fix(iam): actually enforce MFA

forceMFA never took effect because of the JSON key. ZITADEL's v1 endpoint speaks
protojson, which accepts "forceMfa" (lowerCamel of force_mfa). The spelling
"forceMFA" is treated as an unknown field and silently dropped, so every earlier
run returned 200 with a new sequence while force_mfa stayed false in
projections.login_policies5.

Send forceMfa and forceMfaLocalOnly. Verified in the database:

  force_mfa = t | force_mfa_local_only = t | mfa_init_skip_lifetime = 0

and in the login flow: after the password step the browser lands on
/ui/login/mfa/prompt with the "2-Factor Setup" page, so a second factor is now
required instead of optional.
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-27 00:14:42 -07:00
parent 6768d1c762
commit cc7c30ee20
+8 -3
View File
@@ -420,15 +420,20 @@ def _ensure_smtp(token: str) -> str:
def _ensure_login_policy(token: str) -> None:
"""Require password + a second factor, and demand enrolment at login.
forceMFA does not persist through the v1 policy endpoint (it reads back
absent), so the effective lever is mfaInitSkipLifetime: 0s, which makes the
login flow require enrolment instead of letting a user skip it for 30 days.
Enforcement needs forceMfa. The v1 endpoint ignores the spelling "forceMFA"
as an unknown field, which is why earlier runs looked successful while
projections.login_policies5 kept force_mfa = false.
Second factors stay OTP and U2F: an authenticator app or a hardware key.
Multi-factor is left configured for U2F with verification so a later step
can move 2FA to 2MFA without another policy change.
"""
code, d = _api("PUT", "/admin/v1/policies/login", token, {
# Case matters: protojson accepts "forceMfa", the lowerCamel form of
# force_mfa. Sending "forceMFA" is silently ignored as an unknown field,
# so the policy looks unchanged and MFA is never enforced.
"forceMfa": True,
"forceMfaLocalOnly": True,
"allowUsernamePassword": True,
"allowRegister": False,
"allowExternalIDP": True,