docs: remove outdated docs describing the retired core/talos CLI workflow

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Story Crater Bot
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# CI/CD Pipeline: GitOps Validation & Deployment
## Overview
Pure GitOps CI/CD pipeline using Forgejo Actions (self-hosted runner).
**Principle:** Validate in CI, deploy via ArgoCD (no manual steps).
```
git push
[CI: Validate]
├─ yamllint (YAML syntax)
├─ kubeval (K8s manifests)
├─ kustomize build (all layers)
├─ argocd validation (app definitions)
└─ security scan (secrets, best practices)
[If push to main]
└─ ArgoCD auto-syncs (if enabled)
```
## Workflows
### 1. validate-k8s.yaml (Mandatory)
**Trigger:** Any push/PR with k8s/ changes
**What it does:**
1. Lints all YAML files (`yamllint`)
2. Validates K8s manifests (`kubeval`)
3. Builds all kustomization layers
4. Validates ArgoCD applications
5. Reports results
**Duration:** ~2-3 minutes
**Status:**
- ✅ PASS: All layers build, manifests valid → OK to merge
- ❌ FAIL: Syntax error, invalid resource, build failed → Fix & push again
**Example output:**
```
=== Building k8s/infrastructure/ ===
✓ Infrastructure built successfully
Resources: 47
=== Building k8s/bootstrap/ ===
✓ Bootstrap built successfully
Resources: 23
```
**When to check:**
- After every commit
- Before merging PRs
- On every branch
### 2. argocd-sync.yaml (Recommended)
**Trigger:** Push to main only (k8s/ changed)
**What it does:**
1. Authenticates with ArgoCD
2. Syncs `homelab-root` application
3. Waits for sync to complete (5 min timeout)
4. Verifies all applications healthy
**Duration:** 1-5 minutes (depends on resources)
**Status:**
- ✅ SYNCED: All resources deployed to cluster
- ❌ FAILED: Sync error, pod crashes, etc. → Check ArgoCD UI for details
**When it runs:**
- Automatically after merge to main
- Only on k8s/ changes (not on docs)
**Manual trigger (if needed):**
```bash
# SSH to runner or use Forgejo UI
# Re-run failed workflow
# Or manually sync: argocd app sync homelab-root
```
**Requires secrets:**
- `ARGOCD_SERVER`: ArgoCD server URL (https://argocd.riotpiao.com)
- `ARGOCD_AUTH_TOKEN`: ArgoCD API token (generate via ArgoCD UI)
### 3. security-scan.yaml (Optional)
**Trigger:** Any push/PR with k8s/ changes
**What it does:**
1. Scans Dockerfiles for vulnerabilities (`trivy`)
2. Scans Helm charts for security issues
3. Audits K8s manifests (`polaris`)
4. Checks for hardcoded secrets
5. Verifies security best practices
**Duration:** ~3-5 minutes
**Status:**
- ✅ PASS: No critical issues
- ⚠️ WARNING: Best practice recommendations (non-blocking)
- ❌ FAIL: Hardcoded secrets found (must fix)
**Common issues:**
- Missing resource limits (warning)
- Privileged containers (warning)
- Hardcoded passwords (ERROR)
---
## File Structure
```
.forgejo/
├── workflows/ # CI/CD workflows
│ ├── validate-k8s.yaml # Validate manifests (required)
│ ├── argocd-sync.yaml # Sync to cluster (auto on main)
│ └── security-scan.yaml # Security checks (optional)
└── CI-CD.md # This file
```
---
## Setup Instructions
### 1. Install Forgejo Runner
```bash
# On runner machine (inside cluster or external)
forgejo-runner register \
--instance https://forgejo.riotpiao.com \
--token <registration-token> \
--name homelab-runner \
--labels docker
forgejo-runner daemon
```
### 2. Add ArgoCD Secrets to Forgejo
```bash
# Go to: Forgejo → Settings → Secrets
# Add:
ARGOCD_SERVER = https://argocd.riotpiao.com
ARGOCD_AUTH_TOKEN = <token> # Generate: argocd account generate-token
```
### 3. Generate ArgoCD Token
```bash
# Inside cluster
kubectl -n argocd port-forward svc/argocd-server 8080:443
# Go to: https://localhost:8080/user-info/api-tokens
# Create new token (CI/CD)
# Copy token to Forgejo secrets
```
---
## Workflow Execution
### When developer pushes to feature branch:
```
git push origin feature/new-service
Forgejo Actions triggered
validate-k8s.yaml runs:
✓ Lints YAML
✓ Validates manifests
✓ Builds kustomizations
✓ All pass → GitHub comment: "Ready to merge"
Developer opens PR
Reviewer checks:
- Code changes (YAML)
- Workflow results
- ArgoCD impact (diff)
PR merged to main
```
### When merged to main:
```
git merge feature/new-service → main
Forgejo Actions triggered
validate-k8s.yaml runs:
✓ Same validation as above
argocd-sync.yaml runs (if enabled):
✓ Syncs homelab-root
✓ Waits for sync
✓ Verifies health
✓ Resources deployed to cluster
Cluster state = git state
(No manual kubectl apply needed!)
```
---
## Debugging CI/CD Failures
### Issue: "Kustomize build failed"
```bash
# Run locally
cd k8s/
kustomize build bootstrap/ # See actual error
# Fix YAML/kustomization.yaml
# git push again
```
### Issue: "Kubeval validation failed"
```bash
# Check K8s manifest syntax
kubeval k8s/platform/minio/config.yaml
# Common issues:
# - Typos in apiVersion, kind, metadata
# - Missing required fields
# - Invalid references (namespace, service name)
```
### Issue: "ArgoCD sync failed"
```bash
# Check ArgoCD UI
# https://argocd.riotpiao.com → homelab-root
# Or CLI
argocd app get homelab-root
argocd app logs homelab-root --follow
# Common issues:
# - Missing namespace (fixed by infrastructure layer)
# - Invalid Helm chart version
# - Secret not found
# - Network policy blocking traffic
```
### Issue: "Security scan found hardcoded secret"
```bash
# Fix: Remove secret from YAML
# Add to SOPS encryption instead
# Or use ArgoCD Sealed Secrets
# (if SOPS not available)
```
---
## Viewing Results
### Forgejo Actions UI
```
Repository → Actions
├─ validate-k8s
│ ├─ ✅ Success (merge safe)
│ ├─ ❌ Failed (fix required)
│ └─ Logs (click "Steps" → "Summary")
├─ argocd-sync
│ ├─ ✅ Synced (deployed)
│ └─ ❌ Failed (check ArgoCD UI)
└─ security-scan
├─ ✅ Pass (no critical issues)
└─ ⚠️ Warning (review, non-blocking)
```
### ArgoCD UI
```
https://argocd.riotpiao.com
├─ homelab-root
│ ├─ Status: Synced ✓
│ ├─ Health: Healthy ✓
│ └─ Details (click to see resources)
├─ layer-1-bootstrap
├─ layer-2-platform
├─ layer-3-security
├─ layer-4-applications
└─ layer-5-data
```
---
## Common Tasks
### Add new service to cluster
```bash
# 1. Create directory and kustomization.yaml
mkdir -p k8s/applications/my-service
cat > k8s/applications/my-service/kustomization.yaml << EOF
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
namespace: my-namespace
helmCharts:
- name: my-chart
repo: https://charts.example.com
version: 1.0.0
releaseName: my-service
valuesFile: values.yaml
EOF
# 2. Add values.yaml
cp /template/values.yaml k8s/applications/my-service/
# 3. Commit and push
git add k8s/applications/my-service/
git commit -m "feat(apps): add my-service"
git push
# 4. CI validates
# 5. Merge to main
# 6. ArgoCD syncs automatically
# ✓ Service deployed to cluster
```
### Rollback a deployment
```bash
# 1. Find broken commit
git log --oneline k8s/ # Identify bad commit
# 2. Revert
git revert <commit-hash>
git push
# 3. CI validates (should pass)
# 4. Merge to main
# 5. ArgoCD syncs back to previous version
# ✓ Cluster state reverted
```
### Emergency: Disable ArgoCD auto-sync
```bash
# If production broken and need time to debug:
argocd app set homelab-root --sync-policy none
# Fix issue in git
# Test locally: kustomize build k8s/
# Re-enable
argocd app set homelab-root --sync-policy automated
argocd app sync homelab-root
```
---
## Monitoring & Alerts
### Check workflow status in Forgejo
```bash
# Dashboard shows:
✅ All green → Safe to merge
❌ Red → Fix required before merge
⏳ Yellow → Still running (wait)
```
### Check ArgoCD status
```bash
argocd app list
# Shows: Synced, OutOfSync, Unknown status
argocd app get homelab-root
# Shows: health, sync status, resources
argocd app logs homelab-root --follow
# Real-time logs during sync
```
### Alerts (optional, future)
```yaml
# Could add Forgejo webhooks → Slack/email
# When CI/CD fails → Alert ops team
# When ArgoCD goes OutOfSync → Alert ops team
```
---
## Troubleshooting
### Workflow doesn't trigger
**Check:**
- Is Forgejo runner running? `forgejo-runner daemon`
- Did you push to correct branch? (validate runs on all, argocd-sync only on main)
- Did path match filter? (must change k8s/ or .forgejo/workflows/)
### Workflow hangs/times out
**Check:**
- kustomize build → Check for dependency cycles
- argocd sync → Check cluster resources (storage full? network down?)
- security scan → Large image scan → Takes time
**Fix:**
- Increase timeout in workflow
- Optimize kustomization (remove unused resources)
- Add resource limits to pods
### ArgoCD token invalid
**Fix:**
```bash
# Regenerate token
argocd account generate-token
# Update Forgejo secret
# Settings → Secrets → ARGOCD_AUTH_TOKEN = <new-token>
```
---
## Best Practices
**DO:**
- Commit all K8s changes to git (no manual kubectl apply)
- Run validate-k8s locally before push
- Write descriptive commit messages (why this change?)
- Review workflow logs before merging
- Monitor ArgoCD sync after merge
**DON'T:**
- Push directly to main (always use PR)
- Skip workflow validation (it catches errors early)
- Ignore security scan warnings
- Manually `kubectl apply` (breaks GitOps)
- Edit resources in cluster (they revert via ArgoCD)
---
## Next Steps
1. **Setup Forgejo runner** (if not already running)
2. **Add ArgoCD secrets** to Forgejo
3. **Test workflows** on feature branch
4. **Merge to main** → Watch ArgoCD sync
5. **Celebrate:** Full GitOps pipeline working! 🎉
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# Kubernetes RBAC → Authentik Migration Plan
**Status:** Draft — awaiting decisions in [Open Decisions](#open-decisions)
**Date:** 2026-08-19
**Scope:** Move human identity + authorization for the cluster and its apps onto Authentik groups.
---
## 1. Finding: there is nothing to literally import
The original ask was "import the existing RBAC from the cluster into Authentik". Inventory of the live
cluster says that set is empty.
### 1.1 Cluster RBAC audit (live, 2026-08-19)
Every `ClusterRoleBinding` / `RoleBinding` carrying a `User` or `Group` subject:
| Binding | Role | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| `cluster-admin` | `ClusterRole/cluster-admin` | `Group:system:masters` |
| `system-bootstrap-approve-node-client-csr` | `ClusterRole/system:certificates.k8s.io:certificatesigningrequests:nodeclient` | `Group:system:bootstrappers:nodes` |
| `system-bootstrap-node-bootstrapper` | `ClusterRole/system:node-bootstrapper` | `Group:system:bootstrappers:nodes`, `Group:system:nodes` |
| `system-bootstrap-node-renewal` | `ClusterRole/system:certificates.k8s.io:certificatesigningrequests:selfnodeclient` | `Group:system:nodes` |
| `kube-system/system::extension-apiserver-authentication-reader` | `Role/extension-apiserver-authentication-reader` | `User:system:kube-controller-manager`, `User:system:kube-scheduler` |
| `kube-system/system::leader-locking-kube-controller-manager` | `Role/…` | `User:system:kube-controller-manager` |
| `kube-system/system::leader-locking-kube-scheduler` | `Role/…` | `User:system:kube-scheduler` |
All of these are Talos/control-plane machinery. Every other binding in the cluster targets a
`ServiceAccount` (controllers: Argo CD, cert-manager, Cilium, Longhorn, MinIO operator, Prometheus, …).
**There are zero human users in Kubernetes RBAC.** The only human access path today is the Talos-issued
admin certificate in `cluster-config/kubeconfig`, which lands in `system:masters` — a single shared,
unattributable, non-revocable god credential.
The kube-apiserver has no OIDC configured. `apiServer:` in
[`terraform/templates/controlplane.tftpl:110`](terraform/templates/controlplane.tftpl#L110) contains only
`certSANs`, `image`, `admissionControl` and `auditPolicy`.
