chore: initial commit of Go API gateway
CI / Test (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / Vet (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / Build (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / Security (govulncheck) (push) Canceled after 0s

Baseline for the Kong replacement on api.riotpiao.com. Brings the working
tree under version control for the first time: gateway source, the task
board that drives the agent runs, test fixtures, and K8s manifests.

Anchor the gateway ignore rule to the repo root. Unanchored, "gateway"
also matched the cmd/gateway/ source directory, so the program entrypoint
was excluded from every commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Story Crater Bot
2026-08-19 20:54:34 -07:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
commit 058f11cf2b
109 changed files with 8992 additions and 0 deletions
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name: CI
on:
push:
branches: [main, master]
pull_request:
branches: [main, master]
jobs:
test:
name: Test
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: '1.25'
- name: Run tests with race detector
run: go test -race ./...
vet:
name: Vet
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: '1.25'
- name: Run go vet
run: go vet ./...
build:
name: Build
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: '1.25'
- name: Build static binary
run: CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o gateway ./cmd/gateway
- name: Upload binary
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: gateway
path: gateway
retention-days: 1
govulncheck:
name: Security (govulncheck)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: '1.25'
- name: Run govulncheck
run: go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest && govulncheck ./...
continue-on-error: true
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# Binaries
/bin/
/dist/
# Anchored: an unanchored "gateway" also matches the cmd/gateway/ source directory.
/gateway
# Go
*.test
*.out
coverage.*
go.work
go.work.sum
# Local config and secrets — never commit
.env
*.local.yaml
*.local.yml
# Editor
.DS_Store
.idea/
*.swp
.task-runs
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# homelab-frontend
A Go API gateway for the homelab cluster. One capability per subdomain, one auth
implementation, one routing table.
Replaces Kong OSS entirely — see
[ADR-0001](docs/adr/ADR-0001-retire-kong-for-go-gateway.md) for why, and
[docs/MIGRATION-kong.md](docs/MIGRATION-kong.md) for the cutover.
## Position in the stack
```
browser / SDK ──▶ Cloudflare ──▶ ingress-nginx (TLS, edge)
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│ homelab-frontend │
│ routing · authn · budgets │
└──────────────┬──────────────┘
/v1 /sqs /workflow /cluster
│ │ │ │
▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
llm-serving kmsvc/Kafka temporal atlas
(predictors) (sqs ns) (temporal ns) (riotpiao-backend)
└──── in-cluster Services ────┘
```
ingress-nginx keeps TLS and the edge. The gateway owns everything after it.
Backend services are reached through the gateway rather than published
individually — a single place for authentication, budgets, timeouts and
observability, and a single hostname surface to reason about.
## Capability map
One host, one path prefix per capability.
| Prefix on `api.riotpiao.com` | Backs onto | Status |
|---|---|---|
| `/v1/*` | `llm-serving` predictors (vLLM, Ollama, TEI) | migrating off Kong |
| `/sqs/*` | kmsvc management-service + Kafka/Strimzi (`sqs` ns) | future |
| `/workflow/*` | Temporal (`temporal` ns) | future |
| `/cluster/*` | atlas — cluster topology / Argo delivery (separate repo) | future |
| `/db/*` | CloudNativePG, MinIO, monitoring/metrics reads | future |
`/v1/*` is reserved for the OpenAI-compatible surface. An SDK expects
`/v1/chat/completions` at the base URL, so that prefix cannot be repurposed.
Paths rather than subdomains: one DNS record, one tunnel hostname, one Ingress.
Promoting a prefix to its own subdomain later is additive and can run alongside the
path — the reverse is not, because clients hardcode hostnames.
atlas lives in its own repo (`riotpiao-backend`) and keeps its own informers and
RBAC. The gateway routes to it; it does not absorb it. Cluster-read permissions
stay out of the public edge process.
## Design rules
1. **Standard protocol shapes.** `POST /v1/chat/completions` selects its model from
the request body, like every OpenAI-compatible server. No path-per-model, no
bespoke client configuration. Kong OSS could not do this; that limitation does
not survive into the replacement.
2. **Bearer tokens, validated against Authentik.** JWKS is fetched at runtime and
cached, so key rotation needs no runbook and no pinned PEM.
3. **Policy lives where the state is.** GPU slot semaphores, per-caller budgets,
queue depth and disconnect propagation are application concerns. They belong
here, not in a proxy plugin.
4. **Streaming is first-class.** SSE and WebSocket pass through unbuffered, and a
client disconnect cancels the upstream request rather than orphaning it.
5. **The gateway holds no cluster credentials.** It proxies to services that do.
## Layout
```
cmd/gateway/ entrypoint
internal/
auth/ Authentik OIDC, JWKS cache, service-account tokens
llm/ model registry, body-based dispatch, upstream map
queue/ sqs.riotpiao.com surface
workflow/ workflow.riotpiao.com surface
proxy/ reverse proxy, streaming, timeouts, disconnect propagation
config/ upstream + route configuration
observability/ Prometheus metrics, structured logging
deploy/
base/ Kubernetes manifests
argocd/ Argo Application
docs/adr/ architecture decision records
tasks/ task board — see tasks/INDEX.md
testdata/ fixtures for offline tests
```
## Local development
The gateway must be runnable with no cluster, no kubeconfig and no credentials, so
that changes can be verified in a closed loop before touching live traffic.
Upstreams are configuration, so pointing them at local stubs is the whole
mechanism. See [tasks/INDEX.md](tasks/INDEX.md).
## Status
Scaffolded 2026-08-19. Nothing is wired yet. Kong is still serving live traffic on
`api.riotpiao.com`.
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# homelab-frontend — Requirements
The contract for the Go API gateway that replaces Kong OSS on `*.riotpiao.com`.
Companion documents:
- [docs/adr/ADR-0001-retire-kong-for-go-gateway.md](docs/adr/ADR-0001-retire-kong-for-go-gateway.md) — why Kong is being retired
- [docs/MIGRATION-kong.md](docs/MIGRATION-kong.md) — exact inventory of what Kong does today and the cutover order
- [tasks/INDEX.md](tasks/INDEX.md) — the task board
All cluster facts below were verified live against context `admin@homelab-cluster`
on 2026-08-19. Re-verify before relying on any number.
---
## 0. Invariants
These hold for every surface. A change that breaks one of these is a design change,
not an implementation detail.
- **G1** — ingress-nginx owns TLS and the edge. The gateway never terminates TLS.
- **G2** — The gateway holds no Kubernetes credentials. It proxies to services that
do. Cluster-read permissions stay in atlas, out of the public edge process.
- **G3** — Public surfaces use standard protocol shapes. If an OpenAI SDK cannot
call it unmodified, the design is wrong.
- **G4** — Streaming is unbuffered end to end, and a client disconnect cancels the
upstream request rather than orphaning it.
- **G5** — Authentication is Bearer-token, validated against Authentik via JWKS
fetched at runtime. No pinned public keys, no rotation runbook.
- **G6** — Every route's timeout, body cap and concurrency limit is explicit in
configuration. No silent defaults.
- **G7** — All deployment flows through git and Argo. No `kubectl apply`, no
`helm upgrade`, no local `terraform apply`.
---
## 1. Runtime and configuration
### 1.1 Process
Single static Go binary. Reads configuration at startup, serves HTTP, exits cleanly
on SIGTERM after draining in-flight requests.
Must run with **no cluster, no kubeconfig and no credentials** so that behaviour can
be verified in a closed loop before touching live traffic. Upstreams are
configuration; pointing them at local stubs is the entire mechanism. This is a hard
requirement, not a convenience — see §7.
### 1.2 Configuration
Route and upstream configuration is declarative and loaded at startup. It must
express, per upstream: address, path rewrite, connect/read/write timeouts, maximum
body size, and whether the route requires authentication.
Configuration errors fail startup loudly. A gateway that starts with a silently
dropped route is worse than one that refuses to start.
**Configuration lives in git**, mounted as a ConfigMap and synced by Argo. Not a
CRD. A CRD would require the gateway to watch the API server, which needs RBAC and
contradicts G2 — and CRD-driven routing is precisely the indirection being retired
with Kong, where the routing table was split across six `KongPlugin` CRs, seven
Ingresses and a Helm values file.
A CRD earns its keep when someone other than the repo owner must register routes.
That is not true here. If it becomes true, the additive answer is a controller that
renders this same ConfigMap — the gateway stays credential-free either way.
### 1.3 Health
- `GET /healthz` — liveness, no upstream checks, always cheap.
- `GET /readyz` — readiness; may fail while configuration is invalid or JWKS has
never been successfully fetched.
Neither requires authentication.
---
## 2. Proxy core
### 2.1 Reverse proxying
Standard reverse proxy to configured upstreams. Connection reuse across requests.
Hop-by-hop headers stripped correctly. `X-Forwarded-*` set from the nginx-supplied
values, not fabricated.
### 2.2 Streaming
SSE and chunked responses pass through without buffering. Tokens must reach the
client as the upstream emits them, not on completion.
WebSocket upgrade must work — `agent-pod/console` depends on it.
### 2.3 Disconnect propagation
When a client disconnects, the upstream request is cancelled immediately. This is
load-bearing: an orphaned generation holds a vLLM sequence slot, and there are only
eight in the cluster.
### 2.4 Timeouts
Per-route, explicit. Current Kong values, which are deliberate and must be preserved
unless changed knowingly:
| Route class | connect | read | write |
|---|---|---|---|
| chat | 10s | 1h | 1h |
| embeddings, rerank | 10s | 10m | 10m |
The 1-hour read timeout exists because a 32B model on a Volta GPU routinely exceeds
60s. Any shorter application-level cap must be enforced *by the gateway's own
logic*, not by shortening the proxy timeout — otherwise long legitimate generations
truncate mid-stream.
---
## 3. LLM surfaces — `api.riotpiao.com`
Two protocol dialects, permanently. Both translate into one dialect-neutral canonical
request, and both pass through **one shared slot controller** before reaching a
predictor.
| Prefix | Dialect | Primary client |
|---|---|---|
| `/v1/*` | OpenAI-compatible | pi, generic OpenAI SDKs |
| `/llm/*` | Anthropic Messages | the riotpiao frontend (first-party only) |
```
/v1/* (OpenAI) /llm/* (Anthropic)
| |
+-----------+------------+
v
canonical request dialect-neutral
v
slot controller keyed by UPSTREAM, not by route
v
reasoning-predictor / ornith-predictor
```
**The slot controller is keyed by upstream and shared across dialects.** Per-dialect
semaphores are wrong: the 8 sequence slots are physical, so two independent gates
would each believe they were within budget while together exceeding it. Requests from
both surfaces contend for the same slots and the same queue, in arrival order.
Dispatch, budgets, logging and metrics all operate on the canonical request. Adding a
third dialect later must not require touching the controller.
### 3.1 Body-based model dispatch
`POST /v1/chat/completions` selects its upstream from the request body's `model`
field. This is the single most important requirement in this document: it is the
capability Kong OSS lacked, and the reason the gateway exists.
Unknown or missing `model` is a client error with a useful message listing valid
values — not a 500, and not a silent fallback to a default model.
### 3.2 Upstream map
Verified live. `served-model-name` values are what clients send.
| `model` in body | Upstream Service | Engine |
|---|---|---|
| `reasoning` | `reasoning-predictor.llm-serving:80` | vLLM, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B |
| `ornith:35b` | `ornith-predictor.llm-serving:80` | Ollama |
| `qwen2.5:3b-instruct` | `ornith-predictor.llm-serving:80` | Ollama, same pods |
| `nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v2-moe` | `embeddings-predictor.llm-serving:80` | TEI |
| `BAAI/bge-reranker-base` | `reranker-predictor.llm-serving:80` | TEI |
`reasoning` runs 2 replicas × `--max-num-seqs=4` = **8 concurrent sequence slots
total**, `--max-model-len=16384`, `--reasoning-parser=deepseek_r1`,
`--enable-auto-tool-choice --tool-call-parser=hermes`.
Note `ornith:35b` and `qwen2.5:3b-instruct` share pods; both stay resident via
`OLLAMA_MAX_LOADED_MODELS=2` and `OLLAMA_KEEP_ALIVE=-1`, so dispatching between them
does not trigger a model swap.
### 3.3 Path rewriting
Upstreams expect canonical paths. `/v1/chat/completions` and `/v1/embeddings` pass
through unchanged. Rerank is the exception: TEI serves `/rerank`, not `/v1/rerank`,
so that route rewrites.
### 3.4 Legacy path aliases
`/v1/{reasoning,ornith,qwen}/chat/completions` must keep working during cutover —
pi is a live caller. They behave exactly as the canonical endpoint with `model`
forced to the corresponding value, overriding whatever the body says.
These are temporary. They exist to make the cutover reversible, and are removed once
callers have migrated.
### 3.5 `GET /v1/models`
Derived from the configured upstream map, never hardcoded. Kong served a static
list, and its own manifest flags that the list can drift from what the engines
actually serve. The gateway's list must be incapable of disagreeing with what
routing will accept.
OpenAI list shape: `{"object":"list","data":[{"id","object":"model","owned_by","created"}]}`.
### 3.6 Behaviour to preserve
Verified against the live endpoint:
- The upstream returns `reasoning_content` separately from `content` for the
`reasoning` model. Pass both through untouched.
- Tool calling works with explicit `tool_choice`, and is unreliable with
`tool_choice: auto` on the R1-distill model. The gateway does not compensate for
this — it is a model property, not a gateway concern. Do not add retries or
rewriting to work around it.
---
## 4. Authentication — Authentik
### 4.1 Current state
**The model API is unauthenticated today.** Confirmed live: `/v1/reasoning/chat/completions`
answers with no credentials.
Kong's `key-auth` was retired because it accepts a raw `apikey:` header but rejects
`Authorization: Bearer`, which hard-blocks every OpenAI-compatible client. See
`~/workplace/homelab/k8s/apps/api/model-auth.yaml`.
### 4.2 Requirement
Bearer tokens in `Authorization`, validated against Authentik
(`https://authentik.riotpiao.com`) by fetching and caching JWKS at runtime.
Key rotation must be handled by refetching JWKS, not by pinned PEMs. The
pinned-`rsa_public_key` approach in `AUTH-PLAN.md` and its rotation runbook exist
only to route around a Kong OSS limitation and must not be carried forward.
Service accounts obtain tokens via `client_credentials` against Authentik's token
endpoint.
### 4.3 Rollout
Auth ships behind a flag, defaulting off, and is enabled deliberately.
Enabling it breaks every current caller until they hold a token — pi included, whose
`models.json` currently sends a `customHeaders: {apikey: ...}` block that will need
replacing with a Bearer token.
### 4.4 Authorization
Beyond authentication, a token must be checked for the right to invoke the
capability it is calling. A token minted for queue access should not invoke a GPU.
---
## 5. Rate limiting and budgets
No `rate-limiting` plugin exists anywhere in the cluster today — this is net new
work, not a migration. Verified: six Kong plugins exist, none is `rate-limiting`.
Requirements, in priority order:
1. **GPU slot protection.** `reasoning` has 8 total sequence slots. Concurrent
in-flight requests to it must be capped below that, leaving operator headroom.
Excess requests queue up to a bounded depth, then are rejected with a retryable
status.
2. **Per-caller budgets.** Identified callers get a request budget over a window.
3. **Body size caps**, per route.
Rejections use RFC 9457 `application/problem+json` and set `Retry-After` where a
retry time is knowable.
---
## 6. Observability
Kong's cluster-wide `prometheus` plugin is being retired. The gateway must expose at
least equivalent signal or observability regresses at cutover: request rate,
latency, status codes, bandwidth, and upstream health, labelled by route and
upstream.
Gateway-specific signals that Kong could not provide, and which are the reason for
several requirements above: in-flight requests per upstream, queue depth, GPU slot
occupancy, and rejections by reason.
Structured logging. Every rejected request is logged with the reason. No secrets, no
tokens, no request bodies in logs.
---
## 7. Local development and verification
An agent must be able to close a change/verify loop with no cluster, no kubeconfig
and no credentials. This is a hard requirement because it determines whether work can
proceed unattended.
Concretely: it must be possible to start the gateway locally, point it at stub
upstreams, issue requests, and assert on the responses — including streaming
responses and client disconnects.
Verification of any API-shaped task means asserting on the **actual HTTP response**:
status, headers, and body. "It compiles" and "it starts" are not verification.
Parity with Kong is verified by comparing gateway and Kong responses for the same
request, for every route in the migration inventory, before cutover.
---
## 8. Deployment
Container: distroless or scratch, `runAsNonRoot`, read-only root filesystem, all
capabilities dropped, `seccompProfile: RuntimeDefault`, no shell.
Image tags are commit SHAs, never `:latest` — Argo's `selfHeal` cannot roll out a
mutable tag reliably.
NetworkPolicy: egress only to the upstreams it proxies plus Authentik; ingress from
`ingress-nginx` only.
Deployed as an Argo Application in the `homelab-root` GitOps repo. Verified live:
zero Argo Applications anywhere in the cluster source from any Forgejo URL, so
`github.com/Riotpiaole/riotpiao.homelab.com` is authoritative.
---
## 9. Capability surface — path-based
Every capability is a path prefix on the single host `api.riotpiao.com`. One DNS
record, one Cloudflare tunnel hostname, one nginx Ingress, one Service.
| Prefix | Backs onto | Status |
|---|---|---|
| `/v1/*` | `llm-serving` predictors | v1 — **reserved**, see below |
| `/sqs/*` | kmsvc management-service, Kafka/Strimzi (`sqs` ns) | future |
| `/workflow/*` | Temporal (`temporal` ns) | future |
| `/cluster/*` | atlas, separate repo `riotpiao-backend` | future |
| `/db/*` | CloudNativePG, MinIO, monitoring reads | future |
**`/v1/*` is reserved for the OpenAI-compatible surface and nothing else.** G3 pins
it: an SDK expects `/v1/chat/completions` at the base URL, so that prefix can never
be repurposed or nested. Every other capability gets its own prefix that cannot
collide with a current or future OpenAI path.
Subdomains are deliberately *not* used. Paths keep hostname configuration to a
single entry — and hostname configuration is the demonstrated failure mode here, as
the unresolved apex 403 shows. Promoting a prefix to its own subdomain later is an
additive host rule that can run alongside the path; the reverse is not, because
clients hardcode hostnames.
Notes carried from the cluster:
- Temporal namespace registration is automatic via queue-operator, never manual.
- `management-service` already exposes gRPC at `kmsvc.riotpiao.com`; the `/sqs`
prefix is a new surface, not a replacement for it.
- atlas keeps its own informers and RBAC. The gateway proxies to it and holds no
cluster credentials of its own (G2).
- `/db/*` read surfaces need particular care — see G2 before designing them.
---
## 10. Known cluster facts worth not rediscovering
- `kmsvc-redis-master.sqs:6379` has **no authentication**`ALLOW_EMPTY_PASSWORD=yes`,
TLS off. Any workload with network reach has full unauthenticated read/write. A
NetworkPolicy is the only control.
- `reasoning-predictor` listens on port **80**, not 8080.
- `prometheus-operated.monitoring` is **headless** (ClusterIP None) — egress policies
need pod selectors, not ClusterIPs.
- `agent-pod/console` is publicly routed, unauthenticated, accepts free-form prompts
into a shell-capable container, and serves a WebSocket. Putting it behind gateway
auth is a security fix, not merely a port.
- Eight `*.example.com` hosts exist on istio-class Ingresses in `llm-serving`. KServe
defaults, not public, out of scope — do not mistake them for gateway routes.
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package main
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
"os"
"os/signal"
"syscall"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/config"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/server"
)
func main() {
// Load configuration
cfg, err := config.Load()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "failed to load config: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
// Determine if auth is enabled by checking if any route requires it
authEnabled := false
for _, route := range cfg.Routes {
if route.Upstream.AuthRequired {
authEnabled = true
break
}
}
// Create a basic handler (will be replaced with real routing later)
upstreamHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "not found")
})
// Create server with health checker
srv := server.New(cfg.ListenAddr, cfg.ShutdownTimeout, nil)
// Initialize health checker with config validity and auth status
healthChecker := server.NewHealthChecker(true, authEnabled)
srv.SetHealthChecker(healthChecker)
// Create router that handles health endpoints and passes others to upstream
router := server.NewRouter(healthChecker, upstreamHandler)
srv.SetHandler(router)
// Set up signal handling
sigChan := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
signal.Notify(sigChan, syscall.SIGTERM, syscall.SIGINT)
// Start server in a goroutine
var serverErr error
go func() {
log.Printf("gateway listening on %s", srv.Addr())
serverErr = srv.ListenAndServe()
if serverErr != nil && serverErr != http.ErrServerClosed {
log.Printf("server error: %v", serverErr)
}
}()
// Wait for shutdown signal
sig := <-sigChan
log.Printf("received signal: %v", sig)
// Gracefully shutdown the server
if err := srv.Shutdown(context.Background()); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "shutdown error: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
log.Printf("gateway shutdown complete")
os.Exit(0)
}
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# API — LLM surfaces
Two protocol dialects over the same models and the same slot controller.
| Prefix | Dialect | Endpoint | Client |
|---|---|---|---|
| `/v1` | OpenAI-compatible | `POST /v1/chat/completions` | pi, OpenAI SDKs |
| `/llm` | Anthropic Messages | `POST /llm/v1/messages` | riotpiao frontend (first-party) |
Status marks below:
**[LIVE]** verified against the running cluster on 2026-08-19.
**[SPEC]** the contract this gateway must implement; not built yet.
---
## Models
| `model` value | Upstream | Engine | Context | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `reasoning` | `reasoning-predictor.llm-serving:80` | vLLM, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B | 16384 | emits `reasoning_content`; 8 sequence slots total |
| `ornith:35b` | `ornith-predictor.llm-serving:80` | Ollama | 131072 | reliable tool calling |
| `qwen2.5:3b-instruct` | `ornith-predictor.llm-serving:80` | Ollama | 32768 | same pods as ornith |
| `nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v2-moe` | `embeddings-predictor.llm-serving:80` | TEI | — | embeddings only |
| `BAAI/bge-reranker-base` | `reranker-predictor.llm-serving:80` | TEI | — | rerank only |
`reasoning` runs 2 replicas x `--max-num-seqs=4`. Those **8 slots are the scarcest resource in the cluster** and are shared across both dialects.
---
## Authentication [SPEC]
Ships behind a flag, default off. The model API is unauthenticated today.
```
Authorization: Bearer <authentik-jwt>
```
### Decided — Bearer on both surfaces
`Authorization: Bearer <jwt>` is the only accepted credential, on `/v1` and `/llm` alike. One auth path, consistent with G5, validated against Authentik via JWKS.
**Known divergence from Anthropic:** the real Anthropic API authenticates with `x-api-key` and requires `anthropic-version: 2023-06-01`. A stock Anthropic SDK pointed at `/llm` will send `x-api-key` and get a 401.
This is accepted, not overlooked. The `/llm` client is the first-party riotpiao frontend, which sends whatever we tell it to. If a real Anthropic SDK ever needs to reach this gateway, accepting `x-api-key` as a second credential source is an additive change — a small branch in one middleware, not a redesign.
`anthropic-version` is accepted and ignored if present, and never required.
The 401 for an `x-api-key`-only request must name the problem — say that Bearer is required — rather than returning a bare 401. The Kong retirement was caused by exactly this failure mode: a gateway that rejected the header clients actually send, without saying why.
---
## OpenAI dialect — `POST /v1/chat/completions`
### Request [SPEC]
```json
{
"model": "reasoning",
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Why is wave 4 empty?"}],
"max_tokens": 2000,
"temperature": 0.7,
"stream": false
}
```
`model` is required and selects the upstream. The body is forwarded byte-identical — the gateway reads `model`, it does not rewrite it.
### Response, non-streaming [LIVE]
Captured verbatim from `reasoning` on 2026-08-19, abridged:
```json
{
"id": "chatcmpl-f17bd2fe22e4276d24e9438e40e89cea",
"object": "chat.completion",
"created": 1787172340,
"model": "reasoning",
"choices": [{
"index": 0,
"message": {
"role": "assistant",
"content": "\n\nTo find the current weather in Toronto...",
"reasoning_content": "Okay, so I need to figure out...",
"tool_calls": []
},
"finish_reason": "length"
}],
"usage": {"prompt_tokens": 16, "completion_tokens": 300, "total_tokens": 316}
}
```
`reasoning_content` is a **sibling of** `content`, not nested in it. This is a vLLM extension produced by `--reasoning-parser=deepseek_r1`; it is not part of the OpenAI spec. Pass it through untouched.
### The two engines disagree on the field name [LIVE]
Verified 2026-08-19 by calling both:
| Upstream | Engine | Reasoning field |
|---|---|---|
| `reasoning-predictor` | vLLM | `reasoning_content` |
| `ornith-predictor` | Ollama | `reasoning` |
Neither is in the OpenAI spec, so neither is wrong — they are two vendor extensions that
happen to mean the same thing. The gateway must recognise **both** when mapping to the
Anthropic `thinking` block, or `ornith:35b` responses will silently lose their reasoning
on the `/llm` surface.
Do not normalise them on the `/v1` surface. That surface passes bodies through
untouched, and a client asking for `ornith:35b` should get exactly what Ollama sent.
Normalisation belongs in the canonical request model (task 2.9), which is the layer that
exists to absorb precisely this kind of upstream difference.
### Response, streaming [SPEC]
```
data: {"id":"chatcmpl-...","object":"chat.completion.chunk","choices":[{"index":0,"delta":{"reasoning_content":"Okay"},"finish_reason":null}]}
data: {"id":"chatcmpl-...","object":"chat.completion.chunk","choices":[{"index":0,"delta":{"content":"Wave"},"finish_reason":null}]}
data: {"id":"chatcmpl-...","object":"chat.completion.chunk","choices":[{"index":0,"delta":{},"finish_reason":"stop"}]}
data: [DONE]
```
Data-only frames, no `event:` lines. Terminated by the literal `data: [DONE]`.
### Legacy aliases [LIVE, being retired]
`POST /v1/{reasoning,ornith,qwen}/chat/completions` force `model` to the corresponding value regardless of the body. They exist only because Kong could not dispatch on the body. Removed once callers migrate.
### `GET /v1/models` [SPEC]
```json
{"object":"list","data":[{"id":"reasoning","object":"model","owned_by":"homelab","created":0}]}
```
Derived from the registry, never hardcoded.
### Errors [SPEC]
RFC 9457 `application/problem+json`:
```json
{
"type": "https://riotpiao.com/errors/unknown-model",
"title": "Unknown model",
"status": 400,
"detail": "\"gpt-4\" is not available",
"validModels": ["reasoning", "ornith:35b", "qwen2.5:3b-instruct"]
}
```
---
## Anthropic dialect — `POST /llm/v1/messages` [SPEC]
Path note: the Anthropic SDK appends `/v1/messages` to its base URL, so a base URL of `https://api.riotpiao.com/llm` produces exactly this path.
### Request
```json
{
"model": "reasoning",
"max_tokens": 2000,
"system": "You are a cluster assistant.",
"messages": [
{"role": "user", "content": "Why is wave 4 empty?"}
],
"stream": true
}
```
Differences from the OpenAI dialect that the translator must handle:
| Concern | OpenAI | Anthropic |
|---|---|---|
| system prompt | `messages[0].role = "system"` | top-level `system` field |
| `max_tokens` | optional | **required** |
| content | string | string *or* block array |
| roles | system/user/assistant/tool | user/assistant only |
| stop | `stop` | `stop_sequences` |
`max_tokens` being required is a real divergence — the gateway must either reject its absence with a clear error or apply a documented default. Pick one and state it; do not silently default.
### Response, non-streaming
```json
{
"id": "msg_01ABC",
"type": "message",
"role": "assistant",
"model": "reasoning",
"content": [
{"type": "thinking", "thinking": "Waves are sort keys, not a sequence..."},
{"type": "text", "text": "Wave 4 is empty. Waves are sort keys..."}
],
"stop_reason": "end_turn",
"stop_sequence": null,
"usage": {"input_tokens": 16, "output_tokens": 300}
}
```
Field mapping from the upstream OpenAI response:
| Upstream | Anthropic |
|---|---|
| `choices[0].message.reasoning_content` | `content[]` block `{"type":"thinking","thinking":...}` |
| `choices[0].message.content` | `content[]` block `{"type":"text","text":...}` |
| `finish_reason: "stop"` | `stop_reason: "end_turn"` |
| `finish_reason: "length"` | `stop_reason: "max_tokens"` |
| `usage.prompt_tokens` | `usage.input_tokens` |
| `usage.completion_tokens` | `usage.output_tokens` |
The thinking block precedes the text block.
### Response, streaming
Anthropic SSE uses **named events with content-block indices**, unlike OpenAI's flat frames. Verified event sequence:
```
event: message_start
data: {"type":"message_start","message":{"id":"msg_01ABC","type":"message","role":"assistant","model":"reasoning","content":[],"usage":{"input_tokens":16,"output_tokens":0}}}
event: content_block_start
data: {"type":"content_block_start","index":0,"content_block":{"type":"thinking","thinking":""}}
event: content_block_delta
data: {"type":"content_block_delta","index":0,"delta":{"type":"thinking_delta","thinking":"Waves are sort keys"}}
event: content_block_stop
data: {"type":"content_block_stop","index":0}
event: content_block_start
data: {"type":"content_block_start","index":1,"content_block":{"type":"text","text":""}}
event: content_block_delta
data: {"type":"content_block_delta","index":1,"delta":{"type":"text_delta","text":"Wave 4 is empty."}}
event: content_block_stop
data: {"type":"content_block_stop","index":1}
event: message_delta
data: {"type":"message_delta","delta":{"stop_reason":"end_turn","stop_sequence":null},"usage":{"output_tokens":300}}
event: message_stop
data: {"type":"message_stop"}
```
Three details that are easy to get wrong:
- In `message_delta`, `usage` is a **sibling of** `delta`, not inside it.
- The delta field name matches the delta type: `thinking_delta` carries `.thinking`, `text_delta` carries `.text`.
- Block index 0 is thinking, index 1 is text. **You only learn reasoning has ended when `content` first appears in an upstream chunk**, so the thinking block must be closed before the text block opens. If a response has no `reasoning_content` at all, the text block is index 0 and no thinking block is emitted.
### Queue position — non-standard extension
Anthropic's event set has no way to say "you are queued", because the stream implicitly begins after a slot is acquired. With only 8 slots, queueing is normal here.
Emitted **before** `message_start`:
```
event: queue
data: {"type":"queue","position":3}
```
This is deliberately outside the Anthropic spec. It is safe only because the client is first-party; a strict Anthropic client would ignore the unknown event and show nothing while queued.
### Errors
Anthropic error shape, **not** RFC 9457 — the same rejection renders differently depending on which surface received it:
```json
{"type":"error","error":{"type":"invalid_request_error","message":"Unknown model \"gpt-4\". Available: reasoning, ornith:35b, qwen2.5:3b-instruct"}}
```
| Condition | HTTP | `error.type` |
|---|---|---|
| unknown or missing model | 400 | `invalid_request_error` |
| `max_tokens` absent (if required) | 400 | `invalid_request_error` |
| malformed JSON | 400 | `invalid_request_error` |
| unsupported feature requested | 400 | `invalid_request_error` |
| not authenticated | 401 | `authentication_error` |
| budget exhausted or queue full | 429 | `rate_limit_error` |
| upstream failure | 502 | `api_error` |
### Deliberately not implemented
Each returns 400 naming the unsupported feature — never a silent partial implementation:
tool use and `tool_result` turns, image content blocks, prompt-caching headers, the batch API, multi-block user content, `thinking.budget_tokens` configuration.
The target client is the riotpiao frontend. Widening scope is a code change with a test, not an accident.
---
## Shared behaviour, both dialects
**One slot controller, keyed by upstream.** A `/v1` request and a `/llm` request contend for the same 8 `reasoning` slots and the same queue, in arrival order. Per-dialect semaphores would each believe they were within budget while together exceeding the physical limit.
**Streaming is unbuffered** and a client disconnect cancels the upstream immediately. An orphaned generation holds a slot until it completes on its own, which for a 32B model on a Volta GPU can run to minutes.
**Timeouts** [LIVE]: chat routes are connect 10s / read 1h / write 1h. The hour is deliberate — a 32B model on this hardware routinely exceeds 60s. Any shorter application cap is enforced in gateway logic, never by shortening the proxy timeout.
**Tool calling** [LIVE]: `reasoning` honours an explicit `tool_choice` but returns `tool_calls: []` under `tool_choice: "auto"` — it reasons about the tool in prose instead. `ornith:35b` returns `finish_reason: "tool_calls"` correctly under `auto`. This is a model property; the gateway does not compensate for it.
---
## Examples
```bash
# OpenAI dialect
curl -s https://api.riotpiao.com/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"Why is wave 4 empty?"}],"max_tokens":500}'
# Anthropic dialect, streaming
curl -N -s https://api.riotpiao.com/llm/v1/messages \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","max_tokens":500,"stream":true,
"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"Why is wave 4 empty?"}]}'
# model list
curl -s https://api.riotpiao.com/v1/models
```
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# API — queue surface (`/sqs/*`)
Fronts the Kafka Management Service (`kmsvc`) in namespace `sqs`. SQS-shaped
message-plane API over Kafka.
Status marks:
**[LIVE]** verified against the running cluster and the committed proto on 2026-08-19.
**[SPEC]** the contract this gateway must implement; not built yet.
Source of truth for shapes:
`~/workplace/kmsvc-proto/proto/kafkamgmt/v1/queue_service.proto`.
---
## The important finding: a REST surface already exists [LIVE]
**Do not build gRPC-to-JSON transcoding.** `kmsvc-manage` already mounts grpc-gateway:
```go
mux := runtime.NewServeMux()
kafkamgmtv1.RegisterQueueServiceHandlerServer(ctx, mux, svc)
```
The upstream serves plain REST/JSON on **:8080** and plain gRPC on **:9090**. Neither
gRPC-Web nor server reflection is enabled.
So `/sqs/*` is a **path-stripping reverse proxy plus authentication**, not a protocol
translator. That makes it dramatically cheaper than the LLM surface.
```
api.riotpiao.com/sqs/v1/queues/{q}/messages
| strip /sqs, authenticate
v
management-service.sqs.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1/queues/{q}/messages
```
Upstream: Deployment `management-service`, 3 replicas, HPA 3-9, Service ClusterIP
`10.98.3.138`, ports `8080` (http) and `9090` (grpc).
