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Author SHA1 Message Date
rock 6d02f59a9b k8s(llm-serving): stop managing the coder InferenceService
coder.yaml requests 2 V100s and never reaches Ready, so it permanently
occupies half the GPU pool. candle-vllm serves the coder model on the
other two cards; the unmanaged predictor starves clef-serve and blocks
its own rollout on every sync.

ArgoCD has prune:false, so this removes management only. The live object
is deleted manually after the sync, otherwise selfHeal recreates it.
2026-11-04 06:07:20 +08:00
rock 6b609eb4c2 revert(cloudflared): do not publish the kube-apiserver at k8s.riotpiao.com (#105)
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-11-03 22:04:28 +00:00
rock cf3223499e feat(cloudflared): publish the kube-apiserver at k8s.riotpiao.com (#88)
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-11-03 21:48:04 +00:00
rock c1477afc92 feat(llm-serving): poimen ingress, 256K coder, and a stable name for the candle-vllm handoff (#90)
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-11-03 21:47:47 +00:00
rock 53e29d4476 chore(llm-serving): park clef-serve to free a V100 for candle-vllm (#91)
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-11-03 21:47:24 +00:00
rock 712bb6589b feat(poimen): restrict the GraphQL server to the memory proxy (#104)
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-11-03 21:38:34 +00:00
rock 9e004ccb9b feat(poimen): restrict the memory database to its own namespace (#103)
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-11-03 21:34:04 +00:00
rock 4e684b2ee2 chore(kyverno): drop the two Application manifests from 00-substrate (#102)
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-11-03 21:33:27 +00:00
rock 13ec9afd32 Merge pull request 'chore(kyverno): remove the never-deployed policy engine' (#100) from chore/remove-kyverno-future-work into main 2026-11-03 21:30:07 +00:00
rock d8bbf122f9 chore(kyverno): remove the never-deployed policy engine
Both ArgoCD Applications reported broken: 'kyverno' Unknown and
'kyverno-policies' OutOfSync/Missing. Neither the namespace nor a single
kyverno pod ever existed, so no policy was enforced and nothing is lost.

Kyverno is future work. Removing the two Applications and the bootstrap
directory keeps the root app from reporting two permanent failures.
2026-11-04 05:29:48 +08:00
rock c8e8b9532d Merge pull request 'fix(gotify): run gotify-db with 2 instances, not 3' (#99) from fix/gotify-db-two-instances into main 2026-11-03 21:24:18 +00:00
rock 1bfe08eeb8 fix(gotify): run gotify-db with 2 instances, not 3
The header of this file always said 2 instances while the spec said 3. The
third never ran: gotify-db-3's volume held a single replica that could not
start, because talos-cp-2 disk2 is at 2.9% free. That left the cluster
permanently in 'Creating a new replica' with one degraded Longhorn volume.

Two replicas on two different nodes is the redundancy that actually exists.
2026-11-04 05:24:09 +08:00
rock 58bf245920 feat(poimen): publish the memory API at api-poimen.riotpiao.com
poimen-memory is a ClusterIP service on :8080, so a local pi session had no
route to the API. This adds an edge Ingress on the same nginx class and the
same Cloudflare-terminated shape as the frontend ingress.

Auth stays ZITADEL JWT (MEM_AUTH_MODE=jwt): a request without a valid bearer
token gets 401, so exposing the route does not expose the data.

Requires one Cloudflare proxied A record: api-poimen.riotpiao.com -> 192.168.1.160
2026-11-04 04:52:11 +08:00
rock d62ac3d861 Merge pull request 'fix(coredns): declare the poimen rewrite in the source of truth' (#98) from chore/retire-comfyui-fully into main 2026-11-03 19:52:20 +00:00
rock 4c3b917e54 fix(coredns): declare the poimen rewrite in the source of truth
poimen.riotpiao.com resolved only because someone edited the live coredns
ConfigMap by hand. Neither terraform/files/coredns/Corefile nor the Talos
machine config carried the line, so the next Talos reconcile would have
deleted it and broken in-cluster resolution of a heavily used service.

Live and source now agree on both hostnames the retirement touched.
2026-11-04 03:51:34 +08:00
rock b45ae269fd Merge pull request 'chore(comfyui): retire the app for good' (#97) from chore/retire-comfyui-fully into main 2026-11-03 19:44:18 +00:00
rock b8f934806e chore(comfyui): retire the app for good
comfyui served nothing and its oauth2-proxy could not start: the Secret
carried only client-secret while the Deployment asked for client-id,
cookie-secret and client-secret. Rather than repair a service nobody used,
remove it from every layer.

Gone:
  - k8s/apps/comfyui/* and its ArgoCD Application
  - the cloudflared tunnel rule for comfyui.riotpiao.com
  - the CoreDNS rewrite in the terraform Corefile (the tracked source)
  - the Cloudflare DNS record (terraform tfvars)
  - the ZITADEL OIDC app and its two rotation tables
  - the KeyRotation object

Not gone by this commit: the comfyui namespace and its 50Gi PVC. ArgoCD does
not own either, so a person deletes both by hand after the prune. The local
cluster-config/talos-*.yaml copies are gitignored; they carry the same
removal and need an apply-config to reach the live CoreDNS.
2026-11-04 03:44:07 +08:00
rock af45e0f3ac fix(key-rotation): read MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET, not client-secret
The rotation wrote a key the tenant never read, so minio restarted into
CreateContainerConfigError. The key name must match the consumer's
secretKeyRef, not a house style.
2026-11-04 03:41:13 +08:00
rock 814f96040f Merge pull request 'fix(forgejo): keep 60Gi storage, revert CPU limit to 1000m' (#96) from fix/forgejo-storage-60gi-cpu-revert into main 2026-11-02 05:43:06 +00:00
rock b7de85e01e fix(forgejo): resolve merge conflict — keep 60Gi, revert CPU to 1000m 2026-11-02 13:42:46 +08:00
rock aa992872cb fix(forgejo): revert CPU limit 3000m->1000m, keep 60Gi storage 2026-11-02 13:40:16 +08:00
rock 1fd5f25932 feat(longhorn): one-shot destructive disk health scan job (#95)
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-11-02 04:32:30 +00:00
rock 8f9bf6ee8d fix(forgejo): raise the shared storage to 60Gi, the registry outgrew 20Gi
The container registry stores blobs on this volume. A single candle-vllm sm_70
image is 14GB, so a 20Gi volume cannot hold one. It filled, and every blob
upload failed:

  Package registry API internal error: 500 write
  /data/tmp/package-upload/<id>: no space left on device

The push client reports that as `received unexpected HTTP status: 500` after
retrying every layer, which reads like a network or auth fault. It is neither.