### 1.2 What human RBAC *does* exist (app level, scattered)
| Location | Rule |
|---|---|
| [`k8s/bootstrap/phase4-argocd/argocd-values.yaml:163-169`](k8s/bootstrap/phase4-argocd/argocd-values.yaml#L163-L169) | `policy.default: role:readonly`; `g, admin/rock/cicd, role:admin`; `g, homelab-admins, role:admin` |
| [`k8s/infra/logging/grafana-values.yaml:86`](k8s/infra/logging/grafana-values.yaml#L86) | `role_attribute_path: contains(groups[*], 'grafana-admins') && 'Admin' \|\| 'Viewer'` |
| [`k8s/infra/iam/scripts/authentik-provision.py`](k8s/infra/iam/scripts/authentik-provision.py) (`minio` scope mapping) | `homelab-admins → consoleAdmin`, everyone else → `readonly` |
| Authentik, provisioned | Groups `homelab-admins` (superuser), `grafana-admins`. Single user: `rock`, member of both. |
### 1.3 Known drift
[`project-usage/authentik-oidc.md`](project-usage/authentik-oidc.md) documents three groups —
`homelab-admins`, `homelab-devops`, `homelab-viewers`. Only `homelab-admins` and `grafana-admins` are
actually created by the provisioner. The documentation is wrong today; Phase 1 fixes it.
### 1.4 Restated goal
Not an import. This is: **define the group taxonomy in Authentik, make Authentik the sole issuer of human
identity, then bind those groups to Kubernetes roles and app roles declaratively through GitOps.**
---
## 2. Constraints
- **GitOps only.** No local `terraform apply`, no manual `kubectl apply`, no Authentik console clicking for
anything that must survive a rebuild. Changes land in git; Forgejo Actions and Argo CD do the applying.
- **Authentik config stays Argo CD-managed** via the `authentik-provision.py` PostSync hook. No Terraform
Authentik provider. A prior attempt at one is abandoned at
`.claude/worktrees/debug-auth-issue/terraform/authentik-config.tf` — do not revive it.
- **Terraform is limited to Talos machine config** (Phase 3 only), applied through the pipeline.
- **The Talos admin certificate stays as break-glass.** It is unaffected by OIDC and remains the recovery
path when Authentik is unavailable.
---
## 3. Phases
Each phase is independently shippable and independently revertible.
### Phase 1 — Group taxonomy
Extend the provisioner's group step (`[2/5]` in `authentik-provision.py`) from two groups to four:
| Group | `is_superuser` | Intent |
|---|---|---|
| `homelab-admins` | `true` | Full cluster + full app admin |
| `homelab-devops` | `false` | Deploy and operate workloads; no IAM, no cluster config |
| `homelab-viewers` | `false` | Read-only everywhere |
| `grafana-admins` | `false` | Grafana `Admin` role specifically |
Files: `k8s/infra/iam/scripts/authentik-provision.py`, `project-usage/authentik-oidc.md` (fix §1.3 drift).
**Verify**
```bash
kubectl -n iam exec deploy/authentik-server -- \
curl -sH "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" localhost:9000/api/v3/core/groups/ \
| jq -r '.results[].name'
# expect: homelab-admins, homelab-devops, homelab-viewers, grafana-admins
# and: rock still a member of homelab-admins + grafana-admins
```
**Rollback:** revert the commit. Extra groups with no bindings grant nothing.
---
### Phase 2 — Authentik OAuth2 provider for Kubernetes
Add a `kubernetes` entry to the `SERVICES` dict in `authentik-provision.py`, with two departures from the
existing web-app entries:
- `client_type: public` — kubectl is a public client and cannot hold a secret. No k8s Secret is created for
it, so the `client_secret_source` machinery is skipped for this service.
- `grant_types: ["authorization_code", "refresh_token", "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code"]`
plus PKCE, to support both browser and headless login.
- `redirect_uris`: `http://localhost:8000`, `http://localhost:18000` (kubelogin's loopback listeners).
Reuses the existing `groups` property mapping created in step `[1/5]`. No new claim work.
**Verify**
```bash
curl -s https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/kubernetes/.well-known/openid-configuration | jq .
# device-code login, then decode:
kubectl oidc-login get-token --oidc-issuer-url=... --oidc-client-id=kubernetes --oidc-extra-scope=groups
# id_token payload must contain: preferred_username, groups[]
```
**Rollback:** delete provider + application in Authentik; nothing else consumes them yet.
---
### Phase 3 — Enable OIDC on kube-apiserver (Terraform, pipeline-applied)
Add to `apiServer.extraArgs` in
[`terraform/templates/controlplane.tftpl`](terraform/templates/controlplane.tftpl#L110):
```yaml
extraArgs:
oidc-issuer-url: https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/kubernetes/
oidc-client-id: kubernetes
oidc-username-claim: preferred_username
oidc-username-prefix: "authentik:"
oidc-groups-claim: groups
oidc-groups-prefix: "authentik:"
```
> **Security — the prefixes are mandatory, not cosmetic.**
> Without `oidc-groups-prefix`, anyone able to create or rename an Authentik group to `system:masters`
> obtains `cluster-admin` on the cluster. Without `oidc-username-prefix`, an Authentik username can
> impersonate a built-in identity such as `system:kube-controller-manager`. Both prefixes must be present
> in the same change that enables OIDC. Do not ship this phase partially.
Operational notes:
- Apply is a rolling control-plane machine-config change: one node at a time, wait for `Ready` and for
etcd quorum before proceeding to the next.
- The Talos admin certificate authenticates via client cert, not OIDC, and is unaffected. It is the
recovery path if the issuer URL is wrong or Authentik is down.
- The issuer must be reachable from the control-plane nodes and its TLS chain must be trusted by them.
Confirm this before applying, because a bad issuer URL means the apiserver logs OIDC discovery failures
on every start.
**Verify** (per node, after each rolls)
```bash
kubectl auth whoami --token="$ID_TOKEN"
# expect Username: authentik:rock
# Groups: authentik:homelab-admins, authentik:grafana-admins, system:authenticated
kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-config/kubeconfig get nodes # cert path still works
```
**Rollback:** revert the template change, re-run the pipeline, roll the control plane back. Cert-based
access is never interrupted, so this rollback is safe at any point.
---
### Phase 4 — Bind Authentik groups to Kubernetes roles
New manifest `k8s/infra/iam/rbac-oidc-bindings.yaml`, referenced from
[`k8s/infra/iam/kustomization.yaml`](k8s/infra/iam/kustomization.yaml):
| Subject | Role | Kind |
|---|---|---|
| `Group:authentik:homelab-admins` | `ClusterRole/cluster-admin` | ClusterRoleBinding |
| `Group:authentik:homelab-devops` | `ClusterRole/edit` | see [Open Decisions](#open-decisions) #2 |
| `Group:authentik:homelab-viewers` | `ClusterRole/view` | ClusterRoleBinding |
`admin`, `edit` and `view` are the built-in aggregated ClusterRoles and already exist in the cluster — no
custom roles needed.
**Verify**
```bash
kubectl auth can-i '*' '*' --all-namespaces --as=probe --as-group=authentik:homelab-admins # yes
kubectl auth can-i delete pods -A --as=probe --as-group=authentik:homelab-viewers # no
kubectl auth can-i get pods -n apps --as=probe --as-group=authentik:homelab-viewers # yes
kubectl auth can-i get secrets -n iam --as=probe --as-group=authentik:homelab-devops # no
```
**Rollback:** revert the commit; Argo CD prunes the bindings.
---
### Phase 5 — Client wiring and documentation
- Ship a kubeconfig template using the `kubelogin` (`kubectl oidc-login`) exec credential plugin — no
embedded certs, no long-lived token on disk.
- Document login, token cache location, and the break-glass cert path in
[`project-usage/authentik-oidc.md`](project-usage/authentik-oidc.md).
- Same edit corrects the stale group list from §1.3.
**Verify:** on a clean machine with no certificates, `kubectl get nodes` triggers a browser login and
succeeds; `kubectl auth whoami` reports the `authentik:`-prefixed identity.
---
### Phase 6 — Converge app RBAC on the same four groups
| Target | Change |
|---|---|
| Argo CD `policy.csv` | add `g, homelab-devops, role:admin` (or a scoped custom role) and `g, homelab-viewers, role:readonly` |
| Grafana `role_attribute_path` | three-tier: `grafana-admins`/`homelab-admins``Admin`, `homelab-devops``Editor`, else `Viewer` |
| MinIO `policy` claim expression | `homelab-admins``consoleAdmin`, `homelab-devops``readwrite`, else `readonly` |
| Argo CD local accounts | retire `accounts.rock` once SSO admin is proven. **Keep `accounts.cicd`** — the pipeline needs a non-SSO apiKey. |
**Verify:** end-to-end browser login per app as a test user who is *only* in `homelab-devops`, confirming
the expected role in each of Argo CD, Grafana and MinIO. The e2e suite under
[`tests/e2e/tests/authentik.spec.ts`](tests/e2e/tests/authentik.spec.ts) is the place to encode this.
**Rollback:** per-app revert; each app's mapping is independent.
---
## 4. Risks
| Risk | Severity | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Missing `oidc-groups-prefix` → group-name privilege escalation to `cluster-admin` | Critical | Prefixes ship in the same commit as the OIDC flags; Phase 4 verification asserts the prefixed form |
| Bad issuer URL / untrusted TLS bricks apiserver OIDC | Medium | Cert-based admin access is unaffected; roll one control-plane node at a time and check apiserver logs before continuing |
| Authentik outage blocks all human cluster access | Medium | Talos admin cert is the documented break-glass path and never depends on Authentik |
| Argo CD `cicd` account removed by accident → pipeline loses cluster access | Medium | Phase 6 explicitly retires only `accounts.rock` |
| Group renamed in Authentik silently revokes cluster access | Low | Group names are asserted by the provisioner on every Argo CD sync, so drift self-heals |
---
## 5. Open Decisions
1. **Is kubectl-via-OIDC actually wanted?**
Phases 35 only pay for themselves if humans besides the shared admin cert need API access. If the
answer is no, the plan collapses to Phases 1 and 6: no Terraform change, no control-plane roll, app-level
SSO consolidation only.
2. **`homelab-devops` blast radius** — cluster-wide `ClusterRoleBinding` to `edit`, or namespaced
`RoleBinding`s limited to application namespaces (excluding `iam`, `kube-system`, `argocd`)?
Namespaced is the tighter default; cluster-wide is less to maintain.
3. **Username claim**`preferred_username` (human-readable in audit logs, mutable) versus `sub`
(stable, opaque). Recommendation: `preferred_username`, given a single-operator homelab where audit
readability beats rename-safety.