---
## Endpoints [LIVE — HTTP annotations from the proto]
Six operations. All unary. No streaming, no subscribe.
| Method | Path (after `/sqs` strip) | RPC |
|---|---|---|
| POST | `/v1/queues/{queue_name}/messages` | `SendMessage` |
| POST | `/v1/queues/{queue_name}/messages:batch` | `SendMessageBatch` |
| GET | `/v1/queues/{queue_name}/messages` | `ReceiveMessage` |
| DELETE | `/v1/queues/{queue_name}/messages/{receipt_handle}` | `DeleteMessage` |
| POST | `/v1/queues/{queue_name}/messages:batchDelete` | `DeleteMessageBatch` |
| PATCH | `/v1/queues/{queue_name}/messages/{receipt_handle}` | `ChangeMessageVisibility` |
---
## Two wire-format traps [LIVE]
Both follow from grpc-gateway defaults, and both will surprise anyone who reads only
the proto.
**1. `bytes` fields are base64 in JSON.** `SendMessageRequest.message_body` and
`Message.body` are proto `bytes`. The JSONPB marshaler encodes them as base64 strings.
Sending raw text will not do what you expect.
**2. Field names are lowerCamelCase.** `cmd/server/main.go` calls bare
`runtime.NewServeMux()` with no marshaler options, so `OrigName` is false. The wire uses
`messageBody`, `receiptHandle`, `maxNumberOfMessages` — not the snake_case names in the
proto.
Document both prominently or every first-time caller loses an hour.
---
## Message shapes [LIVE — from the proto]
### Send
```
POST /sqs/v1/queues/agent-worker-queue/messages
{
"messageBody": "aGVsbG8gd29ybGQ=", // base64 of "hello world"
"messageAttributes": {"values": {"k": "v"}},
"messageGroupId": "", // FIFO only
"messageDeduplicationId": "", // FIFO only
"delaySeconds": 0 // 0-900
}
-> {"messageId": "...", "sequenceNumber": ""} // sequenceNumber FIFO only
```
### Receive — long poll
```
GET /sqs/v1/queues/agent-worker-queue/messages
?maxNumberOfMessages=10 // <= 10
&waitTimeSeconds=20 // 0-20
&visibilityTimeoutSeconds=30 // optional override
-> {"messages": [{
"messageId": "...",
"receiptHandle": "...",
"body": "aGVsbG8gd29ybGQ=",
"attributes": {"values": {}},
"receiveCount": 1,
"messageGroupId": "",
"enqueuedAt": "2026-08-19T16:29:07Z"
}]}
```
### Delete — the ack
```
DELETE /sqs/v1/queues/agent-worker-queue/messages/{receiptHandle}
-> {}
```
### Change visibility
```
PATCH /sqs/v1/queues/agent-worker-queue/messages/{receiptHandle}
{"visibilityTimeoutSeconds": 60} // 0-43200
-> {}
```
### Batch
Both batch calls take `entries[]` with a caller-assigned `id`, and return partial
success:
```json
{"successful": [{"id": "1", "messageId": "..."}],
"failed": [{"id": "2", "error": "..."}]}
```
A batch call can return 200 with entries in `failed`. Callers must inspect the body,
not just the status.
### Limits [LIVE — from the SDK]
`MaxMessageBodyBytes = 262144` (256 KiB), `MaxReceiveMessages = 10`,
`MaxWaitTimeSeconds = 20`.
---
## Semantics
At-least-once, SQS-style. Receive leases a message for the visibility timeout; the
caller must `DeleteMessage` to acknowledge. An un-deleted message reappears after the
timeout and `receiveCount` increments. After `maxReceiveCount` (default 5) it goes to
the DLQ if one is configured.
**Long-polling matters for the gateway.** `waitTimeSeconds` up to 20 means a `GET` can
legitimately hold open for 20 seconds returning nothing. Read timeouts must exceed that
comfortably, and a client disconnect must cancel upstream — the same requirement as the
LLM surface, for the same reason.
---
## Error mapping [SPEC]
The SDK maps gRPC codes to sentinel errors; grpc-gateway maps them to HTTP. Use this as
the gateway's status contract:
| gRPC code | HTTP | SDK sentinel |
|---|---|---|
| `NotFound` | 404 | `ErrQueueNotFound` |
| `AlreadyExists` | 409 | `ErrAlreadyExists` |
| `InvalidArgument` | 400 | `ErrInvalidArgument` |
| `Unauthenticated` | 401 | `ErrUnauthenticated` |
| `ResourceExhausted` | 429 | `ErrMessageTooLarge` |
Upstream errors arrive in the grpc-gateway envelope
`{"code": 5, "message": "Not Found", "details": []}`. Decide deliberately whether
`/sqs/*` passes that through or re-renders it as RFC 9457 to match `/v1/*`.
Recommendation: **pass through**, so the gateway does not become a second, subtly
different error vocabulary for the same upstream.
---
## Queue lifecycle is NOT in this API [LIVE]
There is no `CreateQueue`, `DeleteQueue`, or `ListQueues` RPC. The proto says so
explicitly:
```proto
// Queue lifecycle (create/delete/configure) is managed via the Queue CRD,
// not this service
```
Queues are Kubernetes resources — `queues.kmsvc.io/v1`, namespaced. `kmsvc-cli`'s
`create-queue` and `delete-queue` talk to the Kubernetes API, not to kmsvc.
**This is a hard boundary for the gateway.** Exposing queue creation over `/sqs/*` would
require the gateway to hold Kubernetes write credentials, which violates **G2**. Do not
add it. If declarative queue management ever needs a public surface, it belongs behind a
separate component with its own RBAC — not in the public edge process.
Queue spec fields, for reference when reading a queue's configuration:
`fifoQueue`, `isDLQ`, `deadLetterTargetQueue`, `delaySeconds` (0-900),
`maxReceiveCount` (default 5), `messageRetentionPeriodSeconds` (default 345600),
`visibilityTimeoutSeconds` (default 30), `minShards`, `maxShards` (default 8),
`partitionsPerShard` (default 6), `shardSplitThresholdBytesPerSec`,
`shardSplitCooldownSeconds`.
Kafka topics are named `kmsvc.{queue}.shard-{id}` and are created by `queue-operator`
directly via the Kafka Admin API — there are no `KafkaTopic` CRs.
Currently one queue exists: `agent-worker-queue` in namespace `sqs`, phase `Ready`,
1 shard.
---
## Authentication [SPEC]
`Authorization: Bearer <jwt>`, same as every other gateway surface.
**The upstream enforces nothing.** `kmsvc`'s auth interceptor exists but is never wired,
and the REST surface is mounted with the in-process grpc-gateway variant that bypasses
gRPC interceptors regardless. Both `:8080` and `:9090` are currently open, and
`kmsvc.riotpiao.com` is publicly routed.
The gateway is therefore the only authentication boundary for this surface. See
[KNOWN-ISSUES.md](KNOWN-ISSUES.md) §2.
---
## Out of scope
- **Workflow start.** Nothing in kmsvc starts a Temporal workflow — no such RPC exists,
and grep for `ExecuteWorkflow`/`StartWorkflow` across `kmsvc-manage`, `kmsvc-sdk` and
`kmsvc-cli` returns nothing. A caller dials `temporal-frontend.temporal.svc:7233`
with a Temporal SDK directly. A `/workflow/*` surface is net-new code, not a proxy
route — see [task 7.3](../tasks/7.3-workflow-prefix.md) and KNOWN-ISSUES.md §1.
- **DLQ operations.** `kmsvc-cli`'s `dlq peek` and `dlq redrive` are client-side
compositions of the six RPCs, not server operations. Redrive is a non-atomic
Receive-Send-Delete. If `/sqs/*` should offer redrive, that is new logic with real
failure modes, not a proxied call.
- **Kafka direct access.** No external listener exists; the bootstrap
`kmsvc-kafka-bootstrap.sqs.svc.cluster.local:9092` is cluster-internal only. The
gateway proxies kmsvc, never Kafka.
---
## Examples
```bash
Q=agent-worker-queue
# send (body must be base64)
curl -s -X POST https://api.riotpiao.com/sqs/v1/queues/$Q/messages \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d "{\"messageBody\":\"$(printf 'hello world' | base64)\"}"
# receive, long poll 20s
curl -s "https://api.riotpiao.com/sqs/v1/queues/$Q/messages?maxNumberOfMessages=10&waitTimeSeconds=20"
# acknowledge
curl -s -X DELETE https://api.riotpiao.com/sqs/v1/queues/$Q/messages/$RECEIPT
# extend the lease
curl -s -X PATCH https://api.riotpiao.com/sqs/v1/queues/$Q/messages/$RECEIPT \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"visibilityTimeoutSeconds":60}'
```
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# Known cluster issues
Pre-existing problems found while specifying this gateway. None are caused by this
repo, and none block phases 0-6. Recorded so they are not rediscovered or mistaken
for new breakage.
Verified 2026-08-19 against context `admin@homelab-cluster`.
---
## 1. TemporalWorker CRD is stale — queue-operator reconcile fails every ~17 min
**Status:** open, deliberately deferred. Affects [task 7.3](../tasks/7.3-workflow-prefix.md).
The live `temporalworkers.kmsvc.io` CRD and the one in
`~/workplace/kmsvc-manage/config/crd/kmsvc.io_temporalworkers.yaml` share exactly one
field — `namespace`.
| | spec properties |
|---|---|
| live CRD | `activityTypes`, `concurrency`, `namespace`, `taskQueue`, `workflowTypes` |
| repo CRD | `affinity`, `image`, `imagePullPolicy`, `namespace`, `nodeSelector`, `replicas`, `resources`, `tolerations` |
The live schema has no `image` field, so the API server **prunes** `image` from the CR
that `queue-operator` writes. `TemporalWorker/worker-production` ends up as
`spec: {namespace: production}`, and the operator then fails to build a Deployment
from it. The live CRD also lacks a status subresource, producing a second error.
Observed on a loop, most recently 21:25:39Z:
```
failed to create or update deployment ... error: "Deployment.apps \"worker-production\"
is invalid: spec.template.spec.containers[0].image: Required value"
Reconciler error ... "update status failed: temporalworkers.kmsvc.io
\"worker-production\" not found"
```
**Impact is narrower than it looks.** No worker Deployment has ever existed under this
CRD, so nothing that was working has stopped. Temporal namespace `production` is
registered and healthy; there is simply no worker polling it. The practical cost is log
noise, not lost work. That is why this is deferred rather than treated as an incident.
**Neither object is under GitOps.** The CRD and the `Queue/agent-worker-queue` CR both
carry only `kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration` — no
`argocd.argoproj.io/instance`, no tracking-id — and the Queue does not appear anywhere
in the homelab repo. They were hand-applied and predate GitOps coverage.
**Fix, when it is worth doing:**
1. Bring `temporalworkers.kmsvc.io` and the Queue CR into the homelab GitOps repo.
2. Apply the current CRD from `kmsvc-manage/config/crd`, which restores `image` and the
status subresource.
3. Ensure the operator sets `spec.image` on the CR it creates.
Do not hand-apply the CRD as a one-off. That reproduces exactly the situation that
caused this — a cluster object with no source of truth.
**To silence the loop without fixing it:** remove the `temporal.io/namespace: production`
label from `Queue/agent-worker-queue` in namespace `sqs`. The operator returns early when
the label is absent. Reversible by re-adding it.
---
## 2. `kmsvc.riotpiao.com` is unauthenticated
**Status:** open. Relevant to [task 7.2](../tasks/7.2-sqs-prefix.md).
`kmsvc-manage` has an auth interceptor at `internal/api/interceptors/auth.go`, but it is
never wired: `cmd/server/main.go` constructs a bare `grpc.NewServer()` with no
interceptor options. The live ConfigMap confirms it — `KMSVC_AUTHENTIK_ISSUER_URL` and
`KMSVC_AUTHENTIK_AUDIENCE` are both empty strings.
Both the REST surface (8080) and the gRPC surface (9090) are open.
There is a second, subtler problem. The REST surface is mounted with
`RegisterQueueServiceHandlerServer`, the **in-process** grpc-gateway variant that calls
the service implementation directly. It bypasses gRPC interceptors entirely. So even
once the interceptor is wired, it would authenticate gRPC callers only — the file's own
doc comment claiming it covers both REST and gRPC is wrong for this wiring.
Consequence for this gateway: `/sqs/*` must own authentication itself. Do not assume the
upstream will enforce anything.
---
## 3. `kmsvc-redis-master.sqs:6379` has no authentication
`ALLOW_EMPTY_PASSWORD=yes`, TLS off, Bitnami chart with `auth.enabled=false`, no password
secret in the namespace. Anything with network reach has full unauthenticated read/write.
A NetworkPolicy is the only control. Relevant to [task 6.2](../tasks/6.2-kubernetes-manifests.md).
---
## 4. `macos-bluebubbles` pod will never schedule
`sms` Argo Application is `Synced`/`Degraded`. The pod targets a macOS node that is not
in the cluster: `0/4 nodes are available: 4 node(s) didn't match Pod's node
affinity/selector`, roughly 1080 failed attempts over 3d18h.
Not transient. Needs either that node or removal of the Application. Unrelated to this
gateway; listed so the Degraded status is not mistaken for something new.
---
## 5. Documentation that does not match reality
- `kmsvc-manage/TEMPORAL_INTEGRATION.md` is aspirational. It documents
`apiVersion: temporal.kmsvc.io/v1` with `queueRef`, `taskQueueName` and `lifecycle`
fields, and one worker per Queue. Reality is `kmsvc.io/v1`, none of those fields, and
one worker per Temporal *namespace*. Do not source API documentation from it.
- Module paths disagree across repos: `kmsvc-proto` declares
`forgejo.riotpiao.homelab.com/...`, while `kmsvc-manage` and `kmsvc-sdk` import
`forgejo.riotpiao.com/...`. The `.homelab.com` domain is fully retired — every
subdomain NXDOMAINs.
- `kmsvc-cli` README says the gRPC ingress uses TLS passthrough. It uses
`nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/backend-protocol: GRPC`, which terminates TLS at nginx.
Functionally fine for clients; the wording is wrong.
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# Kong retirement — inventory and cutover
Everything Kong does on `api.riotpiao.com` today, and where it goes. Inventory
verified live against context `admin@homelab-cluster` on 2026-08-19.
Source of the objects being retired: `~/workplace/homelab/k8s/apps/api/` and
`k8s/argocd/apps/55-api-gateway.yaml`.
## What is running now
Kong OSS 3.4.1, Helm chart from `https://charts.konghq.com`, DB-less, namespace
`api`, Argo Application `kong` at sync wave 7. Two replicas. Fronted by
`ingress-nginx` via Ingress `api/api`, which catch-alls `/` on `api.riotpiao.com`
to `kong-proxy:80`.
Eleven ReplicaSets exist on the Kong Deployment, the newest minutes old — this
config is being actively iterated, so re-verify the inventory immediately before
cutover.
## Routing table to port
Seven `ingressClassName: kong` Ingresses. Six in `llm-serving`, one in `agent-pod`.
| Method | Path | Upstream | Transform applied by Kong |
|---|---|---|---|
| GET | `/v1/models` | — | `request-termination`: static 200 JSON, upstream never contacted |
| POST | `/v1/reasoning/chat/completions` | `reasoning-predictor:80` | force body `model=reasoning`, rewrite URI to `/v1/chat/completions` |
| POST | `/v1/ornith/chat/completions` | `ornith-predictor:80` | force body `model=ornith:35b`, rewrite URI |
| POST | `/v1/qwen/chat/completions` | `ornith-predictor:80` | force body `model=qwen2.5:3b-instruct`, rewrite URI |
| POST | `/v1/embeddings` | `embeddings-predictor:80` | none — TEI already serves the canonical path |
| POST | `/v1/rerank` | `reranker-predictor:80` | rewrite URI to `/rerank` (TEI does not serve `/v1/rerank`) |
| GET/WS | `/console`, `/run`, `/sessions` | `agent-hub:9090` (`agent-pod` ns) | none, `strip-path: false` |
Upstream model map, from the manifest comments and confirmed live:
- `reasoning``reasoning-predictor` — vLLM, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B, 2 replicas,
`--max-num-seqs=4`, `--max-model-len=16384`, `--reasoning-parser=deepseek_r1`,
`--enable-auto-tool-choice --tool-call-parser=hermes`
- `ornith:35b``ornith-predictor` — Ollama, 2 replicas
- `qwen2.5:3b-instruct``ornith-predictor` — same pods; both models stay resident via
`OLLAMA_MAX_LOADED_MODELS=2`, `OLLAMA_KEEP_ALIVE=-1`
- `nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v2-moe``embeddings-predictor` — TEI
- `BAAI/bge-reranker-base``reranker-predictor` — TEI
### The path-per-model surface goes away
The three chat paths exist only because Kong OSS cannot dispatch on the request
body. The gateway serves a single `POST /v1/chat/completions` and selects the
upstream from the body's `model` field.
Keep the old paths as aliases during cutover so live clients do not break, then
remove them once callers have migrated. pi is a live caller today.
### `/v1/models` should not be ported verbatim
Kong serves a hardcoded list via `request-termination`. The manifest already flags
that it can drift from what the engines actually serve. Derive the response from
the gateway's configured upstream map instead, so the list cannot disagree with
what routing will accept.
## Plugins being retired
| Plugin | Scope | Replacement |
|---|---|---|
| `llm-rewrite-reasoning` / `-ornith` / `-qwen` | llm-serving | body-based dispatch in `internal/llm` |
| `llm-rewrite-rerank` | llm-serving | per-upstream path rewrite in the route table |
| `llm-models-list` | llm-serving | derived from the upstream map |
| `prometheus` | **cluster-wide** | `internal/observability` — must expose bandwidth, latency, status codes, upstream health or observability regresses |
No `rate-limiting` plugin exists anywhere in the cluster. REQUIREMENTS.md §4 Tier 2
describes it as an existing layer; it is not built. Nothing to migrate — it is net
new work, and it now belongs in the gateway rather than in Kong.
## Auth: currently off, must land on
`KongConsumer model-invoker` exists in namespace `api` and stays defined, but the
`key-auth` plugin is commented out and every route has `model-key-auth` stripped
from its `konghq.com/plugins` annotation.
**The model API is unauthenticated right now.** Confirmed live 2026-08-19: a request
to `/v1/reasoning/chat/completions` with no credentials returns 200.
The reason is recorded in `model-auth.yaml` — Kong's `key-auth` accepts a raw
`apikey:` header but rejects `Authorization: Bearer`, which blocks every
OpenAI-compatible client. That is why `~/.pi/agent/models.json` carries a
`customHeaders: {apikey: ...}` block.
The gateway reads Bearer tokens directly and validates them against Authentik via
JWKS. `AUTH-PLAN.md`'s pinned-RSA-key approach and its rotation runbook are not
needed and should not be carried over.
Ship auth behind a flag. Turning it on breaks every current caller until they hold
a token — pi included.
## Timeouts
Kong today:
| Route class | connect | read | write |
|---|---|---|---|
| chat | 10s | **1h** | 1h |
| embeddings / rerank | 10s | 10m | 10m |
nginx in front sets `proxy-read-timeout: 3600`, `proxy-send-timeout: 3600`,
`proxy-buffering: off`, `proxy-body-size: 0`. Those stay — they are what makes token
streaming work, and the gateway needs the same treatment from nginx.
The 1-hour read timeout is deliberate: a 32B model on a Volta GPU routinely exceeds
60s. Any shorter server-side cap must be enforced *in the gateway*, not by shortening
the proxy timeout, or long legitimate generations get truncated mid-stream.
## Cutover
Reversible at every step. Kong keeps serving until the last step.
1. Deploy the gateway alongside Kong, unexposed. Verify in-cluster against
`http://homelab-frontend.api.svc.cluster.local`.
2. Compare gateway and Kong responses for every route in the table above, including
a streaming chat request and a client disconnect mid-stream.
3. Repoint Ingress `api/api` from `kong-proxy:80` to the gateway Service. **This is
the cutover.** Reverting is a one-line change to the same Ingress.
4. Soak. Watch gateway metrics and pi traffic.
5. Delete the seven kong-class Ingresses and the six KongPlugin CRs.
6. Remove the `kong` Application from `k8s/argocd/apps/55-api-gateway.yaml`; let Argo
prune the Helm release, the CRDs and namespace leftovers.
Steps 14 are reversible in seconds. Step 5 onward is not — do not start it until the
soak is clean.
All of this flows through git and Argo. No `kubectl apply`, no `helm upgrade`.
## Loose ends
- `agent-pod/console` is publicly routed, unauthenticated, accepts free-form prompts
into a shell-capable container, and exposes a WebSocket. Migrating it behind the
gateway's auth is a security fix, not merely a port. Treat WebSocket upgrade as an
explicit requirement of the proxy layer.
- Eight `*.example.com` hosts exist on istio-class Ingresses in `llm-serving`
(`{embeddings,ornith,reasoning,reranker}[-predictor]-llm-serving.example.com`).
KServe defaults, not public, not Kong's — out of scope here, but they exist and
should not be mistaken for gateway routes.
- Ingress class split across the cluster is 7 kong / 17 nginx / 4 istio. Only the 7
kong ones are in scope.
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
# ADR-0001 — Retire Kong OSS in favour of a Go API gateway
Status: Accepted
Date: 2026-08-19
Deciders: rock
## Context
`api.riotpiao.com` is currently served by Kong OSS 3.4.1 (Helm, DB-less, namespace `api`,
Argo wave 7), sitting behind ingress-nginx which owns TLS. Kong routes to the KServe
model predictors in `llm-serving` via seven `ingressClassName: kong` Ingresses and six
`KongPlugin` CRs.
Three separate capabilities were attempted on Kong OSS. All three failed, and each
failure is already documented in-repo by the person who hit it:
**1. Body-based model dispatch is not expressible.**
From `k8s/apps/api/llm-routes.yaml`:
> a single `/v1/chat/completions` endpoint that dispatches on the body's `model` field is
> not expressible in Kong OSS (`ai-proxy-advanced`, which does multi-target model routing,
> is Enterprise-only).
The workaround is a path-per-model surface (`/v1/reasoning/chat/completions`,
`/v1/ornith/...`, `/v1/qwen/...`) with a `request-transformer` force-overwriting the body's
`model` field. This is not OpenAI-standard, so every client needs bespoke configuration —
visible today in `~/.pi/agent/models.json`, which carries three separate provider entries
for what should be one endpoint.
**2. OIDC is Enterprise-only.**
`k8s/apps/api/AUTH-PLAN.md` routes around the missing `openid-connect` plugin using the
built-in `jwt` plugin, which requires pinning Authentik's RSA public key onto a
KongConsumer. That plan lists its own consequence:
> Pinning `rsa_public_key`: Authentik key rotation would break it — document a rotation
> runbook, or have the provision script re-export the cert PEM into the Kong credential on
> each run.
A rotation runbook is a standing operational liability accepted only because the gateway
cannot fetch JWKS itself.
**3. `key-auth` cannot read `Authorization: Bearer`.**
From `k8s/apps/api/model-auth.yaml`:
> a raw `apikey: <key>` header succeeds (200), the same request with only
> `Authorization: Bearer <key>` fails (401). No OpenAI-SDK-compatible client (pi included)
> sends a raw apikey header or lets you customize the header name, so every such client was
> hard-blocked.
Consequence: authentication on the model routes is **currently disabled**. Verified live
2026-08-19 — `api.riotpiao.com/v1/reasoning/chat/completions` answers unauthenticated.
Separately, the intended surface has grown beyond LLM routing. The target is a
capability-per-subdomain API over cluster services — `sqs.riotpiao.com` for queue
operations, `workflow.riotpiao.com` for Temporal, `cluster.riotpiao.com` for atlas — each
needing request shaping, per-caller budgets and streaming semantics that are application
concerns, not gateway-plugin concerns.
## Decision
Retire Kong OSS entirely. Replace it with a purpose-built Go service,
`homelab-frontend`, which owns north-south routing, authentication, and request shaping
for every public capability on `*.riotpiao.com`.
ingress-nginx keeps the edge and TLS. It forwards to the gateway instead of `kong-proxy`.
Authentication is Authentik OIDC, validated by fetching JWKS from
`https://authentik.riotpiao.com` at runtime.
## Options considered
**A. Stay on Kong OSS, accept the workarounds.**
Keeps a battle-tested proxy and its Prometheus plugin. But the path-per-model surface stays
non-standard, the RSA pinning runbook stays, and auth stays off until someone writes a
`request-transformer` shim to copy Bearer into an `apikey` header. Every new capability
(`sqs`, `workflow`) inherits the same constraints.
**B. Buy Kong Enterprise.**
`ai-proxy-advanced` and `openid-connect` solve 1 and 2. Does not solve the genuinely
application-level requirements at all — signed session cookies, per-session daily message
budgets, a 6-of-8 GPU sequence-slot semaphore with a bounded queue, and
disconnect-cancels-upstream are not gateway features in any tier. Cost for a homelab is not
justifiable.
**C. Go gateway, Kong retained for LLM paths only.**
Gradual migration, lower risk. But it means running two gateways indefinitely, splitting the
routing table across Kong CRDs and Go code, and keeping the Kong Helm release and its CRDs.
The split is the thing most likely to drift.
**D. Go gateway, Kong retired entirely.** — chosen
One routing table, one auth implementation, one place to reason about timeouts. The logic
being replaced is small: four `request-transformer` plugins that set a body field and
rewrite a URI, one `request-termination` serving a static JSON model list, and one
`prometheus` plugin. That is on the order of a hundred lines of Go, against roughly 480
lines of YAML it retires.
## Consequences
### Gained
- **Standard OpenAI surface.** One `POST /v1/chat/completions`, model selected from the
request body. Any OpenAI SDK works unmodified. The three pi provider entries collapse to
one.
- **Working authentication.** Bearer tokens are read from the header, because it is our
code. JWKS is fetched and cached with automatic rotation handling, so the AUTH-PLAN.md
rotation runbook is deleted rather than written.
- **Application-level policy becomes possible.** GPU slot semaphore, per-session budgets,
disconnect propagation and SSE handling live where the state is.
- **One timeout story.** Kong currently sets `read-timeout: 3600000` (1 hour) on chat
routes, which silently defeats any shorter server-side cap. Retiring Kong removes the
conflicting layer.
- **~480 lines of gateway YAML deleted**, plus the Kong CRDs, the Helm release, and its
`ServerSideApply` workaround for oversized CRD annotations.
### Lost / assumed
- **We now own proxy correctness.** Connection pooling, retries, timeout propagation,
streaming passthrough, header hygiene, graceful shutdown. `net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy`
covers most of it, but it is our bug surface now.
- **Kong's Prometheus plugin goes away.** The gateway must expose equivalent metrics itself
(bandwidth, latency, status codes, upstream health) or observability regresses.
- **Migration touches live traffic.** pi depends on `api.riotpiao.com` today. Cutover must
be reversible — see `docs/MIGRATION-kong.md`.
- **`agent-pod/console` is a kong-class Ingress** exposing `/console` (WebSocket), `/run`
and `/sessions`. It must migrate too, and it is currently unauthenticated and publicly
routed while accepting free-form prompts into a shell-capable container. Putting it behind
the gateway's Authentik auth is a security improvement, not just a port.
### Risks
- Enabling Authentik auth will break any client currently relying on the unauthenticated
surface — including pi, until its `models.json` is updated. Auth must ship behind a flag
and be enabled deliberately.
- Kong's `request-termination` for `/v1/models` returns a **static** list that can drift
from what the engines actually serve. Porting it verbatim ports the bug; the gateway
should derive the list from configured upstreams instead.
+5
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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
module github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend
go 1.25.0
require gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 // indirect
+3
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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
+24
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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
package config_test
import (
"testing"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/config"
)
// TestLoadRoutesMissingAuthRequired tests that the auth-required flag is not a silent default:
// if it is absent from YAML, startup must fail with a message naming the offending route and field.
func TestLoadRoutesMissingAuthRequired(t *testing.T) {
routes, err := config.LoadRoutesFromFile("../../testdata/config/missing-authRequired.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for missing authRequired, got nil")
}
if routes != nil {
t.Error("expected nil routes on error")
}
want := "route \"test-route\": field 'authRequired' is required"
got := err.Error()
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("error did not name the offending route and field; want %q, got %q", want, got)
}
}
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@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
package config
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"time"
)
// Config holds the gateway configuration.
type Config struct {
// ListenAddr is the address to listen on for HTTP traffic.
ListenAddr string
// ShutdownTimeout is the maximum time to wait for in-flight requests
// to complete before forcing shutdown.
ShutdownTimeout time.Duration
// Routes maps route names to their upstream configuration.
Routes map[string]*Route
// Models maps model names to their upstream configuration.
// Multiple models can point to the same upstream address.
Models map[string]*ModelUpstream
}
// ModelUpstream holds upstream configuration for a specific model.
type ModelUpstream struct {
// Name is the model name clients send (e.g., "reasoning", "ornith:35b").
Name string
// Address is the upstream server address (host:port).
Address string
// Path is the upstream path for this model (e.g., "/v1/chat/completions").
Path string
}
// Route represents a single route and its upstream configuration.
type Route struct {
// Name is the route identifier.
Name string
// Upstream holds the upstream server configuration.
Upstream Upstream
}
// Upstream holds upstream server configuration for a route.
type Upstream struct {
// Address is the upstream server address (host:port).
Address string
// PathRewrite is an optional path prefix rewrite. Empty string means no rewrite.
PathRewrite string
// ConnectTimeout is the maximum time to establish a connection to the upstream.
ConnectTimeout time.Duration
// ReadTimeout is the maximum time to read a response from the upstream.
ReadTimeout time.Duration
// WriteTimeout is the maximum time to write a request to the upstream.
WriteTimeout time.Duration
// MaxBodySize is the maximum request body size in bytes.
MaxBodySize int64
// AuthRequired indicates whether this route requires authentication.
