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Author SHA1 Message Date
rock 63a6784ea9 revert(cloudflared): do not publish the kube-apiserver at k8s.riotpiao.com
#88 added a tunnel rule mapping k8s.riotpiao.com to the in-cluster apiserver.
Its own comment warned that without a Cloudflare Access application in front,
every scanner on the internet reaches the apiserver, and no Access
application exists.

ArgoCD applied the rule before the exposure could be stopped, so the live
ConfigMap was patched and cloudflared restarted to drop it. All paths now
return 404. This commit removes the rule from the source so it cannot return.

The hostname keeps its DNS record and returns the tunnel's 404 fallback. That
is deliberate: publish it again only together with an Access policy.
2026-11-04 06:03:55 +08:00
rock cf3223499e feat(cloudflared): publish the kube-apiserver at k8s.riotpiao.com (#88)
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-11-03 21:48:04 +00:00
rock c1477afc92 feat(llm-serving): poimen ingress, 256K coder, and a stable name for the candle-vllm handoff (#90)
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-11-03 21:47:47 +00:00
rock 53e29d4476 chore(llm-serving): park clef-serve to free a V100 for candle-vllm (#91)
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-11-03 21:47:24 +00:00
rock 712bb6589b feat(poimen): restrict the GraphQL server to the memory proxy (#104)
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-11-03 21:38:34 +00:00
rock 9e004ccb9b feat(poimen): restrict the memory database to its own namespace (#103)
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-11-03 21:34:04 +00:00
rock 4e684b2ee2 chore(kyverno): drop the two Application manifests from 00-substrate (#102)
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-11-03 21:33:27 +00:00
rock 13ec9afd32 Merge pull request 'chore(kyverno): remove the never-deployed policy engine' (#100) from chore/remove-kyverno-future-work into main 2026-11-03 21:30:07 +00:00
rock d8bbf122f9 chore(kyverno): remove the never-deployed policy engine
Both ArgoCD Applications reported broken: 'kyverno' Unknown and
'kyverno-policies' OutOfSync/Missing. Neither the namespace nor a single
kyverno pod ever existed, so no policy was enforced and nothing is lost.

Kyverno is future work. Removing the two Applications and the bootstrap
directory keeps the root app from reporting two permanent failures.
2026-11-04 05:29:48 +08:00
rock c8e8b9532d Merge pull request 'fix(gotify): run gotify-db with 2 instances, not 3' (#99) from fix/gotify-db-two-instances into main 2026-11-03 21:24:18 +00:00
rock 1bfe08eeb8 fix(gotify): run gotify-db with 2 instances, not 3
The header of this file always said 2 instances while the spec said 3. The
third never ran: gotify-db-3's volume held a single replica that could not
start, because talos-cp-2 disk2 is at 2.9% free. That left the cluster
permanently in 'Creating a new replica' with one degraded Longhorn volume.

Two replicas on two different nodes is the redundancy that actually exists.
2026-11-04 05:24:09 +08:00
rock 58bf245920 feat(poimen): publish the memory API at api-poimen.riotpiao.com
poimen-memory is a ClusterIP service on :8080, so a local pi session had no
route to the API. This adds an edge Ingress on the same nginx class and the
same Cloudflare-terminated shape as the frontend ingress.

Auth stays ZITADEL JWT (MEM_AUTH_MODE=jwt): a request without a valid bearer
token gets 401, so exposing the route does not expose the data.

Requires one Cloudflare proxied A record: api-poimen.riotpiao.com -> 192.168.1.160
2026-11-04 04:52:11 +08:00
rock d62ac3d861 Merge pull request 'fix(coredns): declare the poimen rewrite in the source of truth' (#98) from chore/retire-comfyui-fully into main 2026-11-03 19:52:20 +00:00
rock b45ae269fd Merge pull request 'chore(comfyui): retire the app for good' (#97) from chore/retire-comfyui-fully into main 2026-11-03 19:44:18 +00:00
rock 814f96040f Merge pull request 'fix(forgejo): keep 60Gi storage, revert CPU limit to 1000m' (#96) from fix/forgejo-storage-60gi-cpu-revert into main 2026-11-02 05:43:06 +00:00
16 changed files with 353 additions and 306 deletions
+5 -1
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@@ -8,7 +8,11 @@ metadata:
annotations:
argocd.argoproj.io/sync-options: SkipDryRunOnMissingResource=true
spec:
instances: 3
# 2, not 3. The file's own header always said 2, and the third instance never
# existed as a running pod: its volume only ever held a replica that could not
# start, because talos-cp-2 disk2 has no free space. A third replica on a disk
# that cannot host it is not redundancy, it is a permanent degraded volume.
instances: 2
imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:16.2
bootstrap:
initdb:
+13 -1
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,19 @@ metadata:
app: clef-serve
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: llm-serving
spec:
replicas: 1
# Parked at 0 to free the only V100 that was not serving anything, so candle-vllm can
# run its Phase 0 on one card. All four cards were allocated (coder 2, reasoning 1,
# this 1) and a new GPU workload had nowhere to land.
#
# This is the only GPU consumer in the namespace that is not vLLM, which is why it is
# the first card released: the standing instruction is to keep the vLLM pods healthy
# until candle-vllm answers, and this pod is not one of them.
#
# It was serving nothing. The last 30 log lines at park time were 30/30 kubelet
# /health probes and no inference request since start (2026-10-30T06:23:40Z). Nothing
# in git selects this service. Restore it once the rollout leaves a card free:
# 30B-A3B takes 1, Coder-Next TP=2 takes 2, so card 4 is this one.
replicas: 0
# Recreate, not RollingUpdate. Every GPU card is allocated, so a rolling update leaves
# the new pod Pending forever waiting for a card the old pod still holds.
strategy:
+134
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
apiVersion: serving.kserve.io/v1beta1
kind: InferenceService
metadata:
name: coder
namespace: llm-serving
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: llm-coder
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: llm-serving
annotations:
serving.kserve.io/deploymentMode: RawDeployment
spec:
predictor:
minReplicas: 1
maxReplicas: 1
nodeSelector:
kubernetes.io/hostname: worker-1
# Two GPUs are free, so this rolls out beside `reasoning` instead of over it.
# Recreate still matters for the later swap: a rolling update needs a card the
# old pod holds and would sit Pending forever.
deploymentStrategy:
type: Recreate
containers:
- name: kserve-container
# Pinned to v0.11.0 on purpose. This is the last image measured to work on this
# node: torch 2.8.0+cu128, arch list sm_70..sm_120, driver 580.159.04.
# v0.15.0 was measured and FAILED here: arch list empty, and
# `cudaGetDeviceCount()` raised Error 803 (unsupported driver combination)
# before any model load. Do not raise this tag without re-running that probe.
image: vllm/vllm-openai:v0.11.0@sha256:014a95f21c9edf6abe0aea6b07353f96baa4ec291c427bb1176dc7c93a85845c
args:
# Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-Instruct: 30.5B total, 3.3B active. Architecture is
# Qwen3MoeForCausalLM, the same class as the Qwen3-30B-A3B already serving
# here, so it takes the proven code path on sm70.
#
# Qwen ships this model only as BF16 (61.1 GB) and FP8 (no FP8 on Volta).
# 4-bit GPTQ is the only form that fits one 32 GB card. This checkpoint is a
# community quant: ModelCloud maintains GPTQModel, and the repo is complete
# (config + tokenizer + 4 shards, 16.9 GB). Verified by loading, not by trust.
#
# Qwen3-Coder-Next (80B/3B, the hybrid-attention model) is NOT an option:
# its GatedDeltaNet kernels need compute capability 7.5+ and the `fla` module,
# and sm70 has neither. Measured, not assumed.
- --model=ModelCloud/Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-Instruct-GPTQMODEL-W4A16-A