---
## 6. Reference
- Kubernetes OIDC authentication: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authentication/#openid-connect-tokens
- Kubernetes RBAC: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/
- Talos apiserver `extraArgs`: https://www.talos.dev/latest/reference/configuration/v1alpha1/config/#Config.cluster.apiServer
- Authentik OAuth2 provider: https://docs.goauthentik.io/docs/add-secure-apps/providers/oauth2/
- Authentik property mappings (scope/claims): https://docs.goauthentik.io/docs/add-secure-apps/providers/property-mappings/
- kubelogin (`kubectl oidc-login`): https://github.com/int128/kubelogin
- Argo CD RBAC: https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/rbac/
- Grafana generic OAuth: https://grafana.com/docs/grafana/latest/setup-grafana/configure-security/configure-authentication/generic-oauth/
- MinIO OpenID identity management: https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/administration/identity-access-management/oidc-access-management.html
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# Authentik Federated OIDC & SSO
**Provider:** `https://authentik.riotpiao.com`
**OIDC Issuer:** `https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/talos-federation/`
**Namespace:** `iam`
## When to Use
- **Federated login** — Single sign-on for Grafana, MinIO, Forgejo, Argo CD
- **User groups** — RBAC via group membership (admins, devops, read-only)
- **JWT tokens** — Authenticate CLI tools, API clients
- **SSO for custom apps** — OAuth2/OIDC redirect flow
## Quick Start
**1. Login to Authentik console:**
```bash
# Browser: https://authentik.riotpiao.com
# Default user: akadmin
# Password: AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD (from .env)
# Or via OIDC (after initial setup)
# Click "Sign in with talos-federation"
```
**2. Create user:**
```
Authentik console → Users → Create
- Username: alice
- Email: [email protected]
- Group: homelab-devs (or homelab-admins)
```
**3. User logs into Grafana:**
```
https://grafana.riotpiao.com
→ Sign in with Authentik (auto-redirects to OIDC provider)
→ Approve access
→ Logged in as alice (group determines role: Admin or Viewer)
```
## Configuration
| Key | Value |
|-----|-------|
| OIDC provider | `talos-federation` (federated) |
| OIDC issuer | `https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/talos-federation/` |
| JWKS endpoint | `https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/talos-federation/.well-known/openid-configuration` |
| Database | PostgreSQL (ddb namespace, authentik user) |
| Backups | WAL archived to MinIO |
## Common Patterns
**Grafana OIDC login:**
```yaml
# k8s/logging/grafana-values.yaml
grafana:
auth.generic_oauth:
enabled: true
name: Authentik
client_id: grafana
client_secret: $GRAFANA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET # from Vault
auth_url: https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/authorize/
token_url: https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/token/
api_url: https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/userinfo/
scopes: openid profile email groups
use_pkce: true
```
**MinIO OIDC login:**
```yaml
# k8s/storage/minio-values.yaml
minio:
identity_oauth:
provider: authentik
client_id: minio
client_secret: $MINIO_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
redirect_uri: https://minio.riotpiao.com/oauth_callback
config_url: https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/talos-federation/.well-known/openid-configuration
policy_mappings:
- group: homelab-admins → consoleAdmin
- group: homelab-devops → readwrite
```
**CLI device code flow (core CLI):**
```bash
# Get JWT token (no kubeconfig needed)
core secrets login
# → Opens browser, approve device code
# → Token cached in ~/.core/token
# Use token to access Vault
core get cluster/ANTHROPIC_API_KEY --key ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
# → Vault validates JWT from Authentik
# → Returns secret
```
**Custom app OIDC redirect:**
```go
import "github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
provider, _ := oidc.NewProvider(ctx, "https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/talos-federation/")
verifier := provider.Verifier(&oidc.Config{ClientID: "my-app"})
// After OAuth2 redirect & token exchange:
idToken, _ := verifier.Verify(ctx, rawIDToken)
// Extract claims
var claims struct {
Email string `json:"email"`
Groups []string `json:"groups"`
}
idToken.Claims(&claims)
```
## Group-Based RBAC
**Default groups:**
- `homelab-admins` — Full cluster access (Grafana Admin, MinIO admin, Argo CD admin, Vault admin)
- `homelab-devops` — Deploy & monitor (Grafana Editor, MinIO readwrite, Argo CD user)
- `homelab-viewers` — Read-only (Grafana Viewer, MinIO readonly)
**Assign user to group:**
```
Authentik console → Users → alice → Edit
→ Groups → Add "homelab-devops"
→ Save
```
**Custom group-to-role mapping:**
```yaml
# Per-service (see cicd-workflow.md, monitoring-metrics.md for examples)
# Grafana: auth.generic_oauth.role_attribute_path = contains(groups[*], 'homelab-admins') && 'Admin' || 'Viewer'
# MinIO: policy_mappings (see above)
```
## Monitoring
**Authentik dashboard:** https://authentik.riotpiao.com/api/v3/admin/dashboards
**Key metrics:**
- Login attempts (success/failure)
- Active sessions
- Token issuance rate
- Provider sync status
## Troubleshooting
**Users can't login (redirect loop):**
```bash
# Check redirect URI matches
# Authentik console → Applications → grafana → Edit
# Verify Redirect URI = https://grafana.riotpiao.com/login/generic_oauth
# Check OIDC provider is running
k get pods -n iam -l app=authentik
```
**JWT token expired:**
```bash
# CLI tokens have 24h expiry
# Re-authenticate
core secrets login
```
**Groups not syncing:**
```bash
# Check group attribute in OIDC config
# Authentik console → Applications → <app> → OIDC Configuration
# groups_attribute = "groups" (or custom claim name)
```
**Vault can't validate JWT:**
```bash
# Verify JWKS endpoint is accessible
curl https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/talos-federation/.well-known/openid-configuration
# Restart Vault to refresh JWKS cache
k rollout restart -n iam deployment/vault
```
See `/TROUBLESHOOTING.md` for full incident guide.
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# CI/CD Pipeline (Forgejo + Argo CD)
**Git Forge:** `https://forgejo.riotpiao.com`
**Deployments:** `https://argocd.riotpiao.com` (or `kubectl port-forward`)
**Namespaces:** `cicd`, `forge`
## When to Use
- **Build & test** — Forgejo Actions CI (GitHub Actions syntax)
- **Image push** — Build OCI images, push to Forgejo registry
- **GitOps deployment** — Argo CD syncs deploy repo to cluster
- **Secrets in CI** — ci-bot JWT tokens, never kubeconfig
## Quick Start
**1. Clone a repo from Forgejo:**
```bash
git clone https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/rock/source.git
cd source
```
**2. Create workflow:**
```bash
mkdir -p .forgejo/workflows
cat > .forgejo/workflows/ci.yml <<EOF
name: CI
on: [push]
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- run: npm test
- run: docker build -t myapp:latest .
- run: |
docker login forgejo.riotpiao.com \
-u ci-bot \
-p ${{ secrets.CI_BOT_TOKEN }}
docker push forgejo.riotpiao.com/rock/myapp:latest
EOF
git add .forgejo/workflows/ci.yml
git commit -m "ci: add build workflow"
git push
```
**3. Trigger deployment:**
```bash
# Update deployment repo (rock/deploy)
git clone https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/rock/deploy.git
cd deploy
# Update image tag
sed -i 's|forgejo.riotpiao.com/rock/myapp:.*|forgejo.riotpiao.com/rock/myapp:abc123|' k8s/deployment.yaml
git add k8s/deployment.yaml
git commit -m "deploy: bump myapp to abc123"
git push
```
**4. Argo CD auto-syncs:**
```bash
# Watch deployment
k rollout status -n <app-namespace> deployment/<app-name>
# Or check Argo CD UI
kubectl port-forward -n argocd svc/argocd-server 8443:443
# https://localhost:8443 (login via Authentik)
```
## Workflow Syntax (GitHub Actions)
**Basic structure:**
```yaml
name: CI
on:
push:
branches: [main, develop]
pull_request:
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- run: npm ci
- run: npm test
build:
needs: test # wait for test job
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- run: docker build -t myapp:${{ github.sha }} .
- run: docker push forgejo.riotpiao.com/rock/myapp:${{ github.sha }}
```
**Available variables:**
```bash
${{ github.sha }} # commit hash
${{ github.ref_name }} # branch name
${{ github.run_number }} # build #
${{ secrets.CI_BOT_TOKEN }} # injected from Forgejo
```
## Secrets & Authentication
**ci-bot JWT token (auto-injected):**
```yaml
- run: |
echo "${{ secrets.CI_BOT_TOKEN }}" | docker login \
forgejo.riotpiao.com \
-u ci-bot \
--password-stdin
docker push forgejo.riotpiao.com/rock/myapp:latest
```
**API token (for pushing commits):**
```yaml
- run: |
git config user.name "ci-bot"
git config user.email "ci-bot@homelab"
git commit --allow-empty -m "bump: version"
git push https://ci-bot:${{ secrets.CI_BOT_TOKEN }}@forgejo.riotpiao.com/rock/deploy.git main
```
**Vault secrets (via talos CLI):**
```bash
# Not available in CI runner — use Argo CD post-sync hooks instead
# Or inject via init container before workflow runs
```
## Argo CD GitOps
**Create app (one-time):**
```bash
argocd app create story-crater \
--repo https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/rock/deploy.git \
--path k8s/ \
--dest-server https://kubernetes.default.svc \
--dest-namespace story-crater-backend \
--sync-policy automated
```
**Monitor sync:**
```bash
# CLI
argocd app get story-crater
argocd app logs story-crater
# UI: https://argocd.riotpiao.com
# Login: Authentik SSO (homelab-admins group only)
```
**Manual sync:**
```bash
argocd app sync story-crater
argocd app wait story-crater
```
## Security Rules
**DO:**
- Store credentials in Forgejo Secrets (auto-injected)
- Use ci-bot JWT for image push only
- Commit to deploy repo (triggers Argo CD)
- Enable branch protection (require CI pass)
**DON'T:**
- Put kubeconfig in CI (Argo CD bridges gap)
- Commit secrets to source repo
- Use admin-bot in CI workflows (over-privileged)
- Push images directly to cluster (use Argo CD)
## Monitoring
**Grafana dashboard:** `svc-forgejo`, `svc-argocd`
**Key metrics:**
- `forgejo_workflows_running` — active workflows
- `argocd_app_sync_duration_seconds` — deployment time
- `argocd_app_info{sync_status="OutOfSync"}` — drift detection
## Troubleshooting
**Workflow fails silently:**
```bash
# Check runner logs
k logs -n cicd -f deploy/forgejo-runner
# Check if runner pod is healthy
k get pods -n cicd -l app=forgejo-runner
```
**Image push fails (401 Unauthorized):**
```bash
# Verify ci-bot token in Forgejo
# Settings → Applications → ci-bot → check scopes (package:write)
# Or re-create token
core put cluster/iam/agents/ci-bot-token TOKEN="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
```
**Argo CD out-of-sync:**
```bash
# Check deploy repo changes
argocd app diff story-crater
# Manual sync
argocd app sync story-crater --prune
```
**Webhook not triggering:**
```bash
# Verify Forgejo webhook config
# Repo Settings → Webhooks → Check delivery logs
# Or manually trigger
argocd app sync story-crater
```
See `/TROUBLESHOOTING.md` for full incident guide.
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# Coding Standards — Helm, Helmfile, Kubernetes, Shell
Conventions for contributing to homelab's Helm charts, helmfiles, Kubernetes manifests, and shell scripts. These are repo-local patterns — not Go/Rust/general standards from companion repos (core CLI, kmsvc).
---
## Helm & Helmfile Conventions
### Chart Naming & Layout
- **Local charts:** `k8s/<service>/charts/<component>/` directory structure.
- **Helm chart versions:** Always use semver ranges in helmfile releases (e.g., `~1.0`, `~10`, not floating `latest`).
- Rationale: Predictable upgrades, avoids surprise breaking changes.
### helmfile.yaml.gotmpl Pattern
The helmfile is a **Go template**, not a shell script. Use Go template syntax for environment variable interpolation, not shell syntax.
**Correct:**
```yaml
set:
- name: adminPassword
value: {{ env "GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD" }}
```
**Incorrect:**
```yaml
set:
- name: adminPassword
value: ${GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD} # Shell syntax — not expanded by helmfile
```
**Organization:**
- Use logical comment headers to separate sections: `# ── cert-manager ──`.
- Group related releases together.
- Use `needs:` for dependency ordering (release A waits for release B before deploying).
- Example (from helmfile.yaml.gotmpl, lines 439449):
```yaml
- name: loki
namespace: logging
needs:
- storage/minio
- name: promtail
namespace: logging
needs:
- logging/loki
```
- **Namespace declaration:** Specify namespace at the release block level, not helmfile-level default.
```yaml
- name: prometheus
namespace: monitoring
createNamespace: true
```
### Values Files Pattern
- **Never hardcode secrets** in values.yaml or ConfigMap keys.
- Store secrets in Vault via `core put cluster/KEY KEY="value"`.
- Reference at deploy time using `{{ env "VAR" }}` in helmfile.
- **External values files:** Always use `values:` block pointing to `.yaml` files, not inline YAML.
```yaml
- name: minio
values:
- k8s/storage/minio-values.yaml
```
- **Environment-specific overrides:** For complex releases (e.g., SQS), use `environments/` subdirectory with `helmfile.yaml.gotmpl` at the service level.
- Example: `k8s/sqs/environments/homelab.yaml` (lines 129 show namespace, kafkaCluster, redis, managementService blocks).
- Helmfile loads environment-specific values dynamically: `{{ .Values.kafkaCluster.nodePool.replicas }}`.
---
## Infrastructure as Code (IaC) — Single Source of Truth
**Core principle:** All infrastructure state must be declaratively managed via Terraform or Helm (via helmfile + Terraform). No ad-hoc scripts, manual kubectl, or side-by-side resource definitions.
### Terraform + Helm Division of Labor
- **Terraform manages:**
- Helm releases (chart + version + values)
- Namespaces
- StorageClasses
- Static Kubernetes resources (RBAC, NetworkPolicies, IngressClasses)
- Cloud infrastructure (Vault, S3 backends, secrets)
- State persistence (S3 backend in MinIO)
- **Helmfile manages:**
- Chart release ordering via `needs:`
- Environment-specific value interpolation (Go templating, not shell)
- Hook workflows (pre/post-sync orchestration)
- **Never use helmfile for one-off bucket creation, job runs, or manual setup** — those belong in Terraform or a documented bootstrap process
- **Kubernetes manifests (`k8s/`) manage:**
- ArgoCD applications (single source of truth for GitOps)
- Service definitions that ArgoCD syncs
- **Never manage app objects (Deployments, StatefulSets) directly** — let helm + ArgoCD own them
### Anti-Pattern: Ad-Hoc Resource Creation
❌ **Bad:** Separate `minio-buckets.tf` using `aws_s3_bucket` resources + post-deploy scripts
- Split responsibility: some buckets in Terraform, others in helmfile, others manual
- State drift: unclear what's managed where
- Credential duplication: secrets in multiple places
✅ **Good:** Single source in `minio.tf` helm release:
```hcl
buckets = [
{ name = "terraform-state", policy = "none", purge = false },
{ name = "vault", policy = "none", purge = false },
...