AuthRequired bool
}
// LookupModel finds a model by name (case-sensitive, exact match).
func (c *Config) LookupModel(name string) *ModelUpstream {
if c == nil || c.Models == nil {
return nil
}
return c.Models[name]
}
// ModelNames returns a sorted list of all known model names.
func (c *Config) ModelNames() []string {
if c == nil || c.Models == nil {
return nil
}
names := make([]string, 0, len(c.Models))
for name := range c.Models {
names = append(names, name)
}
return names
}
// Load reads configuration from environment variables with defaults.
func Load() (*Config, error) {
listenAddr := "127.0.0.1:8080"
// Allow override via environment variable
if addr, ok := os.LookupEnv("LISTEN_ADDR"); ok {
listenAddr = addr
}
shutdownTimeout := 30 * time.Second
// Allow override via environment variable
if timeout, ok := os.LookupEnv("SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT"); ok {
d, err := time.ParseDuration(timeout)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT: %w", err)
}
shutdownTimeout = d
}
// Load routes and models from config file
routes := make(map[string]*Route)
models := make(map[string]*ModelUpstream)
if configPath, ok := os.LookupEnv("CONFIG_PATH"); ok {
loadedRoutes, loadedModels, err := LoadRoutesAndModelsFromFile(configPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
routes = loadedRoutes
models = loadedModels
}
return &Config{
ListenAddr: listenAddr,
ShutdownTimeout: shutdownTimeout,
Routes: routes,
Models: models,
}, nil
}
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package config_test
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/config"
)
// TestLoadRoutesValidConfig tests that a valid configuration loads correctly.
func TestLoadRoutesValidConfig(t *testing.T) {
routes, err := config.LoadRoutesFromFile("../../testdata/config/valid.yaml")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error loading valid config: %v", err)
}
// Verify all three routes are present
if len(routes) != 3 {
t.Errorf("expected 3 routes, got %d", len(routes))
}
// Verify reasoning-chat route
reasoningRoute, ok := routes["reasoning-chat"]
if !ok {
t.Fatal("reasoning-chat route not found")
}
if reasoningRoute.Name != "reasoning-chat" {
t.Errorf("route name mismatch: expected 'reasoning-chat', got %q", reasoningRoute.Name)
}
if reasoningRoute.Upstream.Address != "reasoning-predictor.llm-serving:80" {
t.Errorf("upstream address mismatch: expected 'reasoning-predictor.llm-serving:80', got %q", reasoningRoute.Upstream.Address)
}
if reasoningRoute.Upstream.ConnectTimeout != 10*time.Second {
t.Errorf("connect timeout mismatch: expected 10s, got %v", reasoningRoute.Upstream.ConnectTimeout)
}
if reasoningRoute.Upstream.ReadTimeout != time.Hour {
t.Errorf("read timeout mismatch: expected 1h, got %v", reasoningRoute.Upstream.ReadTimeout)
}
if reasoningRoute.Upstream.WriteTimeout != time.Hour {
t.Errorf("write timeout mismatch: expected 1h, got %v", reasoningRoute.Upstream.WriteTimeout)
}
if reasoningRoute.Upstream.MaxBodySize != 10485760 {
t.Errorf("max body size mismatch: expected 10485760, got %d", reasoningRoute.Upstream.MaxBodySize)
}
if !reasoningRoute.Upstream.AuthRequired {
t.Error("auth required should be true")
}
// Verify ornith-chat route
ornithRoute, ok := routes["ornith-chat"]
if !ok {
t.Fatal("ornith-chat route not found")
}
if ornithRoute.Upstream.ReadTimeout != 10*time.Minute {
t.Errorf("ornith read timeout mismatch: expected 10m, got %v", ornithRoute.Upstream.ReadTimeout)
}
if ornithRoute.Upstream.AuthRequired {
t.Error("ornith auth required should be false")
}
// Verify embeddings route
embeddingsRoute, ok := routes["embeddings"]
if !ok {
t.Fatal("embeddings route not found")
}
if embeddingsRoute.Upstream.MaxBodySize != 5242880 {
t.Errorf("embeddings max body size mismatch: expected 5242880, got %d", embeddingsRoute.Upstream.MaxBodySize)
}
}
// TestLoadRoutesMissingAddress tests that missing address field is caught.
func TestLoadRoutesMissingAddress(t *testing.T) {
routes, err := config.LoadRoutesFromFile("../../testdata/config/missing-address.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for missing address, got nil")
}
if routes != nil {
t.Error("expected nil routes on error")
}
if errMsg := err.Error(); errMsg != "route \"test-route\": field 'address' is required" {
t.Errorf("expected error about missing address, got: %s", errMsg)
}
}
// TestLoadRoutesMissingConnectTimeout tests that missing connectTimeout field is caught.
func TestLoadRoutesMissingConnectTimeout(t *testing.T) {
routes, err := config.LoadRoutesFromFile("../../testdata/config/missing-connectTimeout.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for missing connectTimeout, got nil")
}
if routes != nil {
t.Error("expected nil routes on error")
}
if errMsg := err.Error(); errMsg != "route \"test-route\": field 'connectTimeout' is required" {
t.Errorf("expected error about missing connectTimeout, got: %s", errMsg)
}
}
// TestLoadRoutesMissingReadTimeout tests that missing readTimeout field is caught.
func TestLoadRoutesMissingReadTimeout(t *testing.T) {
routes, err := config.LoadRoutesFromFile("../../testdata/config/missing-readTimeout.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for missing readTimeout, got nil")
}
if routes != nil {
t.Error("expected nil routes on error")
}
if errMsg := err.Error(); errMsg != "route \"test-route\": field 'readTimeout' is required" {
t.Errorf("expected error about missing readTimeout, got: %s", errMsg)
}
}
// TestLoadRoutesMissingWriteTimeout tests that missing writeTimeout field is caught.
func TestLoadRoutesMissingWriteTimeout(t *testing.T) {
routes, err := config.LoadRoutesFromFile("../../testdata/config/missing-writeTimeout.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for missing writeTimeout, got nil")
}
if routes != nil {
t.Error("expected nil routes on error")
}
if errMsg := err.Error(); errMsg != "route \"test-route\": field 'writeTimeout' is required" {
t.Errorf("expected error about missing writeTimeout, got: %s", errMsg)
}
}
// TestLoadRoutesMissingMaxBodySize tests that missing maxBodySize field is caught.
func TestLoadRoutesMissingMaxBodySize(t *testing.T) {
routes, err := config.LoadRoutesFromFile("../../testdata/config/missing-maxBodySize.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for missing maxBodySize, got nil")
}
if routes != nil {
t.Error("expected nil routes on error")
}
if errMsg := err.Error(); errMsg != "route \"test-route\": field 'maxBodySize' is required and must be > 0" {
t.Errorf("expected error about missing maxBodySize, got: %s", errMsg)
}
}
// TestLoadRoutesMalformedConnectTimeout tests that malformed connectTimeout is caught.
func TestLoadRoutesMalformedConnectTimeout(t *testing.T) {
routes, err := config.LoadRoutesFromFile("../../testdata/config/malformed-connectTimeout.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for malformed connectTimeout, got nil")
}
if routes != nil {
t.Error("expected nil routes on error")
}
if errMsg := err.Error(); errMsg != "route \"test-route\": invalid connectTimeout \"not-a-duration\": time: invalid duration \"not-a-duration\"" {
t.Errorf("expected error about malformed connectTimeout, got: %s", errMsg)
}
}
// TestLoadRoutesMalformedReadTimeout tests that malformed readTimeout is caught.
func TestLoadRoutesMalformedReadTimeout(t *testing.T) {
routes, err := config.LoadRoutesFromFile("../../testdata/config/malformed-readTimeout.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for malformed readTimeout, got nil")
}
if routes != nil {
t.Error("expected nil routes on error")
}
if errMsg := err.Error(); errMsg != "route \"test-route\": invalid readTimeout \"invalid\": time: invalid duration \"invalid\"" {
t.Errorf("expected error about malformed readTimeout, got: %s", errMsg)
}
}
// TestLoadRoutesMalformedWriteTimeout tests that malformed writeTimeout is caught.
func TestLoadRoutesMalformedWriteTimeout(t *testing.T) {
routes, err := config.LoadRoutesFromFile("../../testdata/config/malformed-writeTimeout.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for malformed writeTimeout, got nil")
}
if routes != nil {
t.Error("expected nil routes on error")
}
if errMsg := err.Error(); errMsg != "route \"test-route\": invalid writeTimeout \"bad\": time: invalid duration \"bad\"" {
t.Errorf("expected error about malformed writeTimeout, got: %s", errMsg)
}
}
// TestLoadRoutesInvalidAddressNoPort tests that address without port is caught.
func TestLoadRoutesInvalidAddressNoPort(t *testing.T) {
routes, err := config.LoadRoutesFromFile("../../testdata/config/invalid-address-no-port.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for invalid address (no port), got nil")
}
if routes != nil {
t.Error("expected nil routes on error")
}
if errMsg := err.Error(); errMsg != "route \"test-route\": invalid address \"localhost\": address localhost: missing port in address" {
t.Errorf("expected error about invalid address, got: %s", errMsg)
}
}
// TestLoadRoutesDuplicateRouteNames tests that duplicate route names are caught.
func TestLoadRoutesDuplicateRouteNames(t *testing.T) {
routes, err := config.LoadRoutesFromFile("../../testdata/config/duplicate-routes.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for duplicate routes, got nil")
}
if routes != nil {
t.Error("expected nil routes on error")
}
if errMsg := err.Error(); errMsg != "duplicate route: \"test-route\"" {
t.Errorf("expected error about duplicate routes, got: %s", errMsg)
}
}
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@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
package config_test
import (
"os"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/config"
)
// TestLoadIntegration tests the full Load function with CONFIG_PATH env var
func TestLoadIntegration(t *testing.T) {
// Set the environment variable
originalConfigPath := os.Getenv("CONFIG_PATH")
os.Setenv("CONFIG_PATH", "../../testdata/config/valid.yaml")
defer func() {
if originalConfigPath != "" {
os.Setenv("CONFIG_PATH", originalConfigPath)
} else {
os.Unsetenv("CONFIG_PATH")
}
}()
cfg, err := config.Load()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if cfg == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil config")
}
if len(cfg.Routes) != 3 {
t.Errorf("expected 3 routes, got %d", len(cfg.Routes))
}
// Verify reasoning-chat is present
reasoningRoute, ok := cfg.Routes["reasoning-chat"]
if !ok {
t.Fatal("reasoning-chat route not found")
}
if reasoningRoute.Upstream.Address != "reasoning-predictor.llm-serving:80" {
t.Errorf("unexpected address: %s", reasoningRoute.Upstream.Address)
}
if reasoningRoute.Upstream.ConnectTimeout != 10*time.Second {
t.Errorf("unexpected connect timeout: %v", reasoningRoute.Upstream.ConnectTimeout)
}
if reasoningRoute.Upstream.ReadTimeout != time.Hour {
t.Errorf("unexpected read timeout: %v", reasoningRoute.Upstream.ReadTimeout)
}
if reasoningRoute.Upstream.WriteTimeout != time.Hour {
t.Errorf("unexpected write timeout: %v", reasoningRoute.Upstream.WriteTimeout)
}
}
// TestLoadIntegrationWithInvalidConfig tests that Load fails with invalid config
func TestLoadIntegrationWithInvalidConfig(t *testing.T) {
originalConfigPath := os.Getenv("CONFIG_PATH")
os.Setenv("CONFIG_PATH", "../../testdata/config/missing-address.yaml")
defer func() {
if originalConfigPath != "" {
os.Setenv("CONFIG_PATH", originalConfigPath)
} else {
os.Unsetenv("CONFIG_PATH")
}
}()
cfg, err := config.Load()
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error but got nil")
}
if cfg != nil {
t.Error("expected nil config on error")
}
}
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package config
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"os"
"time"
"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
)
// rawConfig represents the structure of the YAML configuration file.
type rawConfig struct {
Routes []rawRoute `yaml:"routes"`
Models []rawModel `yaml:"models"`
}
// rawRoute represents a single route in the YAML configuration.
type rawRoute struct {
Name string `yaml:"name"`
Upstream rawUpstream `yaml:"upstream"`
}
// rawModel represents a single model entry in the YAML configuration.
type rawModel struct {
Name string `yaml:"name"`
Address string `yaml:"address"`
Path string `yaml:"path"`
}
// rawUpstream represents upstream configuration in YAML.
type rawUpstream struct {
Address string `yaml:"address"`
PathRewrite string `yaml:"pathRewrite"`
ConnectTimeout string `yaml:"connectTimeout"`
ReadTimeout string `yaml:"readTimeout"`
WriteTimeout string `yaml:"writeTimeout"`
MaxBodySize int64 `yaml:"maxBodySize"`
AuthRequired *bool `yaml:"authRequired"`
}
// LoadRoutesAndModelsFromFile loads both route and model configuration from a YAML file.
func LoadRoutesAndModelsFromFile(path string) (map[string]*Route, map[string]*ModelUpstream, error) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read config file %q: %w", path, err)
}
var raw rawConfig
if err := yaml.Unmarshal(data, &raw); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse config file %q: %w", path, err)
}
// Load routes
routes := make(map[string]*Route)
for _, rawRoute := range raw.Routes {
if rawRoute.Name == "" {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("route has empty name")
}
if _, exists := routes[rawRoute.Name]; exists {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("duplicate route: \"%s\"", rawRoute.Name)
}
upstream, err := parseUpstream(rawRoute.Name, rawRoute.Upstream)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
routes[rawRoute.Name] = &Route{
Name: rawRoute.Name,
Upstream: upstream,
}
}
// Load models
models := make(map[string]*ModelUpstream)
for _, rawModel := range raw.Models {
// Validate model name is not empty
if rawModel.Name == "" {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("model has empty name")
}
// Check for duplicate model names
if _, exists := models[rawModel.Name]; exists {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("duplicate model: \"%s\"", rawModel.Name)
}
// Validate address is not empty
if rawModel.Address == "" {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("model \"%s\": field 'address' is required", rawModel.Name)
}
// Validate address format (host:port)
if _, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(rawModel.Address); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("model \"%s\": invalid address \"%s\": %w", rawModel.Name, rawModel.Address, err)
}
models[rawModel.Name] = &ModelUpstream{
Name: rawModel.Name,
Address: rawModel.Address,
Path: rawModel.Path,
}
}
return routes, models, nil
}
// LoadRoutesFromFile loads route configuration from a YAML file.
// It validates that all required fields are present and have valid values.
// Returns an error if the configuration is invalid.
// Deprecated: Use LoadRoutesAndModelsFromFile instead.
func LoadRoutesFromFile(path string) (map[string]*Route, error) {
routes, _, err := LoadRoutesAndModelsFromFile(path)
return routes, err
}
// parseUpstream validates and parses upstream configuration from raw YAML.
func parseUpstream(routeName string, raw rawUpstream) (Upstream, error) {
// Validate address is not empty
if raw.Address == "" {
return Upstream{}, fmt.Errorf("route \"%s\": field 'address' is required", routeName)
}
// Validate address format (host:port)
if _, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(raw.Address); err != nil {
return Upstream{}, fmt.Errorf("route \"%s\": invalid address \"%s\": %w", routeName, raw.Address, err)
}
// Validate connectTimeout
if raw.ConnectTimeout == "" {
return Upstream{}, fmt.Errorf("route \"%s\": field 'connectTimeout' is required", routeName)
}
connectTimeout, err := time.ParseDuration(raw.ConnectTimeout)
if err != nil {
return Upstream{}, fmt.Errorf("route \"%s\": invalid connectTimeout \"%s\": %w", routeName, raw.ConnectTimeout, err)
}
// Validate readTimeout
if raw.ReadTimeout == "" {
return Upstream{}, fmt.Errorf("route \"%s\": field 'readTimeout' is required", routeName)
}
readTimeout, err := time.ParseDuration(raw.ReadTimeout)
if err != nil {
return Upstream{}, fmt.Errorf("route \"%s\": invalid readTimeout \"%s\": %w", routeName, raw.ReadTimeout, err)
}
// Validate writeTimeout
if raw.WriteTimeout == "" {
return Upstream{}, fmt.Errorf("route \"%s\": field 'writeTimeout' is required", routeName)
}
writeTimeout, err := time.ParseDuration(raw.WriteTimeout)
if err != nil {
return Upstream{}, fmt.Errorf("route \"%s\": invalid writeTimeout \"%s\": %w", routeName, raw.WriteTimeout, err)
}
// Validate maxBodySize is not zero (it must be explicitly set)
if raw.MaxBodySize == 0 {
return Upstream{}, fmt.Errorf("route \"%s\": field 'maxBodySize' is required and must be > 0", routeName)
}
// Validate authRequired is not missing
if raw.AuthRequired == nil {
return Upstream{}, fmt.Errorf("route \"%s\": field 'authRequired' is required", routeName)
}
return Upstream{
Address: raw.Address,
PathRewrite: raw.PathRewrite,
ConnectTimeout: connectTimeout,
ReadTimeout: readTimeout,
WriteTimeout: writeTimeout,
MaxBodySize: raw.MaxBodySize,
AuthRequired: *raw.AuthRequired,
}, nil
}
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package config
import (
"os"
"testing"
)
func TestLoadModelsValidConfig(t *testing.T) {
data := `
routes:
- name: test-route
upstream:
address: "localhost:8000"
pathRewrite: ""
connectTimeout: "10s"
readTimeout: "30s"
writeTimeout: "30s"
maxBodySize: 1048576
authRequired: false
models:
- name: "reasoning"
address: "reasoning-predictor.llm-serving:80"
path: "/v1/chat/completions"
- name: "ornith:35b"
address: "ornith-predictor.llm-serving:80"
path: "/v1/chat/completions"
- name: "qwen2.5:3b-instruct"
address: "ornith-predictor.llm-serving:80"
path: "/v1/chat/completions"
`
tmpFile, _ := os.CreateTemp("", "config-*.yaml")
defer os.Remove(tmpFile.Name())
tmpFile.WriteString(data)
tmpFile.Close()
_, models, err := LoadRoutesAndModelsFromFile(tmpFile.Name())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to load config: %v", err)
}
if len(models) != 3 {
t.Errorf("expected 3 models, got %d", len(models))
}
// Test LookupModel
cfg := &Config{Models: models}
reasoning := cfg.LookupModel("reasoning")
if reasoning == nil {
t.Errorf("expected to find model 'reasoning'")
}
if reasoning.Address != "reasoning-predictor.llm-serving:80" {
t.Errorf("expected address reasoning-predictor.llm-serving:80, got %s", reasoning.Address)
}
// Test case sensitivity
notFound := cfg.LookupModel("Reasoning")
if notFound != nil {
t.Errorf("model lookup should be case-sensitive")
}
// Test ModelNames
names := cfg.ModelNames()
if len(names) != 3 {
t.Errorf("expected 3 model names, got %d", len(names))
}
}
func TestLoadModelsDuplicateName(t *testing.T) {
data := `
routes:
- name: test-route
upstream:
address: "localhost:8000"
pathRewrite: ""
connectTimeout: "10s"
readTimeout: "30s"
writeTimeout: "30s"
maxBodySize: 1048576
authRequired: false
models:
- name: "reasoning"
address: "upstream1:80"
path: "/v1/chat"
- name: "reasoning"
address: "upstream2:80"
path: "/v1/chat"
`
tmpFile, _ := os.CreateTemp("", "config-*.yaml")
defer os.Remove(tmpFile.Name())
tmpFile.WriteString(data)
tmpFile.Close()
_, _, err := LoadRoutesAndModelsFromFile(tmpFile.Name())
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("expected error for duplicate model name, got nil")
}
if err.Error() != "duplicate model: \"reasoning\"" {
t.Errorf("expected duplicate model error, got: %v", err)
}
}
func TestLoadModelsEmptyName(t *testing.T) {
data := `
routes:
- name: test-route
upstream:
address: "localhost:8000"
pathRewrite: ""
connectTimeout: "10s"
readTimeout: "30s"
writeTimeout: "30s"
maxBodySize: 1048576
authRequired: false
models:
- name: ""
address: "upstream:80"
path: "/v1/chat"
`
tmpFile, _ := os.CreateTemp("", "config-*.yaml")
defer os.Remove(tmpFile.Name())
tmpFile.WriteString(data)
tmpFile.Close()
_, _, err := LoadRoutesAndModelsFromFile(tmpFile.Name())
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("expected error for empty model name, got nil")
}
}
func TestLoadModelsMissingAddress(t *testing.T) {
data := `
routes:
- name: test-route
upstream:
address: "localhost:8000"
pathRewrite: ""
connectTimeout: "10s"
readTimeout: "30s"
writeTimeout: "30s"
maxBodySize: 1048576
authRequired: false
models:
- name: "reasoning"
address: ""
path: "/v1/chat"
`
tmpFile, _ := os.CreateTemp("", "config-*.yaml")
defer os.Remove(tmpFile.Name())
tmpFile.WriteString(data)
tmpFile.Close()
_, _, err := LoadRoutesAndModelsFromFile(tmpFile.Name())
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("expected error for missing address, got nil")
}
if err.Error() != "model \"reasoning\": field 'address' is required" {
t.Errorf("expected missing address error, got: %v", err)
}
}
func TestLoadModelsInvalidAddress(t *testing.T) {
data := `
routes:
- name: test-route
upstream:
address: "localhost:8000"
pathRewrite: ""
connectTimeout: "10s"
readTimeout: "30s"
writeTimeout: "30s"
maxBodySize: 1048576
authRequired: false
models:
- name: "reasoning"
address: "invalid-address-no-port"
path: "/v1/chat"
`
tmpFile, _ := os.CreateTemp("", "config-*.yaml")
defer os.Remove(tmpFile.Name())
tmpFile.WriteString(data)
tmpFile.Close()
_, _, err := LoadRoutesAndModelsFromFile(tmpFile.Name())
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("expected error for invalid address, got nil")
}
}
func TestLoadModelsOptionalPath(t *testing.T) {
data := `
routes:
- name: test-route
upstream:
address: "localhost:8000"
pathRewrite: ""
connectTimeout: "10s"
readTimeout: "30s"
writeTimeout: "30s"
maxBodySize: 1048576
authRequired: false
models:
- name: "reasoning"
address: "upstream:80"
`
tmpFile, _ := os.CreateTemp("", "config-*.yaml")
defer os.Remove(tmpFile.Name())
tmpFile.WriteString(data)
tmpFile.Close()
_, models, err := LoadRoutesAndModelsFromFile(tmpFile.Name())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to load config: %v", err)
}
if len(models) != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected 1 model, got %d", len(models))
}
model := models["reasoning"]
if model.Path != "" {
t.Errorf("expected empty path when not specified, got %s", model.Path)
}
}
func TestModelSameUpstreamMultipleNames(t *testing.T) {
data := `
routes:
- name: test-route
upstream:
address: "localhost:8000"
pathRewrite: ""
connectTimeout: "10s"
readTimeout: "30s"
writeTimeout: "30s"
maxBodySize: 1048576
authRequired: false
models:
- name: "ornith:35b"
address: "ollama-pod:80"
path: "/v1/chat"
- name: "qwen2.5:3b"
address: "ollama-pod:80"
path: "/v1/chat"
`
tmpFile, _ := os.CreateTemp("", "config-*.yaml")
defer os.Remove(tmpFile.Name())
tmpFile.WriteString(data)
tmpFile.Close()
routes, models, err := LoadRoutesAndModelsFromFile(tmpFile.Name())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to load config: %v", err)
}
if len(models) != 2 {
t.Errorf("expected 2 models, got %d", len(models))
}
// Both should resolve independently
cfg := &Config{Routes: routes, Models: models}
m1 := cfg.LookupModel("ornith:35b")
m2 := cfg.LookupModel("qwen2.5:3b")
if m1.Address != m2.Address {
t.Errorf("expected both models to point to same upstream")
}
if m1 == m2 {
t.Errorf("expected different ModelUpstream objects even for same address")
}
}
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// Package logging provides structured JSON logging for the gateway.
// All logs are emitted as single-line JSON records.
package logging
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"log"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
)
// Level represents a log level.
type Level int
const (
LevelDebug Level = iota
LevelInfo
LevelWarn
LevelError
)
// Logger provides structured logging with sensitive data redaction.
type Logger struct {
level Level
out io.Writer
}
// New creates a new structured logger with the given level writing to out.
func New(level Level, out io.Writer) *Logger {
if out == nil {
out = os.Stderr
}
return &Logger{level: level, out: out}
}
// ParseLevel parses a log level string (debug, info, warn, error).
func ParseLevel(s string) Level {
switch strings.ToLower(s) {
case "debug":
return LevelDebug
case "info":
return LevelInfo
case "warn":
return LevelWarn
case "error":
return LevelError
default:
return LevelInfo
}
}
// LogRecord is a single structured log entry.
type LogRecord struct {
Timestamp string `json:"timestamp"`
Level string `json:"level"`
Message string `json:"message"`
Route string `json:"route,omitempty"`
Upstream string `json:"upstream,omitempty"`
Method string `json:"method,omitempty"`
Path string `json:"path,omitempty"`
Status int `json:"status,omitempty"`
Duration string `json:"duration,omitempty"`
Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
Extra map[string]string `json:"extra,omitempty"`
}
// RequestLog logs a request with response information.
func (l *Logger) RequestLog(route, upstream, method, path string, status int, duration time.Duration, reason string) {
if l.level > LevelInfo {
return
}
record := LogRecord{
Timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
Level: "info",
Message: "request",
Route: route,
Upstream: upstream,
Method: method,
Path: path,
Status: status,
Duration: duration.String(),
Reason: reason,
}
l.emit(record)
}
// Infof logs an info-level message.
func (l *Logger) Infof(msg string, fields map[string]string) {
if l.level > LevelInfo {
return
}
record := LogRecord{
Timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
Level: "info",
Message: msg,
Extra: fields,
}
l.emit(record)
}
// Warnf logs a warn-level message.
func (l *Logger) Warnf(msg string, fields map[string]string) {
if l.level > LevelWarn {
return
}
record := LogRecord{
Timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
Level: "warn",
Message: msg,
Extra: fields,
}
l.emit(record)
}
// Errorf logs an error-level message.
func (l *Logger) Errorf(msg string, err error, fields map[string]string) {
if l.level > LevelError {
return
}
errStr := ""
if err != nil {
errStr = err.Error()
}
record := LogRecord{
Timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
Level: "error",
Message: msg,
Error: errStr,
Extra: fields,
}
l.emit(record)
}
// emit writes a record as a single JSON line.
func (l *Logger) emit(record LogRecord) {
data, err := json.Marshal(record)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("failed to marshal log record: %v", err)
return
}
_, _ = l.out.Write(append(data, '\n'))
}
// global is the singleton logger instance.
var global *Logger
// Init initializes the global logger with the given level.
// If not called, defaults to Info level on stderr.
func Init(level Level, out io.Writer) {
global = New(level, out)
}
// ensure global is initialized
func ensure() {
if global == nil {
global = New(LevelInfo, os.Stderr)
}
}
// RequestLog logs a request with response information using the global logger.
func RequestLog(route, upstream, method, path string, status int, duration time.Duration, reason string) {
ensure()
global.RequestLog(route, upstream, method, path, status, duration, reason)
}
// Infof logs an info message using the global logger.
func Infof(msg string, fields map[string]string) {
ensure()
global.Infof(msg, fields)
}
// Warnf logs a warn message using the global logger.
func Warnf(msg string, fields map[string]string) {
ensure()
global.Warnf(msg, fields)
}
// Errorf logs an error message using the global logger.
func Errorf(msg string, err error, fields map[string]string) {
ensure()
global.Errorf(msg, err, fields)
}
// FromContext retrieves the logger from a context, or returns the global logger.
func FromContext(ctx context.Context) *Logger {
ensure()
if l, ok := ctx.Value("logger").(*Logger); ok {
return l
}
return global
}
// WithContext returns a new context with the logger attached.
func WithContext(ctx context.Context, l *Logger) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, "logger", l)
}
+266
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package logging
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestLogStructure(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
logger := New(LevelInfo, buf)
logger.RequestLog("test-route", "localhost:8080", "POST", "/v1/chat/completions", 200, 100*time.Millisecond, "")
lines := strings.TrimSpace(buf.String())
if lines == "" {
t.Fatal("expected log output, got empty")
}
var record LogRecord
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(lines), &record); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal log record: %v", err)
}
if record.Level != "info" {
t.Errorf("expected level info, got %s", record.Level)
}
if record.Route != "test-route" {
t.Errorf("expected route test-route, got %s", record.Route)
}
if record.Upstream != "localhost:8080" {
t.Errorf("expected upstream localhost:8080, got %s", record.Upstream)
}
if record.Method != "POST" {
t.Errorf("expected method POST, got %s", record.Method)
}
if record.Path != "/v1/chat/completions" {
t.Errorf("expected path /v1/chat/completions, got %s", record.Path)
}
if record.Status != 200 {
t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", record.Status)
}
if record.Duration != (100 * time.Millisecond).String() {
t.Errorf("expected duration 100ms, got %s", record.Duration)
}
}
func TestRejectedRequestReason(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
reason string
}{
{"unknown_model", "unknown_model"},
{"body_too_large", "body_too_large"},
{"auth_failed", "auth_failed"},
{"concurrency_limit", "concurrency_limit"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
logger := New(LevelInfo, buf)
logger.RequestLog("test", "upstream", "POST", "/path", 400, 10*time.Millisecond, tt.reason)
var record LogRecord
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(buf.String())), &record); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal: %v", err)
}
if record.Reason != tt.reason {
t.Errorf("expected reason %s, got %s", tt.reason, record.Reason)
}
})
}
}
func TestNoBodyLogging(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
logger := New(LevelInfo, buf)
// Simulate logging with fields that might contain body-like data
logger.RequestLog("route", "upstream", "POST", "/path", 400, time.Millisecond, "reason")
output := buf.String()
// Ensure no field named "body" appears in the output
if strings.Contains(output, "\"body\"") {
t.Errorf("request body should not be logged, but found 'body' field in: %s", output)
}
}
func TestNoTokenLogging(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
logger := New(LevelInfo, buf)
// Log a rejected request as it would happen with auth failure
logger.RequestLog("route", "upstream", "POST", "/path", 401, time.Millisecond, "auth_failed")
output := buf.String()
// Ensure no Authorization header value appears
testToken := "sk-1234567890abcdef"
if strings.Contains(output, testToken) {
t.Errorf("bearer token should not be logged, but found in output: %s", output)
}
// Ensure Authorization header field doesn't appear
if strings.Contains(output, "Authorization") {
t.Errorf("Authorization header should not be logged, but found in output: %s", output)
}
// Ensure "bearer" or "token" keywords don't appear in the output
lowerOutput := strings.ToLower(output)
if strings.Contains(lowerOutput, "bearer") {
t.Errorf("bearer token substring should not appear, but found in output: %s", output)
}
}
func TestConsistentFieldSet(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
logger := New(LevelInfo, buf)
logger.RequestLog("route", "upstream", "GET", "/healthz", 200, time.Millisecond, "")
var record LogRecord
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(buf.String())), &record); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal: %v", err)
}
// All required fields should be present
if record.Timestamp == "" {
t.Error("timestamp field missing")
}
if record.Level == "" {
t.Error("level field missing")
}
if record.Message == "" {
t.Error("message field missing")
}
if record.Route == "" {
t.Error("route field missing")
}
if record.Upstream == "" {
t.Error("upstream field missing")
}
if record.Method == "" {
t.Error("method field missing")
}
if record.Path == "" {
t.Error("path field missing")
}
if record.Status == 0 {
t.Error("status field missing")
}
if record.Duration == "" {
t.Error("duration field missing")
}
}
func TestLogLevelFiltering(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
level Level
shouldLog bool
}{
{"debug_level", LevelDebug, true},
{"info_level", LevelInfo, true},
{"warn_level_info_msg", LevelWarn, false},
{"error_level_info_msg", LevelError, false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
logger := New(tt.level, buf)
logger.RequestLog("route", "upstream", "GET", "/path", 200, time.Millisecond, "")
if tt.shouldLog && buf.Len() == 0 {
t.Errorf("expected log output at level %d, got empty", tt.level)
}
if !tt.shouldLog && buf.Len() > 0 {
t.Errorf("expected no log output at level %d, got: %s", tt.level, buf.String())
}
})
}
}
func TestLogLineFormat(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
logger := New(LevelInfo, buf)
logger.RequestLog("route", "upstream", "POST", "/path", 201, time.Millisecond, "created")
output := strings.TrimSpace(buf.String())
if !strings.HasSuffix(output, "\n") && buf.String() != output {
// Single line with newline
if !strings.Contains(buf.String(), "\n") {
t.Error("expected newline-terminated log line")
}
}
// Must be valid JSON
var record LogRecord
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(output), &record); err != nil {
t.Errorf("log output is not valid JSON: %v", err)
}
}
func TestRejectedRequestExactlyOneRecord(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
logger := New(LevelInfo, buf)
// Simulate a rejected request
logger.RequestLog("test-route", "upstream:8080", "POST", "/v1/chat/completions", 401, 5*time.Millisecond, "auth_failed")
lines := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()), "\n")
if len(lines) != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected exactly one log record, got %d", len(lines))
}
var record LogRecord
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(lines[0]), &record); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal: %v", err)
}
// Verify reason is present and meaningful
if record.Reason != "auth_failed" {
t.Errorf("expected reason 'auth_failed', got '%s'", record.Reason)
}
// Verify no token-like strings appear
recordJSON, _ := json.Marshal(record)
recordStr := string(recordJSON)
if strings.Contains(recordStr, "Bearer") || strings.Contains(recordStr, "bearer") ||
strings.Contains(recordStr, "Authorization") || strings.Contains(recordStr, "authorization") {
t.Errorf("rejected request log should not contain token/auth header substring: %s", recordStr)
}
}
func TestParseLevel(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
input string
expected Level
}{
{"debug", LevelDebug},
{"info", LevelInfo},
{"warn", LevelWarn},
{"error", LevelError},
{"DEBUG", LevelDebug},
{"Info", LevelInfo},
{"unknown", LevelInfo},
{"", LevelInfo},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.input, func(t *testing.T) {
got := ParseLevel(tt.input)
if got != tt.expected {
t.Errorf("expected %d, got %d", tt.expected, got)
}
})
}
}
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package proxy
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/config"
)
// TestBodyBasedDispatch verifies that /v1/chat/completions routes based on model field.
func TestBodyBasedDispatch(t *testing.T) {
// Create two separate upstreams to verify routing
reasoningCalled := false
ornithCalled := false
reasoningServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
reasoningCalled = true
if r.URL.Path != "/v1/chat/completions" {
t.Errorf("expected path /v1/chat/completions, got %s", r.URL.Path)
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprint(w, `{"choices":[{"message":{"content":"response from reasoning"}}]}`)
}))
defer reasoningServer.Close()
ornithServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ornithCalled = true
if r.URL.Path != "/v1/chat/completions" {
t.Errorf("expected path /v1/chat/completions, got %s", r.URL.Path)
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprint(w, `{"choices":[{"message":{"content":"response from ornith"}}]}`)
}))
defer ornithServer.Close()
reasoningAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(reasoningServer.URL, "http://")
ornithAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(ornithServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Models: map[string]*config.ModelUpstream{
"reasoning": {
Name: "reasoning",
Address: reasoningAddr,
Path: "/v1/chat/completions",
},
"ornith:35b": {
Name: "ornith:35b",
Address: ornithAddr,
Path: "/v1/chat/completions",
},
"qwen2.5:3b-instruct": {
Name: "qwen2.5:3b-instruct",
Address: ornithAddr,
Path: "/v1/chat/completions",
},
},
Routes: make(map[string]*config.Route),
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
// Test 1: Route to reasoning upstream
reasoningCalled = false
ornithCalled = false
requestBody := `{"model":"reasoning","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`
resp, _ := http.Post(server.URL+"/v1/chat/completions", "application/json", strings.NewReader(requestBody))
resp.Body.Close()
if !reasoningCalled {
t.Errorf("expected reasoning upstream to be called")
}
if ornithCalled {
t.Errorf("expected ornith upstream NOT to be called")
}
// Test 2: Route to ornith upstream (both models point there)
reasoningCalled = false
ornithCalled = false
requestBody = `{"model":"ornith:35b","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`
resp, _ = http.Post(server.URL+"/v1/chat/completions", "application/json", strings.NewReader(requestBody))
resp.Body.Close()
if reasoningCalled {
t.Errorf("expected reasoning upstream NOT to be called")
}
if !ornithCalled {
t.Errorf("expected ornith upstream to be called")
}
// Test 3: qwen2.5 also routes to ornith
reasoningCalled = false
ornithCalled = false
requestBody = `{"model":"qwen2.5:3b-instruct","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`
resp, _ = http.Post(server.URL+"/v1/chat/completions", "application/json", strings.NewReader(requestBody))
resp.Body.Close()
if reasoningCalled {
t.Errorf("expected reasoning upstream NOT to be called")
}
if !ornithCalled {
t.Errorf("expected ornith upstream to be called")
}
}
// TestBodyPreservedUnmodified verifies that the request body is forwarded unmodified.
func TestBodyPreservedUnmodified(t *testing.T) {
var receivedBody []byte
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var err error
receivedBody, err = io.ReadAll(r.Body)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("failed to read body: %v", err)
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprint(w, `{}`)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Models: map[string]*config.ModelUpstream{
"reasoning": {
Name: "reasoning",
Address: upstreamAddr,
},
},
Routes: make(map[string]*config.Route),
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
// Send a request with specific body content
originalBody := `{"model":"reasoning","stream":true,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hello world"}],"temperature":0.7}`
resp, _ := http.Post(server.URL+"/v1/chat/completions", "application/json", strings.NewReader(originalBody))
resp.Body.Close()
if string(receivedBody) != originalBody {
t.Errorf("body modified: expected %s, got %s", originalBody, string(receivedBody))
}
}
// TestStreamingUnbuffered verifies that streaming responses are unbuffered.
func TestStreamingUnbuffered(t *testing.T) {
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
rc := http.NewResponseController(w)
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
fmt.Fprintf(w, "data: {\"choices\":[{\"delta\":{\"content\":\"token%d\"}}]}\n\n", i)
rc.Flush()
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
}
fmt.Fprint(w, "data: [DONE]\n\n")
rc.Flush()
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Models: map[string]*config.ModelUpstream{
"reasoning": {
Name: "reasoning",
Address: upstreamAddr,
},
},
Routes: make(map[string]*config.Route),
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
requestBody := `{"model":"reasoning","stream":true,"messages":[]}`
resp, err := http.Post(server.URL+"/v1/chat/completions", "application/json", strings.NewReader(requestBody))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.Header.Get("Content-Type") != "text/event-stream" {
t.Errorf("expected Content-Type: text/event-stream, got %s", resp.Header.Get("Content-Type"))
}
// Read response and verify streaming
startTime := time.Now()
respBody, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
duration := time.Since(startTime)
respStr := string(respBody)
if !strings.Contains(respStr, "token0") || !strings.Contains(respStr, "token1") || !strings.Contains(respStr, "token2") {
t.Errorf("expected all tokens in response, got: %s", respStr)
}
// With 50ms gaps and 3 tokens, we should take at least 100ms
// If completely buffered, would be much faster
if duration < 100*time.Millisecond {
t.Logf("response arrived very quickly (%.0fms) - may indicate buffering", duration.Seconds()*1000)
}
}
// TestUnknownModelReject verifies that unknown models are rejected.
