The gateway compares the token audience with its allow-list of client ids. The scope
carried urn:zitadel:iam:org:project🆔<project>:aud, so every token said
aud = [396757796898471937] and the gateway answered
token validation failed: audience not allowed: [396757796898471937]
With plain openid the audience is the machine user, which is the entry that exists on
the list.
A Secret volume is owned by root and the sidecar runs as 65532, so defaultMode 0400
left it unable to open /var/run/llm-key/key: the container restarted with
'permission denied' on every start and never minted a token.
Set mode 0440 and give the pod fsGroup 65532, so the group that owns the volume can
read the key while nothing else on the host can.
The init container fetched a token once at pod start with a client_credentials grant
against a web app. A web app has no such grant, so the fetch could not work; and a
token fetched once is dead within the hour while the pod runs for weeks.
llm-token-vendor runs beside the app. It signs a machine-key assertion for the
paperless-llm service account, exchanges it for a token, and rewrites
/app/data/llm_token.txt atomically at 80% of the token lifetime. The vendor image
keeps using CUSTOM_API_KEY_FILE, so it needs no change and no OIDC support.
The key is re-read on every mint, so a rotation lands without a restart: publish the
new key, the next mint uses it, retire the old one.
paperless-llm is a separate service account from poimen-llm, so revoking one caller
leaves the other working.
- Add ConfigMap with production paperless-ai config
- Mount .env config file for app startup
- Enable auto-tagging, correspondent extraction, document type detection
- Set LLM API endpoint and token file location
- Configure 60s scan interval for document processing
- Remove hardcoded client secret from init container
- Reference secret from paperless-ai-config (SOPS-encrypted)
- Init container reads LLM_AUTH_CLIENT_SECRET env var
- Secret key must be added to k8s/argocd/secrets/paperless-ai-secrets.enc.yaml
by someone with SOPS/age key access
This removes the plaintext secret from commit history and future
deployments will source it securely from the encrypted Secret.
- Add paperless namespace to llm-serving NetworkPolicy ingress
- Point paperless-ai CUSTOM_BASE_URL to reasoning-predictor directly
- Gateway JWT auth not yet available for service accounts
- paperless-ai-agent has llm:inference role in Authentik
Required by paperless-ai to find its own user ID for scanning.
Without this, scanning aborts with "Failed to get own user ID".Reviewed-on: #45
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
- paperless-ai deployment using clusterzx/paperless-ai
- LLM via local api-gateway (reasoning model, no auth - phase 3 pending)
- Paperless API token SOPS-encrypted
- Auto-tags new documents, 5min scan interval
- Adds 'ai-processed' tag to classified documents
rock