _ensure_builtin_login(token: str) -> None:
"""Force the built-in login page instead of the hosted Login UI.
The hosted UI authenticates as the machine user `login-client`, which the
chart creates only from its one-shot setup job. When that user is missing,
every session write fails with "Could not create session for user" and no
one can sign in, at ZITADEL or at any relying party.
Disabling the loginV2 feature makes the server serve its own login page,
which needs no machine user. This is instance state in the database, not a
values key, so it must be applied explicitly.
"""
code, d = _api("PUT", "/v2/features/instance", token, {"loginV2": {"required": False}})
if code not in (200, 201):
die(f"disable loginV2 failed: {code} {d}")
print("login page : built-in (loginV2.required=false)")
def _ensure_roles(token: str, project_id: str, roles: dict[str, str]) -> None:
code, d = _api("POST", f"/management/v1/projects/{project_id}/roles/_search", token, {})
# ZITADEL answers with `key`, not `roleKey`. Reading the wrong field left
# this set empty, so every re-run tried to recreate existing roles and died
# on the first 409.
have = {(r.get("key") or r.get("roleKey")) for r in (d.get("result") or [])}
for key, display in roles.items():
if key in have:
continue
code, d = _api("POST", f"/management/v1/projects/{project_id}/roles", token,
{"roleKey": key, "displayName": display, "group": PROJECT_GROUP})
if code not in (200, 201):
die(f"create role {key} failed: {code} {d}")
def _ensure_oidc_apps(token: str, project_id: str, apps: dict[str, dict],
known_secrets: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> tuple[dict, dict]:
code, d = _api("POST", f"/management/v1/projects/{project_id}/apps/_search", token, {})
existing = {a.get("name"): a for a in (d.get("result") or [])}
ids: dict[str, str] = {}
secrets: dict[str, str] = {}
known_secrets = known_secrets or {}
for name, spec in apps.items():
row = existing.get(name)
created = False
if row:
ids[name] = (row.get("oidcConfig") or {}).get("clientId", "")
app_id = row.get("id")
else:
body = {
"name": name,
"redirectUris": spec["redirect_uris"],
"responseTypes": ["OIDC_RESPONSE_TYPE_CODE"],
"grantTypes": ["OIDC_GRANT_TYPE_AUTHORIZATION_CODE",
"OIDC_GRANT_TYPE_REFRESH_TOKEN"],
"appType": spec.get("app_type_id", "OIDC_APP_TYPE_WEB"),
"authMethodType": spec.get("auth_method_id", "OIDC_AUTH_METHOD_TYPE_BASIC"),
"devMode": bool(spec.get("dev_mode")),
"accessTokenType": "OIDC_TOKEN_TYPE_BEARER",
"version": "OIDC_VERSION_1_0",
"idTokenRoleAssertion": True,
}
code, d = _api("POST", f"/management/v1/projects/{project_id}/apps/oidc", token, body)
if code not in (200, 201) or not d.get("appId"):
die(f"create app {name} failed: {code} {d}")
app_id = d["appId"]
ids[name] = d.get("clientId", "")
created = True
if spec.get("auth_method_id") == "OIDC_AUTH_METHOD_TYPE_NONE":
continue
if not created:
# ZITADEL keeps one client secret per app, and the API cannot read it
# back. Generating a new one here would replace the deployed copy and
# break that app's login, so reuse the value already on disk.
if known_secrets.get(name):
secrets[name] = known_secrets[name]
continue
code, d = _api("POST",
f"/management/v1/projects/{project_id}/apps/{app_id}"
"/oidc_config/_generate_client_secret", token, {})
if code in (200, 201) and d.get("clientSecret"):
secrets[name] = d["clientSecret"]
return ids, secrets
def _ensure_smtp(token: str) -> str:
"""Make sure the instance has one active SMTP provider.
ZITADEL sends verification codes and password resets by SMTP only. A
freshly added config is created INACTIVE (state 3), and an inactive config
makes GetSMTPConfig answer 404 "SMTP configuration not found", so nothing is
ever delivered. Activating it is what enables sending: after the activate
call the same GET returns the config and a resend reaches the relay.
This is instance state in the database, not a values key, so it must be
applied explicitly. The host points at the in-cluster smtp-gotify relay
(k8s/infra/iam/smtp-gotify.yaml), which forwards to Gotify.
"""
code, d = _api("GET", "/admin/v1/smtp", token)
if code == 200 and (d.get("smtpConfig") or {}).get("id"):
smtp_id = d["smtpConfig"]["id"]
print(f"smtp : already active ({smtp_id})")
return smtp_id
code, d = _api("POST", "/admin/v1/smtp", token, {
"senderAddress": SMTP_FROM,
"senderName": SMTP_FROM_NAME,
"host": SMTP_HOST,
"tls": False,
})
if code not in (200, 201) or not d.get("id"):
die(f"create smtp config failed: {code} {d}")
smtp_id = d["id"]
# The activate call is mandatory: without it the config stays inactive and
# every send is dropped while the API still reports success.
code, d = _api("POST", f"/admin/v1/smtp/{smtp_id}/_activate", token, {})
if code not in (200, 201):
die(f"activate smtp config {smtp_id} failed: {code} {d}")
code, d = _api("GET", "/admin/v1/smtp", token)
if code != 200 or not (d.get("smtpConfig") or {}).get("id"):
die(f"smtp config {smtp_id} still not visible after activate: {code} {d}")
print(f"smtp : active ({smtp_id}) -> {SMTP_HOST}")
return smtp_id
def _ensure_login_policy(token: str) -> None:
"""Require password + a second factor, and demand enrolment at login.
Enforcement needs forceMfa. The v1 endpoint ignores the spelling "forceMFA"
as an unknown field, which is why earlier runs looked successful while
projections.login_policies5 kept force_mfa = false.
Second factors stay OTP and U2F: an authenticator app or a hardware key.
Multi-factor is left configured for U2F with verification so a later step
can move 2FA to 2MFA without another policy change.
"""
code, d = _api("PUT", "/admin/v1/policies/login", token, {
# Case matters: protojson accepts "forceMfa", the lowerCamel form of
# force_mfa. Sending "forceMFA" is silently ignored as an unknown field,
# so the policy looks unchanged and MFA is never enforced.
"forceMfa": True,
"forceMfaLocalOnly": True,
"allowUsernamePassword": True,
"allowRegister": False,
"allowExternalIDP": True,
"hidePasswordReset": False,
"ignoreUnknownUsernames": True,
"passwordCheckLifetime": "864000s",
"externalLoginCheckLifetime": "864000s",
"mfaInitSkipLifetime": "0s",
"secondFactorCheckLifetime": "64800s",
"multiFactorCheckLifetime": "64800s",
"secondFactors": ["SECOND_FACTOR_TYPE_OTP", "SECOND_FACTOR_TYPE_U2F"],
"multiFactors": ["MULTI_FACTOR_TYPE_U2F_WITH_VERIFICATION"],
"passwordlessType": "PASSWORDLESS_TYPE_ALLOWED",
})
# ZITADEL answers 400 "has not been changed" when the policy already matches.
# That is success for an idempotent run, not a failure.
if code not in (200, 201) and "has not been changed" not in str(d.get("message", "")):
die(f"update login policy failed: {code} {d}")
print("login policy : password + 2FA, enrolment required")
def phase_apply(_args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
"""Declare the ZITADEL objects through the API. No Terraform, no state drift."""
token = bootstrap_token()
if not token:
die("no iam-admin PAT — run the keys phase first")
_ensure_builtin_login(token)
_ensure_smtp(token)
_ensure_login_policy(token)
project_id = _ensure_project(token, PROJECT_NAME)
print(f"project : {PROJECT_NAME} ({project_id})")
_ensure_roles(token, project_id, ROLES)
print(f"roles : {len(ROLES)} ensured")
known: dict[str, str] = {}
try:
known = (json.loads(STATE_FILE.read_bytes()).get("client_secrets", {})
.get("value", {}) or {})
except (OSError, ValueError):
known = {}
ids, secrets = _ensure_oidc_apps(token, project_id, OIDC_APPS, known)
print(f"oidc apps : {len(ids)} ensured, {len(secrets)} secrets issued")
state = {
"project_id": {"value": project_id},
"client_ids": {"value": ids},
"client_secrets": {"value": secrets},
"machine_keys": {"value": {}},
"groups_claim_enabled": {"value": False},
}
write_private(STATE_FILE, json.dumps(state, indent=2, sort_keys=True).encode())
print(f"state -> {STATE_FILE} (0600)")