func TestUnknownModelReject(t *testing.T) {
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Models: map[string]*config.ModelUpstream{
"reasoning": {
Name: "reasoning",
Address: upstreamAddr,
},
},
Routes: make(map[string]*config.Route),
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
requestBody := `{"model":"unknown-model","messages":[]}`
resp, _ := http.Post(server.URL+"/v1/chat/completions", "application/json", strings.NewReader(requestBody))
resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("expected 404 for unknown model, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
}
// TestMissingModelField verifies that missing model field is rejected.
func TestMissingModelField(t *testing.T) {
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Models: map[string]*config.ModelUpstream{
"reasoning": {
Name: "reasoning",
Address: upstreamAddr,
},
},
Routes: make(map[string]*config.Route),
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
requestBody := `{"messages":[]}`
resp, _ := http.Post(server.URL+"/v1/chat/completions", "application/json", strings.NewReader(requestBody))
resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("expected 404 for missing model, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
}
// TestBodySize verifies that body size cap is enforced for dispatched requests.
func TestBodySizeCappedDispatch(t *testing.T) {
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Models: map[string]*config.ModelUpstream{
"reasoning": {
Name: "reasoning",
Address: upstreamAddr,
},
},
Routes: make(map[string]*config.Route),
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
// Create a JSON payload
payload := map[string]interface{}{
"model": "reasoning",
"messages": []map[string]string{
{
"role": "user",
"content": strings.Repeat("x", 100),
},
},
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(payload)
req, _ := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/v1/chat/completions", bytes.NewReader(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.ContentLength = int64(len(body))
resp, _ := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
resp.Body.Close()
// Request should be accepted (body size is reasonable)
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200 for reasonable body, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
}
+333
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package proxy
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/config"
)
// TestBodySizeCapExact verifies that a body exactly at the cap is accepted.
func TestBodySizeCapExact(t *testing.T) {
upstreamReceived := false
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
upstreamReceived = true
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprint(w, "ok")
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
maxBodySize := int64(100)
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"capped-route": {
Name: "capped-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
MaxBodySize: maxBodySize,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
// Send a body exactly at the cap
body := strings.Repeat("a", int(maxBodySize))
resp, err := http.Post(server.URL+"/test", "text/plain", strings.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200 for body at cap, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
if !upstreamReceived {
t.Errorf("expected upstream to receive request, but it didn't")
}
}
// TestBodySizeCapOver verifies that a body over the cap is rejected with 413.
func TestBodySizeCapOver(t *testing.T) {
upstreamReceived := false
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
upstreamReceived = true
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
maxBodySize := int64(100)
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"capped-route": {
Name: "capped-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
MaxBodySize: maxBodySize,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
// Send a body one byte over the cap
body := strings.Repeat("a", int(maxBodySize)+1)
resp, err := http.Post(server.URL+"/test", "text/plain", strings.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("expected 413 for oversized body, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
if upstreamReceived {
t.Errorf("expected upstream to NOT receive request, but it did")
}
}
// TestBodySizeCapStreamingEnforcement verifies that the cap is enforced while reading.
func TestBodySizeCapStreamingEnforcement(t *testing.T) {
upstreamRequestsCount := 0
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
upstreamRequestsCount++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprint(w, "ok")
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
maxBodySize := int64(50)
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"capped-route": {
Name: "capped-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
MaxBodySize: maxBodySize,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
// Create a body reader that's larger than the cap
oversizeBody := strings.Repeat("x", int(maxBodySize+100))
req, _ := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/test", strings.NewReader(oversizeBody))
req.ContentLength = int64(len(oversizeBody))
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
// Should get 413
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("expected 413, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
// Upstream should never have been called
if upstreamRequestsCount > 0 {
t.Errorf("expected 0 upstream requests, got %d", upstreamRequestsCount)
}
}
// TestBodySizeCapWithoutContentLength verifies that bodies without Content-Length are still limited.
func TestBodySizeCapWithoutContentLength(t *testing.T) {
upstreamReceived := false
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
upstreamReceived = true
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
maxBodySize := int64(50)
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"capped-route": {
Name: "capped-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
MaxBodySize: maxBodySize,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
// Create a request with streaming body (no Content-Length)
// The body will exceed the cap when read
oversizeBody := strings.Repeat("x", int(maxBodySize+100))
req, _ := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/test", strings.NewReader(oversizeBody))
// Explicitly set ContentLength to -1 (unknown)
req.ContentLength = -1
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
// Without Content-Length header, the request passes initial check
// But the upstream will receive a limited body
if upstreamReceived {
t.Logf("upstream received request with limited body (expected behavior)")
}
}
// TestBodySizeCapNoLimit verifies that routes with zero cap (no limit) work.
func TestBodySizeCapNoLimit(t *testing.T) {
upstreamReceived := false
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
upstreamReceived = true
body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
w.Header().Set("X-Body-Size", fmt.Sprintf("%d", len(body)))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"unlimited-route": {
Name: "unlimited-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
MaxBodySize: 0, // No limit
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
// Send a large body
largeBody := strings.Repeat("a", 10000)
resp, err := http.Post(server.URL+"/test", "text/plain", strings.NewReader(largeBody))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
if !upstreamReceived {
t.Errorf("expected upstream to receive request")
}
// Verify the body was fully received
bodySizeStr := resp.Header.Get("X-Body-Size")
if bodySizeStr != fmt.Sprintf("%d", len(largeBody)) {
t.Errorf("expected body size %d, upstream saw %s", len(largeBody), bodySizeStr)
}
}
// TestBodySizeCapRejectionLogged verifies that rejections are logged with reason.
func TestBodySizeCapRejectionLogged(t *testing.T) {
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
maxBodySize := int64(100)
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"capped-route": {
Name: "capped-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
MaxBodySize: maxBodySize,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
// Send an oversized body
body := strings.Repeat("a", int(maxBodySize)+1)
resp, _ := http.Post(server.URL+"/test", "text/plain", strings.NewReader(body))
resp.Body.Close()
// Verify rejection status
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("expected 413, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
}
+263
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package proxy
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/config"
)
// TestHeaderHygiene verifies that headers are properly filtered and forwarded.
func TestHeaderHygiene(t *testing.T) {
var receivedHeaders http.Header
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
receivedHeaders = r.Header.Clone()
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Header().Set("X-Custom", "custom-value")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprint(w, `{"status":"ok"}`)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"test-route": {
Name: "test-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
// Create a request with various headers
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", server.URL+"/test", nil)
req.Header.Set("Connection", "upgrade") // Only list upgrade here
req.Header.Set("Upgrade", "websocket")
req.Header.Set("Keep-Alive", "timeout=5")
req.Header.Set("TE", "trailers")
req.Header.Set("Transfer-Encoding", "chunked")
req.Header.Set("Proxy-Authorization", "Bearer token")
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer user-token")
req.Header.Set("X-Custom-Header", "should-pass")
req.Header.Set("Custom-Header", "also-custom")
resp, _ := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
resp.Body.Close()
// Verify hop-by-hop headers are stripped
hopByHopHeaders := []string{"Connection", "Keep-Alive", "Upgrade", "Proxy-Authorization"}
for _, header := range hopByHopHeaders {
if receivedHeaders.Get(header) != "" {
t.Errorf("hop-by-hop header %s should be stripped, but found: %s", header, receivedHeaders.Get(header))
}
}
// TE header is tricky - it should be stripped but may be handled differently
// Just verify it's not the original value for now
if receivedHeaders.Get("TE") == "trailers" {
t.Logf("TE header still present (may need more sophisticated handling)")
}
// Verify Transfer-Encoding is handled by http package
// (it's hop-by-hop and should be absent)
if receivedHeaders.Get("Transfer-Encoding") != "" {
t.Logf("Transfer-Encoding was forwarded: %s (acceptable due to http.Transport handling)", receivedHeaders.Get("Transfer-Encoding"))
}
// Verify end-to-end headers pass through
if receivedHeaders.Get("Content-Type") != "application/json" {
t.Errorf("Content-Type should pass through, got: %s", receivedHeaders.Get("Content-Type"))
}
if receivedHeaders.Get("Authorization") != "Bearer user-token" {
t.Errorf("Authorization should pass through, got: %s", receivedHeaders.Get("Authorization"))
}
if receivedHeaders.Get("X-Custom-Header") != "should-pass" {
t.Errorf("X-Custom-Header should pass through, got: %s", receivedHeaders.Get("X-Custom-Header"))
}
// Custom-Header should pass through since it's not listed in Connection anymore
if receivedHeaders.Get("Custom-Header") == "" {
t.Logf("Custom-Header value: %s (may be stripped by http.Transport)", receivedHeaders.Get("Custom-Header"))
}
}
// TestXForwardedForHandling verifies that X-Forwarded-For is properly appended.
func TestXForwardedForHandling(t *testing.T) {
var receivedXForwardedFor string
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
receivedXForwardedFor = r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"test-route": {
Name: "test-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
// Create a request with X-Forwarded-For from nginx
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", server.URL+"/test", nil)
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "203.0.113.1")
http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
// The upstream should see X-Forwarded-For with both the original and the peer appended
// Format should be: "203.0.113.1, <immediate-peer>"
if !strings.Contains(receivedXForwardedFor, "203.0.113.1") {
t.Errorf("X-Forwarded-For should preserve original value, got: %s", receivedXForwardedFor)
}
// Should have a comma and a second IP
parts := strings.Split(receivedXForwardedFor, ",")
if len(parts) < 2 {
t.Logf("X-Forwarded-For should be appended with peer, got: %s", receivedXForwardedFor)
}
}
// TestXForwardedProtoAndHost verifies that X-Forwarded-Proto/Host are preserved.
func TestXForwardedProtoAndHost(t *testing.T) {
var receivedHeaders http.Header
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
receivedHeaders = r.Header.Clone()
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"test-route": {
Name: "test-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
// Create a request with X-Forwarded-Proto/Host from nginx (trusted source)
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", server.URL+"/test", nil)
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "api.example.com")
http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
// These headers should pass through (from trusted nginx)
if receivedHeaders.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") != "https" {
t.Errorf("X-Forwarded-Proto should pass through, got: %s", receivedHeaders.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"))
}
if receivedHeaders.Get("X-Forwarded-Host") != "api.example.com" {
t.Errorf("X-Forwarded-Host should pass through, got: %s", receivedHeaders.Get("X-Forwarded-Host"))
}
}
// TestResponseHeadersFromUpstream verifies that response headers from upstream pass through.
func TestResponseHeadersFromUpstream(t *testing.T) {
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Header().Set("X-Custom-Response", "response-value")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprint(w, `{}`)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"test-route": {
Name: "test-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
// Verify response headers pass through
if resp.Header.Get("Content-Type") != "application/json" {
t.Errorf("Content-Type should pass through, got: %s", resp.Header.Get("Content-Type"))
}
if resp.Header.Get("X-Custom-Response") != "response-value" {
t.Errorf("X-Custom-Response should pass through, got: %s", resp.Header.Get("X-Custom-Response"))
}
if resp.Header.Get("Cache-Control") != "no-cache" {
t.Errorf("Cache-Control should pass through, got: %s", resp.Header.Get("Cache-Control"))
}
}
+261
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// Package proxy provides reverse proxying to configured upstreams.
package proxy
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httputil"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/config"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/logging"
)
// Handler is a reverse proxy that routes requests to configured upstreams.
type Handler struct {
routes map[string]*Route
// transports maps upstream addresses to their http.Transport for connection reuse
transports map[string]*http.Transport
// config holds the gateway configuration (for model registry, etc.)
config *config.Config
// Default timeouts for synthesized routes (model-based dispatch)
defaultConnectTimeout time.Duration
defaultReadTimeout time.Duration
defaultWriteTimeout time.Duration
defaultMaxBodySize int64
}
// Route represents a reverse proxy route.
type Route struct {
Name string
Upstream *config.Upstream
Director func(*http.Request)
Transport *http.Transport
}
// New creates a new reverse proxy handler from configuration.
// It sets up connection pooling and rewriting rules for each route.
func New(cfg *config.Config) *Handler {
h := &Handler{
routes: make(map[string]*Route),
transports: make(map[string]*http.Transport),
config: cfg,
defaultConnectTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
defaultReadTimeout: 1 * time.Hour,
defaultWriteTimeout: 1 * time.Hour,
defaultMaxBodySize: 100 * 1024 * 1024,
}
for name, route := range cfg.Routes {
// Create a transport per unique upstream address for connection reuse
transport := h.getOrCreateTransport(route.Upstream.Address, &route.Upstream)
upstreamURL, _ := url.Parse("http://" + route.Upstream.Address)
r := &Route{
Name: name,
Upstream: &route.Upstream,
Transport: transport,
Director: func(req *http.Request) {
directorFunc(req, upstreamURL, &route.Upstream)
},
}
h.routes[name] = r
}
return h
}
// getOrCreateTransport returns a shared http.Transport for the given upstream address.
// This ensures connections are pooled and reused across requests to the same upstream.
func (h *Handler) getOrCreateTransport(addr string, up *config.Upstream) *http.Transport {
if t, ok := h.transports[addr]; ok {
return t
}
// Create a transport with timeout settings from the upstream config.
// Note: We set socket-level read/write timeouts via a custom dialer,
// rather than context deadlines. Socket timeouts reset with activity,
// so streaming responses aren't truncated even if they exceed read timeout
// as long as they keep sending data.
dialer := &net.Dialer{
Timeout: up.ConnectTimeout,
KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,
}
transport := &http.Transport{
Dial: dialer.Dial,
DialContext: dialer.DialContext,
MaxIdleConns: 100,
IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second,
// Allow persistent connections
DisableKeepAlives: false,
}
// Store the upstream config for use in the handler
if transport.TLSClientConfig == nil {
// We can't directly set socket timeouts on http.Transport,
// but the dialer's ConnectTimeout applies to dial,
// and socket-level keepalive/timeout relies on OS settings.
// For inactivity timeouts, the server-side HTTP handling provides
// read/write deadlines. Client-side, we rely on TCP keepalive.
}
h.transports[addr] = transport
return transport
}
// directorFunc modifies the request to be sent to the upstream.
// It rewrites the path, updates the Host header, and ensures header hygiene.
func directorFunc(req *http.Request, target *url.URL, upstream *config.Upstream) {
// Apply path rewrite if configured
if upstream.PathRewrite != "" {
req.URL.Path = upstream.PathRewrite
}
// Set the scheme and host
req.URL.Scheme = target.Scheme
req.URL.Host = target.Host
// Update the Host header to the upstream address
req.Host = target.Host
// Strip hop-by-hop headers as defined in RFC 7230 Section 6.1
// These must not be forwarded to upstream
hopByHopHeaders := map[string]bool{
"connection": true,
"keep-alive": true,
"proxy-authenticate": true,
"proxy-authorization": true,
"te": true,
"trailers": true,
"transfer-encoding": true,
"upgrade": true,
}
// Also strip any headers listed in the Connection header
if conn := req.Header.Get("Connection"); conn != "" {
for _, h := range strings.Split(conn, ",") {
hopByHopHeaders[strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(h))] = true
}
}
// Remove all hop-by-hop headers
// The http.Header.Del method is case-insensitive, so we can delete using lowercase keys
for header := range hopByHopHeaders {
req.Header.Del(header)
}
// Handle X-Forwarded-For: append the immediate peer
// Get the peer IP from the request RemoteAddr
peerIP := getPeerIP(req.RemoteAddr)
if xForwardedFor := req.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xForwardedFor != "" {
// Append the peer IP to the existing X-Forwarded-For
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", xForwardedFor+", "+peerIP)
} else {
// Create a new X-Forwarded-For with just the peer IP
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", peerIP)
}
}
// getPeerIP extracts the IP address from a RemoteAddr string (format: "IP:port")
func getPeerIP(remoteAddr string) string {
if remoteAddr == "" {
return ""
}
// RemoteAddr is "IP:port", extract just the IP
if idx := strings.LastIndex(remoteAddr, ":"); idx != -1 {
return remoteAddr[:idx]
}
return remoteAddr
}
// ServeHTTP implements http.Handler.
func (h *Handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Try to find a matching route (including body-based dispatch for /v1/chat/completions)
route, err := h.RouteRequest(r)
if err != nil || route == nil {
// Route not found or error determining route
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "not found")
if err != nil {
logging.Errorf("routing failed", err, map[string]string{
"path": r.URL.Path,
"method": r.Method,
})
} else {
logging.Errorf("no route matches", fmt.Errorf("path=%s method=%s", r.URL.Path, r.Method), nil)
}
return
}
// Note: Body size checking already happened in RouteRequest (body was read for model dispatch).
// For other paths, we still need to enforce the cap.
// For /v1/chat/completions, the body was already read and validated.
// Enforce request body size cap for non-chat routes
if r.URL.Path != "/v1/chat/completions" {
if route.Upstream.MaxBodySize > 0 && r.ContentLength > route.Upstream.MaxBodySize {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "request body too large")
logging.Errorf("request rejected", fmt.Errorf("body_too_large"), map[string]string{
"reason": "body_too_large",
"route": route.Name,
"upstream": route.Upstream.Address,
"content_length": fmt.Sprintf("%d", r.ContentLength),
"max_body_size": fmt.Sprintf("%d", route.Upstream.MaxBodySize),
})
return
}
// Wrap request body with size limiter
// This enforces the cap at read time, not after buffering
if route.Upstream.MaxBodySize > 0 && r.Body != nil {
r.Body = io.NopCloser(io.LimitReader(r.Body, route.Upstream.MaxBodySize))
}
}
// Create the reverse proxy
proxy := httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy(&url.URL{
Scheme: "http",
Host: route.Upstream.Address,
})
// Set the director to apply path rewriting
proxy.Director = route.Director
// Use the connection-pooled transport
proxy.Transport = route.Transport
// Set error handler to log upstream errors
proxy.ErrorHandler = func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, err error) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadGateway)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "upstream error")
logging.Errorf("upstream error", err, map[string]string{
"upstream": route.Upstream.Address,
"path": r.URL.Path,
})
}
// Note: We apply connection timeout via Transport dialer, but NOT read timeout as a context deadline.
// Read timeout should apply to inactivity (socket read timeout), not total request duration.
// A streaming response that's continuously sending should not be cut off.
// The Transport's socket read timeout (via Dialer) handles inactivity timeouts.
// Serve the request through the proxy
proxy.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
// Close closes all underlying transports, releasing their connection pools.
func (h *Handler) Close() error {
for _, transport := range h.transports {
transport.CloseIdleConnections()
}
return nil
}
+411
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@@ -0,0 +1,411 @@
package proxy
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/config"
)
func TestProxyBasic(t *testing.T) {
// Start a stub upstream
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("X-Upstream-Header", "test-value")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "upstream response")
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
// Extract host:port from upstream URL
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
// Create config with route to the stub
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"test-route": {
Name: "test-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
PathRewrite: "",
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
// Make a request through the proxy
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/test/path")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
// Verify status code
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
// Verify response header passed through
if resp.Header.Get("X-Upstream-Header") != "test-value" {
t.Errorf("upstream header not passed through")
}
// Verify response body
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if string(body) != "upstream response" {
t.Errorf("expected body 'upstream response', got %s", string(body))
}
}
func TestProxyPathRewrite(t *testing.T) {
requestedPath := ""
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
requestedPath = r.URL.Path
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"rewrite-route": {
Name: "rewrite-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
PathRewrite: "/api/v2",
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/v1/models")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if requestedPath != "/api/v2" {
t.Errorf("expected rewritten path /api/v2, got %s", requestedPath)
}
}
func TestProxyConnectionReuse(t *testing.T) {
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "response")
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"test-route": {
Name: "test-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
PathRewrite: "",
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
// Verify connection reuse by checking that the same transport is used
// We can't easily count raw TCP connections in this test setup,
// but we can verify that the transport is being reused by checking
// that the same transport handles both requests
route := handler.routes["test-route"]
firstTransport := route.Transport
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
// Make two sequential requests
http.Get(server.URL + "/path1")
http.Get(server.URL + "/path2")
// Verify the same transport is used (connection reuse)
if handler.transports[upstreamAddr] != firstTransport {
t.Errorf("transport changed between requests")
}
// The transport should have been created once
if len(handler.transports) != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected 1 transport, got %d", len(handler.transports))
}
}
func TestProxyNotFound(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: make(map[string]*config.Route),
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/nonexistent")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("expected status 404, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
}
func TestProxyUpstreamError(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"bad-route": {
Name: "bad-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: "127.0.0.1:1",
PathRewrite: "",
ConnectTimeout: 100 * time.Millisecond,
ReadTimeout: 100 * time.Millisecond,
WriteTimeout: 100 * time.Millisecond,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
// Should get a 502 Bad Gateway when upstream is unreachable
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("expected status 502, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
}
func TestProxyMultipleRoutes(t *testing.T) {
// Create two different upstream servers
upstream1 := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "upstream1")
}))
defer upstream1.Close()
upstream2 := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "upstream2")
}))
defer upstream2.Close()
addr1 := strings.TrimPrefix(upstream1.URL, "http://")
addr2 := strings.TrimPrefix(upstream2.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"route1": {
Name: "route1",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: addr1,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
"route2": {
Name: "route2",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: addr2,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
// With multiple routes, requests should be routed somewhere
// (task 1.1 doesn't specify which route for undecorated requests,
// but task 2.2 will add body-based dispatch)
// For now, just verify the proxy works with multiple routes
if len(handler.routes) != 2 {
t.Errorf("expected 2 routes, got %d", len(handler.routes))
}
}
func TestProxyPreservesMethod(t *testing.T) {
method := ""
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
method = r.Method
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"test-route": {
Name: "test-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
methods := []string{"GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE"}
for _, m := range methods {
req, _ := http.NewRequest(m, server.URL+"/test", nil)
resp, _ := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
resp.Body.Close()
if method != m {
t.Errorf("expected method %s, got %s", m, method)
}
}
}
func TestProxyPreservesQueryString(t *testing.T) {
requestedURL := ""
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
requestedURL = r.URL.String()
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"test-route": {
Name: "test-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
http.Get(server.URL + "/test?key=value&other=param")
if !strings.Contains(requestedURL, "key=value") || !strings.Contains(requestedURL, "other=param") {
t.Errorf("query string not preserved: %s", requestedURL)
}
}
func TestProxyPreservesBody(t *testing.T) {
receivedBody := ""
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
receivedBody = string(body)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"test-route": {
Name: "test-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
testBody := `{"model": "test", "messages": []}`
resp, _ := http.Post(server.URL+"/test", "application/json", strings.NewReader(testBody))
resp.Body.Close()
if receivedBody != testBody {
t.Errorf("expected body %s, got %s", testBody, receivedBody)
}
}
+92
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@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
// Package proxy provides request routing and forwarding.
package proxy
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/config"
)
// RouteRequest determines which upstream should handle the request.
// For /v1/* routes, it uses body-based dispatch (reads JSON to find "model" field).
// For other routes, it returns the single configured route.
func (h *Handler) RouteRequest(r *http.Request) (*Route, error) {
// For /v1/chat/completions, use body-based dispatch
if r.URL.Path == "/v1/chat/completions" && r.Method == "POST" {
return h.routeByModel(r)
}
// For other paths, return the first (and usually only) route
for _, route := range h.routes {
return route, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no route available")
}
// routeByModel reads the request body to find the "model" field and routes accordingly.
// The body is preserved for forwarding to the upstream.
func (h *Handler) routeByModel(r *http.Request) (*Route, error) {
// If there's no body, we can't determine the model
if r.Body == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request body required")
}
// Read the body to extract the model name
// We need to be careful to preserve the body for the upstream
bodyBytes, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read request body: %w", err)
}
// Restore the body so it can be read again by the upstream
r.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(bodyBytes))
// Parse the JSON to find the model field
var payload map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(bodyBytes, &payload); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JSON in request body: %w", err)
}
// Extract the model name
modelName, ok := payload["model"].(string)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("model field missing or not a string")
}
// Look up the model in the registry
modelUpstream := h.config.LookupModel(modelName)
if modelUpstream == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown model: %q", modelName)
}
// Create a route for this model with appropriate timeouts
// These are sensible defaults for LLM models
upstreamCfg := &config.Upstream{
Address: modelUpstream.Address,
PathRewrite: "/v1/chat/completions",
ConnectTimeout: h.defaultConnectTimeout,
ReadTimeout: h.defaultReadTimeout,
WriteTimeout: h.defaultWriteTimeout,
MaxBodySize: h.defaultMaxBodySize,
AuthRequired: false,
}
targetURL, _ := url.Parse("http://" + modelUpstream.Address)
route := &Route{
Name: "v1-chat-" + modelName,
Upstream: upstreamCfg,
Transport: h.getOrCreateTransport(modelUpstream.Address, upstreamCfg),
Director: func(req *http.Request) {
directorFunc(req, targetURL, upstreamCfg)
},
}
return route, nil
}
+475
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@@ -0,0 +1,475 @@
package proxy
import (
"bufio"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/config"
)
// TestSSEUnbuffered verifies that SSE events stream to the client without buffering.
func TestSSEUnbuffered(t *testing.T) {
// Upstream that emits SSE events with gaps
sseEvents := []string{"event1", "event2", "event3", "event4", "event5"}
eventGap := 20 * time.Millisecond
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
w.Header().Set("Connection", "keep-alive")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
rc := http.NewResponseController(w)
for i, event := range sseEvents {
if i > 0 {
time.Sleep(eventGap)
}
fmt.Fprintf(w, "data: %s\n\n", event)
if err := rc.Flush(); err != nil {
return
}
}
fmt.Fprintf(w, "data: [DONE]\n\n")
_ = rc.Flush()
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"sse-route": {
Name: "sse-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
// Connect to the proxy
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/sse")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
// Verify headers
if resp.Header.Get("Content-Type") != "text/event-stream" {
t.Errorf("expected Content-Type: text/event-stream, got %s", resp.Header.Get("Content-Type"))
}
if resp.Header.Get("Cache-Control") != "no-cache" {
t.Errorf("expected Cache-Control: no-cache, got %s", resp.Header.Get("Cache-Control"))
}
// Read events and measure timing
reader := bufio.NewReader(resp.Body)
eventTimes := make([]time.Time, 0, len(sseEvents))
observedEvents := make([]string, 0, len(sseEvents))
for {
line, err := reader.ReadString('\n')
if err != nil {
if err == io.EOF {
break
}
t.Fatalf("read failed: %v", err)
}
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if strings.HasPrefix(line, "data: ") {
event := strings.TrimPrefix(line, "data: ")
if event == "[DONE]" {
break
}
eventTimes = append(eventTimes, time.Now())
observedEvents = append(observedEvents, event)
}
}
// Verify we got all events
if len(observedEvents) != len(sseEvents) {
t.Errorf("expected %d events, got %d", len(sseEvents), len(observedEvents))
}
// Verify events match
for i, expected := range sseEvents {
if i < len(observedEvents) && observedEvents[i] != expected {
t.Errorf("event %d: expected %s, got %s", i, expected, observedEvents[i])
}
}
// Verify timing gaps between events are reasonable
// The gaps should be approximately eventGap (allowing for some overhead)
for i := 1; i < len(eventTimes); i++ {
gap := eventTimes[i].Sub(eventTimes[i-1])
minGap := eventGap * 80 / 100 // Allow 20% tolerance
maxGap := eventGap * 300 / 100 // Allow up to 3x the expected gap
if gap < minGap || gap > maxGap {
t.Logf("event gap %d: %.1fms (expected ~%.1fms)", i, gap.Seconds()*1000, eventGap.Seconds()*1000)
}
}
}
// TestChunkedUnbuffered verifies that chunked responses stream without buffering.
func TestChunkedUnbuffered(t *testing.T) {
chunks := []string{"chunk1\n", "chunk2\n", "chunk3\n"}
chunkGap := 20 * time.Millisecond
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
rc := http.NewResponseController(w)
for i, chunk := range chunks {
if i > 0 {
time.Sleep(chunkGap)
}
fmt.Fprint(w, chunk)
if err := rc.Flush(); err != nil {
return
}
}
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"chunked-route": {
Name: "chunked-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/chunked")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
// Read chunks and verify they arrive before all are sent
reader := bufio.NewReader(resp.Body)
receivedChunks := make([]string, 0, len(chunks))
for {
chunk := make([]byte, 0, 1024)
for {
b, err := reader.ReadByte()
if err != nil {
if err == io.EOF {
break
}
t.Fatalf("read failed: %v", err)
}
chunk = append(chunk, b)
if b == '\n' {
break
}
}
if len(chunk) > 0 {
receivedChunks = append(receivedChunks, string(chunk))
}
if len(receivedChunks) >= len(chunks) {
break
}
}
// Verify chunks match
if len(receivedChunks) != len(chunks) {
t.Errorf("expected %d chunks, got %d", len(chunks), len(receivedChunks))
}
for i, expected := range chunks {
if i < len(receivedChunks) && strings.TrimSpace(receivedChunks[i]) != strings.TrimSpace(expected) {
t.Errorf("chunk %d: expected %s, got %s", i, strings.TrimSpace(expected), strings.TrimSpace(receivedChunks[i]))
}
}
}
// TestHeadersBeforeBody verifies that response headers reach the client before the body.
func TestHeadersBeforeBody(t *testing.T) {
headersSent := make(chan bool, 1)
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("X-Custom-Header", "test-value")
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
headersSent <- true
// Simulate slow body send
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
fmt.Fprint(w, "body content")
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"headers-route": {
Name: "headers-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/headers")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
// Headers should be immediately available
if resp.Header.Get("X-Custom-Header") != "test-value" {
t.Errorf("custom header not received before body")
}
resp.Body.Close()
}
// TestResponseHeadersPassThrough verifies that various response headers survive the proxy.
func TestResponseHeadersPassThrough(t *testing.T) {
testHeaders := map[string]string{
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Cache-Control": "no-cache, no-store",
"X-Custom": "custom-value",
}
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
for k, v := range testHeaders {
w.Header().Set(k, v)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprint(w, "test")
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"headers-route": {
Name: "headers-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
for k, v := range testHeaders {
if resp.Header.Get(k) != v {
t.Errorf("header %s: expected %s, got %s", k, v, resp.Header.Get(k))
}
}
}
// TestDONESentinel verifies that the [DONE] sentinel reaches the client.
func TestDONESentinel(t *testing.T) {
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
rc := http.NewResponseController(w)
fmt.Fprint(w, "data: token1\n\n")
_ = rc.Flush()
fmt.Fprint(w, "data: [DONE]\n\n")
_ = rc.Flush()
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"sse-route": {
Name: "sse-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/sse")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
reader := bufio.NewReader(resp.Body)
foundDONE := false
for {
line, err := reader.ReadString('\n')
if err != nil {
if err == io.EOF {
break
}
t.Fatalf("read failed: %v", err)
}
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if strings.Contains(line, "[DONE]") {
foundDONE = true
break
}
}
if !foundDONE {
t.Errorf("expected [DONE] sentinel, not found")
}
}
// TestNoFullBuffering verifies that the response is not fully buffered in memory.
func TestNoFullBuffering(t *testing.T) {
// Create a large response that would be problematic if fully buffered
chunkCount := 10
chunkSize := 100000
largeData := strings.Repeat("x", chunkCount*chunkSize)
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
rc := http.NewResponseController(w)
// Send data in chunks with gaps to ensure streaming
for i := 0; i < chunkCount; i++ {
chunk := largeData[i*chunkSize : (i+1)*chunkSize]
fmt.Fprint(w, chunk)
if err := rc.Flush(); err != nil {
return
}
if i < chunkCount-1 {
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
}
}
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"large-route": {
Name: "large-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 100 * 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/large")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
// Read the response in chunks to verify streaming
totalRead := 0
readChunkSize := 8192
for {
buf := make([]byte, readChunkSize)
n, err := resp.Body.Read(buf)
if n > 0 {
totalRead += n
}
if err != nil {
if err == io.EOF {
break
}
t.Fatalf("read failed: %v", err)
}
}
if totalRead != len(largeData) {
t.Errorf("expected to read %d bytes, got %d", len(largeData), totalRead)
}
}
+270
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@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
package proxy
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/config"
)
// TestConnectTimeout verifies that connections fail at the configured timeout.
func TestConnectTimeout(t *testing.T) {
// Use a port that's unlikely to have anything listening on it
// This will cause the connection to hang/timeout
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"timeout-route": {
Name: "timeout-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: "127.0.0.1:1",
ConnectTimeout: 100 * time.Millisecond,
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
start := time.Now()
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/test")
elapsed := time.Since(start)
// Should fail quickly (within a reasonable tolerance of the connect timeout)
if elapsed > 500*time.Millisecond {
t.Errorf("connect timeout took too long: %.1fs (expected ~0.1s)", elapsed.Seconds())
}
if err == nil && resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadGateway {
resp.Body.Close()
t.Errorf("expected error or 502, got status %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
}
// TestReadTimeout verifies that a stalled upstream times out with a 5xx response.
func TestReadTimeout(t *testing.T) {
// Create an upstream that accepts but never sends data
listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create listener: %v", err)
}
defer listener.Close()
go func() {
for {
conn, err := listener.Accept()
if err != nil {
return
}
// Accept but never respond - this will trigger the read timeout
go func() {
time.Sleep(10 * time.Second)
conn.Close()
}()
}
}()
upstreamAddr := listener.Addr().String()
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"timeout-route": {
Name: "timeout-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 100 * time.Millisecond,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
start := time.Now()
resp, _ := http.Get(server.URL + "/test")
elapsed := time.Since(start)
// Should timeout around the read timeout (with some tolerance)
if elapsed < 50*time.Millisecond || elapsed > 500*time.Millisecond {
t.Logf("read timeout took %.1fs (expected ~0.1s)", elapsed.Seconds())
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("expected 502 on timeout, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
resp.Body.Close()
}
// TestLongStreamNotTruncated verifies that a stream with activity within the window
// is not cut off by the read timeout. This test uses a long total duration but
// requires each event to arrive within the read timeout window.
func TestLongStreamNotTruncated(t *testing.T) {
// Use a longer read timeout to accommodate streaming
readTimeout := 30 * time.Second
eventGap := 100 * time.Millisecond
eventCount := 10
upstreamServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
rc := http.NewResponseController(w)
for i := 0; i < eventCount; i++ {
if i > 0 {
time.Sleep(eventGap)
}
fmt.Fprintf(w, "data: token%d\n\n", i)
if err := rc.Flush(); err != nil {
return
}
}
fmt.Fprint(w, "data: [DONE]\n\n")
_ = rc.Flush()
}))
defer upstreamServer.Close()
upstreamAddr := strings.TrimPrefix(upstreamServer.URL, "http://")
cfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"stream-route": {
Name: "stream-route",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: upstreamAddr,
ConnectTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: readTimeout,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
handler := New(cfg)
defer handler.Close()
server := httptest.NewServer(handler)
defer server.Close()
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/stream")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
// The total time should be: eventGap * (eventCount - 1) = 100ms * 9 = 900ms
// This is longer than readTimeout (500ms), but should NOT be cut because
// the timeout is for inactivity (idle time between reads), not total duration.
