package reconcile

import (
	"context"
	"encoding/base64"
	"encoding/json"
	"fmt"

	iamv1 "github.com/riotpiao/key-rotation-controller/api"
	"github.com/riotpiao/key-rotation-controller/internal/zitadel"
)

// MachineKeyProvider rotates a service user's private key.
//
// ZITADEL keeps many keys per service user, and each assertion names its key with
// `kid`. A new key can be created while the deployed key stays valid, so this
// provider retires the old key only after the new one proves itself. Nothing in
// the window is invalid.
type MachineKeyProvider struct {
	// Client talks to the instance that owns the service user.
	Client *zitadel.Client
	// AuthClientID is the API app the controller authenticates as.
	AuthClientID string
	// KeyIDFile and KeyFile name the Secret keys, defaulting to key-id and key.
	KeyIDFile string
	KeyFile   string
}

// Name implements Provider.
func (p *MachineKeyProvider) Name() string { return iamv1.ProviderZitadelMachineKey }

// Strategy implements Provider. Machine keys overlap.
func (p *MachineKeyProvider) Strategy() string { return iamv1.StrategyOverlap }

// Prepare creates a new key. The currently deployed key remains valid.
func (p *MachineKeyProvider) Prepare(ctx context.Context, kr *iamv1.KeyRotation) (*Credential, error) {
	userID := kr.Spec.Target.MachineUserID
	if userID == "" {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("spec.target.machineUserID is required")
	}
	key, err := p.Client.CreateMachineKey(userID)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating a machine key: %w", err)
	}
	fields := map[string][]byte{
		p.keyField(kr):   []byte(key.Key),
		p.keyIDField(kr): []byte(key.KeyID),
	}
	return &Credential{ID: key.KeyID, Fields: fields}, nil
}

// Verify exchanges a token with the new key. A key that cannot obtain a token is
// not deployed as a working credential, whatever the API said.
func (p *MachineKeyProvider) Verify(ctx context.Context, kr *iamv1.KeyRotation, cred *Credential) error {
	keyPEM := cred.Fields[p.keyField(kr)]
	keyID := string(cred.Fields[p.keyIDField(kr)])
	return p.Client.ExchangeMachineKey(
		p.AuthClientID,
		kr.Spec.Target.MachineUserID,
		keyID,
		keyPEM,
		kr.Spec.Verify.AudienceProject,
	)
}

// Retire deletes the superseded key.
func (p *MachineKeyProvider) Retire(ctx context.Context, kr *iamv1.KeyRotation, credentialID string) error {
	return p.Client.DeleteMachineKey(kr.Spec.Target.MachineUserID, credentialID)
}

func (p *MachineKeyProvider) keyField(kr *iamv1.KeyRotation) string {
	if key, ok := kr.Spec.Target.SecretKeys["key"]; ok && key != "" {
		return key
	}
	return "key"
}

func (p *MachineKeyProvider) keyIDField(kr *iamv1.KeyRotation) string {
	if key, ok := kr.Spec.Target.SecretKeys["key-id"]; ok && key != "" {
		return key
	}
	return "key-id"
}

// OIDCClientProvider rotates an app's client secret.
//
// ZITADEL stores exactly one secret per app, so creating the new secret kills the
// old one. The strategy is atomic: publish immediately, roll the consumer, verify,
// and if verification fails, put the previous value back.
type OIDCClientProvider struct {
	Client *zitadel.Client
	// ClientIDFunc maps a KeyRotation to the app's client id, which the
	// introspection endpoint needs.
	ClientIDFunc func(kr *iamv1.KeyRotation) string
	// SecretKey names the Secret key that holds the secret.
	SecretKey string
}

// Name implements Provider.
func (p *OIDCClientProvider) Name() string { return iamv1.ProviderZitadelOIDCClient }

// Strategy implements Provider. Client secrets cannot overlap.
func (p *OIDCClientProvider) Strategy() string { return iamv1.StrategyAtomic }

// Prepare regenerates the client secret.
func (p *OIDCClientProvider) Prepare(ctx context.Context, kr *iamv1.KeyRotation) (*Credential, error) {
	projectID := kr.Spec.Target.ZitadelProjectID
	appID := kr.Spec.Target.ZitadelAppID
	if projectID == "" || appID == "" {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("spec.target.zitadelProjectID and zitadelAppID are required")
	}
	secret, err := p.Client.GenerateClientSecret(projectID, appID)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("generating a client secret: %w", err)
	}
	field := p.secretField(kr)
	// The credential id is the generation marker, not a ZITADEL identifier: the
	// API returns only the value.
	return &Credential{
		ID:     "secret-" + shortHash(secret),
		Fields: map[string][]byte{field: []byte(secret)},
	}, nil
}

// Verify checks the credential against the introspection endpoint.
func (p *OIDCClientProvider) Verify(ctx context.Context, kr *iamv1.KeyRotation, cred *Credential) error {
	if !kr.Spec.Verify.Introspect {
		return nil
	}
	clientID := ""
	if p.ClientIDFunc != nil {
		clientID = p.ClientIDFunc(kr)
	}
	if clientID == "" {
		return fmt.Errorf("no client id configured for introspection")
	}
	return p.Client.Introspect(clientID, string(cred.Fields[p.secretField(kr)]))
}

// Retire is a no-op: an atomic provider has nothing to retire, because the
// provider already invalidated the previous value.
func (p *OIDCClientProvider) Retire(ctx context.Context, kr *iamv1.KeyRotation, credentialID string) error {
	return nil
}

func (p *OIDCClientProvider) secretField(kr *iamv1.KeyRotation) string {
	if p.SecretKey != "" {
		return p.SecretKey
	}
	if key, ok := kr.Spec.Target.SecretKeys["secret"]; ok && key != "" {
		return key
	}
	return "secret"
}

// shortHash gives a stable, non-reversible marker for a secret so status can
// record which generation is live without storing the value.
func shortHash(value string) string {
	sum := 0
	for _, b := range []byte(value) {
		sum = (sum*31 + int(b)) % 100000007
	}
	encoded := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("%d", sum)))
	return encoded
}

// unusedJSON keeps the import set honest if a provider needs raw JSON later.
var _ = json.Marshal