return 0
@@ -213,8 +524,8 @@ SECRET_MAP = {
"GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET", "secret")],
"minio": [("minio-secrets.enc.yaml", "minio-oidc",
"MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET", "secret")],
"paperless-ai-agent": [("paperless-ai-secrets.enc.yaml", "paperless-ai-config",
"LLM_AUTH_CLIENT_SECRET", "secret")],
"paperless": [("paperless-ai-secrets.enc.yaml", "paperless-ai-config",
"LLM_AUTH_CLIENT_SECRET", "secret")],
}
# Clients whose client_id lives in a plain (unencrypted) manifest. They need the
@@ -224,30 +535,21 @@ CLIENT_ID_MAP = {
"grafana": ("k8s/infra/logging/grafana-values.yaml",
r"(?m)^(\s*client_id:\s*)\S+\s*$", r"\g<1>{value}"),
"minio": ("k8s/infra/minio/minio-tenant.yaml",
r"(?m)^(\s*value:\s*)\"minio\"\s*$", r'\g<1>"{value}"'),
"paperless-ai-agent": ("k8s/apps/paperless/paperless-ai.yaml",
r"client_id=paperless-ai-agent", "client_id={value}"),
r'(?m)^(\s*value:\s*)"(?:minio|\d+)"\s*$', r'\g<1>"{value}"'),
"paperless": ("k8s/apps/paperless/paperless-ai.yaml",
r"client_id=(?:paperless-ai-agent|\d+)", "client_id={value}"),
}
# Secrets that a live workload mounts but no SOPS file in git defines. The phase
# cannot re-point them safely, so it names them.
MANUAL_ONLY = {
"homarr": "Secret homarr-oidc (keys client-id, client-secret) has no SOPS file in git — "
"adopt it first, then add it to SECRET_MAP. The repo also carries an orphan "
"homarr-auth-oidc.enc.yaml that nothing consumes.",
}
MANUAL_ONLY: dict[str, str] = {}
def terraform_outputs() -> dict:
need("terraform")
key = CONF_DIR / "iam-admin.json"
if not key.exists():
die(f"{key} missing — run the keys phase first")
env = dict(os.environ, ZITADEL_JWT_PROFILE_FILE=str(key))
cp = run(["terraform", f"-chdir={TF_DIR}", "output", "-json"], env=env)
if cp.returncode != 0:
die(f"terraform output failed: {cp.stderr.strip()}")
return json.loads(cp.stdout or "{}")
def state_outputs() -> dict:
"""Read the object map written by the apply phase."""
if not STATE_FILE.exists():
die(f"{STATE_FILE} missing — run the apply phase first")
return json.loads(STATE_FILE.read_text())
def sops_env() -> dict:
@@ -345,13 +647,13 @@ def update_client_id(client: str, value: str, dry_run: bool, apply_config: bool)
def phase_secrets(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
need("sops")
out = terraform_outputs()
out = state_outputs()
ids = out.get("client_ids", {}).get("value", {})
secrets = out.get("client_secrets", {}).get("value", {})
machine_keys = out.get("machine_keys", {}).get("value", {})
if not ids and not machine_keys:
die("terraform has no ZITADEL outputs yet — run the apply phase first")
die("no ZITADEL objects recorded yet — run the apply phase first")
print("[1/3] client secrets into SOPS")
for client, entries in SECRET_MAP.items():
@@ -438,7 +740,7 @@ def phase_verify(_args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
if code != 200:
die("discovery endpoint is not 200 — the instance or the ingress is not ready")
out = terraform_outputs()
out = state_outputs()
ids = out.get("client_ids", {}).get("value", {})
print(f"client apps : {len(ids)}")
enabled = bool(out.get("groups_claim_enabled", {}).get("value"))
+51
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
# Cloudflare side of the edge.
#
# The tunnel itself is remotely managed today: its token lives in
# k8s/apps/cloudflared and the public hostnames are configured in the Zero
# Trust dashboard. Terraform can own the DNS records without owning the tunnel,
# which is the safe half: a record change is reversible, a tunnel config rewrite
# removes every hostname the plan does not list.
locals {
# CNAME target of every remotely-managed tunnel.
tunnel_target = "${var.tunnel_id}.cfargotunnel.com"
}
resource "cloudflare_dns_record" "tunnel" {
for_each = toset(var.cloudflare_tunnel_hostnames)
zone_id = var.cloudflare_zone_id
name = each.value
type = "CNAME"
content = local.tunnel_target
proxied = var.cloudflare_dns_proxied
ttl = var.cloudflare_dns_ttl
comment = "cloudflared tunnel; managed by terraform/edge"
# A proxied CNAME must point at the tunnel target. A CNAME to any other
# hostname breaks the tunnel mapping.
lifecycle {
precondition {
condition = var.cloudflare_dns_proxied
error_message = "Tunnel CNAMEs must be proxied; an unproxied record bypasses the tunnel."
}
}
}
# Optional: take the tunnel configuration into Terraform. Off by default.
# Applying it REPLACES the whole ingress list. Import first:
# terraform import cloudflare_zero_trust_tunnel_cloudflared_config.this \
# <account_id>/<tunnel_id>
resource "cloudflare_zero_trust_tunnel_cloudflared_config" "this" {
count = var.manage_tunnel_config ? 1 : 0
account_id = var.cloudflare_account_id
tunnel_id = var.tunnel_id
config = {
ingress = concat(
[for host, service in var.tunnel_ingress : { hostname = host, service = service }],
[{ service = "http_status:404" }],
)
}
}
+40
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
output "cloudflare_records" {
description = "Hostnames now managed in the Cloudflare zone."
value = sort(keys(cloudflare_dns_record.tunnel))
}
output "tunnel_config_managed" {
description = "Whether Terraform owns the tunnel ingress list. False means the dashboard still does."
value = var.manage_tunnel_config
}
output "relay_public_ip" {
description = "Public address of the Tencent relay. Point the .cn DNS at it, or let the module do it."
value = tencentcloud_instance.relay.public_ip
}
output "china_hostnames" {
description = "Fully qualified China hostnames served by the relay."
value = [for host in var.china_hostnames : "${host}.${var.china_domain}"]
}
output "wireguard_peer" {
description = "Peer stanza for the homelab side. Add it to the cluster's wg0.conf; the relay already trusts this public key."
value = <<-EOT
[Peer]
PublicKey = <relay public key; see /etc/wireguard/wg0.conf on the relay>
Endpoint = ${tencentcloud_instance.relay.public_ip}:${var.wireguard_port}
AllowedIPs = ${var.wireguard_relay_address}
PersistentKeepalive = 25
EOT
}
output "next_manual_steps" {
description = "What this module cannot do for you."
value = [
"Confirm the ICP filing for ${var.china_domain} if the relay is in a mainland region.",
"Issue a certificate for the China hostnames on the relay (Caddy ACME needs the DNS-01 challenge for a .cn domain).",
"Run a WireGuard peer in the cluster that dials ${tencentcloud_instance.relay.public_ip}:${var.wireguard_port}.",
"Add the .cn origins to the OIDC client redirect URIs before any China user logs in.",
]
}
+47
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
# terraform/edge — the China-facing edge, plus DNS ownership for the existing zone
#
# Purpose: give users in mainland China a short, stable path to the homelab
# without touching the Cloudflare path that serves everyone else.
#
# China user -> <service>.<china_domain> -> Tencent CVM (this module)
# -> WireGuard tunnel -> ingress-nginx (192.168.1.160) -> service
#
# Everyone else -> Cloudflare -> cloudflared tunnel -> same ingress (unchanged)
#
# The homelab still opens no inbound port: the tunnel is established outbound
# from the cluster to the CVM.
#
# Credentials come from the environment, never from a file in git:
# export CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN=...
# export TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_ID=...
# export TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_KEY=...
# terraform -chdir=terraform/edge init
# terraform -chdir=terraform/edge plan -var china_domain=example.cn ...
#
# State is local and git-ignored. It carries no
# credential today, but it will once InstanceData or certificates are added, so
# treat it as a secret and move it to MinIO before a second operator applies.
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.6.0"
required_providers {
cloudflare = {
source = "cloudflare/cloudflare"
version = "5.28.1"
}
tencentcloud = {
source = "tencentcloudstack/tencentcloud"
version = "1.83.38"
}
}
}
provider "cloudflare" {
api_token = var.cloudflare_api_token
}
provider "tencentcloud" {
secret_id = var.tencent_secret_id
secret_key = var.tencent_secret_key
region = var.tencent_region
}
+22
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
# Rendered by terraform/edge. Do not edit on the instance.
#
# Caddy terminates TLS for the .cn hostnames and forwards over the WireGuard
# tunnel to ingress-nginx. flush_interval -1 disables response buffering so
# Server-Sent Events reach the client chunk-by-chunk.
{
email ${acme_email}
admin off
}
${hosts} {
reverse_proxy ${ingress_upstream} {
flush_interval -1
}
header {
Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
X-Frame-Options "DENY"
Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
}
}
+169
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
# The relay: one small CVM in Tencent Cloud that terminates TLS for the .cn
# domain and forwards over WireGuard to the homelab ingress.
#
# Why a relay and not Cloudflare: mainland clients reach a Tencent edge far
# faster than a Cloudflare edge, and Cloudflare's China network is an
# Enterprise product. The homelab keeps zero inbound exposure because the
# tunnel is dialled outbound from the cluster.
#
# ICP FILING: a mainland resource serving HTTP/HTTPS for a domain requires an
# ICP filing naming that domain. Without it this instance accepts the
# connection and the mainland network resets the HTTP layer. Put the relay in a
# non-mainland region (ap-hongkong, ap-singapore) when no filing exists.
resource "tencentcloud_vpc" "edge" {
name = "${replace(var.china_domain, ".", "_")}_edge"
cidr_block = var.edge_vpc_cidr
}
resource "tencentcloud_subnet" "edge" {
name = "${replace(var.china_domain, ".", "_")}_edge"
vpc_id = tencentcloud_vpc.edge.id
availability_zone = var.tencent_availability_zone
cidr_block = var.edge_subnet_cidr
}
resource "tencentcloud_key_pair" "edge" {
key_name = "${replace(var.china_domain, ".", "_")}_edge"
public_key = var.relay_ssh_public_key
}
resource "tencentcloud_security_group" "edge" {
name = "${replace(var.china_domain, ".", "_")}_edge"
description = "TLS + WireGuard for the ${var.china_domain} relay; SSH from the operator only"
}
resource "tencentcloud_security_group_rule" "ssh" {
security_group_id = tencentcloud_security_group.edge.id
type = "ingress"
ip_protocol = "tcp"
port_range = "22"
cidr_ip = var.relay_admin_cidr
policy = "accept"
}
resource "tencentcloud_security_group_rule" "tls" {
security_group_id = tencentcloud_security_group.edge.id
type = "ingress"
ip_protocol = "tcp"
port_range = "80,443"
cidr_ip = "0.0.0.0/0"
policy = "accept"
}
resource "tencentcloud_security_group_rule" "wireguard" {
security_group_id = tencentcloud_security_group.edge.id
type = "ingress"
ip_protocol = "udp"
port_range = tostring(var.wireguard_port)
# The homelab dials outbound and has no static public address, so this is
# 0.0.0.0/0 by default. WireGuard authenticates every packet by public key,
# and an unauthenticated packet is dropped before it reaches the tunnel.
# Narrow this to the homelab egress CIDR when that address is stable.
cidr_ip = var.wireguard_allowed_cidr
policy = "accept"
}
# cloud-init: WireGuard listener, forwarding sysctls, and Caddy for TLS.
# The relay never holds application credentials; it forwards bytes.
#
# NOTE ON THE PRIVATE KEY: user_data is visible in the instance metadata and in
# Terraform state. That is a known limitation of bootstrapping WireGuard this
# way. The argument is wrapped in sensitive() to keep it out of plan/apply
# output, but anyone with console or state access can read it. Rotate the key
# if the state or the instance metadata is ever exposed.
locals {
china_fqdns = [for host in var.china_hostnames : "${host}.${var.china_domain}"]
caddyfile = templatefile("${path.module}/templates/Caddyfile.tpl", {
acme_email = var.acme_email
hosts = join(", ", local.china_fqdns)
ingress_upstream = var.ingress_upstream
})
relay_user_data = <<-EOT
#cloud-config
package_update: true
package_upgrade: false
manage_etc_hosts: true
timezone: Asia/Shanghai
packages: [wireguard, wireguard-tools, caddy]
write_files:
- path: /etc/wireguard/wg0.conf
permissions: "0600"
content: |
[Interface]
Address = ${var.wireguard_relay_address}
ListenPort = ${var.wireguard_port}
PrivateKey = ${var.wireguard_relay_private_key}
# Masquerade forwarded traffic so the homelab peer only has to accept
# packets sourced from the relay's tunnel address. Without this the
# homelab peer's AllowedIPs would drop the original client source IP.
PostUp = iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o wg0 -j MASQUERADE
PostDown = iptables -t nat -D POSTROUTING -o wg0 -j MASQUERADE
[Peer]
PublicKey = ${var.wireguard_homelab_public_key}
AllowedIPs = ${var.wireguard_homelab_allowed_ips}
PersistentKeepalive = 25
- path: /etc/sysctl.d/99-wireguard.conf
content: |
net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1
- path: /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
permissions: "0644"
content: ${jsonencode(local.caddyfile)}
runcmd:
- sysctl --system
- systemctl enable --now wg-quick@wg0
- caddy validate --config /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
- systemctl enable --now caddy
- systemctl restart caddy
EOT
}
resource "tencentcloud_instance" "relay" {
instance_name = "${replace(var.china_domain, ".", "_")}_edge"
availability_zone = var.tencent_availability_zone
image_id = var.relay_image_id
instance_type = var.relay_instance_type
vpc_id = tencentcloud_vpc.edge.id
subnet_id = tencentcloud_subnet.edge.id
security_groups = [tencentcloud_security_group.edge.id]
key_ids = [tencentcloud_key_pair.edge.id]
allocate_public_ip = true
# Outbound only needs a few Mbps; inbound TLS is the same order.
internet_max_bandwidth_out = var.relay_internet_max_bandwidth_out
system_disk_type = var.relay_system_disk_type
system_disk_size = var.relay_system_disk_size
# The private key is embedded in this bootstrap script. sensitive() keeps it
# out of CLI output; it does not remove it from state or instance metadata.
user_data = sensitive(local.relay_user_data)
tags = {
role = "china-edge"
domain = var.china_domain
}
# Accidental `terraform destroy` would take the only China-facing edge down.
# Remove this block deliberately when a replacement path exists.
lifecycle {
prevent_destroy = true
}
}
# DNS for the .cn domain lives at DNSPod (Tencent). Each subdomain resolves to
# the relay's public address, and the relay proxies to the homelab over the
# tunnel. The "中国境内" line is the default line; no separate line records.
resource "tencentcloud_dnspod_record" "china" {
for_each = toset(var.china_hostnames)
domain = var.china_domain
sub_domain = each.value
record_type = "A"
record_line = var.china_dns_record_line
value = tencentcloud_instance.relay.public_ip
ttl = var.china_dns_ttl
remark = "China edge relay; origin is the homelab ingress over WireGuard"
}
+45
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@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
# Copy to terraform.tfvars.local (git-ignored) and fill in.
# Secrets never belong in a committed file: pass them as environment variables
# instead — TF_VAR_wireguard_relay_private_key, CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN,
# TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_ID, TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_KEY.
# ── Cloudflare (existing zone) ───────────────────────────────────────────────
cloudflare_zone_id = "REPLACE_WITH_ZONE_ID"
tunnel_id = "REPLACE_WITH_TUNNEL_UUID"
# Adopt existing records with `terraform import` before the first apply, or the
# create call collides with the hand-made record of the same name:
# terraform import 'cloudflare_dns_record.tunnel["zitadel"]' \
# <zone_id>/<record_id>
#
# A tunnel CNAME is only half of the path. The tunnel's Public Hostname list
# (Zero Trust -> Networks -> Tunnels -> Public Hostname) must also map the name
# to https://<name>.riotpiao.com, or Cloudflare answers 404 from the tunnel even
# though DNS resolves.
cloudflare_tunnel_hostnames = ["paperless", "img", "poimen", "zitadel"]
# Leave false until the tunnel config import is understood. True makes
# Terraform replace the entire ingress list with tunnel_ingress.
manage_tunnel_config = false
tunnel_ingress = {}
# ── China edge (Tencent Cloud) ───────────────────────────────────────────────
china_domain = "REPLACE.example.cn"
china_hostnames = ["paperless", "img"]
# Mainland regions require an ICP filing for the domain. Use ap-hongkong or
# ap-singapore when no filing exists.
tencent_region = "ap-guangzhou"
tencent_availability_zone = "ap-guangzhou-6"
relay_instance_type = "S5.SMALL2"
relay_image_id = "REPLACE_WITH_IMAGE_ID"
relay_ssh_public_key = "ssh-ed25519 AAAA... operator@laptop"
relay_admin_cidr = "REPLACE_WITH_OPERATOR_CIDR"
# ── WireGuard between the relay and the cluster ──────────────────────────────
# The relay private key comes from `wg genkey`. Keep it in the environment, or
# in a SOPS file mounted for the run. It is not written by this module.
wireguard_port = 51820
wireguard_homelab_public_key = "REPLACE_WITH_HOMELAB_WG_PUBKEY"
wireguard_relay_address = "10.88.0.1/24"
wireguard_homelab_address = "10.88.0.2/24"
+227
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@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
variable "cloudflare_api_token" {
description = "Cloudflare API token with Zone:DNS:Edit and, for tunnel config, Account:Cloudflare Tunnel:Edit."
type = string
sensitive = true
default = null
}
variable "cloudflare_zone_id" {
description = "Zone ID of the existing public zone (riotpiao.com)."
type = string
}
variable "cloudflare_account_id" {
description = "Account ID. Required only when manage_tunnel_config is true."
type = string
default = null
}
variable "tunnel_id" {
description = "UUID of the cloudflared tunnel that the DNS records point at."
type = string
}
# The dashboard remains the source of truth for the remotely-managed tunnel
# today. Setting this true hands that config to Terraform, which then rewrites
# the whole ingress list: every hostname not listed in tunnel_ingress is
# removed from the tunnel. Import first and read the plan before applying.
variable "manage_tunnel_config" {
description = "Take ownership of the remotely-managed tunnel configuration."
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "tunnel_ingress" {
description = "hostname => origin service, used only when manage_tunnel_config is true."
type = map(string)
default = {}
}
# ── DNS records managed in the Cloudflare zone ───────────────────────────────
# These names already exist, created by hand in the dashboard. Adopt them with
# `terraform import` before the first apply, or Terraform will try to create a
# second record with the same name and Cloudflare will reject it.
variable "cloudflare_tunnel_hostnames" {
description = "Hostnames in the Cloudflare zone that must CNAME to the tunnel."
type = list(string)
default = []
validation {
condition = alltrue([for h in var.cloudflare_tunnel_hostnames : can(regex("^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$", h))])
error_message = "cloudflare_tunnel_hostnames entries must be DNS labels or relative names (letters, digits, dot, underscore, hyphen)."