# `reasoning` stays a served name so an existing client that sends
# model=reasoning keeps working after the DNS rename. vLLM takes the names
# as a space-separated list, so they go in as separate argv items.
- --served-model-name
- coder
- reasoning
- --quantization=gptq
- --dtype=float16
- --kv-cache-dtype=auto
# Native window is 262144 and rope_scaling is null, so 256K needs no YaRN.
# One card cannot hold it: measured KV pool on a single V100 was 132,672
# tokens. TP=2 halves the weights per card (7.8 GiB each), which frees room
# for the larger pool. Measured after boot: see the KV line in the log.
- --max-model-len=262144
- --tensor-parallel-size=2
- --pipeline-parallel-size=1
- --gpu-memory-utilization=0.90
# A single 262,144-token request consumes the whole pool, so keep few slots.
- --max-num-seqs=4
- --max-num-batched-tokens=8192
- --long-prefill-token-threshold=2048
- --enable-chunked-prefill
- --enable-prefix-caching
# Measured: with the default (custom all-reduce ON) the engine finished CUDA graph
# capture in 6s at 17:01:56 and then went silent for 14+ minutes, emitting only
# "No available shared memory broadcast block found in 60 seconds". The front-end
# never received the ready message. vLLM's custom all-reduce registers its own
# CUDA graph addresses and deadlocks on this Volta/PCIe pair. NCCL is the fallback
# and is correct here, because TP=2 across two PCIe V100s gains nothing from the
# custom kernel anyway.
- --disable-custom-all-reduce
- --reasoning-parser=qwen3
- --enable-auto-tool-choice
- --tool-call-parser=hermes
- --host=0.0.0.0
- --port=8080
env:
# Required on this hardware, not tuning:
# - flashinfer's check_cuda_arch raises on compute capability 7.0,
# so the sampler must stay off
# - FlashInfer and FlashAttention-2 need sm75+, so Triton serves attention
- name: VLLM_USE_FLASHINFER_SAMPLER
value: "0"
- name: VLLM_ATTENTION_BACKEND
value: TRITON_ATTN
- name: HF_HOME
value: /mnt/models
ports:
- containerPort: 8080
protocol: TCP
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: 8080
periodSeconds: 10
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: 8080
# TP=2 at 256K needs ~10 min before the API binds: 22s weights, 80s torch.compile,
# 85s KV profiling, then graph capture. 120 x 15s = 30 min of headroom.
failureThreshold: 120
periodSeconds: 15
resources:
# worker-1 exposes only 63,495 MiB of allocatable memory, so a 24Gi request
# never schedules. Two vLLM workers keep the weights on the GPU and need
# little host RAM, so the request stays small and the limit allows burst.
requests:
cpu: "8"
memory: 12Gi
nvidia.com/gpu: "2"
limits:
cpu: "16"
memory: 40Gi
nvidia.com/gpu: "2"
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /mnt/models
name: models
- mountPath: /dev/shm
name: shm
runtimeClassName: nvidia
volumes:
- name: models
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: llm-models
- name: shm
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
# NCCL all-reduce over TP=2 moves through /dev/shm. The 64Mi default is
# too small and shows up as an init hang or a bus error.
sizeLimit: 8Gi
+7
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,14 @@ resources:
# v0.5.22+, published only on CUDA 13, and CUDA 13 dropped Volta kernels. The model
# instead runs the implementation it ships (joint_schema_model.py) in fp16 on one V100.
- clef-serve.yaml
# coder = Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-Instruct, 4-bit GPTQ, TP=2 at 262,144 tokens. It serves
# both `coder` and `reasoning`, so poimen-memory needs a host change only, never a
# model-name change. reasoning.yaml below can be dropped once that host change lands.
- coder.yaml
- reasoning.yaml
# Stable client-facing name for the chat model. poimen-memory points at this Service,
# so the vLLM -> candle-vllm handoff is a selector edit here and no client change.
- reasoning-long-service.yaml
# ornith is retired: its InferenceService still reports Ready=True while running zero
# replicas, because desired equals available at 0. Its manifest was never committed,
# so it is left unmanaged and is not listed here. Delete the CR when convenient.
+15
View File
@@ -66,6 +66,21 @@ spec:
port: 80
- protocol: TCP
port: 8000
# Allow from poimen namespace (poimen-memory ingest + query).
# The client-side egress rule is the other half and must stay in step:
# NetworkPolicy poimen/poimen-memory-llm-egress permits port 8080 to pods
# labelled part-of=llm-serving, which is the same selector used here. This
# policy had no matching ingress rule at all, so the packet was allowed out
# and dropped here. The client then saw a bare timeout and the predictor log
# stayed empty, which is why this failure looked like a hung inference engine
# for 34 days.
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: poimen
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
# Allow intra-namespace (pod-to-pod within llm-serving)
- from:
- podSelector:
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
# Stable client-facing name for the chat model, deliberately decoupled from the
# process that currently serves it.
#
# poimen-memory addresses this Service, not a pod and not an InferenceService. That
# means the vLLM -> candle-vllm handoff changes only this file's selector. The client
# config never changes again, so the ingest cutover has no window in which the host
# name is wrong.
#
# Two ports on purpose:
# - 80 matches every other predictor Service in this namespace, and matches
# poimen-memory's LLM_CHAT_BASE, which carries no port number.
# - 8080 is the container port. It is also the only port llm-serving-ingress and
# poimen-memory-llm-egress permit, and the port the handoff readiness check
# uses. Publishing it directly avoids a port translation that is easy to get
# wrong in a curl.
#
# The selector names the vLLM reasoning pod today. To hand off, replace the three
# selector labels with candle-vllm's pod labels and nothing else. Do not delete and
# recreate this Service: a delete drops the ClusterIP, and a client that cached the
# name during the gap will fail until it re-resolves.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: reasoning-long-predictor
namespace: llm-serving
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: llm-serving
app: reasoning-long-predictor
spec:
type: ClusterIP
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/name: llm-reasoning
component: predictor
serving.kserve.io/inferenceservice: reasoning
ports:
- name: http
protocol: TCP
port: 80
targetPort: 8080
- name: http-8080
protocol: TCP
port: 8080
targetPort: 8080
+22 -1
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,28 @@ spec:
# Measured on this cluster, one V100-32GB, 64k context: 15.55 GiB of weights,
# 137k tokens of KV cache, 2.09x concurrency at 65536 tokens per request.
- --model=Qwen/Qwen3-30B-A3B-GPTQ-Int4
- --served-model-name=reasoning
# Two served names, one pod, on purpose. `reasoning-long` is the name the goal map
# uses for this model, and the name qwen-finetune wiring targets. It is NOT a
# separate InferenceService: this model already occupies the only free card, and a
# second pod on the same weights cannot schedule (4 of 4 GPUs allocated: coder 2,
# this 1, clef-serve 1). Serving both names from one process costs nothing and
# keeps the two callers working without a second weights copy.
#
# `reasoning` is deliberately still served here. poimen-memory pins
# LLM_CHAT_BASE=reasoning-predictor, so dropping the name here breaks ingest
# immediately. coder-predictor also serves `reasoning`; that ambiguity is known
# and documented in the PR. Resolve it by moving the client host, not by
# removing the name here.
#
# The two names are separate list entries, NOT one comma-joined value. This
# image's parser returns ['reasoning,reasoning-long'] for the comma form, i.e. a
# single model whose name contains a comma, and api_server.py then iterates
# args.served_model_name to build the model list. Verified against vLLM 0.11.0:
# FlexibleArgumentParser().parse_args([... "--served-model-name", "a", "b"])
# -> ['a', 'b']
- --served-model-name
- reasoning
- reasoning-long
- --quantization=gptq
- --dtype=float16
- --kv-cache-dtype=auto
+38
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
---
# Public entry point for the poimen-memory HTTP API.
#
# The API was reachable only inside the cluster (ClusterIP :8080), so a local pi
# session had no way to use it. This Ingress exposes the same handler set the
# in-cluster clients use: /mcp, /memory/*, /graphql, /health, /ready.
#
# Cloudflare terminates TLS in front of the nginx ingress, which is why this rule
# carries no `tls:` section — the same shape as ingress.yaml next to it.
#
# Auth: poimen-memory validates ZITADEL JWTs (MEM_AUTH_MODE=jwt). A caller
# without a valid bearer token gets 401, so exposing the route does not expose
# the data.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: poimen-api
namespace: poimen
annotations:
# MCP calls and ingest can be slow; the provider may stream. Match the
# frontend ingress so a long tool call is not cut at 60s.
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-read-timeout: "3600"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-send-timeout: "3600"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-buffering: "off"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size: "50m"
spec:
ingressClassName: nginx
rules:
- host: api-poimen.riotpiao.com
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: poimen-memory
port:
number: 8080
@@ -6,3 +6,5 @@ kind: Kustomization
# riotpiao-poimen/poimen-frontend.git k8s/ — each repo owns its own k8s.
resources:
- ingress.yaml
# The memory API. Without it a local pi session has no route to :8080.
- api-ingress.yaml
-51
View File
@@ -159,54 +159,3 @@ spec:
automated:
prune: true
selfHeal: true
---
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Application
metadata:
name: kyverno
namespace: argocd
annotations:
argocd.argoproj.io/sync-wave: "0"
spec:
project: homelab
source:
repoURL: https://kyverno.github.io/kyverno/
chart: kyverno
targetRevision: "1.14.0"
helm:
valueFiles:
- $values/k8s/bootstrap/kyverno/kyverno-values.yaml
sources:
- repoURL: https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/riotpiao-poimen/homelab.git
targetRevision: main
ref: values
destination:
server: https://kubernetes.default.svc
namespace: kyverno
syncPolicy:
automated:
prune: true
selfHeal: true
syncOptions:
- CreateNamespace=true
---
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Application
metadata:
name: kyverno-policies
namespace: argocd
annotations:
argocd.argoproj.io/sync-wave: "0"
spec:
project: homelab
source:
repoURL: https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/riotpiao-poimen/homelab.git
targetRevision: main
path: k8s/bootstrap/kyverno
destination:
server: https://kubernetes.default.svc
namespace: kyverno
syncPolicy:
automated:
prune: true
selfHeal: true
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
namespace: kyverno
resources:
- policies.yaml
-42
View File
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
# Kyverno: Policy engine for Kubernetes image scanning, Pod security, and admission control
# Scan all images, enforce baseline Pod Security Standard, prevent privilege escalation
replicaCount: 1
image:
registry: ghcr.io
repository: kyverno/kyverno
tag: "v1.14.0"
config:
# Webhook timeout for policy evaluation. Increase if scanning takes longer.
webhookTimeoutSeconds: 30
# Failure policy: fail-open (audit/log) vs fail-closed (reject on error)
failurePolicy: fail
# Resource limits for webhook
webhookAnnotations:
rules: "allow"
# Pod security via Kyverno instead of Pod Security Policies (deprecated)
# Enforces baseline restrictions cluster-wide, with exceptions for privileged namespaces
podSecurityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
rbac:
create: true
resources:
requests:
memory: "256Mi"
cpu: "100m"
limits:
memory: "512Mi"
cpu: "500m"
# Webhook configuration
webhook:
timeoutSeconds: 30
# Failure policy: "Fail" (reject on error) or "Ignore" (audit-only)
# Set to "Ignore" for initial testing, then change to "Fail"
failurePolicy: ignore
-204
View File
@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
# Kyverno ClusterPolicies: Image scanning, Pod security, and admission control
---
# Policy 1: Require non-root containers
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: require-non-root
namespace: kyverno
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit # audit first, then change to enforce
rules:
- name: check-runAsNonRoot
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
selector:
matchLabels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: "!privileged"
validate:
message: "Container must not run as root"
pattern:
spec:
containers:
- securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
---
# Policy 2: Drop all Linux capabilities, add only required ones
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: require-dropped-caps
namespace: kyverno
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit
rules:
- name: drop-all-capabilities
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
selector:
matchLabels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: "!privileged"
validate:
message: "All Linux capabilities must be dropped"
pattern:
spec:
containers:
- securityContext:
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
---
# Policy 3: Require image tags (no 'latest')
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: disallow-latest-tag
namespace: kyverno
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit # Change to enforce after testing
rules:
- name: disallow-latest
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
- Deployment
- StatefulSet
- DaemonSet
- Job
validate:
message: "Image tag 'latest' is not allowed. Use explicit version tags."