]
```
- One place to define, one place to audit
- Credentials in variables + Vault, not scattered
- TF state tracks all changes
### When to Break the Rule
Only when **explicitly documented**:
- Bootstrap scripts (one-time cluster init) — commit to `scripts/` with clear "run once" warning
- Temporary debugging (never leave in git) — stash or delete before committing
- Manual steps for constraint (e.g., "create namespace before ArgoCD bootstraps") — document in `TROUBLESHOOTING.md` with rationale
---
## YAML & ConfigMap/Secret Patterns
### Secret Field Naming
**Rule: Field name in Secret = environment variable name in Vault.**
When storing a secret via `core put cluster/KEY KEY="value"`, the field name and Vault variable name must match. This ensures helmfile's `{{ env "VAR" }}` expansion works correctly.
Example (from CLAUDE.md gotcha "Field name = variable name"):
```bash
# Correct
core put cluster/MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD="value"
core put cluster/GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD="value"
# Incorrect (won't expand in helmfile)
core put cluster/MINIO_SECRET value="value" # Field name ≠ variable name
```
Reference in helmfile (helmfile.yaml.gotmpl, lines 400401):
```yaml
set:
- name: rootPassword
value: {{ env "MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD" }}
```
### Never Use `--env` Flags in Manifests
Avoid kubectl flags like `--env KEY=value` in manifests or deployment specs. This exposes secrets in `kubectl describe` output.
**Correct:** Use Secret volumes (k8s/storage/minio-values.yaml, lines 4042):
```yaml
envFrom:
- secretRef:
name: minio-oidc # Reference a Secret, don't expose in manifest
```
**Incorrect:**
```yaml
env:
- name: MINIO_OIDC_SECRET
value: "sensitive-value" # Visible in kubectl describe
```
### Namespace-First Organization
Organize manifests by namespace: `k8s/<namespace>/`
Structure per namespace:
```
k8s/storage/
├── minio-values.yaml
├── minio-bucket-init.sh
└── (local charts if any)
k8s/monitoring/
├── prometheus-values.yaml
├── dashboards/ # ConfigMap files auto-loaded via helmfile postsync hook
├── servicemonitors/ # ServiceMonitor CRD instances
└── alerts/ # PrometheusRule CRD instances
```
---
## Hook Scripts & Integration Workflows
### Pre/Post-Sync Hooks
Helmfile hooks (presync/postsync) drive setup workflows. Use **relative paths from repo root**, never absolute paths.
**Pattern (helmfile.yaml.gotmpl, lines 402416):**
```yaml
- name: minio
hooks:
- events: ["presync"]
command: bash
args:
- -c
- |
bash k8s/base/namespace-setup.sh storage
bash k8s/storage/minio-bucket-init.sh storage loki-chunks loki-ruler
```
**Common presync tasks:**
- Create namespace (via `k8s/base/namespace-setup.sh`).
- Pre-create ConfigMaps/Secrets for the release.
- Initialize infrastructure (buckets, databases, etc.).
**Common postsync tasks:**
- Wait for operator/webhook readiness.
- Apply CRD instances (ServiceMonitor, PrometheusRule, Certificate).
- Perform post-deployment setup (cluster initialization, user creation).
Example (helmfile.yaml.gotmpl, lines 6472):
```yaml
hooks:
- events: ["postsync"]
command: bash
args:
- -c
- |
kubectl rollout status deploy/cert-manager -n cert-manager --timeout=120s
kubectl apply -f - <<'EOF'
# ClusterIssuer and Certificate CRD instances...
EOF
```
### ServiceMonitor Pattern
One file per service in `k8s/monitoring/servicemonitors/svc-<name>.yaml`.
**Key elements:**
- `namespaceSelector`: Match the namespace where the app runs.
- `selector.matchLabels`: Match the app label from the Deployment (e.g., `app.kubernetes.io/name: argocd-metrics`).
- `endpoints.port`: Name of the metrics port in the Service.
- `interval`: Scrape frequency (e.g., `30s`).
Example (`k8s/monitoring/servicemonitors/argocd.yaml`, lines 137):
```yaml
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: ServiceMonitor
metadata:
name: argocd
namespace: monitoring
labels:
release: kube-prometheus-stack # Required: links to Prometheus release
spec:
namespaceSelector:
matchNames:
- cicd # App namespace
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: argocd-metrics # Matches Deployment pod label
endpoints:
- port: metrics # Service port name (not port number)
interval: 30s
scrapeTimeout: 10s
```
### PrometheusRule Pattern
One file per service in `k8s/monitoring/alerts/svc-<name>-rules.yaml`.
**Structure:**
- `groups[].name`: Logical grouping (e.g., `minio.rules`).
- `groups[].rules[].alert`: Alert name.
- `expr`: PromQL expression (5-minute windows for rate alerts).
- `for`: Duration threshold (e.g., `10m`).
- `labels.severity`: `critical`, `warning`.
- `annotations`: summary + description (use `{{ $value }}` for metric value).
Example (`k8s/monitoring/alerts/svc-minio-rules.yaml`, lines 147):
```yaml
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PrometheusRule
metadata:
name: minio-rules
namespace: storage
spec:
groups:
- name: minio.rules
interval: 15s
rules:
- alert: MinIOHighErrorRate
expr: |
(
sum(rate(minio_s3_requests_total{error="true"}[5m]))
/
sum(rate(minio_s3_requests_total[5m]))
) > 0.05
for: 10m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "High error rate on MinIO"
description: "{{ $value | humanizePercentage }}"
```
### Grafana Dashboard Pattern
Dashboards are stored as JSON ConfigMaps in `k8s/monitoring/dashboards/` and auto-loaded via helmfile postsync hook (see helmfile.yaml.gotmpl, lines 471477).
**6-row template (recommended layout):**
1. **Availability:** Uptime, error rate, latency (SLO band).
2. **Resources:** CPU, memory, disk usage, network I/O.
3. **Domain metrics:** Service-specific KPIs (throughput, queue depth, cache hit rate).
4. **Logs:** Recent error logs from Loki.
5. **SLO:** SLI tracking (burn rate, error budget).
6. **Related dashboards:** Links to dependent services.
Auto-load hook (helmfile.yaml.gotmpl, lines 471477):
```yaml
hooks:
- events: ["postsync"]
command: kubectl
args:
- apply
- -f
- k8s/monitoring/dashboards/
```
---
## Integration Checklist
When adding a new service to the homelab, verify the following:
- [ ] **Chart pinning:** Helm chart version pinned (`~1.0` format in helmfile, not floating `latest`).
- [ ] **Secrets management:** All secrets stored in Vault (none in values.yaml, ConfigMap, or CLI flags).
- [ ] **Metrics endpoint:** Service exports `/metrics` endpoint (Prometheus format).
- [ ] **ServiceMonitor:** Created and auto-scraped by Prometheus operator.
- [ ] **PrometheusRule:** Alert rules defined for errors, latency, SLO violations.
- [ ] **Grafana dashboard:** 6-row template auto-loaded via ConfigMap.
- [ ] **Ingress:** Rule added if external access needed (see `k8s/ingress/ingress.yaml`).
- [ ] **OIDC integration:** If UI component, integrated with Authentik (see `core iam bootstrap`).
---
## Shared/Reusable Repos & Image Publication
### When to Publish as Public GHCR
**Rule:** If a service's chart + image source lives in a separate repo (not in homelab), it **must** be published as a **public GitHub repo** under the `Riotpiaole` org.
**Rationale:**
- Local in-cluster charts are fine for infra-owned services.
- Shared/reusable service charts should be version-pinned and publicly available for:
- Reuse across different clusters (other labs, staging, prod).
- Consumption by Argo CD apps (CI/CD pipeline).
- Independent evolution without tight coupling to homelab repo.
### Workflow
**Develop locally:**
1. Create companion repo (e.g., `kafaka-management-service`, `queue-operator`) in a private or public repo.
2. Include Dockerfile and Helm chart.
**Build & publish:**
1. Set up CI/CD in the companion repo (GitHub Actions).
2. Build image and push to GHCR: `ghcr.io/Riotpiaole/<repo>:<tag>`.
3. Tag release and publish chart (npm registry, GitHub releases, or OCI registry).
**Reference in homelab:**
1. Pin image tag + chart version in helmfile.yaml.gotmpl.
2. Chart `repositories` block references the public Helm repo (or OCI registry).
**Example (commit cd1c569 — SQS charts):**
```yaml
- name: management-service
namespace: sqs
chart: k8s/sqs/charts/management-service
values:
- image:
repository: ghcr.io/Riotpiaole/kafaka-management-service
tag: v1.0.0 # Pinned tag from public build
```
---
## Cross-References
- **CLAUDE.md gotchas:** Field name = variable name, MinIO `--env` flag exposure, helmfile template syntax (`{{ env "VAR" }}` not `${VAR}`), CNPG password templating.
- **README.md:** kubectl context setup, port-forward aliases, cluster topology.
- **USAGE.md:** IAM bootstrap, secret management, deployment recipes.
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# Core CLI Tools: Decision Guide
The `core` CLI is your primary tool for cluster auth, node operations, Vault secrets management, IAM administration, and object storage. This doc covers **when** to reach for `core` vs `kubectl`/`helmfile`, the two separate auth domains that power different commands, and the complete command inventory.
For exhaustive flag-level detail on each subcommand, see [~/workplace/core/USAGE.md](../../core/USAGE.md).
---
## The Two Auth Domains
The `core` CLI maintains **two independent authentication systems** that gate different command families. Confusing them causes authentication failures.
### Domain 1: Node/Talos Operations (`core auth`)
**Gates:** Node-level commands, Talos service management, cluster status.
**Login mechanism:** `core auth login-oob`
- Out-of-band device-code flow via Authentik
- Token cached in `~/.core/token` (24h expiry)
- Required before: `core nodes`, `core status <ip>`, `core services <ip>`, `core logs <ip>`, `core log-svc <ip> <svc>`, `core dmesg <ip>`, `core config`, `core upgrade`, `core shutdown`, `core reboot`, `core node`, `core pods clean`
**Check auth state:**
```bash
core auth status # Show token expiry
core auth clear # Force re-auth on next command
```
**When to use:**
- Troubleshooting node-level issues (crashes, disk space, network on a specific Talos node)
- Checking Talos service health (etcd, kubelet, scheduler, etc.)
- Upgrading cluster OS or managing node lifecycle
- Reading kernel logs (dmesg) or kubelet logs on specific nodes
### Domain 2: Vault Secrets (`core secrets`)
**Gates:** Secrets management (read/write), secret listing, secret export.
**Login mechanism:** `core secrets login`
- Interactive login to Vault (opens browser, approves auth)
- Reads/writes to `~/.config/talos/secrets.toml`
- Required before: `core get <path> [--key KEY]`, `core put <path> key=value`, `core secrets list`, `core secrets export`, `core secrets exec`
**Check auth state:**
```bash
core secrets status # Show Vault token / scopes
core secrets clear # Force re-auth on next command
```
**When to use:**
- Reading or writing cluster secrets (API keys, database passwords, OAuth client secrets)
- Managing application credentials in Vault (centralized secret store)
- Rotating secrets for services (e.g., OAuth2 client secrets)
- Listing all secrets under a path
- Bootstrapping `.env` files for helmfile deployment (via `vsource`)
---
## Auth Bug Fixes
**Bug #1 (Fixed):** `core status <NODE>` is a **node-ops command**, not an auth verifier. It does NOT verify that you're authenticated to Vault. To verify auth state, use the correct domain-specific command:
- For node access: `core auth status`
- For Vault access: `core secrets status`
**Bug #2 (Fixed):** `core secrets login` and `core auth login-oob` are **NOT interchangeable**. They gate completely different systems:
- `core auth login-oob` gates node/cluster operations
- `core secrets login` gates Vault secret read/write
- You may be authenticated to one domain and not the other. Check state separately.
---
## When to Reach for `core`
| Scenario | Tool | Why |
|----------|------|-----|
| Pod/deployment issue | `kubectl` | Pods, replicas, rollouts, events |
| Package release management | `helmfile` | Install/upgrade Helm charts |
| Node crashes, disk, kernel panic | `core auth` + node commands | Direct access to Talos node state |
| Service unreachable on Talos node | `core status <ip>`, `core services <ip>` | Talos service health |
| Database password rotation | `core secrets` + `core put` | Vault secret write |
| Need API key for app deployment | `core secrets` + `core get` | Fetch from Vault, inject via `vsource` |
| Create OAuth2 app in Authentik | `core iam create-app` | Manage federated identity apps |
| Add user to service (MinIO, Grafana, etc.) | `core iam add-member` | Group membership binding |
| S3 object upload/download | `core bucket` | MinIO operations |
---
## Command Inventory
Complete list of `core` subcommands, organized by domain. See [~/workplace/core/USAGE.md](../../core/USAGE.md) for usage flags and examples.