}
}
variable "cloudflare_dns_ttl" {
description = "TTL for tunnel CNAME records. 1 means automatic, which is required when proxied is true."
type = number
default = 1
}
variable "cloudflare_dns_proxied" {
description = "Whether tunnel CNAME records are proxied through Cloudflare. Must stay true for a tunnel origin."
type = bool
default = true
}
# ── China edge ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
variable "china_domain" {
description = "The .cn domain served from Tencent Cloud, without a trailing dot."
type = string
}
variable "china_hostnames" {
description = "Subdomains of china_domain that point at the Tencent relay."
type = list(string)
default = ["paperless", "img"]
}
variable "tencent_secret_id" {
description = "Tencent Cloud SecretId. Prefer TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_ID in the environment."
type = string
sensitive = true
default = null
}
variable "tencent_secret_key" {
description = "Tencent Cloud SecretKey. Prefer TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_KEY in the environment."
type = string
sensitive = true
default = null
}
variable "tencent_region" {
description = "Tencent Cloud region for the relay. Mainland regions need an ICP filing for the domain."
type = string
default = "ap-guangzhou"
}
variable "tencent_availability_zone" {
description = "Availability zone inside tencent_region."
type = string
default = "ap-guangzhou-6"
}
variable "relay_instance_type" {
description = "CVM spec for the relay. A relay only terminates TLS and forwards bytes."
type = string
default = "S5.SMALL2"
}
variable "relay_image_id" {
description = "CVM image ID. Find one with: tencentcloud images --image-name 'Ubuntu 24.04' (or the console)."
type = string
}
variable "relay_ssh_public_key" {
description = "Public key injected into the relay for break-glass SSH. Never the private key."
type = string
}
variable "relay_admin_cidr" {
description = "CIDR allowed to reach SSH and WireGuard on the relay. Keep it to the operator, not 0.0.0.0/0."
type = string
validation {
condition = var.relay_admin_cidr != "0.0.0.0/0" && var.relay_admin_cidr != "::/0"
error_message = "relay_admin_cidr must not be the whole internet. Set the operator's egress CIDR."
}
}
variable "wireguard_port" {
description = "UDP port of the WireGuard listener on the relay."
type = number
default = 51820
}
variable "wireguard_allowed_cidr" {
description = "CIDR allowed to reach the WireGuard UDP port. The homelab dials outbound, so this is often 0.0.0.0/0; WireGuard authenticates by key. Restrict it to the homelab egress CIDR when that address is static."
type = string
default = "0.0.0.0/0"
}
variable "wireguard_relay_private_key" {
description = "WireGuard private key of the relay side. Generate with `wg genkey`; pass via TF_VAR_wireguard_relay_private_key."
type = string
sensitive = true
}
variable "wireguard_homelab_public_key" {
description = "WireGuard public key of the homelab peer that dials the relay."
type = string
}
variable "wireguard_relay_address" {
description = "Tunnel address of the relay side."
type = string
default = "10.88.0.1/24"
}
variable "wireguard_homelab_address" {
description = "Tunnel address of the homelab side."
type = string
default = "10.88.0.2/24"
}
# ── Relay networking / sizing ───────────────────────────────────────────────
variable "edge_vpc_cidr" {
description = "CIDR of the relay VPC."
type = string
default = "10.66.0.0/16"
}
variable "edge_subnet_cidr" {
description = "CIDR of the relay subnet."
type = string
default = "10.66.1.0/24"
}
variable "relay_internet_max_bandwidth_out" {
description = "Peak outbound bandwidth in Mbps. The relay only terminates TLS and forwards bytes."
type = number
default = 20
}
variable "relay_system_disk_type" {
description = "System disk type for the relay."
type = string
default = "CLOUD_PREMIUM"
}
variable "relay_system_disk_size" {
description = "System disk size in GB for the relay."
type = number
default = 50
}
# ── DNS records ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
variable "china_dns_ttl" {
description = "TTL in seconds for the .cn A records."
type = number
default = 600
}
variable "china_dns_record_line" {
description = "DNSPod line for the .cn A records. Use 默认 for the default line."
type = string
default = "默认"
}
# ── Caddy reverse proxy ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
variable "wireguard_homelab_allowed_ips" {
description = "AllowedIPs for the homelab peer. Must include the homelab LAN so Caddy can reach ingress-nginx over the tunnel."
type = string
default = "10.88.0.2/32,192.168.1.0/24"
}
variable "ingress_upstream" {
description = "Upstream URL Caddy proxies to over WireGuard (the homelab ingress-nginx)."
type = string
default = "http://192.168.1.160:80"
}
variable "acme_email" {
description = "Contact email for Caddy ACME (Let's Encrypt)."
type = string
default = "[email protected]"
}
-1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
# TLS termination (cert-manager cert) and preserve the Host header. Routing
# via nginx (not the backend service) is critical: a direct rewrite bypasses
# nginx TLS and exposes each app's own self-signed cert, trusted by nothing.
rewrite name authentik.riotpiao.com ingress-nginx-controller.ingress-nginx.svc.cluster.local
rewrite name zitadel.riotpiao.com ingress-nginx-controller.ingress-nginx.svc.cluster.local
rewrite name grafana.riotpiao.com ingress-nginx-controller.ingress-nginx.svc.cluster.local
rewrite name minio.riotpiao.com ingress-nginx-controller.ingress-nginx.svc.cluster.local
-97
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@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
# RECOVERED from live cluster state via talosctl get machineconfig.
# Regenerated after the original tfvars.local was lost/corrupted.
cluster_id = "Rtc4g2av9EP0mOdxA4M0-QQitzHLWICz-rLBNfrOjgw="
cluster_secret = "8E0CAeylAPKmmUEQmIGmHQAhQf+8c7NUf43CdrQZ+vg="
bootstrap_token = "b2q7lh.9w7hwgrulrd65gr3"
machine_token = "hq9wlf.96l9z46efd79jtr2"