Applied live first (20Gi -> 40Gi -> 60Gi) and verified: /data now reports
58.9G total with 39.3G free, and the sm70 image pushed and verified by digest
sha256:8533d742dfe99c926f42cf99db33e057acb1aafc4b74b0ac22f697f4a45cba27.

This commit reconciles the chart with the live PVC, which is why the Application
currently reads OutOfSync.

NOTE FOR THE NEXT EXPANSION: Longhorn's admission webhook checks the PHYSICAL
free space of the disk holding each replica, not the thin volume size. A request
for 100Gi was rejected outright:

  disk ... does not have sufficient physical space for expansion:
  physical free space would drop below minimal:
  left=14596177920 < minimal=49931236556

60Gi fit on the same disk. Raise it in steps, and read the webhook message
rather than retrying the same number.
2026-11-01 13:54:17 -07:00
rock ce4434286c fix(forgejo): raise Gitea CPU limit — it was throttled 16% of the time (#93)
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-11-01 03:27:56 +00:00
31 changed files with 487 additions and 646 deletions
-2
View File
@@ -45,8 +45,6 @@ data:
service: https://igotify.riotpiao.com
- hostname: poimen.riotpiao.com
service: https://poimen.riotpiao.com
- hostname: comfyui.riotpiao.com
service: https://comfyui.riotpiao.com
- hostname: forgejo.riotpiao.com
service: https://forgejo.riotpiao.com
# ZITADEL. Without this rule the connector answers 404 for the hostname
-93
View File
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
# ComfyUI — GPU-accelerated image generation on worker-1.
# Uses 1x V100 32GB (sm70). Freed by scaling ornith 2→1.
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: comfyui
namespace: comfyui
labels:
app: comfyui
spec:
# Retired on purpose. This Deployment held the 4th V100 on worker-1 while
# serving nothing: its oauth2-proxy roll-out has been stuck for 42h and
# failing 11621 times, because the Secret comfyui/comfyui-oauth2-proxy carries
# only 1 key while the pod requests client-id, client-secret and
# cookie-secret. Every request was therefore refused, so the card sat at 0%
# utilisation and blocked a GPU that llm-serving can use.
#
# Scaling to 0 is the whole change. The Deployment, the Service, the Ingress
# and the 50Gi comfyui-models PVC all stay, so nothing is lost and no data is
# touched. To bring it back: set replicas to 1 here, then fix the Secret to
# carry all three keys, otherwise the same stuck roll-out returns.
replicas: 0
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app: comfyui
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: comfyui
spec:
nodeSelector:
kubernetes.io/hostname: worker-1
runtimeClassName: nvidia
# k8s Service named 'comfyui' injects COMFYUI_PORT=tcp://... into pod env,
# which clobbers ai-dock's own COMFYUI_PORT variable (expects a port number).
# Disable service link injection to avoid the collision.
enableServiceLinks: false
containers:
- name: comfyui
image: ghcr.io/ai-dock/comfyui:v2-cuda-12.1.1-base-22.04
ports:
- containerPort: 8188
protocol: TCP
env:
- name: NVIDIA_VISIBLE_DEVICES
value: "all"
resources:
requests:
cpu: "4"
memory: 8Gi
nvidia.com/gpu: "1"
limits:
cpu: "8"
memory: 16Gi
nvidia.com/gpu: "1"
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /workspace/ComfyUI/models
name: models
- mountPath: /workspace/ComfyUI/output
name: output
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: 8188
periodSeconds: 10
initialDelaySeconds: 30
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: 8188
failureThreshold: 120
periodSeconds: 10
volumes:
- name: models
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: comfyui-models
- name: output
emptyDir: {}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: comfyui-models
namespace: comfyui
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteOnce
storageClassName: longhorn
resources:
requests:
storage: 50Gi
-38
View File
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: comfyui
namespace: comfyui
annotations:
# No cert-manager annotation and no tls: block. This host is covered by
# the *.riotpiao.com wildcard, which nginx serves as its
# default-ssl-certificate (ingress-nginx/riotpiao-com-tls).
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-read-timeout: "600"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-send-timeout: "600"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size: "0"
# WebSocket support for ComfyUI's live preview
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-http-version: "1.1"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/upstream-hash-by: "$remote_addr"
# Single sign-on. ComfyUI has no auth of its own, so every request is handed to
# oauth2-proxy for an allow or deny decision.
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-url: "http://comfyui-oauth2-proxy.comfyui.svc.cluster.local:4180/oauth2/auth"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-signin: "https://comfyui.riotpiao.com/oauth2/start?rd=$scheme://$host$request_uri"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-response-headers: "x-auth-request-user,x-auth-request-email"
# No configuration-snippet. The controller rejects that annotation as risky
# ("annotation group ConfigurationSnippet contains risky annotation"), and a
# rejected annotation drops the WHOLE ingress from nginx.conf: the host then
# answers 404 with no entry in the access log. ingress-nginx sets the Upgrade
# and Connection headers itself for a websocket upgrade.
spec:
ingressClassName: nginx
rules:
- host: comfyui.riotpiao.com
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: comfyui
port:
number: 80
-8
View File
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- deployment.yaml
- service.yaml
- oauth2-proxy.yaml
- ingress.yaml
-105
View File
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
# ComfyUI has no authentication of its own: comfyui.riotpiao.com is open to anyone
# who can resolve the host. It also has no OIDC support, so ZITADEL cannot be a
# login method inside it. oauth2-proxy is the front door instead: nginx asks it for
# a decision on every request and it answers from a ZITADEL session.
#
# No API client calls this host today, so the whole host is gated. If a client ever
# needs direct access, add a skip rule for the exact paths it uses rather than
# opening the whole host.
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: comfyui-oauth2-proxy
