Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Story Crater Bot 3d8a965718 refactor(iam): extract provision python to scripts/authentik-provision.py + fix app-list idempotency — configMapGenerator (stable name) replaces inline script; superuser_full_list=true stops the 400 that aborted grant_types patching 2026-07-22 08:01:55 -07:00
Story Crater Bot 246196407a fix(iam): set OAuth2 provider grant_types + non-deprecated groups claim — empty grant_types made authentik reject authorization_code, breaking SSO login for every app 2026-07-21 23:40:49 -07:00
Story Crater Bot 261fa6faa8 fix(iam): authentik-provision Job failing on apk permission denied
Job was crash-looping: 'apk add --no-cache curl' failed with Permission
denied - the container runs as non-root UID 1000 (securityContext.
runAsNonRoot: true), and both apk's working directories and /usr/local/bin
(where curl-downloaded kubectl was being written) are root-owned in the
python:3.12-alpine base image.

Replaced with a pure-Python download via urllib (stdlib, already a
dependency of this Job) writing to /tmp (world-writable) instead - no apk
install needed at all. PATH is extended to include /tmp before invoking the
provisioning script so authentik-provision.py's existing
subprocess.run(['kubectl', ...]) calls resolve it via normal PATH lookup,
no changes needed to the script itself.
2026-07-21 16:50:22 -07:00
Story Crater Bot d602ed8c78 feat(iam): automate Authentik OAuth provisioning + create admin user rock
Adds k8s/security/iam/authentik-provision-job.yaml - a PostSync hook Job
(reruns every ArgoCD sync via hook-delete-policy: BeforeHookCreation) that
replaces the never-migrated setup_talos_iam.sh / provision_oidc.py workflow
(both referenced helmfile + a Python script that no longer exists in this
repo - OAuth was never actually provisioned since the ArgoCD migration).

Idempotently creates:
  - Custom 'groups' OAuth2 scope mapping (Authentik doesn't ship one by
    default; required for ArgoCD's RBAC groups claim and Grafana's
    role_attribute_path, both of which read a groups claim from the token).
  - Groups: homelab-admins (is_superuser), grafana-admins.
  - User 'rock', member of both groups above - gets full Authentik superuser
    access, ArgoCD role:admin via the existing
     RBAC policy in argocd-values.yaml, and
    Grafana Admin role via role_attribute_path. Password generated once,
    stored in iam/rock-credentials (never rotated on re-run).
  - OAuth2 providers + Applications for grafana, minio, forgejo, argocd.
    Client secrets read from existing Secrets (grafana-oidc, minio-oidc) or
    generated once and written out (forgejo-oidc, argocd's oidc-secret).
  - PolicyBinding of homelab-admins -> every Application, guaranteeing rock
    access regardless of each app's default visibility.

Also fixes forgejo-values.yaml: oauth2.CLIENT_ID was set but CLIENT_SECRET
was missing entirely (oauth2 login could never have worked). Added via
extraEnv -> GITEA__oauth2__CLIENT_SECRET sourced from the new forgejo-oidc
Secret, since the oauth2: values map can't reference a Secret inline.

RBAC: dedicated ServiceAccount + ClusterRole (secrets get/list/create/update/
patch only) bound via namespace-scoped RoleBindings in iam/cicd/argocd/
logging/storage - the only 5 namespaces this job ever touches, and the only
resource type it ever touches.

NOTE: MinIO's OIDC env vars were removed from minio-tenant.yaml earlier
(blocked IAM init because the provider/app didn't exist yet -> 404 on
discovery). Now that this job creates them, re-adding MinIO's OIDC config is
a safe follow-up in a separate change.
2026-07-21 16:31:03 -07:00