machine_ca_crt = "LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCk1JSUJQekNCOHFBREFnRUNBaEVBMkUwRWZqbG41L1J3eTVjMVJmNkNSakFGQmdNclpYQXdFREVPTUF3R0ExVUUKQ2hNRmRHRnNiM013SGhjTk1qWXdOekE1TURVd056VTRXaGNOTXpZd056QTJNRFV3TnpVNFdqQVFNUTR3REFZRApWUVFLRXdWMFlXeHZjekFxTUFVR0F5dGxjQU1oQUNwR3NQZkVHdEU4anVmNG9JTkNHNnlCQmN6aURFaEpLbDV3CnJib0hSR0tUbzJFd1h6QU9CZ05WSFE4QkFmOEVCQU1DQW9Rd0hRWURWUjBsQkJZd0ZBWUlLd1lCQlFVSEF3RUcKQ0NzR0FRVUZCd01DTUE4R0ExVWRFd0VCL3dRRk1BTUJBZjh3SFFZRFZSME9CQllFRkdmaExZUUdaOGYzd3lZZAo0SFI3KzlONnZKQXJNQVVHQXl0bGNBTkJBQ1ZQVlAwcGYxMkdUakYvSHJMZmcwZHBLemdBMlE1OGR5Y0paY0ZvClQvNDdPQk8ra29VZm11dXNjVVNNQnBXS0VuWHNYMFNocmNab3hQd1FHM3diblFFPQotLS0tLUVORCBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg=="
machine_ca_key = "LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBFRDI1NTE5IFBSSVZBVEUgS0VZLS0tLS0KTUM0Q0FRQXdCUVlESzJWd0JDSUVJSlR4MXRqZEVOTTg1cGNRRFR0WWRtMFd0QXNBd0tzL1VESlZLN0ZqYU5uUgotLS0tLUVORCBFRDI1NTE5IFBSSVZBVEUgS0VZLS0tLS0K"
kubernetes_ca_crt = "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"
kubernetes_ca_key = "LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBFQyBQUklWQVRFIEtFWS0tLS0tCk1IY0NBUUVFSUUrSEdPcUJJYXpJMzdqNmJJUlA1emVxeXEwZzhBU2xZeGplZUlJcEpIcXBvQW9HQ0NxR1NNNDkKQXdFSG9VUURRZ0FFK1ZkcU9pRzlTVUh4dDVNZ1ROQWN1SGNHaXA4aFhKRkw5MU02Sy9KZ0pMV2UyNURueVhmWAovM242bUdxYkQyU2xreGdiOWQ2MkpWcVBKSjByNE9xTzBRPT0KLS0tLS1FTkQgRUMgUFJJVkFURSBLRVktLS0tLQo="
etcd_ca_crt = "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"
etcd_ca_key = "LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBFQyBQUklWQVRFIEtFWS0tLS0tCk1IY0NBUUVFSUUwZ3JiMk0yblA4c1hxWjVhd3NzNThwbUdvb1FlSWg3a3RoWVlxNzhZZThvQW9HQ0NxR1NNNDkKQXdFSG9VUURRZ0FFRTRpV2dZaHdUbTJwSzUveGxMeE5VMXNyT0ZFUkxFNUZPQXZQSmc3bjF3QTNGZ29PM1VodQorQWZkL0dxU0lkcFlQRC9DUTlSQkNldzNVbUQwNTdHb2JnPT0KLS0tLS1FTkQgRUMgUFJJVkFURSBLRVktLS0tLQo="
aggregator_ca_crt = "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"
aggregator_ca_key = "LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBFQyBQUklWQVRFIEtFWS0tLS0tCk1IY0NBUUVFSUFoOEwycXFLbUxoYkpmczJ2M3ZRWXBFZHF6Ri9hTGZhSmoraEZRazdPY2NvQW9HQ0NxR1NNNDkKQXdFSG9VUURRZ0FFQUdJbThiK1hlUkE0RXBvWGc4bW05aW5ZY1hWWUlNajdJeks5QXpnUzFaWmdZeTZxbzJUQwpTT3NGWDFvWFVkRUU1VkxRQ25kcUF3V1AvMHNkTEFmNDNBPT0KLS0tLS1FTkQgRUMgUFJJVkFURSBLRVktLS0tLQo="
service_account_key = "LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBSU0EgUFJJVkFURSBLRVktLS0tLQpNSUlKSndJQkFBS0NBZ0VBd3NNZU40eE1YQkZ0VVE2dVZ2NEZFU1dNT2ZLc1RKdmxHa0ptVG1URjJIazg1SlJvCkhuQU1nMEkvMEJiMGFUQTJ3MjlkSEUrdUN6dFd5eVVqTzV5eWdJSDQ0Q2RtVnNHVzVua1Z0TmFGNzNpcFllbjYKaG11bmRoWDY1VndqOHpVUmFYZUxtUEc0Y2d4dk5SOXdGYUZXS0ZZdzQzdGtlWjg5S0F5QTNibjFXN3JHTloyOQovcXRYWEcrQnFSSlVuUzhXQmt4dkErUktyRE1OVHF4bjVGOEl1VkpTWkw5bDVEd3lSUnNqMjVMZVdRZUFYenl6CllWcmFKZmVubSt6L3hLZjhLdHFZMSs5U1pwbkZsS2N6TGlWVzg4WkJ5TnR0KytYZjB4N3FSL2lQOHhRQXV0ckIKV1pTbytoa01FRjV5YU0wQWdxcG5mbDBsUmhsM0I0UUx3NHkyTUpoTEpyQ1ltQjl1QllLWU5oRE5NOXk0Z1lrZgpacmdEdm9NdGpsSUJUUHRyVjMyemxYN05Od3d5UjdXOXp5ZlBSVjEvbjhpMk9KR0szeittdGNCR2Y0TS8veDFsClJRNEhzWWhDUVJRaE8vQWp2U2QvQlhFRnB3dEhsb1VYRU5nQ2lPSW00MnFrZTNWb3lLbjJ2Q3g2QlhodlJVZDAKUHgvK0JpM0d4RmRoa2Uxa0doelJLQTdySGhEMVBkVGsyM04wUXV3WHNNVDZRWXVrRDdPZG5KdFZtZVN4TkxqcwptdVpybmpwRzZsaHRDSmdvMGdVeXBYQ2RlWGVnZ0dIc0JCMks4NjIrdThVa0dwMk9IQUhGeldsdDF5L2VXTW9PCmhneWx1SEVLcjkzUU5uNDZsTGtZTDViWjlVTUZ0NXBMRFVrSFQxNkV5dTh0V21ET2ZoQ3Z3M1lmRWY4Q0F3RUEKQVFLQ0FnQUdSbUlSV1JoV3VRc0VHd3g3NmdoQXdxeHZhNFdvbkRjMzd0Njc5Tnc0K3NMKy9GY1ViL2kvTytHeApjeVBoeGJkbCtZOE82L1JJRVZ2ZEJLL0xhbU9INTJnYzFMZ2o0RzNidEJnQ2NRejBwN2NSWEFnQno3TWdCMXBECmpJSHVBbzR5anpMMHRRa0R4Nm5IbE9FNEdUQWM4WlgycGxHWTU0d0JYOUhCRXc0NEs5N1orR0NZTlc0Rm9PUVYKRGUyaStOTGxWZzRYbW9IYlpYT3V6cmcwTCttb2l1SHp0QVQwNHdtZGwxL0M0Y3IvSkZJNi8wb3FQMUthK1kweApaV1BpTXFWWnZoeEJqTWpqWEYzMHlhUkkvdFA3MjYzZjZrM3pXVGNxWnFzV3NZZjF4WFcyajNpK1NaOWVHM043CmpZZHpIL085d2Y2K29BS2s3UW9jT0dGbXBnQnlwdm9JbytlSFdjZlpZNFNXNloyeTRacUl0M2xTSWFHMEtmQjEKUnVrSVBtMlYzNDNlc3Azdy9TV2liRVU2elhvd01sWjlZc0dPalY1MTZDQmJZK0lQcmY2RXY0UFhDWjlnUERxcgpnUFFIZ0lFS294aUdYK2dENG9pYWdUMWVVSk1iYWZkaEkzSHJMWk9YbUpBZU40RHpOZXR1SGRsTk13YnpZZHN5CnpyMllSMkhqNTZydk9hcWZZUFJKV1NmS3ozRlhQdDNDMHJRVmNRekVqV1ZZbm9MZG9yR3FkaU1uMyt1NzF2RW4KSnluZksvN3VRSDY5VTU3NGNKK3FjOFNtNTlPeHBnN1RoODljMUZTeSszTk03bTE2czlJcjQvcG94Q2pWaHNWeQpKRmN2cHE4UTMwek9CQk0waUxyblNKcVRXaXJDRU8xNHlRY0VLbFBVd2VGUWdJK05pUUtDQVFFQTMwMWNrTnZuCmpaRHduRXFQaWp4SlBDSUNEeHcxYWtnVTZUNUpMVkt5SUFnK3BYNHlPZDZtendvV2hpWE5oVUQ5eWxPL21lTEsKSDRPUXVzeWdJUDdkOVNKZi9ZVTV5a1RZaVZLMUdzM1loZXovRmhRQXdBQUg4UmdBdW8rZU9UTUcyT0IxM2loLworQlFYL1lrOG9VR1M0YlpsZWNGWG5pSTZ5S0g1MUJUQ3g0ZTZZcStvdGMrMFc2RzBRVHVBT3JWcjdXWklGY1htClVDdElReXRJN2s2UVd6SXU0K3dnVnU3OUdrUEJTMHNBaXhzU0ppYXRTNzk1TjlhYjYwRzNDeVFWZDZWajJaVmEKWGpCR1oyQXREalpEWS9MMDlZQTlRVUxDbWVqT2hYVFlGNkJuNnRkYmVjeVlZTHdNS2MzWEhqNEt2U2ZaQ01HTwpvUXROdnFoUFFlSWpxUUtDQVFFQTMwZnFCSThDK2QwdXJlM1JhNFFRdUlzUC9xVTMyejIzMUdzbTZOOXlQd0hUClM4ZzlrS0ZDYzhMVGlmWFdnajhIRWxTVjVLSXJseERwZEVWQ1pEM05qdy9GVDdHcHV5SVplN1E3VlhiNld3MnYKY1I0M1FkdUQvOEc4ZkdlZGkrZ1BnKzlzeURCQXFIVzFGSHl1RmVaWGNsVTF1cndOV3V3TlFKUnZHczFoK1NuQQpXVmJxd1ZUL01GMmYxTjlBaFN0alhkM0Nscm1rb0o4ek05YW0zVWg5VUprQ2xSZi9mZVRONXZndE1odS9NNGtGCmVQYUlBMTVqT3h1cEFMN3ptVVVxZ0h1NE9yMm5mYTVNNHMzWTR6TVRYYm9VZGNVT09oRTRzU0J2bGlaak5KL3QKV2pSTmJmUWhxbWRBTTNZZjFGUC8vRW9CYTBPejBxMHNXci92cEhDUlp3S0NBUUFxMlkySnZxa1FZVi9LbmdRdApZcVFyQmR1ZlNxcDFXcCtvb21zb1oxWUhENDMxOCtGdmVXcEpFSWFCOTM4WXN3QUFjMUd4RmZQeldDdk5yTGFOCm5scTVUMzljQnRTd0c4WHhsQTFzdDFOMVg2VVRkNE10Vk5ReFQ0blVRdnI1dnZEeGJTRXhJRlJ1Sm16MEdnR28KY0F6ZmcwQzF2SVF6dEIzVG9rRnVrUTFQZkp3bms4MnNGYzltUmdGeEF4bjRLaGdyMWhTL0dOcTVSNVQyVHJnUQpBc053dkpDQzdDeklnZFBQMW5DaElpTllqamxOV042b1NuWFlZVFpLVHJIeFVWdE5PaytPMFRvbUdOMXB1T3JzCmJ6MC9VTC93M0VyazJ3cTh2Zy9qVENpclgveVE5QUo1dk9rQXB4VXVjSEYzUERDVFc3SXFHL3Bpck9pZVRXM28KRnAwQkFvSUJBRjBxa3JsSU8wT3JTUmtHRE1aQ0d3QUY5cXlZb0EvNVZzVnAySmgrOUJyYVZpSmU4V0Z5Q0ZwcApSdjlmOXh2dDFMT1BXK1JFenMrQUhRbUpCTVR6RE56UEJkUFZIQytiY09xdkw3cmZwR050K0hESTNPRzhDUDRsCkJ0TWFJU0VKdWIraG5kQ0NZZGhwRlIveFRtcVE3SmdtZWY3ckROK05jNUlvM1p0ZmE2d2VBY2JGZjdzZ0RrTk8KTGEwVFlzYXViZzN5eElsRCtTK1VmamI1TUROUlZnalZiOEJxZlE4NDg3bVdnTFZSNHB4TVpsNHM4R0FIZUh4bgpkRU45YWdQZ1duVzJLZzlJcDZUSG9BbGJQMDYrTnl4NndxTEprTUFtQTNQVlJ2cHVGaU1WUUdMTlJDbkhIbTBPCkhEbmM1amNndmNXMTA1WEFjRDVPU0IydHpQN2VnYTBDZ2dFQUZhTHJxMDJ6M2tXaW1iVzdoNi9Pby9YRHdjZ2YKSmdXMDYyYWdWUlpEMjM3Mm4valZSL25kMnFybmwxTFdWaXpzWW91b3hvY2N6NUwvQ2h3MktCOC9Rc1Zxai9KOApOUWh1ZDJ2ZUxjQlUvVzNseVhENnJpajJZMythNzRvM1A4b1psOGdDQmJEck1jajNsMHRZMXRWbm9nOWo0eHQ3Ckp3UXA3djNXb3ArSFVuRWVjbGpscTdlN1VuTGNwZlRDOE5PUmdxbjBGSUtCbXdFNlpJQnQxUzB6NmxSKytJdVMKQk1oTTZTSkZmeUFOVVdjTCt2cHJoRzBjWUZmcUYzajlPZ1dXRnBGTHFWQmdSTlZBVDRoM0U1Ymh4L0lsMTVHMAo2USs2aWlkRElqMEhNNFAzcjhja2lRUlVPdFI1R2NVS1RYZGh1TjkwMjZGRTdEckRvSURVZ0F5dGVnPT0KLS0tLS1FTkQgUlNBIFBSSVZBVEUgS0VZLS0tLS0K"