namespace: comfyui
labels:
app: comfyui-oauth2-proxy
spec:
replicas: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
app: comfyui-oauth2-proxy
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: comfyui-oauth2-proxy
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 65534
seccompProfile: {type: RuntimeDefault}
containers:
- name: oauth2-proxy
image: quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.7.1
args:
- --provider=oidc
- --oidc-issuer-url=https://zitadel.riotpiao.com
- --email-domain=*
- --upstream=static://202
- --reverse-proxy=true
- --set-xauthrequest=true
- --cookie-secure=true
- --cookie-expire=12h
- --cookie-refresh=1h
- --skip-provider-button=true
- --redirect-url=https://comfyui.riotpiao.com/oauth2/callback
- --http-address=0.0.0.0:4180
env:
- name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_ID
valueFrom: {secretKeyRef: {name: comfyui-oauth2-proxy, key: client-id}}
- name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_SECRET
valueFrom: {secretKeyRef: {name: comfyui-oauth2-proxy, key: client-secret}}
- name: OAUTH2_PROXY_COOKIE_SECRET
valueFrom: {secretKeyRef: {name: comfyui-oauth2-proxy, key: cookie-secret}}
ports:
- {name: http, containerPort: 4180}
readinessProbe:
httpGet: {path: /ping, port: http}
initialDelaySeconds: 5
livenessProbe:
httpGet: {path: /ping, port: http}
initialDelaySeconds: 15
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities: {drop: ["ALL"]}
resources:
requests: {cpu: 10m, memory: 32Mi}
limits: {cpu: 200m, memory: 128Mi}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: comfyui-oauth2-proxy
namespace: comfyui
labels:
app: comfyui-oauth2-proxy
spec:
type: ClusterIP
selector:
app: comfyui-oauth2-proxy
ports:
- {name: http, port: 4180, targetPort: http}
---
# The login path must NOT be gated: a request to /oauth2/start that itself demands a
# login redirects to /oauth2/start forever. ingress-nginx applies the annotations of
# an ingress to the locations it defines, so a separate object without auth-url keeps
# this path open. The earlier failure of this shape was not the split — it was the
# configuration-snippet on the app ingress, which made the controller drop the whole
# object and left only this one alive.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: comfyui-oauth2
namespace: comfyui
spec:
ingressClassName: nginx
rules:
- host: comfyui.riotpiao.com
http:
paths:
- path: /oauth2
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: comfyui-oauth2-proxy
port:
number: 4180
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: comfyui
namespace: comfyui
labels:
app: comfyui
spec:
selector:
app: comfyui
ports:
- port: 80
targetPort: 8188
protocol: TCP
+5 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,11 @@ metadata:
annotations:
argocd.argoproj.io/sync-options: SkipDryRunOnMissingResource=true
spec:
instances: 3
# 2, not 3. The file's own header always said 2, and the third instance never
# existed as a running pod: its volume only ever held a replica that could not
# start, because talos-cp-2 disk2 has no free space. A third replica on a disk
# that cannot host it is not redundancy, it is a permanent degraded volume.
instances: 2
imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:16.2
bootstrap:
initdb:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ target is one root-of-trust file per thing that cannot rotate itself:
| controller bootstrap key | chicken and egg: it creates every other key |
| etcd defrag credentials | needed by a job that runs outside the controller |
Everything else — Grafana, Argo CD, Forgejo, MinIO, Paperless, Immich, ComfyUI,
Everything else — Grafana, Argo CD, Forgejo, MinIO, Paperless, Immich,
api-gw, Gotify — is a KeyRotation object, and its secret leaves git.
## Status
@@ -64,32 +64,6 @@ spec:
---
apiVersion: iam.homelab.riotpiao.com/v1
kind: KeyRotation
metadata:
name: comfyui
namespace: iam
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: key-rotation
spec:
provider: zitadel-oidc-client
strategy: atomic
intervalHours: 2160
suspend: true
target:
zitadelProjectID: "396757796898471937"
zitadelAppID: "397015743994003854" # app resource id, not the client id 397015744010781070
zitadelClientID: "397015744010781070"
secretName: comfyui-oauth2-proxy
secretNamespace: comfyui
secretKeys:
secret: client-secret
reload: restart
consumers:
- {kind: Deployment, name: comfyui-oauth2-proxy, namespace: comfyui}
verify:
introspect: true
---
apiVersion: iam.homelab.riotpiao.com/v1
kind: KeyRotation
metadata:
name: minio
namespace: iam
@@ -107,7 +81,11 @@ spec:
secretName: minio-oidc
secretNamespace: storage
secretKeys:
secret: client-secret
# The key name here must match the consumer's secretKeyRef, not a house style.
# minio-tenant.yaml reads MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET. While this said
# `client-secret`, the tenant failed with CreateContainerConfigError on every
# restart and the rotation wrote a key nobody read.
secret: MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET
reload: hot
consumers:
- {kind: StatefulSet, name: minio-cluster-az-a, namespace: storage}
+13 -1
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,19 @@ metadata:
app: clef-serve
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: llm-serving
spec:
replicas: 1
# Parked at 0 to free the only V100 that was not serving anything, so candle-vllm can
# run its Phase 0 on one card. All four cards were allocated (coder 2, reasoning 1,
# this 1) and a new GPU workload had nowhere to land.
#
# This is the only GPU consumer in the namespace that is not vLLM, which is why it is
# the first card released: the standing instruction is to keep the vLLM pods healthy
# until candle-vllm answers, and this pod is not one of them.
#
# It was serving nothing. The last 30 log lines at park time were 30/30 kubelet
# /health probes and no inference request since start (2026-10-30T06:23:40Z). Nothing
# in git selects this service. Restore it once the rollout leaves a card free:
# 30B-A3B takes 1, Coder-Next TP=2 takes 2, so card 4 is this one.
replicas: 0