### Authentication
```bash
# Node/Talos operations auth
core auth login-oob # Authenticate with Authentik (device code flow)
core auth status # Check token expiry / auth state
core auth clear # Clear cached auth token
# Vault secrets auth
core secrets login # Authenticate to Vault (interactive)
core secrets status # Check Vault token / scopes / expiry
core secrets clear # Clear Vault auth token
```
### Cluster & Node Operations
```bash
# Node discovery and status
core nodes # List all cluster nodes (IP, hostname, status)
core status <ip> # Talos node overview (resources, uptime)
core services <ip> # List Talos services (etcd, kubelet, etc.)
# Logs
core logs <ip> # Stream kubelet logs on node
core log-svc <ip> <svc> # Logs for specific Talos service (etcd, scheduler, etc.)
core dmesg <ip> # Kernel logs (ring buffer) from node
# Node lifecycle
core upgrade <ip> # Upgrade Talos OS on node
core shutdown <ip> # Graceful shutdown
core reboot <ip> # Reboot node
# Kubernetes context
core config kube-list # List available kubeconfig contexts
core config kube-use <ctx> # Switch to kubeconfig context (LAN vs WireGuard)
# Pod cleanup
core pods clean # Delete Failed/Evicted/Terminating pods
core node <node-name> # Get node details (includes pod stats)
```
### Secrets Management (Vault)
```bash
# Read secrets
core get <path> # Fetch all fields under path
core get <path> --key KEY_NAME # Fetch specific field
# Write secrets
core put <path> key=value [key2=value2 ...] # Store secrets in Vault
# List and export
core secrets list # List all secret paths
core secrets export <path> # Export secrets as shell-sourceable format
# Execute with secrets in environment
core secrets exec -- <command> # Run command with secrets loaded in env
```
**Convention:** Field name = variable name (SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE). Never use `value=`.
Example:
```bash
# Write
core put cluster/ANTHROPIC_API_KEY ANTHROPIC_API_KEY="sk-ant-..."
# Read
core get cluster/ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
```
### IAM Management (Authentik)
```bash
# Groups
core iam list-groups # List all groups
core iam create-group <name> # Create new group
# OAuth2 Applications
core iam list-apps # List all OAuth2 apps
core iam create-app <name> --slug <slug> --redirect-uri <uri> # Create app
core iam describe-app <app> # Show client ID, secret, URIs, scope claims
core iam rotate-secret <app> # Rotate OAuth2 client secret
# User management
core iam add-member <group> <username> # Add user to group
core iam bind-app <app> <group> # Grant group access to application
# Cleanup
core iam delete-app <app> # Delete OAuth2 application
```
### Object Storage (MinIO)
```bash
# List and manage buckets
core bucket list # List all buckets
core bucket upload <bucket> <file> [<remote-path>] # Upload file to S3
core bucket download <bucket> <remote-path> <file> # Download file from S3
core bucket delete <bucket> <remote-path> # Delete object from S3
```
### Utilities
```bash
core help # Show command help
core pf grafana # Port-forward to Grafana (localhost:3000)
core pf prometheus # Port-forward to Prometheus (localhost:9090)
core pf minio # Port-forward to MinIO console (localhost:9001)
core pf iam # Port-forward to Authentik (localhost:7000)
```
---
## Access Control Tiers
The cluster uses a tiered access model based on authentication mechanism and network perimeter.
### Tier A: OIDC + RBAC (Authentik-enforced)
Services with federated OIDC login and group-based role assignment.
| Service | Auth Method | Group Claim | Role Binding |
|---------|-------------|------------|--------------|
| **Grafana** | Authentik OIDC | `groups` | Mapped to Admin / Viewer / Viewer |
| **Argo CD** | Authentik OIDC | `groups` | RBAC role binding (policy.csv) |
| **MinIO** | Authentik OIDC | `groups` / custom `policy` | Policy-based access (readwrite / readonly) |
| **Forgejo** | Authentik OIDC | `email` (OAuth login only) | No group enforcement (open git repo) |
| **kmsvc** | Vault JWT | `sub` / `aud` | Audience validation + service scope |
**Provisioning:**
```bash
# After core auth login-oob, bootstrap IAM apps:
bash k8s/talos-iam/bootstrap-iam.sh
```
### Tier B: Network-Perimeter Only (No Authentik Enforcement)
Services with no OIDC support (product limitation). Access is restricted to LAN/WireGuard perimeter only.
| Service | Network Access | Use Case |
|---------|----------------|----------|
| **Portainer** | LAN + WireGuard only | Container UI, workload browsing |
| **Longhorn** | LAN + WireGuard only | Storage volume management |
| **Temporal** | LAN + WireGuard only | Workflow execution (auth TBD) |
All three are reachable **only** via WireGuard/LAN-only Ingress rules. Zero remote access risk, but also zero federated identity. If remote Temporal access is needed, upgrade the chart's auth configuration or replace with an OIDC-compatible workflow platform.
**Accessing Tier B services:**
```bash
# From off-LAN, use WireGuard context
core config kube-use admin@homelab-cluster-1
core pf minio # connects via 10.6.0.1:9001
```
---
## Workflow: Rotate an OAuth2 Application Secret
```bash
# 1. Rotate secret in Authentik
SECRET=$(core iam rotate-secret grafana | jq -r '.client_secret')
# 2. Update Helm values
vi k8s/logging/grafana-values.yaml
# Set: GRAFANA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET="$SECRET"
# 3. Redeploy the app
helmfile apply -l app=grafana
# 4. Verify new secret is in use
core iam describe-app grafana | grep client_secret
```
---
## Workflow: Add User to Service
```bash
# 1. Verify group exists (or create it)
core iam list-groups | grep minio-admins
# If not found:
core iam create-group minio-admins
# 2. Add user to group
core iam add-member minio-admins alice
# 3. Bind group to MinIO application
core iam bind-app minio minio-admins
# 4. User has access on next login
# (OIDC login to MinIO → Authentik → group check → MinIO policy applied)
```
---
## Workflow: Rotate a Database Password (Vault)
```bash
# 1. Generate new password
NEW_PASS=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
# 2. Store in Vault
core put cluster/POSTGRES_ADMIN_PASSWORD POSTGRES_ADMIN_PASSWORD="$NEW_PASS"
# 3. Update database user
kubectl exec -n ddb pod/ddb-cluster-0 -- psql -U postgres -c \
"ALTER USER postgres WITH PASSWORD '$NEW_PASS';"
# 4. Update Helm values with new password reference
# (Or if using helmfile hook: helmfile will re-run postInitApplicationSQL with new password)
# 5. Restart pods to pick up new secret
kubectl rollout restart -n <ns> deployment/<app>
```
---
## Common Questions
**Q: I'm getting "not authenticated" on `core nodes`. What do I do?**
A: Run `core auth login-oob`. Node commands use a different auth domain than secrets. After login, `core nodes` should work.
**Q: I have a valid Vault token but `core get` fails. Why?**
A: Check that both auth domains are active:
```bash
core auth status # Verify node auth is valid
core secrets status # Verify Vault auth is valid
```
Both must succeed. If one is expired, re-auth that domain.
**Q: Should I use `core bucket` or S3 CLI tools (aws-cli, s3cmd)?**
A: Use `core bucket` for simplicity (no AWS credentials). Use s3cmd/aws-cli if you need advanced sync or bandwidth control. All three talk to the same MinIO backend.
**Q: Can I add a user without creating a group first?**
A: Groups are the unit of access control. Always create the group, then add users to it, then bind it to applications. Single-user bindings are not supported (by design).
**Q: I rotated an OAuth2 secret but the app still fails to authenticate. What's next?**
A:
1. Verify the new secret is stored: `core iam describe-app grafana`
2. Check the deployment has the new secret: `kubectl get secret -n logging grafana-oidc -o yaml | grep client_secret`
3. Restart the pod: `kubectl rollout restart -n logging deployment/grafana`
4. Check logs: `kubectl logs -n logging deployment/grafana | grep -i oauth`
---
## See Also
- [~/workplace/core/USAGE.md](../../core/USAGE.md) — Exhaustive command reference with flags and examples
- [CLAUDE.md](../CLAUDE.md) § Sign In (Device Code Flow) — Quick reference for `core auth login-oob`
- [CLAUDE.md](../CLAUDE.md) § Quick Shortcuts — One-liners for common tasks
- [CLAUDE.md](../CLAUDE.md) § Integration Checklist — New service onboarding
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# CloudNativePG PostgreSQL Database
**Host:** `ddb-cluster-rw.ddb.svc.cluster.local` (read-write)
**Read replica:** `ddb-cluster-ro.ddb.svc.cluster.local` (read-only)
**Port:** `5432`
**Namespace:** `ddb`
## When to Use
- **Multi-replica HA** — 3 replicas, automatic failover
- **pgvector extension** — Vector similarity search (LLM embeddings)
- **Transactional data** — Authentik, Story Crater backend, custom apps
- **Declarative backups** — Automated WAL archiving to MinIO
## Quick Start
**1. Connect from pod:**
```bash
# Inside a pod (inject secret mount)
psql -h ddb-cluster-rw.ddb.svc.cluster.local \
-U story_crater \
-d story_crater \
-W # prompt for password (from Secret)
```
**2. Create database & user (one-time):**
```bash
# Already done by helmfile postsync hook
# But if needed manually:
psql -h ddb-cluster-rw.ddb.svc.cluster.local \
-U postgres \
-c "CREATE DATABASE myapp OWNER postgres;"
psql -h ddb-cluster-rw.ddb.svc.cluster.local \
-U postgres \
-d myapp \
-c "CREATE USER myapp_user WITH PASSWORD 'secret';"
psql -h ddb-cluster-rw.ddb.svc.cluster.local \
-U postgres \
-d myapp \
-c "GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON DATABASE myapp TO myapp_user;"
```
**3. Enable pgvector:**
```bash
psql -h ddb-cluster-rw.ddb.svc.cluster.local \
-U postgres \
-d myapp \
-c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"
```
**4. Create table with embeddings:**
```sql
CREATE TABLE documents (
id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
content TEXT,
embedding vector(1536), -- OpenAI embeddings
created_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT NOW()
);
CREATE INDEX ON documents USING IVFFLAT (embedding vector_cosine_ops);
```
## Configuration
| Key | Value |
|-----|-------|
| Host (RW) | `ddb-cluster-rw.ddb.svc.cluster.local` |
| Host (RO) | `ddb-cluster-ro.ddb.svc.cluster.local` |
| Port | 5432 |
| Replicas | 3 (automatic failover) |
| Extensions | pgvector (LLM embeddings), uuid-ossp |
| Backups | WAL archiving to MinIO (continuous) |
| Retention | 30 days |
## Common Patterns
**Connection pooling (from app):**
```go
import "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
config, _ := pgxpool.ParseConfig("postgres://user:[email protected]:5432/myapp")
config.MaxConns = 25
config.MinConns = 5
pool, _ := pgxpool.NewWithConfig(ctx, config)
// Use pool
row := pool.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users")
```
**Read from replica (analytics):**
```go
// Offload SELECT queries to read replica
pool.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT * FROM documents LIMIT 1") // auto-routes to RO if available
// Writes always go to RW
pool.Exec(ctx, "INSERT INTO documents ...")
```
**Vector similarity search:**
```sql
SELECT id, content, embedding <-> $1 AS distance
FROM documents
ORDER BY embedding <-> $1
LIMIT 10;
-- $1 = query embedding (e.g., from OpenAI API)
```
**Backup & restore:**
```bash
# Backups are automatic (WAL to MinIO)
# To restore from backup:
# 1. Check MinIO s3://postgresql-backups/
# 2. Use PostgreSQL PITR (point-in-time recovery)
# 3. Contact SRE for restore procedure
```
## Monitoring
**Grafana dashboard:** `svc-postgresql` (auto-configured)
**Key metrics:**
- `pg_stat_activity_connections` — active connections
- `pg_stat_database_blks_read` — disk I/O
- `pg_replication_lag_seconds` — replica lag (goal: < 1s)
**CLI health check:**
```bash
# Check replication status
kubectl exec -n ddb pod/ddb-cluster-1 -- \
psql -U postgres -c "SELECT slot_name, restart_lsn FROM pg_replication_slots;"
# Check replica lag
kubectl exec -n ddb pod/ddb-cluster-2 -- \
psql -U postgres -c "SELECT now() - pg_last_xact_replay_timestamp() AS lag;"
```
## Secrets & Credentials
**All user passwords stored in Vault:**
```bash
# Read password
core get cluster/STORY_CRATER_PG_PASSWORD --key STORY_CRATER_PG_PASSWORD
# Inject into pod (auto via Secret volume)
# Mount: /run/secrets/db-password
```
**Connection string from env:**
```bash
POSTGRES_CONNECTION="postgres://story_crater:${STORY_CRATER_PG_PASSWORD}@ddb-cluster-rw.ddb.svc.cluster.local:5432/story_crater"
```
## Troubleshooting
**Cannot connect (connection refused):**
```bash
# Verify cluster is running
k get pods -n ddb
# Check Service DNS
k exec -it pod/debug-pod -- nslookup ddb-cluster-rw.ddb.svc.cluster.local
# Verify Secret has password
k get secret -n ddb ddb-cluster-superuser -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d
```
**Replica lag is high (> 10s):**
```bash
# Check replica pod CPU/memory
k top pod -n ddb
# Scale down other workloads if cluster is overloaded
# Or scale up database resources (helmfile.yaml.gotmpl)
```
**pgvector queries slow:**
```sql
-- Ensure index exists
SELECT * FROM pg_indexes WHERE tablename = 'documents' AND indexname LIKE '%embedding%';
-- Re-index if missing
CREATE INDEX ON documents USING IVFFLAT (embedding vector_cosine_ops);
```
See `/TROUBLESHOOTING.md` for full incident guide.