secretbox_encryption_secret = "RLkR4RmeaLmH/abyK3eYf6q22umJ/byLhheVCnh/yrA="
controlplane_configs = {
"talos-cp-1" = {
hostname = "talos-cp-1"
lan_ip = "192.168.1.166"
public_ip = "https://k8s-api.riotpiao.com"
lan_subnet = "192.168.1.0/24"
lan_gateway = "192.168.1.254"
install_disk = "/dev/nvme0n1"
longhorn_disks = []
zone = "az-a"
allow_scheduling = true
cloudflare_talos_sans = []
cloudflare_apiserver_sans = []
},
"talos-cp-2" = {
hostname = "talos-cp-2"
lan_ip = "192.168.1.214"
public_ip = "https://k8s-api.riotpiao.com"
lan_subnet = "192.168.1.0/24"
lan_gateway = "192.168.1.254"
install_disk = "/dev/disk/by-id/wwn-0x644a842029bd3f002720989b07d7143d"
longhorn_disks = [
{ device = "/dev/disk/by-id/wwn-0x644a842029bd3f0031b60f4375d97062", mountpoint = "/var/lib/longhorn-disk1" },
{ device = "/dev/disk/by-id/wwn-0x644a842029bd3f0031b5ffeb8bb8b47f", mountpoint = "/var/lib/longhorn-disk2" },
{ device = "/dev/disk/by-id/wwn-0x644a842029bd3f0031b6000c8dabb266", mountpoint = "/var/lib/longhorn-disk3" },
# /var/lib/longhorn-disk4 (wwn-0x6b083fe0c5782700321370dc23fd765b) was
# retired 2026-10-12: the 2TB PERC virtual disk failed with continuous
# SCSI I/O errors, hung its XFS filesystem, and wedged Longhorn replica
# rebuilds on talos-cp-2 with unkillable D-state processes. Do not
# re-add it.
]
zone = "az-b"
allow_scheduling = true
cloudflare_talos_sans = []
cloudflare_apiserver_sans = []
},
"talos-cp-3" = {
hostname = "talos-cp-3"
lan_ip = "192.168.1.162"
public_ip = "https://k8s-api.riotpiao.com"
lan_subnet = "192.168.1.0/24"
lan_gateway = "192.168.1.254"
install_disk = "/dev/nvme0n1"
longhorn_disks = [
{ device = "/dev/disk/by-id/usb-Seagate_One_Touch_w_PW_00000000NABV3H34-0:0", mountpoint = "/var/lib/longhorn-paperless-media" },
]
zone = "az-c"
allow_scheduling = true
cloudflare_talos_sans = []
cloudflare_apiserver_sans = []
},
}
worker_configs = {
"worker-1" = {
hostname = "worker-1"
lan_ip = "192.168.1.223"
lan_subnet = "192.168.1.0/24"
lan_gateway = "192.168.1.254"
install_disk = "/dev/nvme0n1"
network_interface = "enp28s0f0np0"
zone = "az-a"
gpu_count = 4
node_labels = {}
node_taints = []
factory_image = "factory.talos.dev/metal-installer/0a2153a6dc099a371bf2f63d6c3c22d275c876bf6302dd154c5813072924cb3f:v1.13.3"
swap_size = "64GiB"
ephemeral_max_size = "700GiB"
extra_disks = []
}
}
cluster_config = {
controlplane_ip = "192.168.1.166"
pod_subnets = ["10.244.0.0/16"]
service_subnets = ["10.96.0.0/12"]
dns_servers = ["8.8.8.8", "1.1.1.1"]
dns_domain = "cluster.local"
}
-58
View File
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
# The groups claim — the single load-bearing decision of the migration.
#
# ZITADEL does not issue a `groups` claim. Authentik did, and these consumers
# read it: kube-apiserver RBAC (`--oidc-groups-claim=groups` plus 11 RoleBindings
# on oidc:<group>), MinIO (`MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_CLAIM_NAME=groups`), Grafana
# role mapping, and every service that filters on a group name.
#
# Plan §1.3 Option A keeps those consumers unchanged by synthesizing the claim.
# Option B refactors all of them. This module takes responsibility only for the
# ZITADEL side of Option A: the action resource and its trigger.
#
# The script body is NOT shipped by default. The go/no-go gate (§1.3, §1.5 task
# 1.3) is: prove on the live instance that the action runtime can read project
# roles plus user metadata and write both `groups` and the per-agent claims,
# for a human token AND a machine-user token. Until that proof exists, enabling
# this resource would move every consumer onto an unverified claim source:
#
# terraform apply -var enable_groups_claim_action=true \
# -var groups_claim_script=./groups-claim.js
#
# After it applies, verify with a real token exchange before moving a consumer:
#
# curl -s -X POST https://zitadel.riotpiao.com/oauth/v2/token \
# -d grant_type=refresh_token -d refresh_token=<t> \
# -d client_id=kubernetes | jq -R 'split(".")[1] | @base64d | fromjson'
#
# The decoded access token must contain `"groups":["homelab-admins", ...]`.
resource "zitadel_action" "groups_claim" {
count = var.enable_groups_claim_action ? 1 : 0
org_id = data.zitadel_org.default.id
name = "homelab-groups-claim"
script = file(var.groups_claim_script)
timeout = "5s"
allowed_to_fail = false
}
# Both triggers are needed. The access-token trigger fills the JWT that
# Kubernetes and MinIO read. The userinfo trigger fills the response that
# Grafana, paperless and Forgejo read.
resource "zitadel_trigger_actions" "groups_claim_access_token" {
count = var.enable_groups_claim_action ? 1 : 0
org_id = data.zitadel_org.default.id
flow_type = "FLOW_TYPE_CUSTOMISE_TOKEN"
trigger_type = "TRIGGER_TYPE_PRE_ACCESS_TOKEN_CREATION"
action_ids = [zitadel_action.groups_claim[0].id]
}
resource "zitadel_trigger_actions" "groups_claim_userinfo" {
count = var.enable_groups_claim_action ? 1 : 0
org_id = data.zitadel_org.default.id
flow_type = "FLOW_TYPE_CUSTOMISE_TOKEN"
trigger_type = "TRIGGER_TYPE_PRE_USERINFO_CREATION"
action_ids = [zitadel_action.groups_claim[0].id]
}
-18
View File
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
# API applications — the machine-token surface.
#
# ZITADEL keeps two different objects apart: an OIDC application is for a
# browser flow, and an API application is what a client_credentials / JWT-profile
# caller presents. Authentik modelled both with one provider, so the plan §1.1
# row 1 ("OIDC app + machine user") needs one of each here.
#
# The gateway signs its token request with the machine key from machines.tf, so
# the auth method is PRIVATE_KEY_JWT. No secret is stored for it.
resource "zitadel_application_api" "machine" {
for_each = { for name, spec in local.machine_users : name => spec if contains(keys(var.api_app_consumers), name) }
org_id = data.zitadel_org.default.id
project_id = zitadel_project_v2.homelab.id
name = "${each.key}-machine"
auth_method_type = "API_AUTH_METHOD_TYPE_PRIVATE_KEY_JWT"