# Recreate, not RollingUpdate. Every GPU card is allocated, so a rolling update leaves
# the new pod Pending forever waiting for a card the old pod still holds.
strategy:
+134
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
apiVersion: serving.kserve.io/v1beta1
kind: InferenceService
metadata:
name: coder
namespace: llm-serving
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: llm-coder
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: llm-serving
annotations:
serving.kserve.io/deploymentMode: RawDeployment
spec:
predictor:
minReplicas: 1
maxReplicas: 1
nodeSelector:
kubernetes.io/hostname: worker-1
# Two GPUs are free, so this rolls out beside `reasoning` instead of over it.
# Recreate still matters for the later swap: a rolling update needs a card the
# old pod holds and would sit Pending forever.
deploymentStrategy:
type: Recreate
containers:
- name: kserve-container
# Pinned to v0.11.0 on purpose. This is the last image measured to work on this
# node: torch 2.8.0+cu128, arch list sm_70..sm_120, driver 580.159.04.
# v0.15.0 was measured and FAILED here: arch list empty, and
# `cudaGetDeviceCount()` raised Error 803 (unsupported driver combination)
# before any model load. Do not raise this tag without re-running that probe.
image: vllm/vllm-openai:v0.11.0@sha256:014a95f21c9edf6abe0aea6b07353f96baa4ec291c427bb1176dc7c93a85845c
args:
# Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-Instruct: 30.5B total, 3.3B active. Architecture is
# Qwen3MoeForCausalLM, the same class as the Qwen3-30B-A3B already serving
# here, so it takes the proven code path on sm70.
#
# Qwen ships this model only as BF16 (61.1 GB) and FP8 (no FP8 on Volta).
# 4-bit GPTQ is the only form that fits one 32 GB card. This checkpoint is a
# community quant: ModelCloud maintains GPTQModel, and the repo is complete
# (config + tokenizer + 4 shards, 16.9 GB). Verified by loading, not by trust.
#
# Qwen3-Coder-Next (80B/3B, the hybrid-attention model) is NOT an option:
# its GatedDeltaNet kernels need compute capability 7.5+ and the `fla` module,
# and sm70 has neither. Measured, not assumed.
- --model=ModelCloud/Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-Instruct-GPTQMODEL-W4A16-A
# `reasoning` stays a served name so an existing client that sends
# model=reasoning keeps working after the DNS rename. vLLM takes the names
# as a space-separated list, so they go in as separate argv items.
- --served-model-name
- coder
- reasoning
- --quantization=gptq
- --dtype=float16
- --kv-cache-dtype=auto
# Native window is 262144 and rope_scaling is null, so 256K needs no YaRN.
# One card cannot hold it: measured KV pool on a single V100 was 132,672
# tokens. TP=2 halves the weights per card (7.8 GiB each), which frees room
# for the larger pool. Measured after boot: see the KV line in the log.
- --max-model-len=262144
- --tensor-parallel-size=2
- --pipeline-parallel-size=1
- --gpu-memory-utilization=0.90
# A single 262,144-token request consumes the whole pool, so keep few slots.
- --max-num-seqs=4
- --max-num-batched-tokens=8192
- --long-prefill-token-threshold=2048
- --enable-chunked-prefill
- --enable-prefix-caching
# Measured: with the default (custom all-reduce ON) the engine finished CUDA graph
# capture in 6s at 17:01:56 and then went silent for 14+ minutes, emitting only
# "No available shared memory broadcast block found in 60 seconds". The front-end
# never received the ready message. vLLM's custom all-reduce registers its own
# CUDA graph addresses and deadlocks on this Volta/PCIe pair. NCCL is the fallback
# and is correct here, because TP=2 across two PCIe V100s gains nothing from the
# custom kernel anyway.
- --disable-custom-all-reduce
- --reasoning-parser=qwen3
- --enable-auto-tool-choice
- --tool-call-parser=hermes
- --host=0.0.0.0
- --port=8080
env:
# Required on this hardware, not tuning:
# - flashinfer's check_cuda_arch raises on compute capability 7.0,
# so the sampler must stay off
# - FlashInfer and FlashAttention-2 need sm75+, so Triton serves attention
- name: VLLM_USE_FLASHINFER_SAMPLER
value: "0"
- name: VLLM_ATTENTION_BACKEND
value: TRITON_ATTN
- name: HF_HOME
value: /mnt/models
ports:
- containerPort: 8080
protocol: TCP
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: 8080
periodSeconds: 10
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: 8080
# TP=2 at 256K needs ~10 min before the API binds: 22s weights, 80s torch.compile,
# 85s KV profiling, then graph capture. 120 x 15s = 30 min of headroom.
failureThreshold: 120
periodSeconds: 15
resources:
# worker-1 exposes only 63,495 MiB of allocatable memory, so a 24Gi request
# never schedules. Two vLLM workers keep the weights on the GPU and need
# little host RAM, so the request stays small and the limit allows burst.
requests:
cpu: "8"
memory: 12Gi
nvidia.com/gpu: "2"
limits:
cpu: "16"
memory: 40Gi
nvidia.com/gpu: "2"
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /mnt/models
name: models
- mountPath: /dev/shm
name: shm
runtimeClassName: nvidia
volumes:
- name: models
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: llm-models
- name: shm
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
# NCCL all-reduce over TP=2 moves through /dev/shm. The 64Mi default is
# too small and shows up as an init hang or a bus error.
sizeLimit: 8Gi
+3 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ resources:
# v0.5.22+, published only on CUDA 13, and CUDA 13 dropped Volta kernels. The model
# instead runs the implementation it ships (joint_schema_model.py) in fp16 on one V100.
- clef-serve.yaml
- reasoning.yaml
# Stable client-facing name for the chat model. poimen-memory points at this Service,
# so the vLLM -> candle-vllm handoff is a selector edit here and no client change.
- reasoning-long-service.yaml
# ornith is retired: its InferenceService still reports Ready=True while running zero
# replicas, because desired equals available at 0. Its manifest was never committed,
# so it is left unmanaged and is not listed here. Delete the CR when convenient.
+15
View File
@@ -66,6 +66,21 @@ spec:
port: 80
- protocol: TCP
port: 8000
# Allow from poimen namespace (poimen-memory ingest + query).
# The client-side egress rule is the other half and must stay in step:
# NetworkPolicy poimen/poimen-memory-llm-egress permits port 8080 to pods
# labelled part-of=llm-serving, which is the same selector used here. This
# policy had no matching ingress rule at all, so the packet was allowed out
# and dropped here. The client then saw a bare timeout and the predictor log
# stayed empty, which is why this failure looked like a hung inference engine
# for 34 days.
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: poimen
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
# Allow intra-namespace (pod-to-pod within llm-serving)
- from:
- podSelector:
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
# qwen2.5:3b-instruct on CPU (talos-cp-2, 144GB RAM, 24 cores).
# Moved off GPU to free a V100 for ComfyUI. Latency ~10x slower
# Moved off GPU to free a V100, first for ComfyUI and later for llm-serving.
# Latency ~10x slower
# than GPU but sufficient for lightweight tasks (summarization,
# classification, quick answers).
apiVersion: apps/v1
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
# Stable client-facing name for the chat model, deliberately decoupled from the
# process that currently serves it.
#
# poimen-memory addresses this Service, not a pod and not an InferenceService. That
# means the vLLM -> candle-vllm handoff changes only this file's selector. The client
# config never changes again, so the ingest cutover has no window in which the host
# name is wrong.
#
# Two ports on purpose:
# - 80 matches every other predictor Service in this namespace, and matches
# poimen-memory's LLM_CHAT_BASE, which carries no port number.
# - 8080 is the container port. It is also the only port llm-serving-ingress and
# poimen-memory-llm-egress permit, and the port the handoff readiness check
# uses. Publishing it directly avoids a port translation that is easy to get
# wrong in a curl.
#
# The selector names the vLLM reasoning pod today. To hand off, replace the three
# selector labels with candle-vllm's pod labels and nothing else. Do not delete and
# recreate this Service: a delete drops the ClusterIP, and a client that cached the
# name during the gap will fail until it re-resolves.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: reasoning-long-predictor
namespace: llm-serving
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/part-of: llm-serving
app: reasoning-long-predictor
spec:
type: ClusterIP
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/name: llm-reasoning
component: predictor
serving.kserve.io/inferenceservice: reasoning
ports:
- name: http
protocol: TCP
port: 80
targetPort: 8080
- name: http-8080
protocol: TCP
port: 8080
targetPort: 8080
+22 -1
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,28 @@ spec:
# Measured on this cluster, one V100-32GB, 64k context: 15.55 GiB of weights,
# 137k tokens of KV cache, 2.09x concurrency at 65536 tokens per request.
- --model=Qwen/Qwen3-30B-A3B-GPTQ-Int4
- --served-model-name=reasoning
# Two served names, one pod, on purpose. `reasoning-long` is the name the goal map
# uses for this model, and the name qwen-finetune wiring targets. It is NOT a
# separate InferenceService: this model already occupies the only free card, and a
# second pod on the same weights cannot schedule (4 of 4 GPUs allocated: coder 2,
# this 1, clef-serve 1). Serving both names from one process costs nothing and
# keeps the two callers working without a second weights copy.
#
# `reasoning` is deliberately still served here. poimen-memory pins
# LLM_CHAT_BASE=reasoning-predictor, so dropping the name here breaks ingest
# immediately. coder-predictor also serves `reasoning`; that ambiguity is known
# and documented in the PR. Resolve it by moving the client host, not by
# removing the name here.
#
# The two names are separate list entries, NOT one comma-joined value. This
# image's parser returns ['reasoning,reasoning-long'] for the comma form, i.e. a
# single model whose name contains a comma, and api_server.py then iterates
# args.served_model_name to build the model list. Verified against vLLM 0.11.0:
# FlexibleArgumentParser().parse_args([... "--served-model-name", "a", "b"])
# -> ['a', 'b']
- --served-model-name
- reasoning
- reasoning-long
- --quantization=gptq
- --dtype=float16
- --kv-cache-dtype=auto
+38
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
---
# Public entry point for the poimen-memory HTTP API.
#
# The API was reachable only inside the cluster (ClusterIP :8080), so a local pi
# session had no way to use it. This Ingress exposes the same handler set the
# in-cluster clients use: /mcp, /memory/*, /graphql, /health, /ready.
#
# Cloudflare terminates TLS in front of the nginx ingress, which is why this rule
# carries no `tls:` section — the same shape as ingress.yaml next to it.
#
# Auth: poimen-memory validates ZITADEL JWTs (MEM_AUTH_MODE=jwt). A caller
# without a valid bearer token gets 401, so exposing the route does not expose
# the data.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: poimen-api
namespace: poimen
annotations:
# MCP calls and ingest can be slow; the provider may stream. Match the
# frontend ingress so a long tool call is not cut at 60s.
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-read-timeout: "3600"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-send-timeout: "3600"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-buffering: "off"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size: "50m"
spec:
ingressClassName: nginx
rules:
- host: api-poimen.riotpiao.com
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: poimen-memory
port:
number: 8080
@@ -6,3 +6,5 @@ kind: Kustomization
# riotpiao-poimen/poimen-frontend.git k8s/ — each repo owns its own k8s.
resources:
- ingress.yaml
# The memory API. Without it a local pi session has no route to :8080.
- api-ingress.yaml
-51
View File
@@ -159,54 +159,3 @@ spec:
automated:
prune: true
selfHeal: true
---
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Application
metadata:
name: kyverno