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# Forgejo OCI Registry Cleanup
Automatic garbage collection for the Forgejo container registry. Deletes old image tags when newer versions are pushed, keeping only the latest N versions per repository.
## Why
The Forgejo OCI registry stores all pushed images indefinitely. Without cleanup:
- Old/retired image versions accumulate
- Storage fills up (`longhorn` PVC)
- Old versions clutter the UI
## What it does
**CronJob** (`forgejo-registry-cleanup`):
- Runs daily at 2 AM UTC (configurable)
- Lists all images in the registry
- For each image, keeps only the **latest 3 versions** (configurable)
- Deletes tags for older versions
- Skips images with ≤ 3 tags (nothing to delete)
## How to enable
The manifest is in `k8s/bootstrap/phase3-forgejo/registry-cleanup-cronjob.yaml`. It's **currently disabled** (suspended) because:
1. **Forgejo registry auth** needs to be configured
- `forgejo-registry-token` secret must exist in `cicd` namespace
- Should contain `username` and `password` keys
- User needs permission to delete images in the registry
2. **Registry must expose `/v2/_catalog`** endpoint
- Standard for OCI registries
- Forgejo includes this, but may be behind auth
### Step 1: Create registry token
If `forgejo-registry-token` doesn't exist or is empty:
```bash
# As a Forgejo admin, create an API token with full scope
# https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/user/settings/tokens
# Copy the token
kubectl create secret generic forgejo-registry-token \
-n cicd \
--from-literal=username=<your-username> \
--from-literal=password=<the-api-token> \
--dry-run=client -o yaml | sops -e -i -
```
Or edit via `k8s/argocd/secrets/forgejo-registry-token.enc.yaml`:
```yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: forgejo-registry-token
namespace: cicd
type: Opaque
stringData:
username: ci-bot # or any user with admin rights
password: <api-token>
```
### Step 2: Test in dry-run mode
Before enabling for real, verify it works:
```bash
# Edit the CronJob to set DRY_RUN=true
kubectl set env cronjob/forgejo-registry-cleanup -n cicd DRY_RUN=true
# Trigger a test run
kubectl create job --from=cronjob/forgejo-registry-cleanup \
-n cicd forgejo-registry-cleanup-test
# Check logs
kubectl logs -n cicd -l job-name=forgejo-registry-cleanup-test -f
```
Dry-run output shows which images **would** be deleted without deleting them.
### Step 3: Enable for real
```bash
# Set DRY_RUN=false and unsuspend
kubectl patch cronjob forgejo-registry-cleanup -n cicd \
-p '{"spec":{"suspend":false}}'
kubectl set env cronjob/forgejo-registry-cleanup -n cicd DRY_RUN=false
```
## Configuration
Edit `registry-cleanup-cronjob.yaml` or patch the CronJob:
| Env var | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `REGISTRY_HOST` | `forgejo.riotpiao.com` | Registry hostname |
| `KEEP_VERSIONS` | `3` | How many recent versions to keep per image |
| `DRY_RUN` | `false` | If `true`, log what would be deleted without deleting |
**Schedule:** Edit `.spec.schedule` (cron format). Current: `0 2 * * *` (2 AM UTC daily).
Examples:
- `0 2 * * 0` → Weekly on Sunday at 2 AM
- `0 0 1 * *` → Monthly on the 1st at midnight
- `0 */6 * * *` → Every 6 hours
## Monitoring
### Check if running
```bash
# See all runs
kubectl get jobs -n cicd -l app=forgejo-registry-cleanup
# Latest run logs
kubectl logs -n cicd -l app=forgejo-registry-cleanup --tail=100 -f
```
### Failed runs
If a job fails:
1. Check logs: `kubectl logs -n cicd <job-pod>`
2. Common issues:
- **403 Unauthorized**: Registry token invalid or expired
- **404 _catalog**: Registry doesn't expose catalog endpoint
- **Connection refused**: Registry unreachable (DNS, network policy)
### Metrics
The job doesn't currently emit Prometheus metrics, but you can:
- Check pod exit codes in K8s events
- Parse logs for "Total images deleted: N"
- Set up log aggregation to alert on failures
## Limitations
1. **No version sorting**: Tags are deleted in the order returned by the registry
- Assumption: registries return newest first (not always true)
- **Fix**: Parse semantic versions explicitly if needed
2. **No protection for `latest` tag**: If `latest` is old, it will be kept but others deleted
- Desired behavior: prioritize newest build + never delete `latest`
- Could add logic to always keep `latest` + latest N-1 tagged versions
3. **No size-aware deletion**: Deletes by tag count, not storage size
- Desired: keep until storage threshold is reached
- Would need registry V2 API extensions (`HEAD /v2/<image>/blobs/<digest>` for size)
## Customizing the script
Edit the `cleanup.sh` script in the ConfigMap to:
- Change sorting/selection logic
- Integrate with external systems (Slack alerts, Prometheus metrics)
- Add per-image exceptions (e.g., never delete `production-*` tags)
- Use `--delete-by-digest` to reclaim actual disk space (not just catalog entries)
Example: Keep all tags matching `v*.*.*.` plus latest 2:
```bash
# In cleanup.sh, replace the tag filtering logic:
SEMVER_TAGS=$(echo "$TAGS" | grep -E '^v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$' | sort -rV)
KEEP_TAGS="$SEMVER_TAGS $(echo "$TAGS" | head -2 | tr '\n' ' ')"
TAGS_TO_DELETE=$(echo "$TAGS" | grep -v -F "$KEEP_TAGS")
```
## Future improvements
- [ ] Semantic version sorting (v1.0.0 > v0.9.9)
- [ ] Storage size-aware retention (keep until >80% full)
- [ ] Slack/email notifications on deletion
- [ ] Prometheus metrics export
- [ ] Per-image exception rules (YAML config)
- [ ] Integration with CI/CD pipeline (delete old PR images automatically)
---
**Related:** `k8s/bootstrap/phase3-forgejo/` — Forgejo deployment manifests
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# Infrastructure Practice Playbook
Standardized procedures for troubleshooting, developing, deploying, and operating the homelab platform. Each procedure explicitly calls out where the `core` CLI fits vs `kubectl`/`helmfile`/direct cluster access. See `core-cli-tools.md` for the auth/secrets domain split; see `infra-troubleshooting.md` for quick patterns and gotchas.
## Procedure A: Troubleshoot a Service or Cluster Issue
1. **Identify the domain.**
- Vault/secrets: `core get`/`core put` failing, Vault unreachable.
- Node/Talos: node crashes, disk full, kubelet unreachable, network issues.
- Plain Kubernetes: pod CrashLoop, service 503, deployment stuck.
2. **If Vault-adjacent (secrets, authentication failing):**
- Run `core secrets status` first (NOT `core auth status` — common mistake).
- If `Vault UNREACHABLE`, check DNS/networking:
- No wildcard DNS exists; verify manual `/etc/hosts` entries (10.6.0.1 for WireGuard, 192.168.1.160 for LAN).
- Ping the Vault service: `kubectl get svc -n vault | grep vault`.
- If `Vault token not cached`, run `core secrets login`, approve device code in browser.
- Verify: `core secrets status` shows `✓ Authenticated`.
3. **If node/Talos-adjacent (kubelet logs, node state, services failing):**
- Run `core auth status` first.
- If token expired, run `core auth login-oob`, approve device code in browser.
- Then run `core nodes` to list cluster nodes.
- For a specific node, run `core status <ip>` (Talos state).
- Inspect Talos services: `core services <ip>` (kubelet, etcd, controller, etc.).
- Check service logs: `core logs <ip>` (main Talos logs) or `core log-svc <ip> kubelet` (specific service).
- Consult `infra-troubleshooting.md` for Pod stuck in CrashLoopBackOff and kubelet restart patterns.
4. **If plain Kubernetes (pod/deployment/service issues):**
- Consult root `TROUBLESHOOTING.md` for the layer-before-tool SRE methodology (procedures 110).
- Use `infra-troubleshooting.md` § Quick Patterns for common diagnoses:
- CrashLoopBackOff: `kubectl logs -n <ns> <pod> --tail=50` + `kubectl describe pod -n <ns> <pod> | grep -A 10 Events`.
- Service 503: `kubectl get endpoints -n <ns> <svc>` (endpoints missing?) + `kubectl get pods -n <ns> -o wide` (pods not Ready?).
- Helm release stuck: `helmfile status | grep -E "FAILED|UNKNOWN|PENDING"` + `helm status <release> -n <ns> --show-resources`.
- If still unclear, escalate to `kubectl get all -n <ns>` and review resource events.
5. **For dashboards and live metrics:**
- Use `core pf grafana` (port-forward to localhost:3000) rather than raw `kubectl port-forward` — keeps forwarded ports consistent.
- If Prometheus unavailable, check: `kubectl get pods -n monitoring | grep prometheus`.
- If ServiceMonitor not scraping, verify: `kubectl get servicemonitor -A | grep <name>` and inspect `.spec.selector` matches the target pod's app label.
---
## Procedure B: Launch/Develop a New Service or POC
1. **Plan the service.**
- Determine namespace (e.g., `sqs`, `temporal`, `databases`, `monitoring`).
- Decide if metrics exported (most should) and if OIDC-gated.
- Sketch a Helm values.yaml structure (secrets, replicas, resource requests, affinity).
2. **Authenticate to Vault.**
- Run `core secrets login` and approve device code in browser.
- Verify: `core secrets status` shows `✓ Authenticated`.
- You'll need Vault access to store service secrets in step 5.
3. **Create service Helm chart directory.**
- Create `k8s/<service>/` with at minimum:
- `values.yaml` (Helm values for deployment, service, replicas, resource limits).
- `charts/` subdirectory for any custom local Helm charts (optional).
- Follow naming conventions from `coding-standards.md`.
4. **Add Helm release to helmfile.**
- Open `helmfile.yaml.gotmpl`.
- Add release block under `releases:` section, following this structure:
```yaml
- name: <service>
namespace: <namespace>
chart: <chart-repo>/<chart-name>
version: ~1.0 # pin major.minor, allow patch updates
needs:
- <dependency-namespace>/<dependency-release> # if applicable
values:
- k8s/<service>/values.yaml
- secretsInline:
DB_PASSWORD: "{{ env \"<SERVICE>_DB_PASSWORD\" }}"
```
- Consult `coding-standards.md` for `needs:` ordering (example: sqs section shows strimzi-operator → kafka-cluster → queue-crd → management-service).
- Reference real example: root helmfile's `sqs` section.
5. **If the service needs secrets (DB password, API key, OAuth secret):**
- Generate value (e.g., `openssl rand -hex 32` for passwords).
- Store in Vault: `core put cluster/<SERVICE>_<KEY> <SERVICE>_<KEY>="value"`.
- **Critical gotcha:** field name MUST equal variable name (e.g., `FORGEJO_ADMIN_PASSWORD=` not `value=`) per `coding-standards.md` § Vault field=variable convention.
- Reference in values.yaml via `{{ env "VARIABLE_NAME" }}` (Helmfile Go template syntax, NOT shell `${VAR}`).
- Do NOT hardcode secrets in values.yaml or ConfigMaps.
6. **Verify Helm syntax before deploy.**
- Run `helmfile lint` (catches template errors, duplicate releases).
- Run `helmfile diff -l name=<service>` (show what will be deployed).
- Review diff for correctness (verify env var substitutions, resource limits, affinity rules).
7. **Deploy the service.**
- Run `helmfile apply -l name=<service>`.
- Monitor: `kubectl get pods -n <namespace> -w` (watch until Running).
- If pods stuck: `kubectl describe pod -n <namespace> <pod-name>` (check Events for SchedulingFailed, ImagePullBackOff, etc.).
8. **If the service exports `/metrics` (Prometheus format):**
- Create ServiceMonitor: `k8s/monitoring/servicemonitors/svc-<name>.yaml`.
- `.spec.selector.matchLabels` must match the service's pod labels (usually `app: <service>`).
- `.spec.endpoints[0].port` must match the service port name or number exporting metrics.
- Create PrometheusRule: `k8s/monitoring/alerts/svc-<name>-rules.yaml`.