}
-136
View File
@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
# OIDC applications — one per consumer that logs a browser in.
#
# Client IDs: the plan §3.2 wants every client_id byte-identical after the move,
# so that a consumer change is only the issuer URL plus the secret.
#
# THAT GOAL IS NOT ACHIEVABLE HERE, verified twice on 2026-10-24:
# - ZITADEL v4.19.2 CreateOIDCApplicationRequest has no client_id field, and
# CreateOIDCApplicationResponse documents the value as "generated"
# (proto/zitadel/app/v2beta/app_service.proto:540-650).
# - zitadel provider 3.8.7 exposes no settable application id: `id` on
# `zitadel_application_v2` is not a valid argument (terraform validate
# rejects it), and `client_id` on `zitadel_application_oidc` is computed.
# Consequence: every consumer takes a NEW client_id as well as a new secret.
# Budget the extra config change per consumer — this is not the one-line
# re-point the plan assumed.
#
# The only way to keep the old value is to create each app through the v2 REST
# API with an explicit body id, then import it:
# POST /v2/projects/<project_id>/apps
# {"id":"<old-client-id>","name":"<old-client-id>","oidcRequest":{...}}
# Not implemented here: it would put app creation outside Terraform state.
#
# Secrets are generated by ZITADEL, never written here. `terraform output -json
# client_ids` and `client_secrets` feed the SOPS re-point (§3.2, §6.9). Do not
# commit the tfstate: it carries those values.
locals {
oidc_clients = {
# Gateway. Browser sessions for the console, plus a machine path
# (machines.tf) for callers that need client_credentials.
"api-gw" = {
redirect_uris = ["http://localhost:3000/callback", "https://api.riotpiao.com/callback"]
app_type = "WEB"
auth_method = "BASIC"
dev_mode = false
}
"argocd" = {
redirect_uris = ["http://localhost:8080/auth/callback", "https://argocd.riotpiao.com/auth/callback"]
app_type = "WEB"
auth_method = "BASIC"
dev_mode = false
}
"forgejo" = {
redirect_uris = ["http://localhost:3000/user/oauth2/authentik/callback", "https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/user/oauth2/authentik/callback"]
app_type = "WEB"
auth_method = "BASIC"
dev_mode = false
}
"grafana" = {
redirect_uris = ["http://localhost:3000/login/generic_oauth", "https://grafana.riotpiao.com/login/generic_oauth"]
app_type = "WEB"
auth_method = "BASIC"
dev_mode = false
}
"homarr" = {
redirect_uris = ["http://localhost:7575/auth/callback", "https://homarr.riotpiao.com/auth/callback"]
app_type = "WEB"
auth_method = "BASIC"
dev_mode = false
}
"immich" = {
redirect_uris = ["app.immich:///oauth-callback", "https://img.riotpiao.com/auth/login", "https://img.riotpiao.com/user/oauth2/callback"]
app_type = "NATIVE"
auth_method = "BASIC"
dev_mode = false
}
"kubernetes" = {
redirect_uris = ["http://localhost:8000", "http://localhost:18000"]
app_type = "WEB"
auth_method = "NONE"
dev_mode = true
}
"minio" = {
redirect_uris = ["http://localhost:9000/auth/sso/oauth2/code", "https://minio.riotpiao.com/auth/sso/oauth2/code"]
app_type = "WEB"
auth_method = "BASIC"
dev_mode = false
}
"paperless" = {
redirect_uris = ["http://localhost:8000/accounts/oidc/authentik/login/callback/", "https://paperless.riotpiao.com/accounts/oidc/authentik/login/callback/"]
app_type = "WEB"
auth_method = "BASIC"
dev_mode = false
}
"poimen" = {
redirect_uris = ["http://localhost:3000/callback", "https://poimen.riotpiao.com/callback"]
app_type = "WEB"
auth_method = "BASIC"
dev_mode = false
}
"queue-sqs" = {
redirect_uris = ["http://localhost:8080/callback", "https://queue.riotpiao.com/callback"]
app_type = "WEB"
auth_method = "BASIC"
dev_mode = false
}
"vault" = {
redirect_uris = ["http://localhost:8200/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback", "https://vault.riotpiao.com/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback"]
app_type = "WEB"
auth_method = "BASIC"
dev_mode = false
}
}
}
resource "zitadel_application_v2" "oidc" {
for_each = local.oidc_clients
org_id = data.zitadel_org.default.id
project_id = zitadel_project_v2.homelab.id
name = each.key
oidc {
redirect_uris = each.value.redirect_uris
response_types = ["OIDC_RESPONSE_TYPE_CODE"]
grant_types = [
"OIDC_GRANT_TYPE_AUTHORIZATION_CODE",
"OIDC_GRANT_TYPE_REFRESH_TOKEN",
]
app_type = "OIDC_APP_TYPE_${each.value.app_type}"
auth_method_type = "OIDC_AUTH_METHOD_TYPE_${each.value.auth_method}"
version = "OIDC_VERSION_1_0"
# JWT access tokens: Kubernetes RBAC, MinIO policy mapping and the Go
# gateway all read claims, and an opaque bearer token carries none.
access_token_type = "OIDC_TOKEN_TYPE_JWT"
# Assert roles without the client having to request the scope. Every
# consumer here maps roles or groups to local permissions.
access_token_role_assertion = true
id_token_role_assertion = true
id_token_userinfo_assertion = true
dev_mode = each.value.dev_mode
}
}
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# Machine users and their project grants (plan §1.4, §5.3).
#
# Authentik gave each agent an app password or a client_credentials grant built
# on a user password. ZITADEL has no user password on a machine user: it issues
# a JWT profile key (`KEY_TYPE_JSON`) that the SDK signs its token request with.
# That removes the password path entirely, which is the point — see §5.3.
#
# Per-agent claim values are copied from `SERVICE_ACCOUNTS` in
# scripts/iam/provision-rbac.py. They live in user metadata as JSON strings,
# because the groups-claim action (actions.tf) is the only thing that turns them
# into token claims. Without that action a consumer sees roles but not
# `minio_buckets`, `authorized_models`, `sqs_queues`, `memory_projects`,
# `memory_visibility` or `paperless_doctypes`.
#
# Keys are generated per machine user and land in `terraform output -json
# machine_keys` (sensitive). Feed each one to the owning workload as a mounted
# file, never as an environment variable dumps-able through `ps`.
locals {
machine_users = {
"memory-agent" = {
description = "Memory service agent"
project_roles = ["poimen-admins"]
authenticated_by = "poimen memory (Rust)"
metadata = {
roles = jsonencode(["llm:inference", "memory:read", "memory:write", "notification:write", "sessions:read", "sessions:write"])
memory_projects = jsonencode(["*"])
memory_visibility = "private"
authorized_models = jsonencode(["reasoning", "ornith:35b", "qwen2.5:3b"])
}
}
"paperless-ai-agent" = {
description = "Paperless AI plugin (auto-tagging, entity extraction)"
project_roles = ["poimen-devs"]
authenticated_by = "paperless-ai"
metadata = {
roles = jsonencode(["llm:inference", "memory:write", "paperless:admin", "notification:write"])
minio_buckets = jsonencode(["paperless"])
paperless_doctypes = jsonencode(["*"])
memory_projects = jsonencode(["*"])
authorized_models = jsonencode(["reasoning", "qwen2.5:3b"])
}
}
"portfolio-agent" = {
description = "Portfolio service agent"
project_roles = ["poimen-prod-readonly"]
authenticated_by = "portfolio service"
metadata = {
roles = jsonencode(["llm:inference", "memory:read"])
memory_projects = jsonencode(["homelab", "portfolio"])
memory_visibility = "public"
authorized_models = jsonencode(["ornith:35b"])
minio_buckets = jsonencode(["backups"])
}
}
"temporal-worker-agent" = {
description = "Temporal workflow worker"
project_roles = ["poimen-admins"]
authenticated_by = "Temporal worker"
metadata = {
roles = jsonencode(["llm:inference", "workflow:execute", "memory:read", "memory:write", "queue:send", "notification:write"])
memory_projects = jsonencode(["*"])
sqs_queues = jsonencode(["*"])
authorized_models = jsonencode(["reasoning", "ornith:35b", "qwen2.5:3b"])
}
}
# The gateway is the one consumer that used client_credentials on a machine
# token, so it needs both the OIDC app (clients.tf) and a machine user
# (here) plus its API application (api_apps.tf). Its capability check reads
# the `roles` claim, which arrives as metadata.
"api-gw" = {
description = "Go LLM gateway machine identity"
project_roles = []
authenticated_by = "api-gw"
metadata = {
roles = jsonencode(["llm:inference"])
}
}
# pi-worker has no anchor in git (plan §1.1: "not in git") and no group in
# the Authentik provisioning script. It gets a machine user and no project
# role until the owner names the consumer configuration that holds its old
# credentials. Creating a role grant blind would widen access, not preserve it.
"pi-worker" = {
description = "pi sandbox worker (no git anchor for its consumer config)"
project_roles = []
authenticated_by = "pi sandbox worker"
metadata = {
roles = jsonencode([])
}
}
}
machine_metadata = merge([
for user, spec in local.machine_users : {
for key, value in spec.metadata : "${user}/${key}" => {
user = user
key = key
value = value
}
}
]...)