namespace: argocd
annotations:
argocd.argoproj.io/sync-wave: "0"
spec:
project: homelab
source:
repoURL: https://kyverno.github.io/kyverno/
chart: kyverno
targetRevision: "1.14.0"
helm:
valueFiles:
- $values/k8s/bootstrap/kyverno/kyverno-values.yaml
sources:
- repoURL: https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/riotpiao-poimen/homelab.git
targetRevision: main
ref: values
destination:
server: https://kubernetes.default.svc
namespace: kyverno
syncPolicy:
automated:
prune: true
selfHeal: true
syncOptions:
- CreateNamespace=true
---
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Application
metadata:
name: kyverno-policies
namespace: argocd
annotations:
argocd.argoproj.io/sync-wave: "0"
spec:
project: homelab
source:
repoURL: https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/riotpiao-poimen/homelab.git
targetRevision: main
path: k8s/bootstrap/kyverno
destination:
server: https://kubernetes.default.svc
namespace: kyverno
syncPolicy:
automated:
prune: true
selfHeal: true
-32
View File
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Application
metadata:
name: comfyui
namespace: argocd
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: comfyui
app.kubernetes.io/component: image-generation
annotations:
argocd.argoproj.io/sync-wave: "8"
spec:
project: homelab
revisionHistoryLimit: 3
source:
repoURL: https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/riotpiao-poimen/homelab.git
targetRevision: main
path: k8s/apps/comfyui
destination:
server: https://kubernetes.default.svc
namespace: comfyui
syncPolicy:
automated:
prune: true
selfHeal: true
syncOptions:
- CreateNamespace=true
retry:
limit: 5
backoff:
duration: 5s
factor: 2
maxDuration: 3m
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
namespace: kyverno
resources:
- policies.yaml
-42
View File
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
# Kyverno: Policy engine for Kubernetes image scanning, Pod security, and admission control
# Scan all images, enforce baseline Pod Security Standard, prevent privilege escalation
replicaCount: 1
image:
registry: ghcr.io
repository: kyverno/kyverno
tag: "v1.14.0"
config:
# Webhook timeout for policy evaluation. Increase if scanning takes longer.
webhookTimeoutSeconds: 30
# Failure policy: fail-open (audit/log) vs fail-closed (reject on error)
failurePolicy: fail
# Resource limits for webhook
webhookAnnotations:
rules: "allow"
# Pod security via Kyverno instead of Pod Security Policies (deprecated)
# Enforces baseline restrictions cluster-wide, with exceptions for privileged namespaces
podSecurityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
rbac:
create: true
resources:
requests:
memory: "256Mi"
cpu: "100m"
limits:
memory: "512Mi"
cpu: "500m"
# Webhook configuration
webhook:
timeoutSeconds: 30
# Failure policy: "Fail" (reject on error) or "Ignore" (audit-only)
# Set to "Ignore" for initial testing, then change to "Fail"
failurePolicy: ignore
-204
View File
@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
# Kyverno ClusterPolicies: Image scanning, Pod security, and admission control
---
# Policy 1: Require non-root containers
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: require-non-root
namespace: kyverno
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit # audit first, then change to enforce
rules:
- name: check-runAsNonRoot
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
selector:
matchLabels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: "!privileged"
validate:
message: "Container must not run as root"
pattern:
spec:
containers:
- securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
---
# Policy 2: Drop all Linux capabilities, add only required ones
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: require-dropped-caps
namespace: kyverno
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit
rules:
- name: drop-all-capabilities
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
selector:
matchLabels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: "!privileged"
validate:
message: "All Linux capabilities must be dropped"
pattern:
spec:
containers:
- securityContext:
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
---
# Policy 3: Require image tags (no 'latest')
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: disallow-latest-tag
namespace: kyverno
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit # Change to enforce after testing
rules:
- name: disallow-latest
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
- Deployment
- StatefulSet
- DaemonSet
- Job
validate:
message: "Image tag 'latest' is not allowed. Use explicit version tags."
pattern:
spec:
=(template):
spec:
containers:
- image: "!*:latest"
=(initContainers):
- image: "!*:latest"
---
# Policy 4: Restrict images to trusted registries
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: restrict-registries
namespace: kyverno
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit
rules:
- name: trusted-registries
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
- Deployment
- StatefulSet
- DaemonSet
- Job
selector:
matchLabels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: "!privileged"
validate:
message: "Images must come from trusted registries: docker.io, ghcr.io, quay.io, k8s.gcr.io, registry.k8s.io, or internal forgejo registry"
pattern:
spec:
=(template):
spec:
containers:
- image: "docker.io/* | ghcr.io/* | quay.io/* | k8s.gcr.io/* | registry.k8s.io/* | forgejo.riotpiao.com/* | *"
---
# Policy 5: Require read-only root filesystem (audit only, exceptions for apps that need writes)
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: require-readonly-filesystem
namespace: kyverno
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit
rules:
- name: check-readOnlyRootFilesystem
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
selector:
matchLabels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: "!privileged"
validate:
message: "Root filesystem should be read-only for defense-in-depth"
pattern:
spec:
containers:
- securityContext:
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
---
