Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
rock 7b7499c689 feat(poimen): restrict the memory database to its own namespace
The database was already off the internet: every memory-db service is ClusterIP,
no Ingress backs one, and no public DNS name resolves to them.

That is not isolation. A ClusterIP service answers every pod in the cluster, so
any workload in any namespace could open 5432. Cilium enforces NetworkPolicy, so
stating the allowed sources is what closes it.

Two sources:
- namespace poimen, which holds every client (poimen-memory, poimen-graphql,
  poimen-worker, poimen-workflows, the migration Job)
- namespace cnpg-system, where the CloudNativePG operator connects for switchover
  and failover

Port 5432 only. The operator metrics port stays closed because no PodMonitor for
this cluster exists.
2026-11-04 05:33:56 +08:00
rock b6e317b34c feat(poimen): pi sandbox workspace volume, encrypted api keys, cluster dns rewrite (#54)
Adds the pi coding-agent sandbox's cluster side:
- `k8s/infra/poimen/pi-agent-workspace-pv.yaml` — static hostPath PV + PVC for the sandbox /workspace (Longhorn cannot attach new volumes in this cluster; this gives real persistence and survived a pod delete/recreate test: marker file + 38 KB session.jsonl intact, the session answered from its own history afterwards).
- `k8s/argocd/secrets/pi-sandbox-secrets.enc.yaml` — the sandbox's API-key Secret, SOPS-encrypted (recipient from .sops.yaml, payload only: `encrypted_regex ^(data|stringData)$`), registered in the ksops generator. Round-trip verified against the live Secret.
- `terraform/files/coredns/Corefile` — `rewrite name pi.riotpiao.com ingress-nginx-controller...` so the hostname resolves in-cluster.

Note: the keys currently in that Secret are the ones leaked earlier and must be rotated; re-encrypt with `sops -e -i` after rotating.Reviewed-on: #54
Co-authored-by: rock <[email protected]>
2026-10-06 01:49:12 +00:00
rock 8bd40c5152 feat: poimen-sandbox namespace + security hardening + RBAC
Phase 1: sandbox namespace with PSA restricted enforcement,
ResourceQuota (20 pods, 10/20 CPU, 20/40Gi memory), and
CiliumNetworkPolicy denying pi-session egress to kube-apiserver.

Phase 2: sandbox-observer Role + poimen-devs RoleBinding for
OIDC-authenticated kubectl access to sandbox pod status/logs.
2026-09-28 23:15:25 +08:00
rock 227839c27a feat(poimen): consolidate into single multi-source ArgoCD app
- Merge poimen-workflows + poimen-memory + db + frontend into one app
- Delete duplicate apps: poimen-workflows, poimen-memory-app (kubectl done)
- Delete poimen-memory ArgoCD app file (replaced by multi-source source 2)
- Delete poimen-memory-database (replaced by source 3 → k8s/infra/poimen/)
- Move memory-db CNPG cluster to k8s/infra/poimen/ (isolated from other tenants)
- Remove memory-db from k8s/infra/databases/kustomization.yaml
- Add frontend manifests (Deployment, Service, Ingress) to k8s/apps/poimen/
- Add frontend NetworkPolicy: egress to api-gw (api:8080), memory (poimen:8080),
  Gotify (notifications:80), Authentik (iam:9000/9443), DNS (kube-system:53)
- Sync-wave -1 on CNPG cluster ensures DB ready before app pods (wave 0)
- Image updater: workflows + memory + frontend tracked in one annotation block
- poimen-toolkit stays separate (CRD management, independent rollback)
2026-09-28 08:51:31 +08:00