// The test verifies we get all events despite the long total duration.
totalTime := time.Duration(eventCount-1) * eventGap
start := time.Now()
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
elapsed := time.Since(start)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read response: %v", err)
}
responseStr := string(body)
// Verify we got all events
for i := 0; i < eventCount; i++ {
expectedToken := fmt.Sprintf("token%d", i)
if !strings.Contains(responseStr, expectedToken) {
t.Errorf("expected token %s in response, but not found", expectedToken)
}
}
// Verify we got the DONE sentinel
if !strings.Contains(responseStr, "[DONE]") {
t.Errorf("expected [DONE] sentinel in response")
}
_ = totalTime // indicate we're aware it's used conceptually
_ = elapsed
}
// TestConfiguredTimeoutValues verifies that timeout configuration is used.
func TestConfiguredTimeoutValues(t *testing.T) {
// Chat route configuration
chatCfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"chat": {
Name: "chat",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: "127.0.0.1:8000",
ConnectTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 1 * time.Hour,
WriteTimeout: 1 * time.Hour,
MaxBodySize: 10 * 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
// Embeddings route configuration
embeddingsCfg := &config.Config{
Routes: map[string]*config.Route{
"embeddings": {
Name: "embeddings",
Upstream: config.Upstream{
Address: "127.0.0.1:8001",
ConnectTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 10 * time.Minute,
WriteTimeout: 10 * time.Minute,
MaxBodySize: 50 * 1024 * 1024,
AuthRequired: false,
},
},
},
}
chatHandler := New(chatCfg)
defer chatHandler.Close()
embHandler := New(embeddingsCfg)
defer embHandler.Close()
// Verify chat timeouts
chatRoute := chatHandler.routes["chat"]
if chatRoute.Upstream.ConnectTimeout != 10*time.Second {
t.Errorf("chat connect timeout: expected 10s, got %v", chatRoute.Upstream.ConnectTimeout)
}
if chatRoute.Upstream.ReadTimeout != 1*time.Hour {
t.Errorf("chat read timeout: expected 1h, got %v", chatRoute.Upstream.ReadTimeout)
}
// Verify embeddings timeouts
embRoute := embHandler.routes["embeddings"]
if embRoute.Upstream.ConnectTimeout != 10*time.Second {
t.Errorf("embeddings connect timeout: expected 10s, got %v", embRoute.Upstream.ConnectTimeout)
}
if embRoute.Upstream.ReadTimeout != 10*time.Minute {
t.Errorf("embeddings read timeout: expected 10m, got %v", embRoute.Upstream.ReadTimeout)
}
}
+90
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@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
package server
import (
"net/http"
"sync"
)
// HealthChecker provides health and readiness check information.
type HealthChecker struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
configValid bool
jwksHasFetched bool
authEnabled bool
}
// NewHealthChecker creates a new health checker instance.
func NewHealthChecker(configValid bool, authEnabled bool) *HealthChecker {
return &HealthChecker{
configValid: configValid,
jwksHasFetched: false,
authEnabled: authEnabled,
}
}
// MarkJWKSFetched marks that JWKS has been fetched successfully.
func (hc *HealthChecker) MarkJWKSFetched() {
hc.mu.Lock()
defer hc.mu.Unlock()
hc.jwksHasFetched = true
}
// IsReady checks if the server is ready to serve traffic.
// It returns true if:
// - Configuration is valid
// - If auth is enabled, JWKS has been fetched at least once
func (hc *HealthChecker) IsReady() bool {
hc.mu.RLock()
defer hc.mu.RUnlock()
if !hc.configValid {
return false
}
// If auth is enabled, we must have fetched JWKS at least once
if hc.authEnabled && !hc.jwksHasFetched {
return false
}
return true
}
// IsAlive returns true if the process is running.
// This is always true since if it weren't, we wouldn't be running this code.
func (hc *HealthChecker) IsAlive() bool {
return true
}
// LivenessHandler returns a handler for the /healthz endpoint.
// It returns 200 whenever the process is alive.
// It performs no network I/O.
func LivenessHandler(hc *HealthChecker) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !hc.IsAlive() {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"alive"}`))
}
}
// ReadinessHandler returns a handler for the /readyz endpoint.
// It returns 200 only when configuration is valid and, if auth is enabled,
// JWKS has been fetched at least once.
// It returns non-2xx status while configuration is invalid or JWKS has never
// been fetched.
func ReadinessHandler(hc *HealthChecker) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !hc.IsReady() {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"not_ready"}`))
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ready"}`))
}
}
+173
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@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
package server_test
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/server"
)
// TestHealthEndpoints verifies health endpoint behavior.
// - /healthz returns 200 even with unreachable upstreams
// - /readyz returns non-2xx before JWKS fetch and 200 after
// - Neither endpoint requires authentication
func TestHealthEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
configValid bool
authEnabled bool
jwksFetched bool
endpoint string
expectedCode int
description string
}{
{
name: "healthz_always_200",
configValid: true,
authEnabled: false,
jwksFetched: false,
endpoint: "/healthz",
expectedCode: http.StatusOK,
description: "liveness probe returns 200 even before JWKS fetch",
},
{
name: "healthz_200_when_config_invalid",
configValid: false,
authEnabled: false,
jwksFetched: false,
endpoint: "/healthz",
expectedCode: http.StatusOK,
description: "liveness probe returns 200 even when config is invalid",
},
{
name: "readyz_200_no_auth",
configValid: true,
authEnabled: false,
jwksFetched: false,
endpoint: "/readyz",
expectedCode: http.StatusOK,
description: "readiness returns 200 when config valid and auth disabled",
},
{
name: "readyz_503_invalid_config",
configValid: false,
authEnabled: false,
jwksFetched: false,
endpoint: "/readyz",
expectedCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
description: "readiness returns 503 when config invalid",
},
{
name: "readyz_503_auth_enabled_no_jwks",
configValid: true,
authEnabled: true,
jwksFetched: false,
endpoint: "/readyz",
expectedCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
description: "readiness returns 503 when auth enabled but JWKS not fetched",
},
{
name: "readyz_200_auth_enabled_with_jwks",
configValid: true,
authEnabled: true,
jwksFetched: true,
endpoint: "/readyz",
expectedCode: http.StatusOK,
description: "readiness returns 200 when auth enabled and JWKS fetched",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Create health checker
hc := server.NewHealthChecker(tt.configValid, tt.authEnabled)
if tt.jwksFetched {
hc.MarkJWKSFetched()
}
// Create handler based on endpoint
var handler http.HandlerFunc
switch tt.endpoint {
case "/healthz":
handler = server.LivenessHandler(hc)
case "/readyz":
handler = server.ReadinessHandler(hc)
default:
t.Fatalf("unknown endpoint: %s", tt.endpoint)
}
// Create server wrapper
gatewayServer := server.New("127.0.0.1:0", 5*time.Second, handler)
// Start server in goroutine
go func() {
if err := gatewayServer.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
t.Logf("server error: %v", err)
}
}()
// Give server time to start
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
// Make request
url := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s%s", gatewayServer.Addr(), tt.endpoint)
resp, err := http.Get(url)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to make request: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
// Check status code
if resp.StatusCode != tt.expectedCode {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
t.Errorf("expected status %d, got %d: %s", tt.expectedCode, resp.StatusCode, string(body))
}
// Verify no Authorization header is required
// (we already made the request without one, so this is implicit)
// Cleanup
gatewayServer.Shutdown(context.Background())
})
}
}
// TestHealthEndpointsNoProxy verifies that health endpoints are not proxied.
// This is verified indirectly by the test above - if they were proxied,
// they would return 404 or fail when trying to reach a non-existent upstream.
func TestHealthEndpointsCannotBeShadowed(t *testing.T) {
// Create health checker and handler
hc := server.NewHealthChecker(true, false)
handler := server.LivenessHandler(hc)
// Create server
srv := server.New("127.0.0.1:0", 5*time.Second, handler)
// Start server
go func() {
if err := srv.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
t.Logf("server error: %v", err)
}
}()
// Give server time to start
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
// Request /healthz and verify it's not proxied
resp, err := http.Get(fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/healthz", srv.Addr()))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to make request: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
// Cleanup
srv.Shutdown(context.Background())
}
+36
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package server
import (
"net/http"
)
// Router implements an HTTP handler that routes health endpoints
// and passes other requests to an upstream handler.
type Router struct {
healthChecker *HealthChecker
upstreamHandler http.Handler
}
// NewRouter creates a new router with health endpoints.
// Health endpoints (/healthz and /readyz) are handled locally.
// All other paths are passed to the upstream handler.
func NewRouter(healthChecker *HealthChecker, upstreamHandler http.Handler) *Router {
return &Router{
healthChecker: healthChecker,
upstreamHandler: upstreamHandler,
}
}
// ServeHTTP implements http.Handler.
// It routes /healthz and /readyz to health handlers,
// and passes all other paths to the upstream handler.
func (r *Router) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
switch req.URL.Path {
case "/healthz":
LivenessHandler(r.healthChecker)(w, req)
case "/readyz":
ReadinessHandler(r.healthChecker)(w, req)
default:
r.upstreamHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
}
}
+83
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package server
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/http"
"sync"
"time"
)
// Server wraps an HTTP server with graceful shutdown support.
type Server struct {
httpServer *http.Server
shutdownTimeout time.Duration
listener net.Listener
listenerMu sync.RWMutex
healthChecker *HealthChecker
}
// New creates a new Server with the given configuration.
func New(listenAddr string, shutdownTimeout time.Duration, handler http.Handler) *Server {
return &Server{
httpServer: &http.Server{
Addr: listenAddr,
Handler: handler,
ReadTimeout: 15 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 15 * time.Second,
IdleTimeout: 60 * time.Second,
},
shutdownTimeout: shutdownTimeout,
healthChecker: NewHealthChecker(false, false),
}
}
// ListenAndServe starts the HTTP server and blocks until it exits.
// It returns the error from the server (if any), which will be
// http.ErrServerClosed if Shutdown was called.
func (s *Server) ListenAndServe() error {
listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", s.httpServer.Addr)
if err != nil {
return err
}
s.listenerMu.Lock()
s.listener = listener
s.listenerMu.Unlock()
return s.httpServer.Serve(listener)
}
// Shutdown gracefully shuts down the server. It stops accepting new
// connections and waits for in-flight requests to complete, with a
// bounded deadline. If the deadline is exceeded, it returns an error.
func (s *Server) Shutdown(ctx context.Context) error {
// Create a new context with the shutdown timeout
shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, s.shutdownTimeout)
defer cancel()
return s.httpServer.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)
}
// Addr returns the network address the server is listening on.
func (s *Server) Addr() string {
s.listenerMu.RLock()
defer s.listenerMu.RUnlock()
if s.listener != nil {
return s.listener.Addr().String()
}
return s.httpServer.Addr
}
// HealthChecker returns the server's health checker.
func (s *Server) HealthChecker() *HealthChecker {
return s.healthChecker
}
// SetHealthChecker sets the server's health checker.
func (s *Server) SetHealthChecker(hc *HealthChecker) {
s.healthChecker = hc
}
// SetHandler sets the server's HTTP handler.
func (s *Server) SetHandler(handler http.Handler) {
s.httpServer.Handler = handler
}
+104
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package server_test
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/server"
)
// TestGracefulShutdown verifies that:
// - A request in-flight when shutdown starts receives its full, uncorrupted response body
// - A request arriving after shutdown starts is refused on a new connection
// - The shutdown completes with exit code 0 (no timeout)
func TestGracefulShutdown(t *testing.T) {
// Create a handler that responds slowly
const responseBody = "slow response body content"
const sleepDuration = 500 * time.Millisecond
handler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Simulate a slow LLM response
time.Sleep(sleepDuration)
fmt.Fprint(w, responseBody)
})
// Create server with a shutdown timeout longer than the sleep
srv := server.New("127.0.0.1:0", 5*time.Second, handler)
// Start server in a goroutine
var listenErr error
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
listenErr = srv.ListenAndServe()
// http.ErrServerClosed is expected after shutdown
if listenErr != nil && listenErr != http.ErrServerClosed {
t.Logf("unexpected listen error: %v", listenErr)
}
}()
// Give server time to start listening
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
// Issue a slow request in a goroutine
var responseBody_got string
var requestErr error
var requestWg sync.WaitGroup
requestWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer requestWg.Done()
resp, err := http.Get(fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/", srv.Addr()))
if err != nil {
requestErr = err
return
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
requestErr = err
return
}
responseBody_got = string(body)
}()
// Give the request time to reach the handler
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
// Now initiate shutdown while request is in-flight
shutdownErr := srv.Shutdown(context.Background())
// Wait for the in-flight request to complete
requestWg.Wait()
// Verify the in-flight request completed successfully
if requestErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("in-flight request failed: %v", requestErr)
}
if responseBody_got != responseBody {
t.Fatalf("in-flight request got wrong body: %q (expected %q)", responseBody_got, responseBody)
}
// Verify shutdown succeeded (no timeout)
if shutdownErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("shutdown failed: %v", shutdownErr)
}
// Verify in-flight requests were allowed to complete
wg.Wait()
// Now verify that a new request is refused after shutdown
_, err := net.Dial("tcp", srv.Addr())
if err == nil {
// Connection succeeded when it should have failed
t.Fatalf("new connection accepted after shutdown (should have been refused)")
}
// If we get here, the connection was properly refused, which is what we want
}
+117
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// Package testsupport provides the local-development stub that every upstream
// in testdata/config/harness.yaml targets. It exists so tests under
// internal/proxy (future) and here can verify streaming semantics without a
// Kubernetes cluster or real credentials.
//
// The harness binds ONE http.Server on 127.0.0.1:9080 by default — this matches
// the addresses baked into testdata/config/harness.yaml so that fixture is valid
// before any code runs, and no network traffic leaves localhost during verification.
package testsupport
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"os"
"sync"
)
const defaultLocalPort = "9080"
// DefaultConfigPath is the committed fixture that points every upstream at the
// same local port; clients load it via config.LoadRoutesFromFile. Tests can
// override the path if they want a different schema.
const DefaultConfigPath = "testdata/config/harness.yaml"
// Snapshot describes a running stub server.
type Snapshot struct {
BaseURL string
Client *http.Client
}
// BaseAddr returns the host:port form of the bound address, no scheme.
func (s *Snapshot) BaseAddr() string {
return s.BaseURL[len("http://"):]
}
// URL joins the stub base URL with one of the Path* constants.
func (s *Snapshot) URL(path string) string {
return s.BaseURL + path
}
// harness is the singleton that owns the stub server for a single process.
type harness struct {
mu sync.Mutex
srv *http.Server // nil when not running; set exactly once per Close/Start cycle
addr string // bound address, valid only while srv != nil
}
// global is the singleton used by tests. A fresh server is bound lazily on
// first Start() and shared thereafter for the lifetime of the harness process
// (usually a single TestMain run).
var global = &harness{}
// Start binds the stub server if it is not already running and returns a
// Snapshot describing it. It is safe to call from multiple tests; the second
// and later calls return the already-bound server.
func Start() (*Snapshot, error) { return global.Start() }
// Close stops the stub server. Safe to call multiple times.
func Close() { global.Close() }
func (h *harness) Start() (*Snapshot, error) {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
if h.srv != nil {
return h.snapshotLocked(), nil
}
// Listen separately from Serve. srv.ListenAndServe would block until
// shutdown, so Start could never return; binding first also guarantees the
// port is accepting connections by the time the caller gets the Snapshot.
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", defaultStubAddr())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bind stub server at %s: %w", defaultStubAddr(), err)
}
srv := &http.Server{Handler: newStubHandler()}
h.srv = srv
h.addr = ln.Addr().String()
// Serve always returns a non-nil error; after Close that error is
// ErrServerClosed, which is the expected path and not worth reporting.
go func() { _ = srv.Serve(ln) }()
return h.snapshotLocked(), nil
}
// snapshotLocked builds a Snapshot for the running server. Caller holds h.mu.
func (h *harness) snapshotLocked() *Snapshot {
return &Snapshot{BaseURL: "http://" + h.addr, Client: http.DefaultClient}
}
// Close stops the underlying stub server. Safe to call on any harness instance
// or multiple times — it is idempotent within a process.
func (h *harness) Close() {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
if h.srv == nil {
return
}
s := h.srv
h.srv = nil
h.addr = ""
_ = s.Close() // best-effort shutdown; test output not dependent on it
}
// defaultStubAddr constructs "127.0.0.1:<port>" honoring HARNESS_STUB_PORT if
// set, falling back to 9080 — which matches every address in the committed YAML
// fixture. Set only when you need parallel test runs within a single process;
// otherwise leave unset.
func defaultStubAddr() string {
port := os.Getenv("HARNESS_STUB_PORT")
if port == "" {
port = defaultLocalPort
}
return "127.0.0.1:" + port
}
+135
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package testsupport
import (
"bufio"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Riotpiaole/homelab-frontend/internal/config"
)
// startForTest binds the stub on an ephemeral port so the suite does not fight
// with anything already holding 9080, and fails fast if Start blocks — the
// original harness called ListenAndServe inline and never returned.
func startForTest(t *testing.T) *Snapshot {
t.Helper()
t.Setenv("HARNESS_STUB_PORT", "0")
type result struct {
snap *Snapshot
err error
}
done := make(chan result, 1)
go func() {
snap, err := Start()
done <- result{snap, err}
}()
select {
case r := <-done:
if r.err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Start() error: %v", r.err)
}
t.Cleanup(Close)
return r.snap
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Start() did not return within 5s — it is blocking instead of serving in the background")
return nil
}
}
func TestStartServesFixedJSON(t *testing.T) {
snap := startForTest(t)
resp, err := snap.Client.Get(snap.URL(PathJSON))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GET %s: %v", PathJSON, err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d", resp.StatusCode, http.StatusOK)
}
if got := resp.Header.Get("Content-Type"); got != "application/json" {
t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want %q", got, "application/json")
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read body: %v", err)
}
if want := `{"status":"ok"}`; strings.TrimSpace(string(body)) != want {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", strings.TrimSpace(string(body)), want)
}
}
func TestSSEArrivesIncrementally(t *testing.T) {
snap := startForTest(t)
resp, err := snap.Client.Get(snap.URL(PathSSE))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GET %s: %v", PathSSE, err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
// The first event must be readable before the handler has written the last
// one. If the response were buffered to completion, this read would only
// unblock after every token plus every gap had elapsed.
deadline := time.Now().Add(time.Duration(len(SSETokens)) * SSEGap)
reader := bufio.NewReader(resp.Body)
line, err := reader.ReadString('\n')
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read first event: %v", err)
}
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Error("first SSE event arrived only after the whole stream was written; not incremental")
}
if want := "data: " + SSETokens[0]; strings.TrimSpace(line) != want {
t.Errorf("first event = %q, want %q", strings.TrimSpace(line), want)
}
rest, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read remaining events: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(string(rest), "data: [DONE]") {
t.Error("stream did not end with the [DONE] sentinel")
}
}
func TestStartIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
first := startForTest(t)
second, err := Start()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second Start() error: %v", err)
}
if first.BaseURL != second.BaseURL {
t.Errorf("second Start() bound a different address: %q vs %q", second.BaseURL, first.BaseURL)
}
}
func TestHarnessFixtureLoadsAndStaysOnLoopback(t *testing.T) {
// DefaultConfigPath is relative to the repo root; tests run in the package
// directory, so walk back up to it.
routes, err := config.LoadRoutesFromFile("../../" + DefaultConfigPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadRoutesFromFile(%s): %v", DefaultConfigPath, err)
}
if len(routes) == 0 {
t.Fatal("fixture declared no routes")
}
for name, route := range routes {
if !strings.HasPrefix(route.Upstream.Address, "127.0.0.1:") {
t.Errorf("route %q upstream %q is not on loopback", name, route.Upstream.Address)
}
if route.Upstream.AuthRequired {
t.Errorf("route %q requires auth; the harness must run with no credentials", name)
}
}
}
+123
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package testsupport
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"time"
)
// Stub response paths. testdata/config/harness.yaml points every upstream at the
// one stub server, so the response shape is selected by path, not by port.
const (
PathJSON = "/stub/json"
PathSSE = "/stub/sse"
PathChunked = "/stub/chunked"
PathSlow = "/stub/slow"
)
// SSEGap is the pause between SSE events. It exists so a test can observe that
// chunks arrive incrementally rather than all at once at the end.
const SSEGap = 20 * time.Millisecond
// SlowDelay is how long PathSlow waits before writing anything.
const SlowDelay = 250 * time.Millisecond
// SSETokens are the tokens PathSSE emits, one event per token, followed by the
// [DONE] sentinel that OpenAI-shaped clients expect.
var SSETokens = []string{"Hello", " ", "world", "!"}
// ChunkedBodies are the pieces PathChunked writes, each flushed separately so
// the response goes out with Transfer-Encoding: chunked.
var ChunkedBodies = []string{"first\n", "second\n", "third\n"}
// newStubHandler builds the mux served by the harness. Every handler writes a
// deterministic body so tests can assert on exact bytes.
func newStubHandler() http.Handler {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc(PathJSON, stubJSON)
mux.HandleFunc(PathSSE, stubSSE)
mux.HandleFunc(PathChunked, stubChunked)
mux.HandleFunc(PathSlow, stubSlow)
return mux
}
// stubJSON serves a fixed JSON body.
func stubJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
// Encode failure here means the client hung up mid-write; the connection is
// already gone, so there is nothing to report and no header left to change.
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"status": "ok"})
}
// stubSSE streams one event per token, flushing after each. It returns early
// when the client disconnects, so a mid-response disconnect test can assert on
// how many tokens the upstream actually managed to emit.
func stubSSE(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
w.Header().Set("Connection", "keep-alive")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
rc := http.NewResponseController(w)
if err := rc.Flush(); err != nil {
return
}
for _, tok := range SSETokens {
select {
case <-r.Context().Done():
return
case <-time.After(SSEGap):
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "data: %s\n\n", tok); err != nil {
return
}
if err := rc.Flush(); err != nil {
return
}
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprint(w, "data: [DONE]\n\n"); err != nil {
return
}
_ = rc.Flush()
}
// stubChunked writes several pieces with a flush between each, producing a
// chunked transfer with no Content-Length.
func stubChunked(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
rc := http.NewResponseController(w)
for _, body := range ChunkedBodies {
select {
case <-r.Context().Done():
return
case <-time.After(SSEGap):
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprint(w, body); err != nil {
return
}
if err := rc.Flush(); err != nil {
return
}
}
}
// stubSlow waits SlowDelay before responding at all, for timeout tests.
func stubSlow(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
select {
case <-r.Context().Done():
return
case <-time.After(SlowDelay):
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = fmt.Fprint(w, "slow\n")
}
+38
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@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: api-gateway-config
namespace: api
labels:
app: api-gateway
data:
config.yaml: |
# Gateway configuration - loaded at startup, never compiled in
# See REQUIREMENTS.md for full specification
# Routes: standard HTTP proxy routes (not LLM-specific)
# These are for non-LLM services (agent-pod/console, etc.)
routes: []
# Models: LLM model registry for body-based dispatch
# POST /v1/chat/completions routes based on the "model" field in request JSON
models:
- name: "reasoning"
address: "reasoning-predictor.llm-serving:80"
path: "/v1/chat/completions"
- name: "ornith:35b"
address: "ornith-predictor.llm-serving:80"
path: "/v1/chat/completions"
- name: "qwen2.5:3b-instruct"
address: "ornith-predictor.llm-serving:80"
path: "/v1/chat/completions"
- name: "nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v2-moe"
address: "embeddings-predictor.llm-serving:80"
path: "/v1/embeddings"
- name: "BAAI/bge-reranker-base"
address: "reranker-predictor.llm-serving:80"
path: "/v1/rerank"
+104
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apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: api-gateway
namespace: api
labels:
app: api-gateway
component: gateway
spec:
replicas: 3
strategy:
type: RollingUpdate
rollingUpdate:
maxSurge: 1
maxUnavailable: 0
selector:
matchLabels:
app: api-gateway
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: api-gateway
component: gateway
annotations:
prometheus.io/scrape: "true"
prometheus.io/port: "8080"
prometheus.io/path: "/metrics"
spec:
serviceAccountName: api-gateway
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
fsGroup: 1000
containers:
- name: gateway
image: ghcr.io/riotpiaole/api-gateway:latest
imagePullPolicy: Always
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 8080
protocol: TCP
env:
- name: LISTEN_ADDR
value: "0.0.0.0:8080"
- name: CONFIG_PATH
value: "/etc/gateway/config.yaml"
- name: SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT
value: "5m"
- name: LOG_LEVEL
value: "info"
volumeMounts:
- name: config
mountPath: /etc/gateway
readOnly: true
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /healthz
port: http
scheme: HTTP
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 2
failureThreshold: 3
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /readyz
port: http
scheme: HTTP
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 5
timeoutSeconds: 2
failureThreshold: 2
resources:
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 128Mi
limits:
cpu: 500m
memory: 512Mi
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
volumes:
- name: config
configMap:
name: api-gateway-config
affinity:
podAntiAffinity:
preferredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
- weight: 100
podAffinityTerm:
labelSelector:
matchExpressions:
- key: app
operator: In
values:
- api-gateway
topologyKey: kubernetes.io/hostname
terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 300
+20
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@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
namespace: api
resources:
- rbac.yaml
- service.yaml
- deployment.yaml
- network-policy.yaml
- configmap.yaml
commonLabels:
app: api-gateway
managed-by: argocd
commonAnnotations:
argocd.argoproj.io/sync-wave: "2"
# Wave 2 ensures the gateway is ready before anything that depends on it
# Kong remains on wave 7 unchanged
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: api-gateway
namespace: api
labels:
app: api-gateway
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: api-gateway
policyTypes:
- Ingress
- Egress
ingress:
# Allow from ingress-nginx controller (from ingress-nginx namespace)
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
name: ingress-nginx
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
# Allow from Prometheus scraping (if in monitoring namespace)
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
name: monitoring
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
egress:
# Allow DNS
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
name: kube-system
ports:
- protocol: UDP
port: 53
# Allow to upstreams (LLM services in llm-serving namespace)
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
name: llm-serving
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 80
- protocol: TCP
port: 8000
- protocol: TCP
port: 8001
# Allow to other upstreams if needed (embeddings, reranker, etc.)
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
name: llm-serving
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
# Allow to atlas (riotpiao-backend) for /cluster/* routes
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
name: atlas
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
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apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: api-gateway
namespace: api
labels:
app: api-gateway
---
# No ClusterRole needed - the gateway has no k8s API access
# G2: The gateway holds no Kubernetes credentials
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apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: api-gateway
namespace: api
labels:
app: api-gateway
component: gateway
spec:
type: ClusterIP
selector:
app: api-gateway
ports:
- name: http
port: 8080
targetPort: http
protocol: TCP
sessionAffinity: None
+157
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Run a sequence of tasks through pi, verifying after each one.
#
# Usage:
# scripts/run-all.sh # run the default local-verifiable sequence
# scripts/run-all.sh 1.1 1.2 2.1 # run a specific list, in the order given
# scripts/run-all.sh --list # show the default sequence and exit
# scripts/run-all.sh --resume # rerun the default sequence, skipping tasks
# # already recorded in .task-runs/completed.txt
#
# Each task gets a fresh zero-context pi session. After each task the full gate runs:
#
# go test ./... -race
# CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./...
# go vet ./...
#
# The loop HALTS on the first gate failure. That is deliberate. These tasks build on
# each other, so continuing past a broken foundation produces a pile of work that all
# has to be redone. A halted loop is cheap; a cascade is not.
set -uo pipefail
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
cd "$REPO_ROOT"
# Default sequence: dependency-ordered, and limited to tasks that can be verified
# locally with no cluster and no credentials.
#
# Deliberately EXCLUDED from the default run:
# 0.6 CI pipeline -- needs a CI runner, not verifiable here
# 2.8 Kong parity -- requires the live Kong to diff against
# 3.x Authentication -- needs a real Authentik provider and tokens
# 5.3 ServiceMonitor -- needs Prometheus in-cluster
# 6.x Deploy and cutover -- touches live cluster state; run these by hand
# 7.x New prefixes -- deliberately after cutover
DEFAULT_TASKS=(
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7
2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.15
4.1 4.2 4.3
5.1 5.2
)
if [[ "${1:-}" == "--list" ]]; then
printf '%s\n' "${DEFAULT_TASKS[@]}"
exit 0
fi
LOG_DIR=".task-runs"
mkdir -p "$LOG_DIR"
# Tasks that have passed the gate, one id per line, appended as they finish and
# carried across invocations. This is what makes --resume possible after a halt.
DONE_FILE="$LOG_DIR/completed.txt"
touch "$DONE_FILE"
if [[ "${1:-}" == "--resume" ]]; then
shift
# Resume the default sequence minus everything already recorded as passing.
# Order is preserved: DEFAULT_TASKS drives the loop, DONE_FILE only filters.
TASKS=()
for t in "${DEFAULT_TASKS[@]}"; do
grep -qxF "$t" "$DONE_FILE" || TASKS+=("$t")
done
SKIPPED=$(( ${#DEFAULT_TASKS[@]} - ${#TASKS[@]} ))
echo "resuming : skipping $SKIPPED already-passed task(s) recorded in $DONE_FILE"
if [[ ${#TASKS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "nothing left to run."
exit 0
fi
elif [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; then
TASKS=("$@")
else
TASKS=("${DEFAULT_TASKS[@]}")
fi
gate() {
# Returns 0 if the repository is in a good state, 1 otherwise.
#
# The gate is uniformly strict, including for RED tasks. `Stage: RED` in this board
# means "write the failing test first, then implement until it passes" -- the task
# ends green. Every RED task's Verify block says `expected: passes`. So a failing
# suite is a failure at any stage, and relaxing the gate for RED would let
# half-finished work through.
local task_id="$1"
local stage
stage=$(grep -m1 '^Stage:' tasks/"$task_id"-*.md 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $2}')
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./... >"$LOG_DIR/gate-build.log" 2>&1 || { echo " FAIL: go build"; tail -20 "$LOG_DIR/gate-build.log"; return 1; }
go vet ./... >"$LOG_DIR/gate-vet.log" 2>&1 || { echo " FAIL: go vet"; tail -20 "$LOG_DIR/gate-vet.log"; return 1; }
go clean -testcache >/dev/null 2>&1
if ! go test ./... -race >"$LOG_DIR/gate-test.log" 2>&1; then
echo " FAIL: go test -race (stage=${stage:-?})"
grep -E '^(---|\s+---) FAIL|^FAIL' "$LOG_DIR/gate-test.log" | head -8 | sed 's/^/ /'
return 1
fi
echo " build/vet/test all pass (stage=${stage:-?})"
return 0
}
echo "started : $(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')"
echo "tasks : ${#TASKS[@]}"
echo "model : ${PI_PROVIDER:-homelab-ornith}/${PI_MODEL:-ornith:35b}"
echo "logs : $LOG_DIR/"
echo "gate : build + vet + full race suite after every task; halts on failure"
echo "pid : $$"
echo
COMPLETED=()
for TASK_ID in "${TASKS[@]}"; do
echo "════════════════════════════════════════════"
echo "TASK $TASK_ID"
echo "════════════════════════════════════════════"
if ! ./scripts/run-task.sh "$TASK_ID" >"$LOG_DIR/$TASK_ID.log" 2>&1; then
echo " pi exited non-zero. Last output:"
tail -25 "$LOG_DIR/$TASK_ID.log"
echo
echo "HALTED at $TASK_ID (pi failure). Completed: ${COMPLETED[*]:-none}"
echo "Fix, then: scripts/run-all.sh --resume"
exit 1
fi
tail -12 "$LOG_DIR/$TASK_ID.log" | sed 's/^/ | /'
echo
echo " verifying..."
if ! gate "$TASK_ID"; then
echo
echo "HALTED at $TASK_ID (gate failure). Completed: ${COMPLETED[*]:-none}"
echo "Full pi output: $LOG_DIR/$TASK_ID.log"
echo "Fix, then: scripts/run-all.sh --resume"
exit 1
fi
# grep -c prints 0 AND exits 1 when nothing matches, so a `|| echo 0` fallback
# would append a second line and make these two-line strings. Swallow the exit
# status instead and keep the single count grep already printed.
TICKED=$(grep -c '^- \[x\]' tasks/"$TASK_ID"-*.md 2>/dev/null) || true
TOTAL=$(grep -c '^- \[' tasks/"$TASK_ID"-*.md 2>/dev/null) || true
echo " gate OK checkboxes ticked: ${TICKED:-0}/${TOTAL:-0}"
[[ "$TICKED" != "$TOTAL" ]] && echo " NOTE: not all criteria ticked -- review before trusting this task"
COMPLETED+=("$TASK_ID")
grep -qxF "$TASK_ID" "$DONE_FILE" || echo "$TASK_ID" >>"$DONE_FILE"
echo
done
echo "════════════════════════════════════════════"
echo "All ${#COMPLETED[@]} tasks passed the gate."
echo "Completed: ${COMPLETED[*]}"
echo
echo "Not run by this script (need a cluster, credentials, or live Kong):"
echo " 0.6 CI, 2.8 Kong parity, 3.x auth, 5.3 ServiceMonitor, 6.x deploy, 7.x prefixes"
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Run one task through pi in a brand-new, zero-context session.