}
resource "zitadel_machine_user" "agent" {
for_each = local.machine_users
org_id = data.zitadel_org.default.id
user_name = each.key
name = each.key
description = "${each.value.description} — consumer: ${each.value.authenticated_by}"
with_secret = false
}
resource "zitadel_machine_key" "agent" {
for_each = local.machine_users
org_id = data.zitadel_org.default.id
user_id = zitadel_machine_user.agent[each.key].id
key_type = "KEY_TYPE_JSON"
expiration_date = var.machine_key_expiry
}
resource "zitadel_project_member" "agent" {
for_each = { for user, spec in local.machine_users : user => spec if length(spec.project_roles) > 0 }
org_id = data.zitadel_org.default.id
project_id = zitadel_project_v2.homelab.id
user_id = zitadel_machine_user.agent[each.key].id
roles = each.value.project_roles
}
resource "zitadel_user_metadata" "agent_claim" {
for_each = local.machine_metadata
org_id = data.zitadel_org.default.id
user_id = zitadel_machine_user.agent[each.value.user].id
key = each.value.key
value = each.value.value
}
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# Outputs feed two things: the SOPS re-point of consumer secrets (§3.2, §6.9)
# and the machine-key handoff to each agent workload (§5.3). Every value that can
# authenticate a client is marked sensitive, so `terraform output` prints a
# placeholder until you ask for it explicitly.
output "org_id" {
description = "Organization that owns the project, roles and applications."
value = data.zitadel_org.default.id
}
output "project_id" {
description = "Project ID, which ZITADEL puts in the access-token `aud` claim."
value = zitadel_project_v2.homelab.id
}
output "client_ids" {
description = "client_id per consumer. Compare against the Authentik values: any difference means the consumer config must change too."
value = { for name, app in zitadel_application_v2.oidc : name => app.oidc[0].client_id }
}
output "client_secrets" {
description = "Generated client secret per consumer. Write these into the existing SOPS files; never into git."
value = { for name, app in zitadel_application_v2.oidc : name => app.oidc[0].client_secret }
sensitive = true
}
output "api_app_client_ids" {
description = "client_id of each API application (machine-token surface)."
value = { for name, app in zitadel_application_api.machine : name => app.client_id }
}
output "machine_user_ids" {
description = "ZITADEL user ID per machine user."
value = { for name, user in zitadel_machine_user.agent : name => user.id }
}
output "machine_keys" {
description = "JWT profile key JSON per machine user. Mount as a file; do not pass through the environment."
value = { for name, key in zitadel_machine_key.agent : name => key.key_details }
sensitive = true
}
output "groups_claim_enabled" {
description = "Whether the groups-claim action and its triggers exist. False means Option A is not yet in place and no consumer may move."
value = var.enable_groups_claim_action
}
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# Project, roles and default-org lookup.
#
# ZITADEL has no group object. The plan §1.3 maps every Authentik group to a
# project role, and the groups-claim action (actions.tf) reconstructs the
# `groups` claim from those role keys. Role keys therefore EQUAL the existing
# Authentik group names, including the hyphens, so that the resulting claim is
# byte-identical and no consumer or RBAC file changes. The v4.19.2 API allows
# role keys of 1-200 characters with no character-set restriction (proto
# zitadel/project/v2/project_service.proto, AddProjectRole.role_key).
data "zitadel_org" "default" {
id = var.org_id
}
locals {
# Single source: the 19 groups of scripts/iam/provision-rbac.py GROUPS.
# Descriptions are carried over so the console reads the same as before.
roles = {
"homelab-admins" = "Cluster administrators with full access"
"minio-admins" = "MinIO administrators"
"minio-photos" = "Photos bucket (Immich) access"
"minio-documents" = "Documents bucket (Paperless) access"
"minio-backups" = "Backups bucket read-only access"
"poimen-admins" = "Poimen memory administrators"
"poimen-devs" = "Dev and staging projects access"
"poimen-prod-readonly" = "Production projects read-only access"
"paperless-admins" = "Paperless administrators"
"paperless-finance" = "Finance documents"
"paperless-legal" = "Legal documents"
"paperless-hr" = "HR documents"
"grafana-admins" = "Grafana administrators"
"grafana-editors" = "Grafana dashboard editors"
"grafana-viewers" = "Grafana dashboard viewers"
"sqs-users" = "SQS/Temporal queue read access"
"sqs-writers" = "SQS/Temporal queue read/write access"
"s3-users" = "S3 read access"
"s3-writers" = "S3 read/write access"
}
}
resource "zitadel_project_v2" "homelab" {
org_id = data.zitadel_org.default.id
name = var.project_name
project_id = var.project_id
project_role_check = false
# Roles must reach the tokens. Every consumer authorizes on them:
# kube-apiserver RBAC reads `groups`, MinIO reads bucket policies, Grafana
# reads grafana_org_role. Role assertion on the ID token is what most OIDC
# clients inspect.
project_role_assertion = true
}
resource "zitadel_project_role" "groups" {
for_each = local.roles
org_id = data.zitadel_org.default.id
project_id = zitadel_project_v2.homelab.id
role_key = each.key
display_name = each.key
group = "homelab"
}
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# terraform/zitadel — identity configuration for the ZITADEL instance
#
# Scope: this root module declares the objects INSIDE ZITADEL (org, project,
# roles, OIDC applications, machine users, grants). It does NOT deploy ZITADEL
# itself — that is ArgoCD's job (`k8s/argocd/apps/30-security.yaml`, values in
# `k8s/infra/iam/zitadel-values.yaml`).
#
# Migration plan: ~/workplace/homelab-doc/ZITADEL_MIGRATION.html (outside git).
# This file implements §1.3 (roles), §1.4 (machine users), §2.4 (grants) and
# §6.2 (Terraform provider route). The claim-injection action of §1.3 lives in
# `actions.tf` and stays disabled until the live go/no-go gate proves it.
#
# Authentication to ZITADEL uses the `iam-admin` machine key that the chart's
# setup job writes to the `iam-admin` Secret in namespace iam:
#
# kubectl -n iam get secret iam-admin -o jsonpath='{.data.iam-admin\.json}' \
# | base64 -d > ~/.config/zitadel/iam-admin.json
# chmod 600 ~/.config/zitadel/iam-admin.json
#
# export ZITADEL_JWT_PROFILE_FILE=$HOME/.config/zitadel/iam-admin.json
# terraform -chdir=terraform/zitadel init
# terraform -chdir=terraform/zitadel plan
#
# State is LOCAL and git-ignored (`terraform/*.tfstate` in .gitignore). That is
# a deliberate first step, not the final answer: §8 risk 8 of the plan names
# state drift as a blast-radius item. Move the state to MinIO before a second
# operator ever runs `apply`. No secret is written to state except the generated
# client secrets and machine keys, which are marked sensitive — they still land
# in the state file, so treat that file as a secret.
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.6.0"
required_providers {
zitadel = {
source = "zitadel/zitadel"
version = "3.8.7"
}
}
}
provider "zitadel" {
domain = var.zitadel_domain
port = var.zitadel_port
# JWT profile of the iam-admin machine user. Preferred over a PAT: it is
# short-lived per call and never sits in the environment as a bearer token.
# Set the path through ZITADEL_JWT_PROFILE_FILE.
jwt_profile_file = var.jwt_profile_file
# The instance serves plain HTTP behind ingress-nginx, which terminates TLS.
# Turn this on only if the provider must call the pod directly.
insecure = var.zitadel_insecure
}
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variable "zitadel_domain" {
description = "External domain of the ZITADEL instance, without scheme."
type = string
default = "zitadel.riotpiao.com"
}
variable "zitadel_port" {
description = "Port for the ZITADEL API. 443 behind ingress, 8080 for a direct pod port-forward."
type = string
default = "443"
}
variable "zitadel_insecure" {
description = "Call the API over plain HTTP (set true only when port-forwarding the pod)."
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "jwt_profile_file" {
description = "Path to the iam-admin machine key JSON extracted from the iam-admin Secret."
type = string
default = null
}
variable "org_id" {
description = <<-EOT
ID of the ZITADEL organization that holds the project. Read it from the
console: https://zitadel.riotpiao.com -> Organization settings -> Resource
ID. The chart's setup job creates the default org; this module never creates
one, because creating a second org would split the role and grant space.
EOT
type = string
}
variable "project_id" {
description = <<-EOT
Stable project ID. ZITADEL puts the project ID in the access token `aud`
claim, so pinning it keeps audience checks readable across a rebuild.
Every consumer that validates `aud` against a client ID must be re-pointed
to this value — see the plan §5.2.
EOT
type = string
default = "homelab"
}
variable "project_name" {
description = "Display name of the project that carries every role and application."
type = string
default = "homelab"
}
variable "machine_key_expiry" {
description = "Expiry of every machine key, RFC3339. Matches the chart's default iam-admin key window; rotate by changing this value and re-applying."
type = string
default = "2029-01-01T00:00:00Z"
}
variable "api_app_consumers" {
description = <<-EOT
Machine users that also need an API application (the client_credentials
replacement). Only the gateway does: every other agent signs a JWT with its
machine key and does not need a client_credentials grant.
EOT
type = map(string)
default = { api-gw = "Go LLM gateway" }
}
variable "enable_groups_claim_action" {
description = <<-EOT
Create the Actions v1 script and its trigger that synthesizes the `groups`
claim. Keep this false until the live go/no-go gate passes: the claim is
load-bearing for kube-apiserver RBAC, MinIO policies, Grafana role mapping
and every service that reads `groups`. Turning it on with an unverified
script can break every consumer at once.
EOT
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "groups_claim_script" {
description = <<-EOT
Path to the JavaScript body for the groups-claim action, read only when
enable_groups_claim_action is true. The body is deliberately not shipped
blind: the ZITADEL v1 Actions runtime API must be confirmed against the live
instance before a script is committed, because a wrong call silently emits
no claim instead of failing loudly.
EOT
type = string
default = null
validation {
# try() is required: HCL does not short-circuit `||`, so fileexists(null)
# would fail the whole plan even with the action disabled.
condition = try(fileexists(var.groups_claim_script), true)
error_message = "groups_claim_script must name an existing file when it is set."
}
# Enabling the action without a script would reach file(null) inside actions.tf.
validation {
condition = !var.enable_groups_claim_action || var.groups_claim_script != null
error_message = "enable_groups_claim_action requires groups_claim_script."
}
}