pattern:
spec:
=(template):
spec:
containers:
- image: "!*:latest"
=(initContainers):
- image: "!*:latest"
---
# Policy 4: Restrict images to trusted registries
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: restrict-registries
namespace: kyverno
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit
rules:
- name: trusted-registries
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
- Deployment
- StatefulSet
- DaemonSet
- Job
selector:
matchLabels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: "!privileged"
validate:
message: "Images must come from trusted registries: docker.io, ghcr.io, quay.io, k8s.gcr.io, registry.k8s.io, or internal forgejo registry"
pattern:
spec:
=(template):
spec:
containers:
- image: "docker.io/* | ghcr.io/* | quay.io/* | k8s.gcr.io/* | registry.k8s.io/* | forgejo.riotpiao.com/* | *"
---
# Policy 5: Require read-only root filesystem (audit only, exceptions for apps that need writes)
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: require-readonly-filesystem
namespace: kyverno
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit
rules:
- name: check-readOnlyRootFilesystem
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
selector:
matchLabels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: "!privileged"
validate:
message: "Root filesystem should be read-only for defense-in-depth"
pattern:
spec:
containers:
- securityContext:
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
---
# Policy 6: Require resource requests and limits (prevent resource starvation)
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: require-resource-limits
namespace: kyverno
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit
rules:
- name: check-resources
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
- Deployment
- StatefulSet
- DaemonSet
excludeResources:
namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: "kyverno|kube-system|kube-node-lease"
validate:
message: "CPU and memory requests and limits are required"
pattern:
spec:
=(template):
spec:
containers:
- resources:
requests:
memory: "?*"
cpu: "?*"
limits:
memory: "?*"
cpu: "?*"
---
# Policy 7: Require securityContext on all containers
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: require-security-context
namespace: kyverno
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit
rules:
- name: check-securityContext
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
selector:
matchLabels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: "!privileged"
validate:
message: "securityContext must be defined"
pattern:
spec:
containers:
- securityContext: {}
+28
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@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
---
# Keep the GraphQL server reachable only from the one service that proxies it.
#
# poimen-graphql is already off the internet: its Service is ClusterIP on 8090 and
# no Ingress names it. What it lacked is in-cluster isolation — a ClusterIP answers
# every pod in the cluster.
#
# The only caller is poimen-memory, whose /graphql route forwards the request body
# to MEM_GQL_PORT (8090). No other workload references this service.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: poimen-graphql-ingress
namespace: poimen
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: poimen-graphql
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: poimen-memory
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8090
+4
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ kind: Kustomization
# deployments (wave 0) are applied.
resources:
- memory-db.yaml
# ClusterIP alone is not isolation: every pod in the cluster can reach it.
- memory-db-netpol.yaml
# Only poimen-memory's /graphql proxy calls 8090.
- graphql-netpol.yaml
- poimen-sandbox-namespace.yaml
- poimen-sandbox-quota.yaml
- pi-session-netpol.yaml
+42
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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
---
# Keep the memory database reachable only from inside its own namespace.
#
# What this does NOT change: the database was already unreachable from the
# internet. `memory-db-rw`, `memory-db-ro` and `memory-db-r` are ClusterIP
# services, no Ingress backs them, and no public DNS name resolves to them.
#
# What it fixes: a ClusterIP service is reachable by EVERY pod in the cluster,
# because Kubernetes has no implicit isolation. Cilium enforces NetworkPolicy, so
# stating the allowed sources is what turns "not on the internet" into "not
# reachable from another tenant's namespace".
#
# Two sources, both required:
# - the poimen namespace, which holds every client: poimen-memory, poimen-graphql,
# poimen-worker, poimen-workflows and the migration Job.
# - cnpg-system, where the CloudNativePG operator lives. It connects to the
# instance for switchover and failover, so a narrower rule breaks recovery.
#
# No other port is opened. The operator's metrics endpoint stays closed because no
# PodMonitor for this cluster exists, so nothing scrapes it.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: memory-db-ingress
namespace: poimen
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
cnpg.io/cluster: memory-db
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: poimen
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: cnpg-system
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 5432