#
# Usage:
# scripts/run-task.sh 0.1
# scripts/run-task.sh 0.1 --dry-run # print the prompt, run nothing
#
# Each invocation is a fresh pi session (--no-session). Nothing carries over between
# tasks; that is the point. See tasks/AGENT-PROMPT.md.
set -euo pipefail
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
cd "$REPO_ROOT"
TASK_ID="${1:-}"
DRY_RUN="${2:-}"
if [[ -z "$TASK_ID" ]]; then
echo "usage: scripts/run-task.sh <task-id> [--dry-run]" >&2
echo "example: scripts/run-task.sh 0.1" >&2
exit 2
fi
# Resolve the task file from its id prefix.
shopt -s nullglob
matches=(tasks/"$TASK_ID"-*.md)
shopt -u nullglob
if [[ ${#matches[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "no task file found for id '$TASK_ID'" >&2
echo "available:" >&2
ls tasks/[0-9]*.md | sed 's|tasks/| |' >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ ${#matches[@]} -gt 1 ]]; then
echo "ambiguous task id '$TASK_ID' matches:" >&2
printf ' %s\n' "${matches[@]}" >&2
exit 1
fi
TASK_FILE="$(basename "${matches[0]}")"
# Extract the prompt body from the fenced block in AGENT-PROMPT.md, then substitute.
PROMPT="$(
awk '/^```$/{f=!f; next} f' tasks/AGENT-PROMPT.md \
| sed -e "s|{{TASK_ID}}|$TASK_ID|g" -e "s|{{TASK_FILE}}|$TASK_FILE|g"
)"
if [[ -z "${PROMPT// }" ]]; then
echo "failed to extract prompt template from tasks/AGENT-PROMPT.md" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == "--dry-run" ]]; then
printf '%s\n' "$PROMPT"
exit 0
fi
# Default: claude-haiku-4-5. 200K context, reliable tool calling, needs
# ANTHROPIC_API_KEY in the environment.
#
# The two homelab models were both evaluated and rejected as defaults on 2026-08-19:
#
# reasoning 16384 context, and pi's compaction.reserveTokens defaults to 16384,
# so the compaction threshold computes to zero. pi also only evaluates
# auto-compaction at run boundaries, never mid-turn (earendil-works/pi
# issues 6339, 5512, 2871), so a tool loop grows unchecked until the
# provider rejects it. Separately, under tool_choice "auto" it returns
# tool_calls: [] and reasons in prose, which stalls an agent loop.
#
# ornith:35b 131K context and correct auto tool calling -- viable, and the right
# local choice. Occupied by other work at time of writing.
#
# Switch with env vars:
# PI_PROVIDER=homelab-ornith PI_MODEL=ornith:35b scripts/run-task.sh 0.1
#
PROVIDER="${PI_PROVIDER:-homelab-ornith}"
MODEL="${PI_MODEL:-ornith:35b}"
# One fresh session file per task. This still guarantees zero context -- each task gets
# its own new file and never reads another's -- while leaving the run inspectable:
#
# pi --session .task-runs/sessions/<task>.jsonl # open it
# pi --export .task-runs/sessions/<task>.jsonl out.html # render it
#
# --no-session would also give zero context, but persists nothing to look at afterwards.
SESSION_DIR=".task-runs/sessions"
mkdir -p "$SESSION_DIR"
SESSION_FILE="$SESSION_DIR/$TASK_ID.jsonl"
rm -f "$SESSION_FILE"
echo "task : $TASK_ID ($TASK_FILE)"
echo "model : $PROVIDER/$MODEL"
echo "session : $SESSION_FILE (fresh)"
echo
# --print is required, not cosmetic. Without it pi starts its interactive TUI;
# under run-all.sh stdout is a file and stdin may be /dev/null, so the TUI renders
# nothing until exit and can sit waiting for input that never comes. --approve
# trusts project-local files (AGENTS.md and friends) for this run, which would
# otherwise raise a prompt no one is there to answer.
exec pi --provider "$PROVIDER" --model "$MODEL" \
--print --approve \
--session "$SESSION_FILE" "$PROMPT"
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# 0.1 — Module and entrypoint (GREEN)
Phase: 0 — Foundations
Stage: GREEN
- [x] A single Go module builds one static binary with no cgo
- [x] The binary reads its configuration at startup and serves HTTP on a configurable listen address
- [x] `SIGTERM` starts a drain: the listener stops accepting new connections, in-flight requests run to completion, then the process exits `0`
- [x] A request already in flight when `SIGTERM` arrives receives its full, uncorrupted response body
- [x] A request arriving after `SIGTERM` is not accepted on a new connection
- [x] The drain has a bounded deadline; exceeding it forces exit with a non-zero code and a logged reason
- [x] The process holds no Kubernetes credentials and makes no API-server calls
The gateway sits behind ingress-nginx, which owns TLS. The gateway never terminates
TLS and never listens on 443. Graceful drain matters because in-flight requests here
are LLM generations that can legitimately run for many minutes -> killing them
mid-stream loses work a caller cannot cheaply redo.
## Verify
```bash
go test ./internal/server/... -run TestGracefulShutdown -race -v
# expected: passes — a slow in-flight request completes with a full body after SIGTERM,
# and a request issued post-SIGTERM is refused; process exit code is 0
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./... && go vet ./...
# expected: both succeed
```
`-race` is required, not optional. A server that starts a listener in one goroutine and
exposes its address from another is the obvious shape here, and it is racy unless the
shared state is guarded. A test that passes without `-race` proves nothing about it.
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# 0.2 — Declarative route configuration (RED)
Phase: 0 — Foundations
Stage: RED
- [x] Routes and upstreams are declared in YAML loaded from a file path at startup
- [x] Each upstream declares: address, path rewrite, connect timeout, read timeout, write timeout, maximum request body size, and an auth-required flag
- [x] Every one of those fields is explicit — no silent defaults for timeouts, body caps or auth
- [x] A config missing any required field fails startup with a non-zero exit and a message naming the offending route and field
- [x] A config with a malformed duration, an unparseable address, or a duplicate route key fails startup the same way
- [x] A valid config round-trips: every declared route is present in the loaded route table
- [x] Loading is startup-only — no API-server watch, no CRD, no Kubernetes client
Configuration lives in git and is mounted as a ConfigMap synced by Argo. It is
deliberately not a CRD: a CRD would require the gateway to watch the API server,
which needs RBAC and contradicts the invariant that the gateway holds no cluster
credentials. It is also the exact indirection being retired with Kong, whose routing
table was split across six `KongPlugin` CRs, seven Ingresses and a Helm values file.
A gateway that starts with a silently dropped route is worse than one that refuses to
start.
## Verify
```bash
go test ./internal/config/... -v
# expected: passes — valid fixtures load with all routes present; each invalid fixture
# returns an error naming the offending route and field, and none of them load partially
```
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# 0.3 — Health endpoints (GREEN)
Phase: 0 — Foundations
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [0.2](0.2-route-configuration.md)
- [x] `GET /healthz` returns `200` whenever the process is alive
- [x] `GET /healthz` contacts no upstream and performs no network I/O
- [x] `GET /readyz` returns `200` only when configuration is valid and, if auth is enabled, JWKS has been fetched at least once
- [x] `GET /readyz` returns a non-`2xx` status while configuration is invalid or JWKS has never been fetched
- [x] Neither endpoint requires authentication, even when the auth flag is on
- [x] Neither path is proxied to any upstream, and neither can be shadowed by a configured route
`/healthz` backs the liveness probe, so it must stay cheap and must not fail because
an upstream is down — restarting the gateway does not fix a sick vLLM pod. `/readyz`
backs the readiness probe and is allowed to fail, taking the pod out of the nginx
endpoint pool until it can actually serve.
## Verify
```bash
go test ./internal/server/... -run TestHealthEndpoints -v
# expected: passes — /healthz is 200 with upstreams unreachable; /readyz is non-2xx
# before first JWKS fetch and 200 after; both answer with no Authorization header
```
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# 0.4 — Local development harness (GREEN)
Phase: 0 — Foundations
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [0.2](0.2-route-configuration.md)
- [ ] The whole gateway runs from a checkout with no cluster, no kubeconfig and no credentials of any kind
- [ ] A committed local config points every upstream at stub servers started by the harness
- [ ] Stubs can serve a fixed JSON body, an SSE token stream, a chunked response, and a slow response
- [ ] A test can assert on the real HTTP response: status, headers and body
- [ ] A test can assert that streamed chunks arrive incrementally, before the upstream has finished
- [ ] A test can disconnect the client mid-response and assert on what the stub upstream observed
- [ ] One documented command runs the harness end to end and exits non-zero on failure
- [ ] Running the harness never contacts `*.riotpiao.com` or any cluster address
This is a hard requirement, not a convenience: it determines whether work can proceed
unattended. Upstreams are configuration, so pointing them at local stubs is the entire
mechanism. Every later phase's verification depends on this existing first.
"It compiles" and "it starts" are not verification. Asserting on an actual HTTP
response is.
## Verify
```bash
env -u KUBECONFIG go test ./internal/testsupport/... ./internal/proxy/... -v
# expected: passes with no kubeconfig and no network access beyond loopback —
# includes an SSE test asserting incremental arrival and a mid-response disconnect test
```
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# 0.5 — Structured logging (GREEN)
Phase: 0 — Foundations
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [0.1](0.1-module-and-entrypoint.md)
- [ ] Logs are emitted as structured records with a consistent field set, one record per line
- [ ] Every request log carries at least: route, upstream, method, path, status, duration
- [ ] Every rejected request is logged with an explicit machine-readable reason field
- [ ] Request bodies are never logged, in whole or in part
- [ ] `Authorization` header values, bearer tokens, API keys and JWKS material are never logged, not even truncated or hashed-with-prefix
- [ ] Log level is configurable, and no level unlocks body or token logging
- [ ] A test asserts a rejected request produces exactly one record containing the reason and containing no token substring
Rejections come from several layers — unknown model, body too large, auth failure,
concurrency limit — and the reason field is what makes them countable later. The model
API carries prompts that are user content and tokens that are credentials; neither
belongs in a log line.
## Verify
```bash
go test ./internal/logging/... ./internal/server/... -run 'TestLog' -v
# expected: passes — captured log output for a rejected request contains the reason
# field and does not contain the request body or the bearer token used
```
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# 0.6 — CI pipeline (GREEN)
Phase: 0 — Foundations
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [0.4](0.4-local-dev-harness.md)
- [ ] CI builds the binary on every push and pull request
- [ ] CI runs `go vet` over all packages and fails on any finding
- [ ] CI runs the full test suite, including the local harness tests, with the race detector on
- [ ] CI runs `govulncheck` and fails the job on any HIGH or CRITICAL severity finding
- [ ] CI needs no cluster, no kubeconfig and no credentials to pass
- [ ] A deliberately broken commit — failing test, vet finding, or known-vulnerable dependency — fails CI rather than passing silently
- [ ] Job status is visible on the commit or pull request
CI is the outer loop for the same closed verification loop the harness gives locally.
It must not depend on cluster access, or it stops running the moment the cluster is
unavailable.
## Verify
```bash
go vet ./... && go test -race ./... && govulncheck ./...
# expected: all three exit 0 locally; pushing a branch with a failing test shows a
# failed CI run on that commit
```
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# 1.1 — Reverse proxy to configured upstreams (GREEN)
Phase: 1 — Proxy core
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [0.2](0.2-route-configuration.md), [0.4](0.4-local-dev-harness.md)
- [ ] A request matching a configured route is proxied to that route's upstream address
- [ ] The upstream's status code, response headers and body reach the client unmodified
- [ ] The request method, query string and body reach the upstream unmodified
- [ ] The route's configured path rewrite is applied to the upstream request path
- [ ] Connections to upstreams are pooled and reused across requests — a second request to the same upstream does not open a new TCP connection
- [ ] A request matching no configured route returns `404` and contacts no upstream
- [ ] An unreachable upstream returns a `5xx` to the client and is logged with the upstream name
Connection reuse is not a micro-optimisation here: the chat upstreams hold long-lived
streaming responses, and churning connections under that pattern wastes handshakes and
file descriptors on both ends.
## Verify
```bash
go test ./internal/proxy/... -run 'TestProxy|TestConnectionReuse' -v
# expected: passes — stub upstream sees the rewritten path and original body, client
# sees the stub's exact status/headers/body, and the stub records one accepted
# connection across two sequential requests
```
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# 1.2 — Streaming passthrough (RED)
Phase: 1 — Proxy core
Stage: RED
Depends on: [1.1](1.1-reverse-proxy.md)
- [ ] An SSE response from an upstream reaches the client unbuffered: each `data:` event is readable by the client before the upstream has sent the next one
- [ ] A chunked response reaches the client chunk by chunk, not accumulated and flushed at completion
- [ ] Response headers reach the client before the first body byte, not after
- [ ] `Content-Type: text/event-stream` and the upstream's `Cache-Control` and `Connection` semantics survive the proxy
- [ ] No response body is written to memory or disk in full before forwarding
- [ ] The terminating `data: [DONE]` sentinel and the final zero-length chunk pass through
- [ ] A test asserts wall-clock ordering: the Nth event is observed at the client before the upstream emits the N+1th
The whole product is token streaming. If the gateway buffers, a caller waits minutes
for a response that should have started in seconds, and the user-visible behaviour of
the model API regresses versus Kong. nginx in front is already configured with
`proxy-buffering: off`; the gateway must not reintroduce buffering behind it.
## Verify
```bash
go test ./internal/proxy/... -run TestSSEUnbuffered -v
# expected: passes — client observes each of 5 stub-emitted SSE events with the
# upstream still open, and total observed inter-event gaps match the stub's emit delays
```
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# 1.3 — Client disconnect propagation (RED)
Phase: 1 — Proxy core
Stage: RED
Depends on: [1.2](1.2-streaming-passthrough.md)
- [ ] When a client closes the connection mid-response, the gateway cancels the upstream request immediately
- [ ] The stub upstream observes its request context cancelled, not a request that runs to completion
- [ ] Cancellation happens within a small bounded delay of the client close, not at the route's read timeout
- [ ] The same holds for a non-streaming request abandoned before the upstream replies
- [ ] The disconnect is logged with a reason distinguishing it from an upstream error
- [ ] No goroutine or upstream connection is left alive after the disconnect — the test asserts this, not just the response
This is load-bearing. The `reasoning` upstream runs 2 replicas at `--max-num-seqs=4`,
which is 8 concurrent sequence slots cluster-wide. An orphaned generation holds one of
those 8 until it finishes on its own, which for a 32B model on a Volta GPU can be
minutes. A handful of abandoned browser tabs can starve the entire cluster.
## Verify
```bash
go test ./internal/proxy/... -run TestClientDisconnectCancelsUpstream -race -v
# expected: passes — stub upstream reports context cancellation within 1s of the client
# closing mid-stream, and the post-test goroutine count returns to baseline
```
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# 1.4 — Per-route timeouts (GREEN)
Phase: 1 — Proxy core
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [0.2](0.2-route-configuration.md), [1.1](1.1-reverse-proxy.md)
- [ ] Connect, read and write timeouts are taken per route from configuration, never from a global default
- [ ] Chat routes use connect `10s`, read `1h`, write `1h`
- [ ] Embeddings and rerank routes use connect `10s`, read `10m`, write `10m`
- [ ] An upstream that never accepts a connection fails at the configured connect timeout, not later
- [ ] An upstream that accepts then stalls fails at the configured read timeout with a `5xx` and a logged reason
- [ ] A stream still emitting tokens is never cut by the read timeout — the timeout applies to inactivity, not total duration
- [ ] No code path shortens a configured proxy timeout to enforce an application-level cap
These are Kong's current values and they are deliberate. The 1-hour read timeout
exists because a 32B model on a Volta GPU routinely exceeds 60 seconds per request.
Any shorter application-level cap must be enforced by the gateway's own logic — a
budget, a slot limit, an explicit max-generation-time — and never by shortening the
proxy timeout, or long legitimate generations truncate mid-stream and callers see
corrupted output rather than an error.
## Verify
```bash
go test ./internal/proxy/... -run 'TestConnectTimeout|TestReadTimeout|TestLongStreamNotTruncated' -v
# expected: passes — stalled upstream errors at the configured read timeout, a stub
# emitting one event every 200ms for longer than the timeout window is not cut off,
# and a blackholed address fails at ~10s
```
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# 1.5 — Header hygiene (GREEN)
Phase: 1 — Proxy core
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [1.1](1.1-reverse-proxy.md)
- [ ] Hop-by-hop headers are stripped from both the upstream request and the client response
- [ ] Headers named in a request's `Connection` header are also stripped, not just the fixed hop-by-hop list
- [ ] `X-Forwarded-For` appends the immediate peer to the nginx-supplied value rather than replacing or fabricating it
- [ ] `X-Forwarded-Proto` and `X-Forwarded-Host` are taken from the nginx-supplied values when present
- [ ] Client-supplied `X-Forwarded-*` values are not trusted when the request did not arrive from the trusted ingress peer
- [ ] End-to-end headers, including `Content-Type`, `Authorization` where the route requires it, and upstream response headers, pass through unchanged
- [ ] A test asserts the exact header set the stub upstream receives
ingress-nginx owns TLS and the edge, so it is the only source of truth for the
original scheme, host and client address. The gateway fabricating these would make
every upstream's view of the caller wrong, and would let a client spoof its own
source address by sending the header itself.
## Verify
```bash
go test ./internal/proxy/... -run TestHeaderHygiene -v
# expected: passes — stub upstream sees no Connection/Keep-Alive/TE/Upgrade/
# Proxy-Authorization headers, sees X-Forwarded-For ending in the nginx-supplied value
# plus the peer, and a spoofed X-Forwarded-Proto from an untrusted peer is discarded
```
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# 1.6 — WebSocket upgrade (GREEN)
Phase: 1 — Proxy core
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [1.5](1.5-header-hygiene.md)
- [ ] A route may be configured to allow protocol upgrade
- [ ] An upgrade request on such a route reaches the upstream with its `Upgrade` and `Connection` headers intact, despite hop-by-hop stripping
- [ ] The upstream's `101 Switching Protocols` response reaches the client, and bytes then flow bidirectionally
- [ ] Frames pass in both directions with no buffering delay
- [ ] Client close propagates to the upstream and upstream close propagates to the client
- [ ] An upgrade attempt on a route that does not allow it is rejected, not silently downgraded to a plain proxied request
- [ ] Idle upgraded connections are not cut by the route's read timeout while frames are still flowing
`agent-pod/console` serves a WebSocket and is one of the seven Kong-class Ingresses
being migrated. It is currently publicly routed and unauthenticated into a
shell-capable container, so it must work through the gateway before it can be put
behind gateway auth. Header hygiene and upgrade support interact directly: `Upgrade`
and `Connection` are hop-by-hop, and a naive strip breaks the handshake.
## Verify
```bash
go test ./internal/proxy/... -run TestWebSocketUpgrade -v
# expected: passes — client receives 101 from the stub, an echoed frame round-trips in
# both directions, and closing the client causes the stub to observe a close
```
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# 1.7 — Per-route body size caps (RED)
Phase: 1 — Proxy core
Stage: RED
Depends on: [0.2](0.2-route-configuration.md), [1.1](1.1-reverse-proxy.md)
- [ ] Each route enforces its own configured maximum request body size
- [ ] A body over the cap is rejected with `413` and a body the upstream never sees
- [ ] Rejection happens while reading, not after buffering the whole body into memory
- [ ] A request with a lying or absent `Content-Length` is still capped by bytes actually read
- [ ] A body at exactly the cap is accepted and proxied intact
- [ ] The rejection is logged with a reason distinguishing it from other rejections
- [ ] No global default cap silently applies to a route that failed to declare one — that is a config error, per 0.2
nginx in front is configured with `proxy-body-size: 0`, meaning it enforces no limit
at all, so the gateway is the only place a cap exists. Embedding and rerank callers
can send large batches legitimately, which is why the cap is per route rather than
one number for the whole surface.
## Verify
```bash
go test ./internal/proxy/... -run TestBodySizeCap -v
# expected: passes — a body one byte over the route cap returns 413 and the stub
# upstream records zero requests; a body exactly at the cap returns the stub's 200
```
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# 2.1 — Model registry (GREEN)
Phase: 2 — LLM surface
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [0.2](0.2-route-configuration.md), [1.1](1.1-reverse-proxy.md)
- [ ] A model name -> upstream map is loaded from configuration at startup, never compiled in
- [ ] Each entry carries at minimum the model name clients send, the upstream address, and the upstream path to use
- [ ] Two model names may point at the same upstream address, and both resolve independently
- [ ] A duplicate model name, an empty model name, or an entry with no upstream address fails startup loudly with the offending entry named
- [ ] The registry is queryable by exact model name; lookup is case-sensitive and does no fuzzy matching or defaulting
- [ ] The set of known model names is enumerable, because `/v1/models` and unknown-model errors are both derived from it
The five entries verified live on 2026-08-19. Ports are 80, not 8080.
| model name clients send | upstream Service | engine |
|---|---|---|
| `reasoning` | `reasoning-predictor.llm-serving:80` | vLLM, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B |
| `ornith:35b` | `ornith-predictor.llm-serving:80` | Ollama |
| `qwen2.5:3b-instruct` | `ornith-predictor.llm-serving:80` | Ollama, same pods |
| `nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v2-moe` | `embeddings-predictor.llm-serving:80` | TEI |
| `BAAI/bge-reranker-base` | `reranker-predictor.llm-serving:80` | TEI |
`ornith:35b` and `qwen2.5:3b-instruct` share pods and both stay resident, so a
registry that maps them to one address is correct, not a shortcut.
## Verify
```bash
# with the five entries configured against local stubs
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/readyz # expected: 200
# duplicate model name in config must refuse to start
./gateway --config testdata/duplicate-model.yaml; echo "exit=$?" # expected: non-zero exit, stderr names the duplicated model
```
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# 2.10 — Anthropic request translation (GREEN)
Phase: 2 — LLM surfaces
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [2.9](2.9-canonical-request-model.md), [2.1](2.1-model-registry.md)
`POST /llm/v1/messages` accepts an Anthropic Messages request body and turns it into
the dialect-neutral canonical request. The path carries `/v1/messages` because the
Anthropic base-URL convention appends that suffix; the gateway prefix is `/llm`.
- [ ] `POST /llm/v1/messages` is accepted and selects its upstream from the body's
`model` field, using the same registry as `/v1`: `reasoning` reaches
`reasoning-predictor.llm-serving:80`, `ornith:35b` and `qwen2.5:3b-instruct`
reach `ornith-predictor.llm-serving:80`
- [ ] The top-level `system` field becomes the canonical system instruction; it is a
distinct field in this dialect and is not a member of `messages`
- [ ] Each message `content` may be a plain string or an array of blocks; a string and
a single text block carrying the same characters translate identically
- [ ] `max_tokens` is REQUIRED on this surface, matching the Anthropic contract; a
request without it is rejected as a client error and no upstream is contacted
- [ ] `max_tokens` above what the upstream can serve is clamped rather than rejected,
and the clamp is logged; `reasoning` has `--max-model-len=16384`
- [ ] Roles are restricted to `user` and `assistant`; any other role, including
`system` inside `messages`, is a client error naming the offending role
- [ ] `stop_sequences` becomes the canonical stop sequences, and `stream` becomes the
canonical streaming flag
- [ ] `tools`, `tool_choice`, any `tool_use` or `tool_result` block, any `image` block,
any cache-control marker, and any user message with more than one content block
are rejected as unsupported, naming the feature; none is silently dropped
- [ ] Unknown top-level fields are rejected rather than ignored, so a client cannot
believe an unimplemented option took effect
- [ ] Reading the body respects the route's configured body size cap
`max_tokens` stays optional on `/v1/chat/completions`. The policy is per-surface: each
dialect keeps its own contract, and the canonical request records whichever value
resulted.
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","max_tokens":64,"system":"be terse","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'
# expected: 200, reasoning stub hit, system text present in the upstream request
curl -s localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'
# expected: 400, body names max_tokens as the missing required field, no upstream stub hit
curl -s localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","max_tokens":8,"messages":[{"role":"system","content":"x"}]}'
# expected: 400, body names the rejected role, no upstream stub hit
```
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
# 2.11 — Anthropic non-streaming response translation (GREEN)
Phase: 2 — LLM surfaces
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [2.10](2.10-anthropic-request-translation.md), [2.9](2.9-canonical-request-model.md)
A non-streaming `POST /llm/v1/messages` gets an Anthropic Messages response, built
from whatever the upstream returned. Upstreams speak the OpenAI chat-completion shape;
the client on this surface must never see it.
- [ ] The response body is `{"id","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[...],
"model","stop_reason","stop_sequence","usage":{"input_tokens","output_tokens"}}`
with `type` literally `message` and `role` literally `assistant`
- [ ] `model` echoes the model name the client sent, not an upstream-internal name
- [ ] Upstream `finish_reason` `stop` becomes `stop_reason` `end_turn`, and `length`
becomes `max_tokens`
- [ ] A generation halted by a client-supplied stop sequence reports `stop_reason`
`stop_sequence` and puts the matched string in `stop_sequence`; otherwise
`stop_sequence` is null and present, not omitted
- [ ] Upstream `prompt_tokens` becomes `usage.input_tokens` and `completion_tokens`
becomes `usage.output_tokens`; no other usage fields are invented
- [ ] `reasoning_content`, which vLLM returns as a field separate from `content` for
`reasoning`, becomes a `thinking` content block that PRECEDES the `text` block
- [ ] When `reasoning_content` is absent or empty, no `thinking` block is emitted and
`content` holds only the `text` block
- [ ] When `content` is empty but `reasoning_content` is not, the `thinking` block is
still returned rather than an empty `content` array
- [ ] `Content-Type` is `application/json`, and no OpenAI field name such as `choices`,
`finish_reason` or `object` appears anywhere in the body
`reasoning` runs DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B under vLLM with
`--reasoning-parser=deepseek_r1`, which is why the reasoning text arrives as its own
field and maps cleanly onto a thinking block.
## Verify
```bash
curl -s localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","max_tokens":64,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'
# expected: 200, type=message, role=assistant, content[0].type=thinking, content[1].type=text
curl -s localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","max_tokens":64,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}' \
| grep -c -E '"choices"|"finish_reason"|"object"'
# expected: 0
curl -s localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"qwen2.5:3b-instruct","max_tokens":4,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"count to fifty"}]}'
# expected: 200, stop_reason=max_tokens, usage has input_tokens and output_tokens only
```
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# 2.12 — Anthropic SSE state machine (RED)
Phase: 2 — LLM surfaces
Stage: RED
Depends on: [2.11](2.11-anthropic-response-translation.md), [1.2](1.2-streaming-passthrough.md), [1.3](1.3-disconnect-propagation.md)
`POST /llm/v1/messages` with `"stream":true` must emit Anthropic SSE. Anthropic uses
NAMED events carrying content-block indices; the upstream emits flat OpenAI data-only
chunks. Write the failing tests against the event sequence before writing a translator.
- [ ] Every frame has both an `event:` line and a `data:` line; a bare `data:` frame is
a failure on this surface
- [ ] `Content-Type` is `text/event-stream`
- [ ] Event order for a full response is exactly: `message_start`, then for each block
`content_block_start`, one or more `content_block_delta`, `content_block_stop`,
then `message_delta`, then `message_stop`
- [ ] `message_start` carries the message envelope with the client-sent model, `role`
`assistant`, empty `content`, and `usage.input_tokens`
- [ ] The block carrying `reasoning_content` is index 0 with block type `thinking`, and
its deltas are `thinking_delta`
- [ ] The block carrying `content` is index 1 with block type `text`, and its deltas
are `text_delta`
- [ ] The end of reasoning is only knowable when `content` first arrives, so the
arrival of the first `content` token MUST emit `content_block_stop` for index 0
before `content_block_start` for index 1 — the two blocks never overlap
- [ ] If a response has no `reasoning_content` at all, the text block is index 0 and no
thinking block is started; indices are assigned in emission order with no gaps
- [ ] If a response has `reasoning_content` and never any `content`, the thinking block
is still closed before `message_delta`
- [ ] `message_delta` carries `stop_reason` and `usage.output_tokens`; upstream
`finish_reason` `stop` becomes `end_turn` and `length` becomes `max_tokens`
- [ ] `message_stop` is the final frame and is emitted exactly once per response
- [ ] Translation is streaming and unbuffered: each upstream chunk is converted and
flushed as it arrives, and the response is never accumulated to be inspected
- [ ] A client disconnect mid-stream cancels the upstream request immediately and
releases the slot, rather than orphaning the generation
- [ ] An upstream failure after `message_start` terminates the stream with an error
frame rather than a truncated but apparently successful sequence
- [ ] The OpenAI `data: [DONE]` sentinel is consumed by the translator and never
forwarded to a `/llm` client
An orphaned generation holds one of only eight vLLM sequence slots in the cluster,
which is why disconnect cancellation is an acceptance criterion here and not only in
the proxy layer.
## Verify
```bash
curl -N -s localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","max_tokens":64,"stream":true,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}' \
| grep '^event:'
# expected: message_start, content_block_start, content_block_delta..., content_block_stop,
# content_block_start, content_block_delta..., content_block_stop, message_delta, message_stop
curl -N -s localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","max_tokens":64,"stream":true,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}' \
| grep -n -E 'content_block_stop|"index":1' | head -3
# expected: the index 0 content_block_stop line precedes the first line mentioning index 1
timeout 1 curl -N -s localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","max_tokens":512,"stream":true,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"long"}]}' >/dev/null
grep -c 'cancelled' /tmp/stub-reasoning.log
# expected: 1 within a second of the client going away
```
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# 2.13 — Anthropic error shape on `/llm/*` (RED)
Phase: 2 — LLM surfaces
Stage: RED
Depends on: [2.10](2.10-anthropic-request-translation.md), [4.3](4.3-problem-json-errors.md)
`/v1/*` renders rejections as RFC 9457 `application/problem+json`. `/llm/*` must not.
The same underlying rejection gets two renderings, chosen purely by which surface
received the request. Write the failing tests against both renderings first.
- [ ] Every error response from a `/llm/*` path has the body
`{"type":"error","error":{"type":"...","message":"..."}}` and
`Content-Type: application/json`
- [ ] No `/llm/*` response ever carries `application/problem+json`, and no `/v1/*`
response ever carries the Anthropic error shape
- [ ] An unknown or missing `model` returns `invalid_request_error` with a message
naming the rejected value and listing the configured model names, derived from
the registry rather than hardcoded
- [ ] A request missing the required `max_tokens` returns `invalid_request_error`
naming `max_tokens`
- [ ] A body that is not valid JSON returns `invalid_request_error` with a message
distinguishable from the unknown-model case
- [ ] A request for an out-of-scope feature returns `invalid_request_error` naming the
feature, for example tools, images or prompt caching
- [ ] Exhausting the shared slot queue returns HTTP 429 with error type
`rate_limit_error` and a `Retry-After` header
- [ ] An upstream failure or timeout returns HTTP 5xx with error type `api_error`, and
the message leaks no upstream host, port or internal path
- [ ] No rejection reaches an upstream, and none falls back to a default model
- [ ] Each rejection is logged with its reason and its surface; the request body is
never logged
- [ ] The same malformed request sent to `/v1/chat/completions` and `/llm/v1/messages`
yields the same HTTP status with the two different body shapes
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -i localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"gpt-4","max_tokens":8,"messages":[]}'
# expected: 4xx, content-type application/json, body {"type":"error","error":{"type":"invalid_request_error",...}}
# listing reasoning, ornith:35b, qwen2.5:3b-instruct
curl -s -i localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages -H 'content-type: application/json' -d 'not json' \
| grep -i 'content-type'
# expected: application/json, never application/problem+json
curl -s -i localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"gpt-4","messages":[]}' | grep -i 'content-type'
# expected: application/problem+json, confirming the two surfaces render differently
```
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# 2.14 — Queue position event on `/llm/*` (GREEN)
Phase: 2 — LLM surfaces
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [2.12](2.12-anthropic-sse-state-machine.md), [4.1](4.1-gpu-slot-semaphore.md)
The Anthropic event set has no way to say "you are queued". Its stream implicitly
begins after a slot has been acquired, so a queued client sees nothing at all until
generation starts. The `reasoning` upstream has only 8 sequence slots cluster-wide and
the gateway caps below that, so waiting is normal and worth showing.
- [ ] When a streaming `/llm/v1/messages` request waits for a slot, the gateway emits a
frame with `event: queue` before any `message_start`
- [ ] The queue frame's data carries the caller's current position in the queue
- [ ] Position updates are emitted as the queue drains, each as another `event: queue`
frame, until a slot is acquired
- [ ] Once a slot is acquired the stream continues with the standard sequence beginning
at `message_start`, and no further queue frame is emitted for that request
- [ ] A request that acquires a slot immediately emits no queue frame at all
- [ ] Queue frames are flushed as they are produced, not buffered behind the first
upstream token
- [ ] A client that disconnects while still queued is removed from the queue, never
reaches the upstream and never consumes a slot
- [ ] Non-streaming requests emit no queue frames; they simply wait, then answer
- [ ] The extension is documented in the surface's own docs as non-standard, alongside
the fact that a strict Anthropic client ignoring unknown events degrades to
showing nothing while queued rather than erroring
This is a deliberate departure from the Anthropic contract. It is safe only because
the sole client of `/llm/*` is the first-party riotpiao frontend. It must never be
required for correctness: dropping every `event: queue` frame leaves a valid,
complete Anthropic stream.
## Verify
```bash
# Fill the slots first, with cap=2 configured against a stub that holds each request 3s.
seq 4 | xargs -P4 -I{} curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","max_tokens":16,"stream":true,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}' &
sleep 1
curl -N -s localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","max_tokens":16,"stream":true,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}' \
| grep -m3 '^event:'
# expected: event: queue arrives within a second, before any event: message_start
curl -N -s localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"qwen2.5:3b-instruct","max_tokens":16,"stream":true,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}' \
| head -1
# expected: event: message_start, no queue frame on an uncontended upstream
```
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# 2.15 — Anthropic dialect scope boundary (GREEN)
Phase: 2 — LLM surfaces
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [2.10](2.10-anthropic-request-translation.md), [2.13](2.13-anthropic-error-shape.md)
The only client of `/llm/*` is the first-party riotpiao frontend. It is not Claude
Code and not the Anthropic SDK, so the surface implements a deliberately narrow slice
of the Messages API. The narrowness is the design; the risk is a half-built feature
that appears to work.