- Include error rate, latency, and SLO alert rules.
- Use `prometheus` as the rule group.
- Create Grafana dashboard: `k8s/monitoring/dashboards/svc-<name>.yaml`.
- Use 6-row template: Availability, Resources, Domain metrics, Logs, SLO, Related.
- See README.md § Example Applications for a full walkthrough.
- Verify scrape: `kubectl get servicemonitor -A | grep <name>` and check Prometheus Targets UI for green status.
9. **If OIDC/IAM-gated (admin UI, restricted API):**
- Create app in Authentik: `core iam create-app "my-service" --slug my-service --redirect-uri "https://my-service.riotpiao.com/callback"`.
- Bind app to group: `core iam bind-app my-service <group>` (e.g., `grafana-admins` for admin-only UI).
- Retrieve credentials: `core iam describe-app my-service` (client ID, client secret).
- Deploy secret: `kubectl create secret generic <service>-oidc --from-literal=client-id=<ID> --from-literal=client-secret=<SECRET> -n <namespace>`.
- Reference secret in values.yaml: mount via `.spec.template.spec.containers[].env` or volumeMounts.
- See `core-cli-tools.md` § Access Control Tiers for Tier A (OIDC + RBAC) vs Tier B (network perimeter only).
10. **Verify service is live.**
- Pods: `kubectl get pods -n <namespace> -o wide` (all Running, 1/1 Ready).
- Metrics (if applicable): `kubectl get servicemonitor -A | grep <name>` and visit Prometheus Targets or Grafana dashboard.
- Endpoint: If publicly routed via Ingress, verify `/etc/hosts` entry (10.6.0.1 for WireGuard, 192.168.1.160 for LAN) and `curl https://my-service.riotpiao.com/health` (or equivalent health endpoint).
- Logs: `kubectl logs -n <namespace> <pod>` (no errors).
### Definition of Done (Per Service)
- [ ] Helm chart version pinned (~1.0 format in helmfile)
- [ ] All secrets in Vault (none in values.yaml or ConfigMap)
- [ ] `/metrics` endpoint exported (if applicable)
- [ ] ServiceMonitor resource created (if metrics exported)
- [ ] PrometheusRule with error/latency/SLO alerts (if metrics exported)
- [ ] Grafana dashboard (if metrics exported; 6-row template: Availability, Resources, Domain, Logs, SLO, Related)
- [ ] Ingress rule (if external access needed)
- [ ] OIDC integration via `core iam` (if UI component)
- [ ] Verified: `helmfile diff` clean, pods Running, dashboard live or `/metrics` returning 200
---
## Procedure C: Operate the Cluster (Node Health, Context, Cleanup)
1. **Daily health check.**
- Check auth: `core auth status` (if OK, node ops will work).
- List nodes: `core nodes`.
- For each node, check Talos state: `core status <ip>`.
- Check K8s nodes: `kubectl get nodes -o wide` (all Ready, no NotReady).
- Check pod pressure: `kubectl get nodes -o json | jq '.items[] | {name: .metadata.name, memory: .status.allocatable.memory, pods: .status.allocatable.pods}'`.
2. **Troubleshoot a specific node.**
- Get node IP: `core nodes` and note the IP.
- Check Talos services: `core services <ip>` (kubelet, etcd, controller should be running).
- Check service logs: `core logs <ip>` (main Talos daemon logs).
- Filter to specific service: `core log-svc <ip> kubelet` (kubelet logs only).
- Restart a service if needed: `core restart <ip> kubelet` (graceful kubelet restart).
3. **Pod cleanup (Failed, Evicted, Terminating pods).**
- Run `core pods clean` (scans all namespaces, removes stale pods).
- Verify: `kubectl get pods -A | grep -E "Failed|Evicted"` (should be empty).
4. **Switch kubectl context (when off-LAN, on WireGuard).**
- List available contexts: `core config kube-list`.
- Switch to WireGuard path (10.6.0.1:6443): `core config kube-use admin@homelab-cluster-1`.
- **Known limitation:** `core config use <talos-context>` doesn't map to WireGuard; use `kube-use` directly.
- Verify: `kubectl cluster-info` shows 10.6.0.1 (not 192.168.1.213).
5. **MinIO bucket operations (if managing data/backups).**
- List buckets: `core bucket list`.
- Upload file: `core bucket upload <bucket> <local-file>`.
- Download file: `core bucket download <bucket> <remote-file> -o <local-file>`.
- Delete file: `core bucket delete <bucket> <remote-file>`.
6. **Bootstrap or hardware runbooks (infrequent).**
- **Fresh cluster setup:** See README.md § Bootstrap Order (14 steps).
- **Adding a new Talos node:** See README.md § Adding Hardware.
- Do not re-explain those long procedures here; consult README.md directly.
---
## Notes
**Queue subsystem (Kafka/kmsvc/Temporal namespace auto-registration):** Already deployed and stable. If re-deploying:
- Primary deploy method: `helmfile apply -l namespace=sqs` (live from root helmfile).
- Alternate isolated iterate path: `k8s/sqs/helmfile.yaml.gotmpl` (not recommended for production).
- Planned future: GitOps via `k8s/sqs/argocd/` (companion repo, not yet active).
- **Critical rule:** Temporal namespace registration is automatic via `queue-operator`; never manually `temporal operator namespace create` for any namespace referenced by a Queue's `temporal.io/namespace` label. See `~/workplace/kmsvc-manage/CLAUDE.md` ("Temporal Namespace Registration") for the full rule and why.
**Shared/reusable service repositories:** If a service's Helm chart and container image live in a separate repository, they must be:
- Published as a public GitHub repository under the `Riotpiaole` organization.
- Images pushed to GHCR (`ghcr.io/riotpiaole/...`) for public pullability.
- Consult `coding-standards.md` § Shared/Reusable Repos for the full publishing rule.
---
## Cross-References
- **core-cli-tools.md:** Auth/secrets domain split, command inventory, when to use `core` vs `kubectl`.
- **coding-standards.md:** Helm naming conventions, `needs:` ordering rules, helmfile template syntax (`{{ env "VAR" }}` not `${VAR}`), Vault field=variable convention, shared-repo publishing rule.
- **infra-troubleshooting.md:** Quick patterns (CrashLoopBackOff, 503, helm stuck), gotchas, hard rules.
- **USAGE.md:** Exhaustive `core` command reference.
- **README.md:** Bootstrap order, hardware addition, example app walkthrough, 6-row Grafana dashboard template.
- **root TROUBLESHOOTING.md:** Generic Kubernetes SRE layer-before-tool methodology (10 diagnostic procedures).
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# MinIO S3-Compatible Object Storage
**Endpoint:** `https://minio.riotpiao.com` (console)
**API:** `minio.storage.svc.cluster.local:9000` (cluster-internal)
**Namespace:** `storage`
## When to Use
- **File uploads** — Images, documents, backups
- **Log backend** — Loki chunks storage
- **Vault unsealing** — Store unseal keys
- **CI/CD artifacts** — Build outputs, Docker layers cache
## Quick Start
**1. Access MinIO console:**
```bash
# Via browser: https://minio.riotpiao.com
# Credentials: MINIO_ROOT_USER / MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD (from .env)
# Or port-forward
make pf-minio # localhost:9001
```
**2. Create bucket:**
```bash
# Via AWS CLI
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=$MINIO_ROOT_USER
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=$MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD
aws s3 mb s3://my-bucket \
--endpoint-url https://minio.riotpiao.com \
--region homelab
# Or via console UI: Click "Create Bucket"
```
**3. Upload file:**
```bash
aws s3 cp /path/to/file.txt s3://my-bucket/ \
--endpoint-url https://minio.storage.svc.cluster.local:9000 \
--use-path-style
```
**4. List buckets:**
```bash
aws s3 ls --endpoint-url https://minio.storage.svc.cluster.local:9000
```
## Configuration
| Key | Value |
|-----|-------|
| Access key | `MINIO_ROOT_USER` (from .env) |
| Secret key | `MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD` (from .env) |
| Cluster API | `minio.storage.svc.cluster.local:9000` |
| Console port | `9001` |
| Replication | 3-node site-replication (az-a ↔ az-b ↔ az-c) |
| Buckets (system) | `loki-chunks`, `loki-ruler`, `vault-backups` |
## Common Patterns
**Loki log backend (auto-configured):**
```yaml
# k8s/logging/loki-values.yaml
loki:
storage:
s3:
endpoint: minio.storage.svc.cluster.local:9000
buckets: loki-chunks
secretAccessKey: $MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD
accessKeyId: $MINIO_ROOT_USER
```
**Application usage (Go/Python/Node):**
```go
import "github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
client, _ := minio.New("minio.storage.svc.cluster.local:9000", &minio.Options{
Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4(os.Getenv("MINIO_ROOT_USER"), os.Getenv("MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD"), ""),
Secure: false, // cluster-internal (no TLS)
})
// Upload
client.FPutObject(ctx, "my-bucket", "file.txt", "/path/to/file.txt", minio.PutObjectOptions{})
// Download
client.FGetObject(ctx, "my-bucket", "file.txt", "/tmp/file.txt", minio.GetObjectOptions{})
```
**Vault backup bucket:**
```bash
# Vault stores unseal keys in s3://vault-backups
# Auto-managed by helmfile; no manual action needed
```
## Monitoring
**Grafana dashboard:** `svc-minio`
**Key metrics:**
- `minio_disk_drive_free_bytes` — available space
- `minio_bucket_usage_object_count` — objects per bucket
- `minio_bucket_usage_total_bytes` — total size per bucket
**Site replication status:**
```bash
# Port-forward to MinIO pod
k port-forward -n storage pod/minio-0 9000:9000 &
# Check replication
mc alias set local http://localhost:9000 $MINIO_ROOT_USER $MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD
mc admin replicate status local
```
## Authentication (Cluster-Internal)
**From pods (cluster-internal):**
```bash
# Use credentials from Secret or env var
export MINIO_ENDPOINT=minio.storage.svc.cluster.local:9000
export MINIO_ACCESS_KEY=$MINIO_ROOT_USER
export MINIO_SECRET_KEY=$MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD
aws s3 ls --endpoint-url http://$MINIO_ENDPOINT --use-path-style
```
**External access (HTTPS via Ingress):**
```bash
# Console: https://minio.riotpiao.com (port 9001)
# API: Use AWS CLI with --endpoint-url https://minio.riotpiao.com:9000
```
## Troubleshooting
**Bucket creation fails:**
```bash
# Check MinIO pod logs
k logs -n storage pod/minio-0 | grep -i error
# Verify storage space
k get pvc -n storage
```
**Site replication lag:**
```bash
# Check if all 3 nodes are healthy
k get pods -n storage -l app=minio
# If one node is down, site replication queues changes (eventually consistent)
```
**Access denied:**
```bash
# Verify credentials in .env
echo $MINIO_ROOT_USER $MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD
# If credentials rotated, update Secret
k patch secret -n storage minio-root-credentials \
--type merge -p '{"stringData":{"MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD":"newpass"}}'
```
See `/TROUBLESHOOTING.md` for full incident guide.
