ZITADEL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN and ZITADEL_URL now live in .env and .env.example, the
same shape the Authentik variables use. The line is present and empty: the PAT
does not exist until the chart's setup job creates the iam-admin machine user on
the first sync, so a value cannot be minted ahead of time.
The provisioning script loads .env itself instead of relying on the caller to
source it, and resolves the token in a fixed order: ZITADEL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN,
then the cached file under ~/.config/zitadel, then the cluster Secret. The .env
value wins so a human can paste a rotated token without touching the cluster;
the cluster Secret remains the only source that always reflects a rotation.
.env stays git-ignored. It already holds the live Authentik secrets, and this
change does not move them.
Not exercised against a live instance: the kube-apiserver on talos-cp-1 is in
CrashLoopBackOff, so kubectl only works against cp-2 or cp-3 right now.
scripts/iam/zitadel-provision.py replaces the manual sequence that
provision-rbac.py did for Authentik. Phases: keys, apply, secrets, users,
verify. `all` runs keys -> apply -> secrets -> verify; users stays manual
because the password hash must come from a human, one user at a time.
- keys: extract the chart's iam-admin machine key and PAT to ~/.config/zitadel
at 0600, outside the repo.
- apply: terraform apply terraform/zitadel with the machine key.
- secrets: write generated client secrets into the SOPS files, write client ids
into the plain manifests that carry them, write machine keys per agent.
Requires an exactly-one-match regex before it edits a manifest, prints the
diff without --apply-config, and is a no-op when the value already matches.
- users: import a human user with the Django pbkdf2_sha256 hash converted to the
passwap MCF form ZITADEL accepts.
- verify: discovery endpoint, client count, and it refuses to clear cutover
while the groups-claim action is disabled.
Design points that came out of review:
- Multi-document SOPS files (minio) are rewritten whole, because `sops set`
cannot address one document. sops reads the creation rule from the filename,
so the temp file is passed with --filename-override; without it sops finds no
matching rule and refuses. Ciphertext is staged in the destination directory
and installed with os.replace, so the mode is preserved and EXDEV is
impossible. SIGTERM/SIGINT trigger cleanup of the decrypted temp file.
- homarr is listed as manual: the live workload mounts Secret homarr-oidc, which
no SOPS file in git defines, and the tracked homarr-auth-oidc.enc.yaml has no
consumer. Writing the new secret into the orphan file would report success
while the dashboard kept the old one.
- Secrets never enter argv: curl reads its config from stdin, so the PAT and the
password hash do not appear in ps.
.gitignore: allow this one script through the scripts/iam/*.py ignore rule (it
embeds no credential), and ignore authentik-m2m-tokens.env, which holds live M2M
tokens and was one `git add -A` away from being committed.
Checks: py_compile clean, --help lists every phase, convert_hash verified on a
synthetic hash, the 3-document SOPS rewrite tested on a real copy (3 documents
survive, value set, second run unchanged, mode 644 kept, no temp left), all
three client-id regexes match exactly once, dry-run leaves the manifests
untouched. Reviewer round: BLOCK on the sops creation rule, the orphan homarr
Secret, the missing client-id writes and argv exposure; all fixed and
re-reviewed to SIGN-OFF.
Not run against a live ZITADEL: no instance exists yet.
rock