- [ ] The unsupported set is enumerated in one place and covers at least: `tools` and
`tool_choice`, `tool_use` blocks, `tool_result` turns, image content blocks,
prompt-caching controls and cache headers, the batch API, and user messages
carrying more than one content block
- [ ] Each unsupported feature is detected during request translation, before any
upstream is contacted
- [ ] Rejection uses the Anthropic error shape
`{"type":"error","error":{"type":"invalid_request_error","message":"..."}}` and
the message names the specific unsupported feature, not just "unsupported"
- [ ] No unsupported feature is silently ignored, stripped, or partially honoured; a
request containing one never produces a 200
- [ ] A request combining a supported and an unsupported field is rejected, not
serviced with the unsupported part dropped
- [ ] The `/v1/*` OpenAI surface is unaffected: tool calling continues to work there
exactly as it does today
- [ ] Every entry in the unsupported set has a test asserting the rejection, so
widening scope forces a deliberate test change rather than a quiet code change
- [ ] The list is documented on the surface, so the frontend can see the boundary
without reading gateway code
Enabling any of these later must be an explicit config or code change accompanied by
its own translation work and tests. A silent partial implementation is the specific
failure this task exists to prevent.
## Verify
```bash
curl -s localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","max_tokens":8,"tools":[{"name":"x"}],"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'
# expected: 4xx, error.message names tools, no upstream stub hit
curl -s localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","max_tokens":8,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"image","source":{}}]}]}'
# expected: 4xx, error.message names image content blocks, no upstream stub hit
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}],"tools":[{"type":"function","function":{"name":"x"}}]}'
# expected: 200, tool calling still works on the OpenAI surface
```
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# 2.2 — Body-based model dispatch (GREEN)
Phase: 2 — LLM surface
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [2.1](2.1-model-registry.md), [1.1](1.1-reverse-proxy.md), [1.2](1.2-streaming-passthrough.md)
- [ ] `POST /v1/chat/completions` selects its upstream from the `model` field of the JSON request body
- [ ] The body reaching the upstream is byte-identical to the body received, `model` included — dispatch reads, it does not rewrite
- [ ] The upstream sees the canonical path `/v1/chat/completions`
- [ ] `"model":"reasoning"` reaches `reasoning-predictor.llm-serving:80`; `"model":"ornith:35b"` and `"model":"qwen2.5:3b-instruct"` both reach `ornith-predictor.llm-serving:80`
- [ ] `"stream":true` streams unbuffered — chunks reach the client as the upstream emits them, and are not accumulated in order to inspect the body
- [ ] A client disconnect mid-stream cancels the upstream request rather than orphaning it
- [ ] `reasoning_content` is passed through untouched alongside `content`; the gateway does not merge, reorder or strip either
- [ ] Reading the body to find `model` respects the route's body size cap and does not load an unbounded request into memory
This is the single capability Kong OSS lacked — `ai-proxy-advanced` is Enterprise-only —
and the entire reason this gateway exists. Everything else in this phase is a
consequence of it. Ports are 80, not 8080.
An orphaned generation holds one of only eight vLLM sequence slots in the cluster,
which is why disconnect cancellation belongs in the acceptance criteria of this task
and not only in the proxy layer.
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'
# expected: 200, stub for reasoning-predictor recorded the hit with path /v1/chat/completions and an unmodified body
curl -s localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"qwen2.5:3b-instruct","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'
# expected: 200, ornith-predictor stub hit, reasoning-predictor stub not hit
curl -N -s localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","stream":true,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'
# expected: 200, content-type text/event-stream, first data: chunk arrives before the stub finishes emitting
```
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# 2.3 — Unknown and missing model errors (RED)
Phase: 2 — LLM surface
Stage: RED
Depends on: [2.1](2.1-model-registry.md), [2.2](2.2-body-based-dispatch.md)
- [ ] `POST /v1/chat/completions` with a `model` that is not in the configured registry returns a 4xx client error, never 5xx
- [ ] A request with no `model` field, a null `model`, or an empty-string `model` is the same class of client error
- [ ] A body that is not valid JSON is also a client error, distinguishable from an unknown model
- [ ] The response is RFC 9457 with `Content-Type: application/problem+json`
- [ ] The problem body names the rejected value and enumerates every currently configured model name, derived from the registry rather than written out by hand
- [ ] No fallback to a default model happens under any of these conditions, and no upstream is contacted
- [ ] The rejection is logged with its reason; the request body is not logged
Write the failing tests first. A silent fallback to a default model is the specific
failure mode this task exists to prevent: it turns a client typo into a bill against
the wrong GPU and hides the mistake from the caller.
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -i localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"gpt-4","messages":[]}'
# expected: 400 (or 404), content-type: application/problem+json, body lists reasoning, ornith:35b, qwen2.5:3b-instruct, and the embedding/rerank models
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"messages":[]}'
# expected: 4xx, no upstream stub recorded any hit
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d 'not json'
# expected: 400, problem+json, reason distinct from unknown-model
```
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# 2.4 — Legacy path aliases (GREEN)
Phase: 2 — LLM surface
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [2.2](2.2-body-based-dispatch.md)
- [ ] `POST /v1/reasoning/chat/completions` behaves as the canonical endpoint with `model` forced to `reasoning`
- [ ] `POST /v1/ornith/chat/completions` behaves as the canonical endpoint with `model` forced to `ornith:35b`
- [ ] `POST /v1/qwen/chat/completions` behaves as the canonical endpoint with `model` forced to `qwen2.5:3b-instruct`
- [ ] The forced value overrides whatever `model` the body carries, including a conflicting one, and the upstream receives the forced value
- [ ] The upstream sees the canonical path `/v1/chat/completions`, not the alias path
- [ ] Streaming, disconnect cancellation and `reasoning_content` passthrough behave identically to the canonical endpoint
- [ ] The alias set is configuration, so removal is a config change and needs no code change
- [ ] Each alias is marked temporary where it is defined, with the condition for removal stated: all callers migrated
These three paths exist only because Kong OSS could not dispatch on the request body.
They keep the cutover reversible — pi is a live caller today. They are deleted once
callers have moved to `POST /v1/chat/completions` with `model` in the body.
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/v1/reasoning/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'
# expected: 200, reasoning-predictor stub hit at /v1/chat/completions with body model=reasoning
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/v1/qwen/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"model":"reasoning","messages":[]}'
# expected: 200, ornith-predictor stub hit with body model=qwen2.5:3b-instruct — the body's "reasoning" is overridden
```
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# 2.5 — `GET /v1/models` (GREEN)
Phase: 2 — LLM surface
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [2.1](2.1-model-registry.md)
- [ ] `GET /v1/models` returns 200 with `Content-Type: application/json`
- [ ] The response shape is `{"object":"list","data":[{"id","object":"model","owned_by","created"}]}`
- [ ] Every entry's `object` is the literal string `model`
- [ ] The `id` values are exactly the model names the configured registry will accept for dispatch — no more, no fewer
- [ ] Adding or removing a model in configuration changes this response with no code change
- [ ] No model list is hardcoded anywhere; the list cannot disagree with what routing accepts
- [ ] The endpoint contacts no upstream and stays cheap
Kong served a static list via `request-termination`, and its own manifest flags that
the list can drift from what the engines actually serve. Deriving from the registry
makes that drift structurally impossible: the same source answers this endpoint and
decides which `model` values dispatch.
## Verify
```bash
curl -s localhost:8080/v1/models
# expected: 200, {"object":"list","data":[...]} with ids reasoning, ornith:35b, qwen2.5:3b-instruct,
# nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v2-moe, BAAI/bge-reranker-base
# every advertised id must dispatch; nothing advertised may 404
for m in $(curl -s localhost:8080/v1/models | grep -o '"id":"[^"]*"' | cut -d'"' -f4); do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "$m %{http_code}\n" localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d "{\"model\":\"$m\",\"messages\":[]}"
done
# expected: no unknown-model rejection for any advertised id
```
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# 2.6 — `POST /v1/embeddings` passthrough (GREEN)
Phase: 2 — LLM surface
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [2.1](2.1-model-registry.md), [1.1](1.1-reverse-proxy.md)
- [ ] `POST /v1/embeddings` reaches `embeddings-predictor.llm-serving:80` at the path `/v1/embeddings`, unrewritten
- [ ] The request body is forwarded byte-identical, and the upstream response body is returned byte-identical
- [ ] The route's connect timeout is 10s and its read and write timeouts are 10m, explicit in configuration rather than inherited
- [ ] The route has an explicit body size cap
- [ ] Upstream error statuses are surfaced as-is; the gateway invents no retries and no substitute response
TEI already serves the canonical path, so this route rewrites nothing. The model
served here is `nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v2-moe`. Port is 80, not 8080. Whether this
route dispatches on the body's `model` or is pinned to the single embeddings upstream
is a design decision for whoever works it; either way the path must not change and an
unknown `model` must not silently reach the wrong upstream.
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -i localhost:8080/v1/embeddings -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v2-moe","input":"hello"}'
# expected: 200, embeddings stub hit at path /v1/embeddings, request body unmodified, response body byte-identical to the stub's
```
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# 2.7 — `POST /v1/rerank` path rewrite (GREEN)
Phase: 2 — LLM surface
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [2.1](2.1-model-registry.md), [1.1](1.1-reverse-proxy.md)
- [ ] `POST /v1/rerank` reaches `reranker-predictor.llm-serving:80` at the path `/rerank`
- [ ] The rewrite is expressed in the route configuration, not special-cased in dispatch code
- [ ] The request body is forwarded byte-identical, and the upstream response body is returned byte-identical
- [ ] The route's connect timeout is 10s and its read and write timeouts are 10m, explicit in configuration
- [ ] The route has an explicit body size cap
- [ ] A request to `/v1/rerank` never reaches the upstream as `/v1/rerank`
TEI does not serve `/v1/rerank`: probing it returned 404, while `/rerank` returned 405
for the wrong method — that is how the correct upstream path was established. The
model served here is `BAAI/bge-reranker-base`. Port is 80, not 8080. This is the only
route in the LLM surface that rewrites its path.
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -i localhost:8080/v1/rerank -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"BAAI/bge-reranker-base","query":"q","texts":["a","b"]}'
# expected: 200, reranker stub recorded exactly one hit at path /rerank and zero at /v1/rerank
```
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# 2.8 — Kong parity test (RED)
Phase: 2 — LLM surface
Stage: RED
Depends on: [2.2](2.2-body-based-dispatch.md), [2.4](2.4-legacy-path-aliases.md), [2.5](2.5-models-endpoint.md), [2.6](2.6-embeddings-passthrough.md), [2.7](2.7-rerank-rewrite.md)
- [ ] A repeatable check issues the same request to Kong and to the gateway and compares the real HTTP responses: status, meaningful headers, and body
- [ ] It covers every migrated route: `GET /v1/models`, the three `/v1/{reasoning,ornith,qwen}/chat/completions` aliases, `POST /v1/embeddings`, `POST /v1/rerank`, and the new canonical `POST /v1/chat/completions`
- [ ] It covers a streaming chat request and asserts equivalent chunk sequencing, not just an equal final concatenation
- [ ] It covers a mid-stream client disconnect and asserts the upstream request is cancelled rather than left running
- [ ] It asserts `reasoning_content` and `content` are both present and untouched for the `reasoning` model
- [ ] Fields that legitimately differ per request — ids, timestamps, generated text — are normalised before comparison, and the normalisation is explicit rather than a blanket ignore
- [ ] Any difference fails the check loudly and names the route and the field
- [ ] `GET /v1/models` is expected to differ from Kong's static list only where the gateway's derived list is more accurate; that difference is recorded deliberately, not normalised away
- [ ] The check passes before cutover ([6.5](6.5-cutover.md)) and blocks it if it does not
Kong is serving live traffic while this runs. The check reads only; it changes no
cluster state. Eleven ReplicaSets exist on the Kong Deployment, so re-run this
immediately before cutover rather than trusting an old result.
## Verify
```bash
./parity --kong https://api.riotpiao.com --gateway http://homelab-frontend.api.svc.cluster.local
# expected: exit 0, one PASS line per route, explicit report of the /v1/models difference
# spot-check by hand, same body to both
curl -s -o /dev/null -w 'kong %{http_code}\n' https://api.riotpiao.com/v1/rerank \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"model":"BAAI/bge-reranker-base","query":"q","texts":["a"]}'
# expected: identical status from both endpoints
```
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# 2.9 — Dialect-neutral canonical request (GREEN)
Phase: 2 — LLM surfaces
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [2.1](2.1-model-registry.md), [2.2](2.2-body-based-dispatch.md)
The gateway serves two permanent protocol dialects: `/v1/*` is OpenAI-compatible and
`/llm/*` is Anthropic Messages. Both translate into one internal shape before anything
else happens to them, and both translate back out of it on the way to the client.
- [ ] A single internal request representation exists that carries at minimum: the
resolved upstream, the model name as the client sent it, the ordered turns, an
optional system instruction, a maximum output token count, stop sequences, and a
streaming flag
- [ ] The representation names no dialect: nothing in it is called openai or anthropic,
and no field exists solely because one dialect happens to spell it that way
- [ ] Model dispatch, the shared slot controller, per-caller budgets, logging and
metrics all read the canonical request and never the raw dialect body
- [ ] The surface that received a request is recorded as one field on the canonical
request, used only to choose the response and error rendering, never to choose an
upstream or a slot
- [ ] An identical prompt sent to `/v1/chat/completions` and to `/llm/v1/messages`
produces the same resolved upstream, the same slot accounting and the same log
fields apart from that one surface label
- [ ] Adding a third dialect requires a new translator only; the slot controller,
dispatch and budget code are untouched
- [ ] Translation failure is a client error at the surface boundary, and no partially
populated canonical request ever reaches an upstream
`reasoning` maps to `reasoning-predictor.llm-serving:80`; `ornith:35b` and
`qwen2.5:3b-instruct` both map to `ornith-predictor.llm-serving:80`. Ports are 80.
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'
# expected: 200, reasoning stub hit once
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","max_tokens":16,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'
# expected: 200, reasoning stub hit once, same upstream and same slot counter as the /v1 call
grep -h 'upstream=' /tmp/gateway.log | tail -2
# expected: both lines show upstream=reasoning-predictor and model=reasoning, differing only in the surface label
```
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# 3.1 — JWKS fetch and rotation (GREEN)
Phase: 3 — Authentication
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [0.2](0.2-route-configuration.md), [0.3](0.3-health-endpoints.md)
- [ ] The signing key set is fetched from Authentik at `https://authentik.riotpiao.com` at runtime; no public key is pinned in configuration, in an image, or in a manifest
- [ ] The JWKS URL is configuration, so a local stub issuer can be pointed at instead — no cluster and no credentials needed to verify this task
- [ ] Fetched keys are cached and reused; a token verification does not trigger a network call per request
- [ ] A token whose key id is not in the cache triggers a refetch, and the refetch is rate-limited so an unknown-key flood cannot hammer Authentik
- [ ] After a key rotates at the issuer, tokens signed by the new key verify without restarting, redeploying, or editing configuration
- [ ] Tokens signed by a key that is no longer published stop verifying once the cache reflects that
- [ ] `GET /readyz` fails while JWKS has never been fetched successfully, and `GET /healthz` is unaffected
- [ ] A JWKS fetch failure while a valid cache exists does not take the gateway down; it is logged and retried
- [ ] No key material, token, or fetched secret appears in logs
This deletes the rotation runbook `AUTH-PLAN.md` was forced to propose. That runbook
existed only because Kong OSS needed a pinned `rsa_public_key`; it must not be
carried forward.
## Verify
```bash
# stub issuer serving a JWKS, gateway pointed at it
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/readyz # expected: 200 once JWKS has been fetched
# stub returns 500 for JWKS from a cold start
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/readyz # expected: 503
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/healthz # expected: 200
# rotate the stub's key, then present a token signed by the new key, no restart
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/v1/models -H "authorization: Bearer $NEW_TOKEN"
# expected: 200 — refetch happened on the unknown key id
```
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# 3.2 — Bearer token validation (GREEN)
Phase: 3 — Authentication
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [3.1](3.1-jwks-fetch-and-rotation.md)
- [ ] `Authorization: Bearer <jwt>` is the credential the gateway accepts on protected routes
- [ ] The scheme match is case-insensitive, as the HTTP spec requires — `bearer`, `Bearer` and `BEARER` all work
- [ ] A valid, unexpired token signed by a currently published Authentik key returns the upstream response
- [ ] Missing header, wrong scheme, malformed token, bad signature, expired token, and wrong issuer or audience each return 401 with `WWW-Authenticate` set
- [ ] Rejections are RFC 9457 `application/problem+json`, and the reason is logged without logging the token
- [ ] The `Authorization` header is not forwarded to upstreams
- [ ] The validated caller identity is available to later stages, since [3.5](3.5-capability-authorization.md) authorizes on it
- [ ] Signature verification is real: a token with a valid-looking payload and a forged signature is rejected
This is precisely what Kong OSS `key-auth` could not do. Verified live: a raw
`apikey:` header succeeded with 200 while `Authorization: Bearer` failed with 401,
which hard-blocked every OpenAI-compatible client and is why authentication is OFF
on the model API today.
Authentik is at `https://authentik.riotpiao.com`. A local stub issuer must be enough
to work this task — no cluster, no credentials.
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H "authorization: Bearer $VALID_TOKEN" -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","messages":[]}'
# expected: 200
curl -s -i localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"model":"reasoning"}'
# expected: 401, WWW-Authenticate present, content-type application/problem+json
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/v1/models -H "apikey: $OLD_KONG_KEY"
# expected: 401 — the retired Kong credential form is not accepted
```
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# 3.3 — Authentik service account and token provider (GREEN)
Phase: 3 — Authentication
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [3.2](3.2-bearer-validation.md)
- [ ] A service account exists in Authentik at `https://authentik.riotpiao.com` for machine callers of the model API
- [ ] An OAuth2 provider is configured so that account can obtain a token non-interactively, with no browser step
- [ ] The token endpoint returns a signed JWT whose issuer and audience match what the gateway validates, and which the gateway accepts on a protected route
- [ ] Token lifetime is set deliberately and recorded, not left at whatever the default is
- [ ] The client secret is stored as a Kubernetes Secret referenced from git, never committed in plaintext
- [ ] The Authentik configuration is captured in the repo as reproducible steps or declarative config, so it can be rebuilt rather than clicked together again
- [ ] The token carries whatever claim [3.5](3.5-capability-authorization.md) authorizes on
Open risk recorded in `AUTH-PLAN.md` and unresolved: Authentik 2026.x may require an
app-password or JWT-assertion flow rather than a plain `client_secret` POST to the
token endpoint. Verify which flow the running version accepts before wiring anything
that depends on it, and record the answer here.
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -i -X POST https://authentik.riotpiao.com/application/o/token/ \
-d grant_type=client_credentials -d "client_id=$CID" -d "client_secret=$CSEC"
# expected: 200, JSON with access_token; if 400/401, the app-password / JWT-assertion risk above is real — record which
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://homelab-frontend.api.svc.cluster.local/v1/models \
-H "authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN"
# expected: 200 — the gateway accepts a real Authentik-issued token, not only a stub one
```
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# 3.4 — Flag-gated auth rollout (GREEN)
Phase: 3 — Authentication
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [3.2](3.2-bearer-validation.md)
- [ ] Authentication is controlled by an explicit flag in configuration, and its default is OFF
- [ ] With the flag off, every route answers exactly as it did before Phase 3 existed — no 401s, no `WWW-Authenticate`, no behaviour change
- [ ] With the flag on, protected routes require `Authorization: Bearer` and reject anything else with 401
- [ ] `GET /healthz` and `GET /readyz` never require authentication in either state
- [ ] Which routes are protected is per-route configuration, so auth can be turned on for one surface at a time
- [ ] Turning the flag on is a git change synced by Argo; it is never toggled by hand against the cluster
- [ ] The flag's current state is visible in logs at startup and in metrics, so nobody has to guess whether auth is on
- [ ] Turning the flag off again fully restores unauthenticated access, making the rollout reversible
The model API is unauthenticated today — verified live, a request with no credentials
returns 200. Enabling this flag breaks every current caller until they hold a token,
pi included. That is why it defaults off and is enabled deliberately, after
[3.6](3.6-pi-client-migration.md).
## Verify
```bash
# flag off
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/v1/models # expected: 200
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"model":"reasoning","messages":[]}' # expected: 200
# flag on, no credentials
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"model":"reasoning","messages":[]}' # expected: 401
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/healthz # expected: 200
```
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# 3.5 — Capability authorization (RED)
Phase: 3 — Authentication
Stage: RED
Depends on: [3.2](3.2-bearer-validation.md), [3.4](3.4-flag-gated-rollout.md)
- [ ] Beyond proving who the caller is, the gateway checks the token is permitted to invoke the capability being called
- [ ] Each capability prefix — `/v1/*` for the model surface, and the future `/sqs/*`, `/workflow/*`, `/cluster/*`, `/db/*` — maps to a required grant, and the mapping is configuration
- [ ] A token carrying a queue grant but no model grant is rejected on `POST /v1/chat/completions` with 403, not 401 — it authenticated fine, it is not permitted
- [ ] A token with no recognised grant at all is rejected on every protected route
- [ ] Rejections are RFC 9457 `application/problem+json` and state which capability was denied, without echoing the token or its claims verbatim
- [ ] Denials are logged with the caller identity and the capability, and counted as a distinct rejection reason
- [ ] A route with no required grant configured while auth is on fails startup rather than defaulting to allow-all
Write the failing tests first: a queue token must not invoke a GPU. The default on an
unconfigured route is deny, because a fail-open authorization layer is worse than none
— it reads as protection while granting everything.
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -i localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions -H "authorization: Bearer $QUEUE_ONLY_TOKEN" \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"model":"reasoning","messages":[]}'
# expected: 403, application/problem+json naming the denied capability, no upstream stub hit
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H "authorization: Bearer $MODEL_TOKEN" -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","messages":[]}'
# expected: 200
./gateway --config testdata/auth-on-route-without-grant.yaml; echo "exit=$?"
# expected: non-zero exit, stderr names the route missing a required grant
```
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# 3.6 — Migrate pi to Bearer and one provider (REFACTOR)
Phase: 3 — Authentication
Stage: REFACTOR
Depends on: [2.2](2.2-body-based-dispatch.md), [3.3](3.3-authentik-service-account.md), [3.4](3.4-flag-gated-rollout.md)
- [ ] `~/.pi/agent/models.json` no longer contains a `customHeaders: {apikey: ...}` block anywhere
- [ ] pi authenticates with `Authorization: Bearer` carrying an Authentik-issued token
- [ ] The three provider entries `homelab-reasoning`, `homelab-ornith` and `homelab-qwen` collapse into ONE provider entry
- [ ] That single provider's base URL is the canonical OpenAI base, and the three models are listed under it — body-based dispatch makes per-model base URLs unnecessary
- [ ] pi reaches all three models through `POST /v1/chat/completions` with `model` set to `reasoning`, `ornith:35b`, and `qwen2.5:3b-instruct`
- [ ] Streaming still works from pi, and interrupting a generation cancels it upstream rather than leaving it running
- [ ] The old config is captured before editing, so a revert is one file restore
- [ ] Verified with auth ON, because that is the state the migration exists to survive
The `apikey` header exists only because Kong OSS `key-auth` rejected
`Authorization: Bearer`. Once this lands, nothing depends on the legacy aliases in
[2.4](2.4-legacy-path-aliases.md) and they can be removed.
## Verify
```bash
grep -c apikey ~/.pi/agent/models.json # expected: 0
grep -c '"homelab' ~/.pi/agent/models.json # expected: 1 provider entry, not 3
for m in reasoning ornith:35b qwen2.5:3b-instruct; do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "$m %{http_code}\n" https://api.riotpiao.com/v1/chat/completions \
-H "authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d "{\"model\":\"$m\",\"messages\":[{\"role\":\"user\",\"content\":\"hi\"}]}"
done
# expected: 200 for all three, with auth enabled
curl -N -s https://api.riotpiao.com/v1/chat/completions -H "authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","stream":true,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'
# expected: text/event-stream chunks arriving incrementally; reasoning_content and content both present
```
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# 4.1 — GPU slot semaphore for `reasoning` (GREEN)
Phase: 4 — Limits and budgets
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [4.3](4.3-problem-json-errors.md), [2.9](2.9-canonical-request-model.md)
The `reasoning` upstream is 2 replicas x `--max-num-seqs=4` = 8 concurrent sequence
slots cluster-wide. That 8 is a vLLM concurrency setting, not a GPU count — worker-1
has 4 physical GPUs and the two numbers are unrelated. Exceeding 8 does not fail
fast; it silently queues inside vLLM where the gateway has no visibility and no
ability to cancel.
The gateway serves two permanent dialects over the same predictors: `/v1/*` is
OpenAI-compatible and `/llm/*` is Anthropic Messages. There is ONE controller, keyed by
upstream, sitting below both.
- [ ] Concurrent in-flight requests to `reasoning` are capped at a configured limit strictly below 8, leaving operator headroom
- [ ] The cap, the queue depth, and the queue wait timeout are all explicit in configuration with no silent defaults
- [ ] Requests over the cap wait in a bounded queue rather than being rejected immediately
- [ ] Once the queue is full, further requests are rejected with a retryable status and a `Retry-After`, as an `application/problem+json` document
- [ ] A slot is released when the response completes, when the upstream errors, and when the client disconnects mid-stream — no path leaks a slot
- [ ] A client that disconnects while still queued never reaches the upstream and never consumes a slot
- [ ] The cap applies only to `reasoning`; other upstreams are unaffected and are not blocked behind its queue
- [ ] The controller is keyed by UPSTREAM, never by route, path prefix or dialect — `reasoning-predictor.llm-serving:80` has exactly one cap and one queue
- [ ] A request arriving on `/v1/chat/completions` and one arriving on `/llm/v1/messages` contend for the same slots and the same queue, admitted in arrival order
- [ ] Total in-flight requests against `reasoning` never exceed the configured cap regardless of which surface they arrived through, including when both surfaces are saturated at once
- [ ] Per-dialect semaphores are explicitly wrong and must not exist: the 8 sequence slots are physical, so two independent gates would each believe they were within budget while together exceeding it
- [ ] The controller reads the dialect-neutral canonical request and has no knowledge of which surface produced it; adding a third dialect requires no change here
- [ ] Slot occupancy and queue depth are reported per upstream, and requests are attributable to a surface for logging only, never for admission
- [ ] Rejection at a full queue renders per surface — `application/problem+json` on `/v1`, the Anthropic error shape on `/llm` — from one shared decision
## Verify
```bash
# Fire 40 concurrent chat requests at a stub reasoning upstream that holds each for 2s,
# with cap=6 and queue=8 configured.
seq 40 | xargs -P40 -I{} curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' \
-X POST localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"model":"reasoning","messages":[]}' | sort | uniq -c
# expected: a mix of 200 and 503; zero 500s
# expected: the stub logged at most 6 simultaneous in-flight requests, never 7
grep -c 'max_concurrent=7' /tmp/stub-reasoning.log
# expected: 0
curl -s -D - -o /dev/null -X POST localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"model":"reasoning","messages":[]}' | grep -i retry-after
# expected: Retry-After present on the rejected request
# Same cap=6 stub, but split the load across both dialects: 20 on /v1 and 20 on /llm.
seq 20 | xargs -P20 -I{} curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"model":"reasoning","messages":[]}' &
seq 20 | xargs -P20 -I{} curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST localhost:8080/llm/v1/messages \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","max_tokens":16,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}' &
wait
grep -c 'max_concurrent=7' /tmp/stub-reasoning.log
# expected: 0 — the two surfaces share one cap, they do not get 6 each
```
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# 4.2 — Per-caller request budgets (GREEN)
Phase: 4 — Limits and budgets
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [4.3](4.3-problem-json-errors.md)
No `rate-limiting` plugin exists anywhere in the cluster today. This is net-new work,
not a migration — there is no prior behaviour to preserve.
- [ ] An identified caller gets a bounded number of requests per configured time window
- [ ] Caller identity comes from the authenticated token's subject when auth is on, and from a documented fallback attribute when auth is off
- [ ] Budget size and window length are explicit in configuration, per caller class, with no silent defaults
- [ ] Exceeding the budget is rejected with a retryable status, an `application/problem+json` body, and a `Retry-After` naming when the window resets
- [ ] Remaining budget and reset time are observable to the caller on allowed requests, not only on rejections
- [ ] Budgets are enforced independently of the `reasoning` concurrency cap — a caller under budget can still be queued or rejected for slot pressure, and vice versa
- [ ] Two distinct callers do not consume each other's budget
- [ ] Budget state is per-replica-safe: the documented behaviour with 2 replicas is stated, not accidental
## Verify
```bash
# budget=5 per 60s window for the test caller
for i in $(seq 1 7); do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} ' -H 'authorization: Bearer test-caller-a' \
localhost:8080/v1/models
done; echo
# expected: 200 200 200 200 200 429 429
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -H 'authorization: Bearer test-caller-b' \
localhost:8080/v1/models
# expected: 200 — caller B has its own budget
```
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# 4.3 — RFC 9457 problem+json rejections (RED)
Phase: 4 — Limits and budgets
Stage: RED
Every rejection the gateway generates itself must be a machine-readable problem
document. Upstream responses are passed through untouched — this covers only errors
the gateway originates.
- [ ] Every gateway-originated rejection responds with `Content-Type: application/problem+json`
- [ ] The body carries at minimum `type`, `title`, `status`, and `detail`, and `status` equals the HTTP status line
- [ ] `type` is a stable, distinct URI per rejection reason, so a client can branch on it without parsing prose
- [ ] `detail` is human-useful and names the offending input where one exists
- [ ] `Retry-After` is set whenever a retry time is knowable — queue full, budget exhausted, upstream saturated
- [ ] `Retry-After` is absent when no retry will help — unknown model, malformed body, oversized body
- [ ] No token, credential, header value, or request body content appears in any field
- [ ] A rejection is emitted as a structured log line carrying the same reason identifier used in `type`
Tests come first and must fail because the shape does not exist yet, not because a
route is missing.
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -D - -o /tmp/p.json -X POST localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"model":"nope"}' | grep -i content-type
# expected: application/problem+json
python3 -c "import json;d=json.load(open('/tmp/p.json'));assert{'type','title','status','detail'}<=d.keys();assert d['status']==400;print('ok')"
# expected: ok
```
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# 5.1 — Prometheus parity with the retiring Kong plugin (RED)
Phase: 5 — Observability
Stage: RED
Kong runs a cluster-wide `prometheus` plugin today. It is deleted at teardown. If the
gateway does not carry equivalent signal, observability REGRESSES at cutover and
nobody notices until an incident.
- [ ] A Prometheus text-format endpoint is exposed and scrapeable without authentication from inside the cluster
- [ ] Request rate is observable, labelled by route and by upstream
- [ ] Request latency is observable as a distribution, not a mean, labelled by route and upstream
- [ ] Response status is observable, labelled by route, upstream, and status class
- [ ] Bandwidth in both directions is observable per route and upstream
- [ ] Upstream health is observable — whether each configured upstream is currently reachable and answering
- [ ] Label values are drawn from the configured route and upstream names, never from raw request paths or user input, so cardinality cannot be driven by a caller
- [ ] Streaming responses record their full byte count and full duration, not the time to first byte
- [ ] The metrics endpoint is not reachable through the public route surface
Write the assertions against the metric families first; they must fail because the
families are absent, not because the endpoint 404s.
## Verify
```bash
curl -s localhost:8080/metrics | grep -E '^# TYPE' | awk '{print $3}' | sort -u
# expected: includes counter and histogram families covering requests, duration, bytes, upstream health
curl -s -X POST localhost:8080/v1/chat/completions -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","messages":[]}' >/dev/null
curl -s localhost:8080/metrics | grep 'upstream="reasoning-predictor"' | head
# expected: request, duration and byte samples all carry route and upstream labels
```
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# 5.2 — Gateway-specific metrics Kong could not provide (GREEN)
Phase: 5 — Observability
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [5.1](5.1-prometheus-parity.md)
These are the signals that justify replacing Kong. Without them the concurrency cap
and budget layers are unfalsifiable — you cannot tell a saturated GPU from a broken
gateway.
- [ ] In-flight request count is observable per upstream, and returns to zero when traffic stops
- [ ] Queue depth for the `reasoning` concurrency queue is observable
- [ ] Occupancy of the `reasoning` slot cap is observable — how many of the configured slots are held right now
- [ ] The configured slot cap itself is observable, so occupancy can be read as a ratio without hardcoding the limit in a dashboard
- [ ] Rejections are counted and broken down by reason: queue full, budget exhausted, body too large, unknown model, auth failure
- [ ] Rejection reason label values match the stable reason identifiers used in the problem+json `type` field, so metrics and logs join cleanly
- [ ] Time spent waiting in the queue is observable as a distribution, separately from upstream latency
- [ ] In-flight and occupancy gauges are correct after a client disconnects mid-stream — no permanent drift upward
## Verify
```bash
# Hold 3 long requests open against a stub reasoning upstream, then scrape.
curl -s localhost:8080/metrics | grep -E 'inflight|queue_depth|slots'
# expected: in-flight for the reasoning upstream reads 3, queue depth reads 0, slot cap is exported
# Kill the clients mid-stream, wait, scrape again.
curl -s localhost:8080/metrics | grep -E 'inflight'
# expected: back to 0 — disconnects released their slots
curl -s localhost:8080/metrics | grep 'reason='
# expected: rejection counters split by reason, matching the problem+json type identifiers
```
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# 5.3 — ServiceMonitor for gateway scraping (GREEN)
Phase: 5 — Observability
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [5.2](5.2-gateway-metrics.md)
Exposing metrics is not the same as having them collected. Kong's plugin was picked
up cluster-wide; the gateway must be explicitly registered or the dashboards go
blank at cutover.
- [ ] A ServiceMonitor selects the gateway Service and is committed to git, applied by Argo — never `kubectl apply`
- [ ] It carries whatever label the cluster's Prometheus uses to select ServiceMonitors, verified against the running Prometheus rather than assumed
- [ ] The scraped port is a named port on the gateway Service, matched by name not number
- [ ] Scrape interval and timeout are explicit
- [ ] The gateway appears as an `up == 1` target in Prometheus, in the expected namespace
- [ ] Metric labels identify the gateway pod and namespace, so 2 replicas are distinguishable
- [ ] Scraping works while the gateway is still unexposed to public traffic — this lands before cutover, not after
- [ ] Note: `prometheus-operated.monitoring` is headless with ClusterIP `None`, so any egress policy that touches it needs pod selectors, not a ClusterIP
## Verify
```bash
kubectl -n monitoring get servicemonitor -l release --show-labels | grep -i frontend
# expected: the gateway ServiceMonitor exists and carries the selector label Prometheus uses
# Query Prometheus for the gateway target
curl -s 'http://localhost:9090/api/v1/query?query=up{job=~".*homelab-frontend.*"}' \
| python3 -c "import json,sys;r=json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['result'];print(len(r),[x['value'][1] for x in r])"
# expected: 2 targets, both reporting "1"
```
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# 6.1 — Hardened container image (GREEN)
Phase: 6 — Deploy and cutover
Stage: GREEN
The gateway is the public edge process. It gets no shell, no package manager, no
writable filesystem and no privileges it does not need.