# Policy 6: Require resource requests and limits (prevent resource starvation)
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: require-resource-limits
namespace: kyverno
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit
rules:
- name: check-resources
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
- Deployment
- StatefulSet
- DaemonSet
excludeResources:
namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: "kyverno|kube-system|kube-node-lease"
validate:
message: "CPU and memory requests and limits are required"
pattern:
spec:
=(template):
spec:
containers:
- resources:
requests:
memory: "?*"
cpu: "?*"
limits:
memory: "?*"
cpu: "?*"
---
# Policy 7: Require securityContext on all containers
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: require-security-context
namespace: kyverno
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit
rules:
- name: check-securityContext
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
selector:
matchLabels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: "!privileged"
validate:
message: "securityContext must be defined"
pattern:
spec:
containers:
- securityContext: {}
@@ -97,10 +97,25 @@ gitea:
# USER and PASSWD injected via env vars below (GITEA__MAILER__USER, GITEA__MAILER__PASSWD)
# Persistence (shared storage for repos)
#
# 60Gi, not the original 20Gi. The container registry stores its blobs here,
# and a single candle-vllm sm_70 image is 14GB uncompressed. At 20Gi the volume
# filled, and every blob upload failed with:
# Package registry API internal error: 500 write /data/tmp/package-upload/...:
# no space left on device
# The push client surfaces that as a bare `received unexpected HTTP status: 500`
# after retrying every layer, which looks like a network fault and is not one.
#
# Note for whoever expands this again: Longhorn's admission webhook checks the
# PHYSICAL free space of the disk holding each replica, not the thin volume
# size. A request for 100Gi was rejected while the disk had 23.5Gi free:
# disk ... does not have sufficient physical space for expansion:
# physical free space would drop below minimal: left=14596177920 < minimal=49931236556
# 60Gi fit. Raise it in steps and watch the webhook message.
persistence:
enabled: true
storageClass: longhorn
size: 20Gi
size: 60Gi
accessModes:
- ReadWriteOnce
@@ -146,19 +161,19 @@ ingress:
# The database was never the bottleneck. A real action_runner UPDATE measured
# 2.133ms with zero lock waits, so this is CPU starvation in Gitea itself.
#
# requests.cpu rises to 750m because a request below real usage earns the pod
# little scheduling weight during contention. limits.cpu rises to 3000m
# because diff computation is bursty and needs room to run without throttling.
# requests.cpu stays 200m and limits.cpu stays 1000m. The 3000m limit was a
# temporary measure while the Actions stall was diagnosed; the real fix landed
# elsewhere, so the limit is back to the original.
#
# Caution: this pod runs on talos-cp-3, a control-plane node. 3000m is 25% of
# that node's 11950m allocatable CPU. If Gitea sustains near this limit, move
# the workload off the control plane rather than raising the limit again.
# Caution: this pod runs on talos-cp-3, a control-plane node. If Gitea
# throttles again at 1000m, move the workload off the control plane rather
# than raising the limit.
resources:
requests:
cpu: 750m
cpu: 200m
memory: 768Mi
limits:
cpu: 3000m
cpu: 1000m
memory: 2Gi
# Tolerations for control-plane
+90
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
# One-shot destructive health scan of a candidate Longhorn disk.
#
# WHY THIS IS A MANUAL JOB AND NOT AN ARGOCD HOOK
# It writes over the entire raw device. An ArgoCD PostSync hook would run it
# on every sync and destroy whatever the volume holds. Apply it by hand,
# once, on a disk that has no partitions and no mounts.
#
# WHY NOT TALOS
# Talos declares disks by mounting them (machine.disks in the machine
# config). It has no primitive for "run this command on the host", so a scan
# cannot live in the Talos config. This Job is the IaC-correct home.
#
# ORDER OF OPERATIONS
# 1. Scan the raw device with this Job <- the disk must be UNMOUNTED
# 2. If it passes, add the disk to terraform.tfvars.local `longhorn_disks`
# with device /dev/disk/by-id/<wwid> and run `make apply-cp`
# 3. Register it with Longhorn via the pattern in longhorn-add-disks-job.yaml
#
# What it does
# fio writes a CRC32C-verified pattern across the whole device, then reads
# every block back and compares. Any unreadable or mismatched sector fails
# the Job. This is a full write and read pass, not a sample.
#
# Expected duration
# 2 TB on a 5400 rpm 2.5" drive at roughly 90 MB/s is about 6 h to write and
# 6 h to verify. Budget 12 hours. Check progress with:
# kubectl -n llm-io logs job/disk-scan-cp1-sdb -f
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: disk-scan-cp1-sdb
namespace: llm-io
labels:
app: disk-scan
spec:
backoffLimit: 0
# Do not let a stuck scan retry silently.
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: disk-scan
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
nodeSelector:
kubernetes.io/hostname: talos-cp-1
containers:
- name: scan
image: ubuntu:22.04
securityContext:
privileged: true
command:
- /bin/bash
- -c
- |
set -euo pipefail
apt-get update -qq
apt-get install -y -qq smartmontools fio
echo "=== device identity ==="
smartctl -i /dev/sdb | tail -12
echo "=== SMART before ==="
smartctl -H /dev/sdb | tail -2
echo "=== full write + verify (destructive) ==="
fio --name=devverify \
--filename=/dev/sdb \
--rw=write \
--bs=1M \
--iodepth=4 \
--ioengine=libaio \
--direct=1 \
--verify=crc32c \
--do_verify=1 \
--verify_fatal=1 \
--eta=always \
--output-format=normal
echo "=== SMART after ==="
smartctl -H /dev/sdb | tail -2
smartctl -A /dev/sdb | awk '/Reallocated_Sector|Current_Pending|Offline_Uncorrect|UDMA_CRC/{print " "$0}'
echo "=== SCAN PASSED ==="
volumeMounts:
- name: dev
mountPath: /dev
volumes:
- name: dev
hostPath:
path: /dev
+28
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
---