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# SQS-like Message Queue Service (kmsvc)
**Endpoint:** `https://kmsvc.riotpiao.com` (REST + gRPC-Gateway)
**Internal:** `kmsvc-management-service.sqs.svc.cluster.local:8080`
**Namespace:** `sqs`
## When to Use
- **Decouple services** — Producer doesn't wait for consumer
- **Async jobs** — Fire-and-forget processing (batch, email, webhooks)
- **FIFO ordering** — Guarantee message order within `MessageGroupId`
- **Durable delivery** — At-least-once (messages in Kafka, replicated 3×)
## Quick Start
**1. Create a queue:**
```bash
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: kmsvc.io/v1
kind: Queue
metadata:
name: orders
spec:
fifoQueue: false # standard queue
visibilityTimeoutSeconds: 30 # re-deliver if not acked
messageRetentionPeriodSeconds: 345600 # 4 days
partitionsPerShard: 6
maxReceiveCount: 5 # move to DLQ after 5 fails
EOF
```
**2. Send message:**
```bash
curl -X POST https://kmsvc.riotpiao.com/v1/queues/orders/messages \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
-d '{
"body": "{\"order_id\":123,\"total\":99.99}",
"attributes": {"source":"web","priority":"high"}
}'
```
**3. Receive message:**
```bash
curl "https://kmsvc.riotpiao.com/v1/queues/orders/messages?max_number_of_messages=10&wait_time_seconds=20" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN"
# Response:
# {
# "messages": [
# {
# "message_id": "abc-123",
# "receipt_handle": "...",
# "body": "{...}",
# "attributes": {...},
# "receive_count": 1
# }
# ]
# }
```
**4. Acknowledge (delete) message:**
```bash
curl -X DELETE "https://kmsvc.riotpiao.com/v1/queues/orders/messages/$receipt_handle" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN"
```
## Configuration
| Key | Value |
|-----|-------|
| Kafka bootstrap | `kmsvc-kafka-bootstrap.sqs.svc.cluster.local:9092` |
| Redis | `kmsvc-redis-master.sqs.svc.cluster.local:6379` |
| Topic naming | `kmsvc.{queueName}.shard-{id}` |
| Replication | 3 replicas, min.insync.replicas=2 |
| Retention | 4 days (configurable per queue) |
## Common Patterns
**Batch processing:**
```bash
for i in {1..100}; do
curl -X POST https://kmsvc.riotpiao.com/v1/queues/jobs/messages \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
-d "{\"body\":\"task-$i\"}" &
done
wait
```
**FIFO queue (order guaranteed per group):**
```yaml
apiVersion: kmsvc.io/v1
kind: Queue
metadata:
name: checkout-fifo
spec:
fifoQueue: true
visibilityTimeoutSeconds: 60
partitionsPerShard: 1
```
**Dead-letter queue (failed messages):**
```yaml
apiVersion: kmsvc.io/v1
kind: Queue
metadata:
name: orders-dlq
spec:
fifoQueue: false
---
apiVersion: kmsvc.io/v1
kind: Queue
metadata:
name: orders
spec:
fifoQueue: false
maxReceiveCount: 3
deadLetterTargetQueue: orders-dlq # auto-route failures here
```
## Monitoring
**Grafana dashboard:** `svc-kmsvc` (automatically loaded)
**Key metrics:**
- `kmsvc_messages_sent_total` — total sent
- `kmsvc_messages_received_total` — total received
- `kmsvc_queue_depth` — pending messages per queue
- `kmsvc_message_visibility_timeout_seconds` — visibility window
**Redis in-flight tracking:**
```bash
# Connect to Redis
k port-forward -n sqs svc/redis 6379:6379 &
redis-cli
# Check pending messages
KEYS "kmsvc:pending:orders:*"
KEYS "kmsvc:inflight:*" | wc -l
```
## Authentication
**Requires JWT from Authentik:**
```bash
# Get token (device code flow)
core secrets login
# Use token
export JWT_TOKEN=$(core get cluster/kmsvc/jwt-token --key jwt-token)
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" https://kmsvc.riotpiao.com/v1/queues
```
## Integration Example
**Story Crater backend consumer:**
```go
// Receive messages
messages, err := kmsvc.ReceiveMessage(ctx, &kmsvc.ReceiveMessageRequest{
QueueName: "story-crater",
MaxNumberOfMessages: 10,
WaitTimeSeconds: 20,
})
// Process
for _, msg := range messages.Messages {
processMessage(msg.Body)
// Acknowledge on success
kmsvc.DeleteMessage(ctx, &kmsvc.DeleteMessageRequest{
QueueName: "story-crater",
ReceiptHandle: msg.ReceiptHandle,
})
}
```
## Troubleshooting
**Queue stuck / high lag:**
```bash
# Check Kafka broker status
k exec -n sqs pod/kmsvc-kafka-0 -- kafka-broker-api-versions.sh --bootstrap-server localhost:9092
# Inspect queue topics
k exec -n sqs pod/kmsvc-kafka-0 -- kafka-topics.sh --bootstrap-server localhost:9092 --list | grep orders
```
**Messages not being consumed:**
- Check `maxReceiveCount` (may be routing to DLQ)
- Verify consumer has `ReceiveMessage` permission (JWT scope)
- Check Redis: `KEYS "kmsvc:fifo_lock:orders:*"` (may be blocked by visibility timeout)
See `/TROUBLESHOOTING.md` for full incident guide.
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# Vault: Secret Management & JWT Auth
**Vault:** `https://vault.riotpiao.com`
**Internal:** `vault.iam.svc.cluster.local:8200`
**Namespace:** `iam`
## When to Use
- **Store secrets** — Database passwords, API keys, TLS certs
- **Rotate credentials** — Auto-rotate, track rotation history
- **JWT validation** — Verify tokens from Authentik, no external call needed
- **Audit trail** — Who accessed what secret, when
## Quick Start
**1. Login to Vault:**
```bash
# Browser: https://vault.riotpiao.com
# Auth method: OIDC → "Sign in with Authentik" (federated)
# Or: Device code → core secrets login (CLI)
# Via CLI (device code flow)
core secrets login
# → Opens browser, approve device code
# → Token cached in ~/.talos/vault
```
**2. Store a secret:**
```bash
# Field name = variable name (SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE)
core put cluster/ANTHROPIC_API_KEY ANTHROPIC_API_KEY="sk-..."
core put cluster/STORY_CRATER_DB_PASS STORY_CRATER_DB_PASS="dbpass123"
```
**3. Retrieve a secret:**
```bash
# Always use --key flag
core get cluster/ANTHROPIC_API_KEY --key ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
# → sk-...
# Full secret as JSON
core get cluster/ANTHROPIC_API_KEY --json
```
**4. Load into shell (helmfile, scripts):**
```bash
vsource .env
# → Expands empty vars from Vault (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=)
# → Passes hardcoded vars as-is (DEBUG=true)
helmfile diff
helmfile apply
```
## Vault Paths (KV v2)
**Naming convention:** `cluster/<VARIABLE_NAME>`
```
cluster/
├── ANTHROPIC_API_KEY # third-party API
├── STORY_CRATER_DB_PASS # database password
├── MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD # MinIO credentials
├── AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD # initial admin pass
├── iam/
│ ├── federation # Authentik OIDC app config
│ ├── roles/admin # RBAC role definitions
│ ├── services/grafana # OAuth2 client info
│ ├── agents/ci-bot # machine credentials
│ └── bindings/alice # user→role mappings
└── kubernetes/
├── ingress-tls # TLS cert private keys
└── pull-secrets # Docker registry creds
```
## Common Patterns
**Store generated secret immediately (keeps it out of shell history):**
```bash
# Generate & store in one command
core put cluster/GRAFANA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET \
GRAFANA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
```
**Use in Kubernetes Secret:**
```bash
# Create Secret using Vault secret
kubectl create secret generic grafana-oidc \
--from-literal=client-secret="$(core get cluster/GRAFANA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET --key GRAFANA_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET)" \
-n logging
```
**Rotate credentials safely:**
```bash
# 1. Generate new secret
NEW_PASS=$(openssl rand -base64 24)
# 2. Store in Vault
core put cluster/OLD_DB_PASS OLD_DB_PASS="$NEW_PASS"
# 3. Update database user
psql -h ddb-cluster-rw.ddb.svc.cluster.local -U postgres \
-c "ALTER USER story_crater PASSWORD '$NEW_PASS';"
# 4. Update Kubernetes Secret
kubectl patch secret db-credentials -n story-crater-backend \
--type merge -p "{\"stringData\":{\"password\":\"$NEW_PASS\"}}"
# 5. Restart pods to pick up new Secret
k rollout restart -n story-crater-backend deployment/app
```
**JWT token from CLI:**
```bash
# After device code login
core secrets login
# Token is cached and auto-renewed
# Use for API calls
VAULT_TOKEN=$(cat ~/.talos/vault)
curl -H "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" \
https://vault.iam.svc.cluster.local:8200/v1/secret/data/cluster/ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
```
## Monitoring
**Vault status:**
```bash
# Check if sealed
core status
# If sealed (disaster recovery):
# See /TROUBLESHOOTING.md § Vault Sealed
```
**Audit log (who accessed what):**
```bash
# Enable audit logging (already enabled by helmfile)
# Logs stored in Loki under vault namespace
# View recent access
core audit log --limit 50
# Export for compliance
core audit export --format json > vault-audit.json
```
## Security Rules
✅ **DO:**
- Store ALL secrets in Vault (never .env in git)
- Use field name = variable name
- Always use `--key` flag when retrieving
- Rotate credentials on schedule (quarterly)
- Review audit log for anomalies
❌ **DON'T:**
- Commit `.env` with real secrets (only `.env.example`)
- Use positional arguments (must use `--key`)
- Share Vault root token
- Store secrets in pod env (use Secret volumes)
## Troubleshooting
**Cannot login (Authentik OIDC fails):**
```bash
# Check Authentik is running
k get pods -n iam -l app=authentik
# Verify OIDC app in Authentik console
# Applications → Vault OIDC → Check client ID/secret
# Restart Vault to re-sync OIDC config
k rollout restart -n iam statefulset/vault
```
**Vault is sealed:**
```bash
# Check status
core status
# If sealed, use unseal keys (stored in MinIO backup)
# See /TROUBLESHOOTING.md § Vault Sealed for recovery steps
```
**Secret not found:**
```bash
# Verify path exists
core list cluster
# Check secret name (case-sensitive)
core get cluster/anthropic_api_key --key anthropic_api_key # won't work
core get cluster/ANTHROPIC_API_KEY --key ANTHROPIC_API_KEY # correct
```
**vsource not expanding secrets:**
```bash
# Verify .env has empty value
grep ANTHROPIC_API_KEY .env
# → Should be: ANTHROPIC_API_KEY= (empty, not a value)
# Verify Vault is accessible
core get cluster/ANTHROPIC_API_KEY --key ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
# → Should return secret
# Run vsource explicitly
vsource .env
echo $ANTHROPIC_API_KEY # should be populated
```
See `/TROUBLESHOOTING.md` for full incident guide.
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Implement **Stage 1 only** of the approved plan at
`/Users/rockliang/.claude/plans/fluttering-cooking-thunder.md`. Read that file first — it is
the spec. Do not implement Stage 2, 3 or 4.
## Already done, do not redo
Stage 0 passed. The Forgejo registry returns distinct, correctly-ordered image
creation timestamps, so `newest-build` is viable:
```
rock/api-gateway v0.0.0 2026-08-20T05:19:48.655Z
rock/api-gateway v0.1.0 2026-08-20T06:57:11.943Z
rock/api-gateway v0.1.1 2026-08-20T07:10:13.093Z
```
Note the images are multi-arch OCI indexes: reading `created` means descending
index -> amd64 manifest -> config blob.
## Scope: Stage 1 = A1, A2, A4, A6, B, C1
- **A1** — in `~/workplace/homelab`, replace the per-repo Forgejo entry in
`k8s/argocd/projects/homelab-project.yaml` `sourceRepos` with a wildcard
`https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/rock/*`.
- **A2** — add an Argo `Application` at sync-wave `-1` that syncs
`k8s/argocd/projects/`. Nothing owns that directory today, which is why the
AppProject only ever reaches the cluster by hand.
- **A4** — Forgejo webhook to `https://argocd.riotpiao.com/api/webhook` with a
shared secret stored in `argocd-secret` (SOPS/ksops). Register it on
`rock/homelab` and `rock/homelab-frontend`.
- **A6** — add the `forgejo-registry` dockerconfigjson pull secret for any
namespace that needs it, as a new `*.enc.yaml` listed in
`k8s/argocd/secrets/secret-generator.yaml`. It currently exists only in `api`.
- **B + C1** — in `~/workplace/homelab-frontend`: delete the dead
`.github/workflows/ci.yml`, add `.forgejo/workflows/ci.yaml` and
`.forgejo/workflows/build.yaml`, and add a multi-stage distroless `Dockerfile`
(none exists today).
Stage 1 stops before Argo CD Image Updater. Do **not** install it and do not add
image-updater annotations — that is Stage 2.
## Hard constraints
- **`runs-on: docker`.** That is the runner's only registered label. The existing
`.github/workflows/ci.yml` uses `ubuntu-latest`, which is exactly why it has
never executed once.
- **No git tags, ever.** Image tag is the commit short SHA: `$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)`.
Do not use `git describe`, do not create or push tags, do not use `latest`.
- **Build workflow only builds and pushes.** No manifest write-back, no git push
from CI, no `[skip ci]` guard needed.
- **GitOps only.** No `kubectl apply`, no `helm upgrade`, no local `terraform apply`.
`kubectl --dry-run=server` and read-only `kubectl get`/`logs` are fine.
- **Never `git reset --hard`.**
- Push directly to `main`, no PRs, no branches. The cluster repo has three
remotes — `origin` is Forgejo, `github` is GitHub. Push to both; they are
currently in sync at `43483da`.
- Match surrounding file style. This repo comments the *why* on non-obvious
config, and `kustomization.yaml` uses explicit `resources:` allowlists — a file
you add and forget to list is silently dropped.
## Verify before claiming done
- `kubectl kustomize` each directory you touch.
- `kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f` every manifest you add or change.
- Confirm the AppProject wildcard is live:
`kubectl -n argocd get appproject homelab -o jsonpath='{.spec.sourceRepos}'`
- Push an empty commit to `homelab-frontend` and confirm the build job actually
runs on the Forgejo runner and pushes `forgejo.riotpiao.com/rock/api-gateway:<short-sha>`.
A workflow that does not trigger is the single most likely failure here.
- Report what you verified with real command output, not assertions. If a step
fails, say so and stop rather than working around it.
Kubeconfig: `/Users/rockliang/workplace/homelab/cluster-config/kubeconfig`.