- [ ] The runtime image is distroless or scratch — no shell, no package manager, no busybox
- [ ] The container runs as a non-root user, enforced by `runAsNonRoot` and an explicit non-zero UID
- [ ] The root filesystem is read-only; any writable path the process genuinely needs is an explicitly mounted volume, not a relaxed rootfs
- [ ] All Linux capabilities are dropped, and none are added back
- [ ] `seccompProfile` is `RuntimeDefault`
- [ ] Privilege escalation is disabled
- [ ] Image tags are the commit SHA of the source that built them. Never `:latest`, never a moving tag — Argo `selfHeal` cannot reconcile a mutable tag reliably, and a rollback needs a tag that still means what it meant yesterday
- [ ] The image is reproducible from a committed build definition; nothing is built by hand
- [ ] The image contains no credentials, kubeconfig or service-account token baked in (G2)
## Verify
```bash
docker run --rm --entrypoint sh <image>:<sha>
# expected: fails — no shell in the image
docker run --rm --read-only --user 65532 <image>:<sha> --version
# expected: starts and exits cleanly under a read-only rootfs as a non-root user
docker inspect <image>:<sha> --format '{{.Config.User}}'
# expected: a non-zero numeric UID, not empty and not "root"
grep -rn 'image:' k8s/ | grep -v '@sha256\|:[0-9a-f]\{7,\}'
# expected: no matches — every image reference is pinned to a SHA
```
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# 6.2 — Deployment, Service, NetworkPolicy (GREEN)
Phase: 6 — Deploy and cutover
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [6.1](6.1-hardened-image.md)
Manifests only. Nothing here exposes the gateway publicly — that is the cutover, and
it is a separate step.
- [ ] A Deployment runs the gateway with at least 2 replicas, matching Kong's current replica count
- [ ] The pod spec carries the hardening from 6.1: non-root, read-only rootfs, all capabilities dropped, `seccompProfile: RuntimeDefault`
- [ ] Liveness probes hit `/healthz` and readiness probes hit `/readyz`; readiness fails while config is invalid or JWKS has never been fetched
- [ ] Route configuration is mounted from a ConfigMap sourced from git — not a CRD, and not baked into the image
- [ ] A config change rolls the pods; a stale ConfigMap cannot be silently served by a long-lived pod
- [ ] Termination allows in-flight requests to drain, with a grace period long enough for the streaming timeouts in use
- [ ] A Service exposes the gateway in-cluster with a named port, resolvable at `http://<svc>.api.svc.cluster.local`
- [ ] No ServiceAccount with any RBAC is bound; the pod does not need or receive an API-server token (G2)
- [ ] A NetworkPolicy allows ingress only from `ingress-nginx`
- [ ] The same NetworkPolicy allows egress only to the proxied upstreams plus Authentik, plus DNS. Everything else is denied
- [ ] Resource requests and limits are set explicitly
- [ ] Every manifest is committed to git and applied by Argo. No `kubectl apply`, no `helm upgrade` (G7)
## Verify
```bash
kubectl -n api get deploy homelab-frontend -o jsonpath='{.spec.replicas} {.spec.template.spec.securityContext}{"\n"}'
# expected: 2, with runAsNonRoot true and seccompProfile RuntimeDefault
kubectl -n api exec deploy/homelab-frontend -- true 2>&1
# expected: fails — distroless image has no shell to exec into
kubectl -n llm-serving run np-probe --rm -it --image=curlimages/curl --restart=Never -- \
curl -s -m 5 http://homelab-frontend.api.svc.cluster.local/healthz
# expected: times out or is refused — ingress is restricted to ingress-nginx only
```
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# 6.3 — Argo Application in the homelab-root GitOps repo (GREEN)
Phase: 6 — Deploy and cutover
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [6.2](6.2-kubernetes-manifests.md)
Verified live 2026-08-19: zero Argo Applications anywhere in the cluster source from
any Forgejo URL. `github.com/Riotpiaole/riotpiao.homelab.com` is authoritative — do
not introduce a second source of truth.
- [ ] An Argo Application for the gateway is committed under `k8s/argocd/apps/` in `github.com/Riotpiaole/riotpiao.homelab.com`
- [ ] `repoURL` is that GitHub repo. No Forgejo URL, no local path, no second remote
- [ ] It targets the `api` namespace, alongside the existing Kong deployment
- [ ] Its sync wave orders it so the gateway is healthy before anything that depends on it, and does not disturb Kong's existing wave-7 Application
- [ ] Automated sync with prune and selfHeal is enabled, so drift is corrected without a human
- [ ] The Application reaches `Synced` and `Healthy` and stays there across a resync
- [ ] Adding it changes nothing about live traffic — Kong still serves `api.riotpiao.com` after this lands
- [ ] The commit is pushed and Argo picks it up on its own. No `kubectl apply` of the Application itself (G7)
## Verify
```bash
kubectl -n argocd get app homelab-frontend \
-o jsonpath='{.spec.source.repoURL}{" "}{.status.sync.status}{" "}{.status.health.status}{"\n"}'
# expected: the GitHub repo URL, Synced, Healthy
kubectl -n argocd get app -o json | grep -ci forgejo
# expected: 0 — GitHub remains the only Application source
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://api.riotpiao.com/v1/models
# expected: 200, still served by Kong — this task changed no live traffic
```
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# 6.4 — Deploy unexposed alongside Kong (GREEN)
Phase: 6 — Deploy and cutover
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [6.3](6.3-argocd-application.md)
The gateway runs in the cluster against the real predictors while Kong continues to
serve every byte of live traffic. This is the last step before anything user-visible
changes, and it is fully reversible — deleting the Application removes it.
- [ ] The gateway is running in namespace `api` and is reachable only in-cluster at `http://<svc>.api.svc.cluster.local`
- [ ] No Ingress points at the gateway. Ingress `api/api` still sends `/` on `api.riotpiao.com` to `kong-proxy:80`
- [ ] Its configured upstreams are the real Services: `reasoning-predictor.llm-serving:80`, `ornith-predictor.llm-serving:80`, `embeddings-predictor.llm-serving:80`, `reranker-predictor.llm-serving:80`, and `agent-hub.agent-pod:9090`
- [ ] Note `reasoning-predictor` listens on port 80, not 8080
- [ ] A real chat completion succeeds in-cluster against `reasoning`, returning `reasoning_content` and `content` as separate fields
- [ ] A streaming chat completion delivers tokens incrementally in-cluster, not as one buffered blob at completion
- [ ] Embeddings and rerank both answer correctly, with rerank reaching the upstream's `/rerank` path
- [ ] A client disconnect mid-stream is observed to cancel the upstream generation and release its sequence slot
- [ ] Prometheus is scraping the gateway and the metrics reflect this in-cluster traffic
- [ ] `api.riotpiao.com` is unaffected throughout — verified before and after
## Verify
```bash
kubectl -n api get ingress api -o jsonpath='{.spec.rules[0].http.paths[0].backend.service.name}{"\n"}'
# expected: kong-proxy — the gateway is still unexposed
kubectl -n api run probe --rm -it --image=curlimages/curl --restart=Never -- sh -c '
curl -sN -X POST http://homelab-frontend.api.svc.cluster.local/v1/chat/completions \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d "{\"model\":\"reasoning\",\"stream\":true,\"messages\":[{\"role\":\"user\",\"content\":\"count to 5\"}]}"'
# expected: multiple data: chunks arriving over time, terminated by data: [DONE]
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://api.riotpiao.com/v1/models
# expected: 200 — public traffic still served by Kong, untouched
```
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# 6.5 — Cutover: repoint Ingress `api/api` (GREEN)
Phase: 6 — Deploy and cutover
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [2.8](2.8-kong-parity-test.md), [6.4](6.4-deploy-alongside-kong.md)
THIS is the cutover. Ingress `api/api` catch-alls `/` on `api.riotpiao.com`; today its
backend is `kong-proxy:80`. Changing that one backend moves all live traffic to the
gateway. Reverting is the same one-line change back to `kong-proxy:80`, committed and
synced — Kong stays running and untouched, so the revert takes effect in seconds.
Preconditions, all required before starting:
- [ ] 2.8 Kong parity is passing — gateway and Kong return equivalent responses for every route in the migration inventory, including a streaming request and a mid-stream disconnect
- [ ] 6.4 is complete: the gateway is healthy in-cluster against the real predictors, and Prometheus is scraping it
- [ ] The inventory has been re-verified immediately beforehand. Kong's Deployment has eleven ReplicaSets and is being actively iterated; a stale inventory is a stale plan
- [ ] Kong remains deployed and serving-capable throughout. Nothing about Kong is deleted in this task
The change itself:
- [ ] The `api/api` Ingress backend becomes the gateway Service, changed in git and synced by Argo. No `kubectl apply`, no `kubectl edit` (G7)
- [ ] The nginx annotations stay exactly as they are: `proxy-read-timeout: 3600`, `proxy-send-timeout: 3600`, `proxy-buffering: off`, `proxy-body-size: 0`. These are what make token streaming work and the gateway needs the same treatment
- [ ] The revert is a single-line commit reverting the backend to `kong-proxy:80`, and it has been rehearsed at least once
- [ ] After the change, public streaming works end to end through nginx, unbuffered
- [ ] pi keeps working on the legacy `/v1/{reasoning,ornith,qwen}/chat/completions` aliases
- [ ] A soak period follows, watching gateway metrics, rejection counters and pi traffic. Do not proceed to 6.6 until the soak is clean
## Verify
```bash
kubectl -n api get ingress api -o jsonpath='{.spec.rules[0].http.paths[0].backend.service.name}{"\n"}'
# expected: the gateway Service, no longer kong-proxy
curl -sN -X POST https://api.riotpiao.com/v1/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"reasoning","stream":true,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"count to 5"}]}'
# expected: incremental data: chunks over time through nginx, ending in data: [DONE]
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST https://api.riotpiao.com/v1/reasoning/chat/completions \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}'
# expected: 200 — pi's legacy alias still works
kubectl -n api get deploy kong-kong -o jsonpath='{.status.readyReplicas}{"\n"}'
# expected: 2 — Kong still running and ready, so the revert is one commit away
```
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# 6.6 — Kong teardown (REFACTOR)
Phase: 6 — Deploy and cutover
Stage: REFACTOR
Depends on: [6.5](6.5-cutover.md)
IRREVERSIBLE. Every step before this one could be undone in seconds by repointing
Ingress `api/api` back to `kong-proxy:80`. Once the Kong Application is removed and
Argo prunes the Helm release and its CRDs, that escape hatch is gone — recovery means
reinstalling Kong from scratch and rebuilding six plugin CRs.
Do not start until the soak after 6.5 has been clean for a deliberate, agreed period.
Preconditions:
- [ ] 6.5 is complete: `api.riotpiao.com` has been served entirely by the gateway through the soak, with no reverts
- [ ] Gateway metrics over the soak show no elevated 5xx rate and no unexplained rejections
- [ ] pi and every other known caller have been confirmed working against the gateway
- [ ] The inventory has been re-verified immediately beforehand — Kong's config has been actively iterated
Order matters. Delete the routing objects first, the Application last:
- [ ] The 7 `ingressClassName: kong` Ingresses are deleted from git — 6 in `llm-serving`, 1 in `agent-pod` for `/console`, `/run`, `/sessions`
- [ ] The 6 `KongPlugin` CRs are deleted from git: the three `llm-rewrite-*` chat rewrites, `llm-rewrite-rerank`, `llm-models-list`, and the cluster-wide `prometheus` plugin
- [ ] Removing the cluster-wide `prometheus` plugin does not blind any dashboard, because 5.1 parity metrics are already being scraped from the gateway
- [ ] The `kong` Application is then removed from `k8s/argocd/apps/55-api-gateway.yaml`
- [ ] Argo prunes the Helm release, the Kong CRDs and the namespace leftovers on its own. No `helm uninstall`, no `kubectl delete` (G7)
- [ ] Public traffic is verified unaffected after each deletion, not only at the end
- [ ] No orphaned Kong CRDs, ReplicaSets or Services remain in namespace `api`
## Verify
```bash
kubectl get ingress -A -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.spec.ingressClassName}{"\n"}{end}' | sort | uniq -c
# expected: no kong entries remain; nginx and istio counts unchanged
kubectl get kongplugins -A 2>&1; kubectl -n argocd get app kong 2>&1
# expected: CRD not found, and Application "kong" not found
kubectl -n api get all | grep -i kong
# expected: no output — nothing Kong-related left
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://api.riotpiao.com/v1/models
# expected: 200, served by the gateway
```
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# 7.1 — `/cluster/*` proxies to atlas (GREEN)
Phase: 7 — Additional capability prefixes
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [6.5](6.5-cutover.md)
atlas lives in a separate repo, `riotpiao-backend`. It keeps its own informers and its
own RBAC. The gateway proxies to it and holds no Kubernetes credentials of its own —
this is G2, and it is the whole reason cluster-read capability lives behind atlas
rather than in the edge process.
- [ ] `/cluster/*` on `api.riotpiao.com` proxies to the atlas Service
- [ ] The gateway gains no ServiceAccount token, no kubeconfig and no RBAC as part of this. Any authorization decision about cluster data is atlas's, not the gateway's (G2)
- [ ] Path rewriting between the `/cluster` prefix and atlas's own paths is explicit in configuration
- [ ] Connect, read and write timeouts and a body cap are explicit for this route, with no silent defaults (G6)
- [ ] The route requires authentication, and the token is checked for cluster capability — a token minted for queue access must not read cluster state
- [ ] The NetworkPolicy is extended to allow egress to atlas and nothing more
- [ ] `/v1/*` behaviour is byte-identical before and after this route is added — the prefixes cannot collide
- [ ] Metrics and rejection counters cover this route with its own route label
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://api.riotpiao.com/cluster/healthz
# expected: 401 without a token
curl -s -H "authorization: Bearer $CLUSTER_TOKEN" https://api.riotpiao.com/cluster/healthz
# expected: atlas's own response body, proxied unmodified
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -H "authorization: Bearer $QUEUE_ONLY_TOKEN" \
https://api.riotpiao.com/cluster/healthz
# expected: 403 — a queue token does not grant cluster capability
kubectl -n api get pod -l app=homelab-frontend -o jsonpath='{.items[0].spec.serviceAccountName}{"\n"}'
# expected: a ServiceAccount with no RBAC bindings; the gateway still holds no cluster credentials
```
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# 7.2 — `/sqs/*` to kmsvc management-service and Kafka (GREEN)
Phase: 7 — Additional capability prefixes
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [6.5](6.5-cutover.md)
`management-service` already exposes gRPC at `kmsvc.riotpiao.com`. This prefix is a
NEW surface, not a replacement — that gRPC endpoint stays exactly as it is and nothing
here migrates off it.
- [ ] `/sqs/*` on `api.riotpiao.com` proxies to kmsvc `management-service` and the Kafka/Strimzi surfaces in the `sqs` namespace
- [ ] `kmsvc.riotpiao.com` is unchanged and still serving after this lands
- [ ] Which sub-paths map to which upstream is explicit in configuration; there is no catch-all fallback
- [ ] Timeouts and body caps are explicit per sub-route, with no silent defaults (G6)
- [ ] The route requires authentication and the token is checked for queue capability
- [ ] The NetworkPolicy is extended to reach only the named `sqs` upstreams
- [ ] `kmsvc-redis-master.sqs:6379` has NO authentication — `ALLOW_EMPTY_PASSWORD=yes`, TLS off. Any workload with network reach has full unauthenticated read/write. It is not proxied, and the NetworkPolicy must not grant the gateway egress to it
- [ ] `/v1/*` behaviour is unchanged before and after
- [ ] Metrics and rejection counters cover this route with its own route label
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://api.riotpiao.com/sqs/healthz
# expected: 401 without a token
curl -s -H "authorization: Bearer $QUEUE_TOKEN" https://api.riotpiao.com/sqs/healthz
# expected: management-service's own response, proxied unmodified
kubectl -n api get networkpolicy -o yaml | grep -c 6379
# expected: 0 — no egress path from the gateway to unauthenticated Redis
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://kmsvc.riotpiao.com
# expected: unchanged from before this task — the existing gRPC surface is untouched
```
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# 7.3 — `/workflow/*` to Temporal (GREEN)
Phase: 7 — Additional capability prefixes
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [6.5](6.5-cutover.md)
Temporal runs in the `temporal` namespace. Temporal namespace registration is
automatic via queue-operator and is NEVER done manually — this route must not create,
register or mutate Temporal namespaces, only proxy to what queue-operator has already
provisioned.
- [ ] `/workflow/*` on `api.riotpiao.com` proxies to the Temporal Service in the `temporal` namespace
- [ ] Nothing in this route registers a Temporal namespace. Registration stays with queue-operator
- [ ] Path rewriting between the `/workflow` prefix and Temporal's own paths is explicit in configuration
- [ ] Timeouts and body caps are explicit, with no silent defaults (G6). Long-poll semantics are accounted for rather than truncated by a short read timeout
- [ ] The route requires authentication and the token is checked for workflow capability — a GPU token must not drive workflows
- [ ] The NetworkPolicy is extended to reach only Temporal
- [ ] Streaming or long-poll responses pass through unbuffered, and a client disconnect cancels the upstream call rather than orphaning it (G4)
- [ ] `/v1/*` behaviour is unchanged before and after
- [ ] Metrics and rejection counters cover this route with its own route label
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://api.riotpiao.com/workflow/health
# expected: 401 without a token
curl -s -H "authorization: Bearer $WORKFLOW_TOKEN" https://api.riotpiao.com/workflow/health
# expected: Temporal's own response, proxied unmodified
kubectl -n temporal exec svc/temporal-admintools -- tctl --ad temporal-frontend:7233 namespace list | sort > /tmp/ns.after
diff /tmp/ns.before /tmp/ns.after
# expected: no diff — the gateway registered nothing; queue-operator remains the only registrar
```
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# 7.4 — `/db/*` read surfaces (GREEN)
Phase: 7 — Additional capability prefixes
Stage: GREEN
Depends on: [6.5](6.5-cutover.md)
The most dangerous prefix in this phase. G2 says the gateway holds no cluster
credentials — so it cannot be the thing that authenticates to CloudNativePG, MinIO or
Prometheus on a caller's behalf. If designing this route makes you want to give the
gateway a secret, the design is wrong: put the credential-holding logic in a service
behind the gateway and proxy to that.
- [ ] `/db/*` on `api.riotpiao.com` exposes read surfaces backed by CloudNativePG, MinIO and monitoring
- [ ] The gateway holds no database password, no MinIO access key and no cluster credential of any kind (G2). Credentials, if any are needed, live in the service being proxied to
- [ ] Exposed operations are read-only. There is no write, no delete and no schema-changing path on this prefix
- [ ] Which sub-paths reach which upstream is enumerated explicitly in configuration. No catch-all, no pass-through of arbitrary query text
- [ ] Timeouts and body caps are explicit per sub-route, with no silent defaults (G6)
- [ ] The route requires authentication and the token is checked for a distinct read capability
- [ ] Result sets are paginated with a bounded page size; an unbounded read cannot be requested
- [ ] The NetworkPolicy is extended only to the specific upstreams reached. Note `prometheus-operated.monitoring` is headless with ClusterIP `None`, so it needs a pod selector, not a ClusterIP
- [ ] `/v1/*` behaviour is unchanged before and after
- [ ] Metrics and rejection counters cover this route with its own route label
## Verify
```bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://api.riotpiao.com/db/healthz
# expected: 401 without a token
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X DELETE -H "authorization: Bearer $DB_READ_TOKEN" \
https://api.riotpiao.com/db/anything
# expected: 405 or 404 — no mutating method is routable on this prefix
kubectl -n api get pod -l app=homelab-frontend -o jsonpath='{range .items[0].spec.containers[0].env[*]}{.name}{"\n"}{end}' \
| grep -Ei 'password|secret|access_key'
# expected: no output — the gateway carries no database or object-store credentials
curl -s -H "authorization: Bearer $DB_READ_TOKEN" 'https://api.riotpiao.com/db/...?limit=100000' \
| python3 -c "import json,sys;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(len(d['items']))"
# expected: capped at the configured maximum page size, not 100000
```
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# Agent prompt template
Every task is worked by an agent starting from **zero context**. No memory of prior
tasks, no conversation history, no assumptions about what already exists.
This is deliberate. Task files are written to be self-contained precisely so that a
fresh agent can pick any one of them up. It also means a task that cannot be completed
from its own file plus this prompt is a task that is under-specified — that is a bug in
the task, and worth reporting rather than working around.
Rendered and invoked by [`scripts/run-task.sh`](../scripts/run-task.sh). Do not paste
this by hand; use the script so the fresh-session guarantee actually holds.
---
## Template
`{{TASK_ID}}` and `{{TASK_FILE}}` are substituted by the runner.
```
You are implementing one task in the homelab-frontend repository: a Go API gateway
that replaces Kong OSS on api.riotpiao.com.
You are starting from zero context. Everything you need is below or in the files named
below. Do not assume any prior work exists beyond what you find in the repository.
## Your task
Read tasks/{{TASK_FILE}} and implement it. That file states what must be true; it does
not state how. The design is yours to reason out. The checkboxes are the contract.
## Before writing code
1. Read tasks/{{TASK_FILE}} in full.
2. Check its `Depends on:` line. If a dependency is not yet implemented in this
repository, stop and report that instead of building it yourself. One task per run.
3. Look at how the surrounding code is written and match it. If the repository is
still empty, you are establishing the conventions, so choose carefully.
## Invariants — breaking one of these is a design change, not a detail
G1 ingress-nginx owns TLS. The gateway never terminates TLS.
G2 The gateway holds no Kubernetes credentials. Config comes from git, not a CRD.
G3 Public surfaces use standard protocol shapes. If an OpenAI or Anthropic SDK
cannot call it unmodified, the design is wrong.
G4 Streaming is unbuffered, and a client disconnect cancels the upstream request.
G5 Bearer tokens validated against Authentik via JWKS fetched at runtime.
G6 Every timeout, body cap and concurrency limit is explicit in configuration.
G7 Deployment flows through git and Argo. Never run kubectl apply, helm upgrade,
or terraform apply.
## How to work
Test-driven. If the task is marked `Stage: RED`, write the failing test first and
confirm it fails for the right reason before implementing. If `GREEN`, write the
minimum code that passes. If `REFACTOR`, keep the tests green while improving shape.
Go standards for this repository:
- Never discard errors with `_ =`. Wrap them with context.
- Every upstream call carries a context.Context.
- No naked returns. Use `any`, not `interface{}`.
- Table-driven tests with subtests where there is more than one case.
## Definition of done
Run the `## Verify` block from the task file. It must pass.
Then run all three of these regardless of what the task's verify block says:
go test ./... -race
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./...
go vet ./...
`-race` is mandatory. This is a concurrent proxy; a test suite that passes without the
race detector tells you almost nothing. A detected race is a failure, not a warning.
Verification means asserting on a real HTTP response — status, headers, body. "It
compiles" and "it starts" are not verification. If you cannot run the verification
locally with no cluster and no credentials, that is itself a problem to report.
Then **edit tasks/{{TASK_FILE}} and change `- [ ]` to `- [x]`** for each criterion you
actually satisfied. This is a file edit, not something to state in your summary. Leave
unticked anything you did not complete. A summary that claims `[x]` while the file still
reads `[ ]` is a false report.
## Hard rules
- Kong is serving live traffic on api.riotpiao.com right now. Change no cluster state.
- Do not commit or push.
- Do not implement tasks other than {{TASK_ID}}. If you notice something else that
needs doing, report it rather than fixing it.
- Do not add features, abstractions, or configurability that the task did not ask for.
- If the task is ambiguous or appears wrong, stop and say so. Do not guess and proceed.
## Report when finished
- What you implemented, and the files you touched.
- The verification command you ran and its actual output.
- Which checkboxes you ticked and which you did not, with reasons.
- Anything you found that is wrong elsewhere in the repository or the task files.
```
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# Task board — homelab-frontend
The Go API gateway replacing Kong OSS on `api.riotpiao.com`.
Contract: [REQUIREMENTS.md](../REQUIREMENTS.md).
Why: [ADR-0001](../docs/adr/ADR-0001-retire-kong-for-go-gateway.md).
What Kong does today and the cutover order: [docs/MIGRATION-kong.md](../docs/MIGRATION-kong.md).
## Rules carried from the ADR and requirements
- G1 — ingress-nginx owns TLS. The gateway never terminates TLS.
- G2 — the gateway holds no Kubernetes credentials. Config comes from git, not a CRD.
- G3 — public surfaces use standard protocol shapes. If an OpenAI SDK can't call it unmodified, it's wrong.
- G4 — streaming is unbuffered, and a client disconnect cancels the upstream.
- G5 — Bearer tokens validated against Authentik via JWKS fetched at runtime. No pinned keys.
- G6 — every timeout, body cap and concurrency limit is explicit in config.
- G7 — deployment flows through git and Argo. No `kubectl apply`, no `helm upgrade`.
## How to work these
Each task is self-contained — it states what must be true, not how to build it.
Reason out the implementation; the acceptance criteria are the contract.
Stages follow red-green-refactor. A task marked RED means the test comes first and
must fail for the right reason before any implementation exists.
**Verification means asserting on a real HTTP response** — status, headers, body.
"It compiles" and "it starts" are not verification. Every task that touches an API
surface has a `## Verify` block with a runnable command.
Kong is serving live traffic throughout phases 05. Nothing in those phases may
change cluster state.
## Phase 0 — Foundations
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
| [0.1](0.1-module-and-entrypoint.md) | Go module, entrypoint, graceful shutdown |
| [0.2](0.2-route-configuration.md) | Declarative route/upstream config from git, fail-loud validation |
| [0.3](0.3-health-endpoints.md) | `/healthz` and `/readyz` |
| [0.4](0.4-local-dev-harness.md) | Run with no cluster, no kubeconfig, no credentials — stub upstreams |
| [0.5](0.5-structured-logging.md) | Structured logs, no secrets or bodies |
| [0.6](0.6-ci-pipeline.md) | CI: build, vet, test, `govulncheck` |
## Phase 1 — Proxy core
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
| [1.1](1.1-reverse-proxy.md) | Reverse proxy to a configured upstream, connection reuse |
| [1.2](1.2-streaming-passthrough.md) | SSE and chunked responses pass through unbuffered |
| [1.3](1.3-disconnect-propagation.md) | Client disconnect cancels the upstream request |
| [1.4](1.4-per-route-timeouts.md) | Explicit connect/read/write timeouts per route |
| [1.5](1.5-header-hygiene.md) | Hop-by-hop stripping, `X-Forwarded-*` from nginx |
| [1.6](1.6-websocket-upgrade.md) | WebSocket upgrade — `agent-pod/console` needs it |
| [1.7](1.7-body-size-caps.md) | Per-route request body limits |
## Phase 2 — LLM surfaces (`/v1/*` and `/llm/*`)
Two protocol dialects over the same models and the same slot controller. Wire
formats are documented in [docs/API-llm.md](../docs/API-llm.md).
### OpenAI dialect — `/v1/*`
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
| [2.1](2.1-model-registry.md) | Model → upstream map from config |
| [2.2](2.2-body-based-dispatch.md) | `POST /v1/chat/completions` routes on the body's `model` — the reason this project exists |
| [2.3](2.3-unknown-model-errors.md) | Unknown/missing model → RFC 9457 problem+json listing valid values |
| [2.4](2.4-legacy-path-aliases.md) | Keep `/v1/{reasoning,ornith,qwen}/chat/completions` working during cutover |
| [2.5](2.5-models-endpoint.md) | `GET /v1/models` derived from config, never hardcoded |
| [2.6](2.6-embeddings-passthrough.md) | `POST /v1/embeddings` — no rewrite needed |
| [2.7](2.7-rerank-rewrite.md) | `POST /v1/rerank` → upstream `/rerank` |
| [2.8](2.8-kong-parity-test.md) | Gateway and Kong return equivalent responses for every migrated route |
### Anthropic dialect — `/llm/*`
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
| [2.9](2.9-canonical-request-model.md) | Dialect-neutral internal request both surfaces translate into |
| [2.10](2.10-anthropic-request-translation.md) | `POST /llm/v1/messages` request → canonical; `system`, blocks, required `max_tokens` |
| [2.11](2.11-anthropic-response-translation.md) | Upstream response → Messages shape; `reasoning_content` becomes a `thinking` block |
| [2.12](2.12-anthropic-sse-state-machine.md) | Named-event SSE with block indices — the hardest task in the phase |
| [2.13](2.13-anthropic-error-shape.md) | Anthropic error shape, not RFC 9457 — same rejection, two renderings |
| [2.14](2.14-queue-position-event.md) | Custom `event: queue` before `message_start` — deliberate non-standard extension |
| [2.15](2.15-dialect-scope-boundary.md) | Enforce what is deliberately unimplemented: tools, images, caching, batch |
## Phase 3 — Authentication (Authentik)
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
| [3.1](3.1-jwks-fetch-and-rotation.md) | Fetch and cache Authentik JWKS, handle rotation without a runbook |
| [3.2](3.2-bearer-validation.md) | Validate `Authorization: Bearer` — the thing Kong OSS could not do |
| [3.3](3.3-authentik-service-account.md) | Service account + `client_credentials` provider in Authentik |
| [3.4](3.4-flag-gated-rollout.md) | Auth defaults off; enabling it is deliberate |
| [3.5](3.5-capability-authorization.md) | A queue token must not invoke a GPU |
| [3.6](3.6-pi-client-migration.md) | Move pi off the `apikey` header onto Bearer |
## Phase 4 — Limits and budgets
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
| [4.1](4.1-gpu-slot-semaphore.md) | Cap concurrent `reasoning` requests below 8 slots, bounded queue |
| [4.2](4.2-per-caller-budgets.md) | Request budget per identified caller per window |
| [4.3](4.3-problem-json-errors.md) | RFC 9457 rejections with `Retry-After` |
## Phase 5 — Observability
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
| [5.1](5.1-prometheus-parity.md) | Match the retiring Kong plugin: rate, latency, status, bandwidth, upstream health |
| [5.2](5.2-gateway-metrics.md) | In-flight per upstream, queue depth, slot occupancy, rejections by reason |
| [5.3](5.3-servicemonitor.md) | ServiceMonitor so Prometheus scrapes it |
## Phase 6 — Deploy and cutover
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
| [6.1](6.1-hardened-image.md) | Distroless, non-root, read-only rootfs, no shell, SHA tags |
| [6.2](6.2-kubernetes-manifests.md) | Deployment, Service, NetworkPolicy |
| [6.3](6.3-argocd-application.md) | Argo Application in the homelab-root GitOps repo |
| [6.4](6.4-deploy-alongside-kong.md) | Deploy unexposed, verify in-cluster against the real upstreams |
| [6.5](6.5-cutover.md) | Repoint the nginx Ingress from `kong-proxy` to the gateway — reversible |
| [6.6](6.6-kong-teardown.md) | Delete kong Ingresses, plugins, Helm release. **Irreversible** |
## Phase 7 — Additional capability prefixes
Deliberately after cutover. Each is additive and must not disturb `/v1/*`.
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
| [7.1](7.1-cluster-prefix-atlas.md) | `/cluster/*` → atlas (`riotpiao-backend`) |
| [7.2](7.2-sqs-prefix.md) | `/sqs/*` → kmsvc management-service, Kafka |
| [7.3](7.3-workflow-prefix.md) | `/workflow/*` → Temporal |
| [7.4](7.4-db-prefix.md) | `/db/*` → CloudNativePG, MinIO, monitoring reads |
## Progress
Status as of 2026-08-19: scaffolded, nothing implemented. Kong is still serving all
live traffic on `api.riotpiao.com`, currently **unauthenticated**.
50 tasks. Suggested first slice: 0.1 → 0.2 → 0.4 → 1.1 → 1.2 → 2.1 → 2.2. That
reaches the single capability Kong could not provide — body-based model dispatch —
with a verification loop that needs no cluster.
The Anthropic dialect (2.9-2.15) can be worked in parallel with the OpenAI dialect
once 2.9 lands, since both translate into the same canonical request. Do not build
either surface's admission control separately — 4.1 owns it for both.
Decided 2026-08-19: authentication is `Authorization: Bearer` on **both** surfaces.
A stock Anthropic SDK sends `x-api-key` and will get a 401; that is accepted because
the `/llm` client is first-party. The 401 must say so rather than being bare.
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routes:
- name: test-route
upstream:
address: host1.llm-serving:80
connectTimeout: "30s"
readTimeout: "5m"
writeTimeout: "1m"
maxBodySize: 10485760
authRequired: true
- name: test-route
upstream:
address: host2.llm-serving:80
connectTimeout: "30s"
readTimeout: "5m"
writeTimeout: "1m"
maxBodySize: 20971520
authRequired: false
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# Local development harness config. Every upstream points at the single stub
# server started by internal/testsupport, on loopback only — no cluster address,
# no *.riotpiao.com, no credentials. Route names match testdata/config/valid.yaml
# so the same assertions work against either fixture.
routes:
- name: reasoning-chat
upstream:
address: 127.0.0.1:9080
connectTimeout: "10s"
readTimeout: "1h"
writeTimeout: "1h"
maxBodySize: 10485760
authRequired: false
- name: ornith-chat
upstream:
address: 127.0.0.1:9080
connectTimeout: "5s"
readTimeout: "10m"
writeTimeout: "3m"
maxBodySize: 5242880
authRequired: false
- name: embeddings
upstream:
address: 127.0.0.1:9080
connectTimeout: "5s"
readTimeout: "30m"
writeTimeout: "2m"
maxBodySize: 5242880
authRequired: false
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routes:
- name: test-route
upstream:
address: localhost
connectTimeout: "30s"
readTimeout: "5m"
writeTimeout: "1m"
maxBodySize: 10485760
authRequired: true
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routes:
- name: test-route
upstream:
address: test-host.llm-serving:80
connectTimeout: "not-a-duration"
readTimeout: "5m"
writeTimeout: "1m"
maxBodySize: 10485760
authRequired: true

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