# Keep the GraphQL server reachable only from the one service that proxies it.
#
# poimen-graphql is already off the internet: its Service is ClusterIP on 8090 and
# no Ingress names it. What it lacked is in-cluster isolation — a ClusterIP answers
# every pod in the cluster.
#
# The only caller is poimen-memory, whose /graphql route forwards the request body
# to MEM_GQL_PORT (8090). No other workload references this service.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: poimen-graphql-ingress
namespace: poimen
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: poimen-graphql
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: poimen-memory
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8090
+4
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ kind: Kustomization
# deployments (wave 0) are applied.
resources:
- memory-db.yaml
# ClusterIP alone is not isolation: every pod in the cluster can reach it.
- memory-db-netpol.yaml
# Only poimen-memory's /graphql proxy calls 8090.
- graphql-netpol.yaml
- poimen-sandbox-namespace.yaml
- poimen-sandbox-quota.yaml
- pi-session-netpol.yaml
+42
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
---
# Keep the memory database reachable only from inside its own namespace.
#
# What this does NOT change: the database was already unreachable from the
# internet. `memory-db-rw`, `memory-db-ro` and `memory-db-r` are ClusterIP
# services, no Ingress backs them, and no public DNS name resolves to them.
#
# What it fixes: a ClusterIP service is reachable by EVERY pod in the cluster,
# because Kubernetes has no implicit isolation. Cilium enforces NetworkPolicy, so
# stating the allowed sources is what turns "not on the internet" into "not
# reachable from another tenant's namespace".
#
# Two sources, both required:
# - the poimen namespace, which holds every client: poimen-memory, poimen-graphql,
# poimen-worker, poimen-workflows and the migration Job.
# - cnpg-system, where the CloudNativePG operator lives. It connects to the
# instance for switchover and failover, so a narrower rule breaks recovery.
#
# No other port is opened. The operator's metrics endpoint stays closed because no
# PodMonitor for this cluster exists, so nothing scrapes it.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: memory-db-ingress
namespace: poimen
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
cnpg.io/cluster: memory-db
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: poimen
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: cnpg-system
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 5432
-1
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ ISSUER = "https://zitadel.riotpiao.com"
APPS = [
("grafana", "grafana", "grafana-oidc", "logging", "GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET", "deploy", "grafana"),
("argocd", "argocd", "oidc-secret", "argocd", "client-secret", "deploy", "argocd-server"),
("comfyui", "comfyui", "comfyui-oauth2-proxy", "comfyui", "client-secret", "deploy", "comfyui-oauth2-proxy"),
("minio", "minio", "minio-oidc", "storage", "MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET", "sts", "minio-cluster-az-a"),
("paperless", "paperless", "paperless-oidc", "paperless", "client-secret", "deploy", "paperless"),
("immich", "immich", "immich-oidc", "immich", "client-secret", "deploy", "immich-server"),
+12 -6
View File
@@ -128,11 +128,6 @@ OIDC_APPS = {
"https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/user/oauth2/zitadel/callback",
"http://localhost:3000/user/oauth2/authentik/callback",
"https://forgejo.riotpiao.com/user/oauth2/authentik/callback"]},
# ComfyUI has no native OIDC. oauth2-proxy is its front door and this app is
# the proxy's client, so the callback path belongs to the proxy.
"comfyui": {**_WEB, "redirect_uris": [
"http://localhost:4180/oauth2/callback",
"https://comfyui.riotpiao.com/oauth2/callback"]},
"grafana": {**_WEB, "redirect_uris": [
"http://localhost:3000/login/generic_oauth",
"https://grafana.riotpiao.com/login/generic_oauth"]},
@@ -143,7 +138,11 @@ OIDC_APPS = {
"http://localhost:8000", "http://localhost:18000"]},
"minio": {**_WEB, "redirect_uris": [
"http://localhost:9000/auth/sso/oauth2/code",
"https://minio.riotpiao.com/auth/sso/oauth2/code"]},
"https://minio.riotpiao.com/auth/sso/oauth2/code",
# The MinIO Tenant sets MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_REDIRECT_URI to this value,
# which is NOT the generic /auth/sso/oauth2/code path. Without it ZITADEL
# rejects the authorization request at the redirect step.
"https://minio.riotpiao.com/oauth_callback"]},
"paperless": {**_WEB, "redirect_uris": [
"http://localhost:8000/accounts/oidc/zitadel/login/callback/",
"https://paperless.riotpiao.com/accounts/oidc/zitadel/login/callback/",
@@ -359,6 +358,13 @@ MACHINE_CALLERS = {
"description": "poimen calls api-gateway inference",
"roles": ["llm:inference", "svc-caller"],
},
# paperless-ai is a vendor image: it cannot sign an assertion, so a sidecar mints
# a token with this account and writes it to the file the image already reads.
"paperless-llm": {
"name": "Paperless AI LLM caller",
"description": "paperless-ai calls api-gateway inference through the token vendor",
"roles": ["llm:inference", "svc-caller"],
},
}
+4 -2
View File
@@ -36,8 +36,10 @@
rewrite name paperless.riotpiao.com ingress-nginx-controller.ingress-nginx.svc.cluster.local
rewrite name img.riotpiao.com ingress-nginx-controller.ingress-nginx.svc.cluster.local
rewrite name api.riotpiao.com ingress-nginx-controller.ingress-nginx.svc.cluster.local
rewrite name comfy.riotpiao.com ingress-nginx-controller.ingress-nginx.svc.cluster.local
rewrite name comfyui.riotpiao.com ingress-nginx-controller.ingress-nginx.svc.cluster.local
# poimen ran only in the live ConfigMap, never in this file or the Talos
# machine config. The next Talos reconcile would have deleted it and broken
# in-cluster resolution. Declared here so the source of truth carries it.
rewrite name poimen.riotpiao.com ingress-nginx-controller.ingress-nginx.svc.cluster.local
rewrite name gotify.riotpiao.com ingress-nginx-controller.ingress-nginx.svc.cluster.local
rewrite name pi.riotpiao.com ingress-nginx-controller.ingress-nginx.svc.cluster.local
rewrite name igotify.riotpiao.com ingress-nginx-controller.ingress-nginx.svc.cluster.local